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Informal lending and borrowing among close acquaintances such as relatives and 
friends have been found to be widely prevalent in the rural areas of developing 
economies, which appears to be a less explored area. This dissertation’s main 
objective is to investigate various pertinent economic issues related with such informal 
financial transactions. Furthermore, the analytical results are empirically investigated 
using household survey data from China and India and using appropriate econometric 
methods and identification strategies.   
As credit rationing in the formal credit market is one of the important factors that 
compel these families to engage in informal lending and borrowing, important issues  
related with this matter has been investigated in detail and useful findings are made.  
The survey data also reveals that the families in these areas face various types of risks 
and uncertainties. In absence of adequate access to credit and insurance arrangements 
often these families enter into mutual risk sharing insurance and credit arrangements.  
It has been observed that in both the countries more than 70 percent and 90 percent 
families have engaged in gift and loan transactions respectively in emergencies. This 
demonstrates that people do share risk on a large scale and moreover preference for 
loan transaction dominates. 
This dissertation makes key contribution in exploring the significance of underlying 
motives for these informal financial transactions. Particularly the significance of 
 various social preferences, apart from risk sharing motive which is exclusively driven 
by the material gain considerations, has been highlighted. Among these the 
investigation of   the fairness reciprocity, in terms of fairness equilibrium framework 
(Rabin, 1993), as an important motive underlying the informal financial transactions 
among relatives and friends, supplements the existing knowledge in this field.  
Analytical results are obtained to explain the informal borrowing and lending as a 
mutual-max fairness equilibrium outcome.  However mixed evidences are obtained for 
mutual-max and mutual-min reciprocity. In totality Rabin’s model of fairness and 
reciprocity when applied to explain the informal lending and borrowing is not 
adequate but this seems to be an excellent starting place to incorporate social 
preferences for explaining the informal lending and borrowing among relatives and 
friends.  
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Chapter 1:  Motivation, Introduction, and Objectives of the 
Dissertation 
 
1.1. Motivation  
The motivation of this dissertation roots in my preliminary discussion with Prof. 
Calum Turvey in the beginning of fall 2007, with an interest to work in the area of 
microfinance and micro insurance. I wrote my policy paper on the issues related to 
health insurance of people in rural areas during my MPA/ID program at Harvard and 
so was keen to expand along those lines.   
As he was working on a survey data from China, he found that more than 60% of the 
households have engaged in borrowing and lending with their family relatives and 
friends. Even such large extent of informal financial transactions may be crowding out 
the borrowing of lending of formal institutions such as banks and rural credit 
cooperatives. Also there may be possibility of crowding out of financial transactions 
handled by microfinance institutions if the underlying forces of informal lending and 
borrowing are quite strong. Some of the related issues are discussed in length in 
Turvey and Kong (2007). 
There is a growing volume of literature on microfinance, but the study of economic 
significance of informal lending in developing economies appears to be a less 
explored area. I found this area of research quite fresh and challenging.   That 
encouraged me to work on the economics of informal lending. And that’s how this 
dissertation started taking shape.  I am thankful to Prof. Turvey for introducing me to 
this field of inquiry. 
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1.2. Introduction  
In order to understand the mechanics of informal lending, it’s essential to first 
understand the fundamentals of credit delivery operations of formal lending 
institutions such as banks and rural credit cooperatives.  Here I was introduced by 
Prof. Turvey to the seminal paper of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) on credit rationing. 
Building on that and researching in this field Chapter 3 presents a detailed discussion 
on credit rationing and presents an illustrative model of credit rationing, which 
generates useful results. Further, using the household survey data from China and 
India (discussed in the next chapter), this analysis helps in understanding the 
significance of various factors that are associated with credit rationing in the formal 
credit market in the rural areas of developing countries. Also this analysis helps in 
estimating the extent of credit rationing in these areas. 
The obvious question is why issues related to credit rationing and informal lending 
should interest us. How the nonavailablility of credit or inadequate access to credit 
affects the livelihood of people. Hence Chapter 4 attempts to analyze the impacts of 
credit rationing on the livelihood of people in the rural areas of developing economies.  
Now the question arises as to how farm households respond to the exigencies of credit 
rationing. It is also well studied that families in rural areas of developing countries 
face various types of risks and uncertainties. Well functioning credit and insurance 
markets usually enable people to face these risks and uncertainties in the developed 
countries. However, as investigated in Chapter 3, it is evident that a large proportion 
of people in the rural areas of developing countries face credit rationing as well as 
limited access to insurance markets. Consrquently they resort to various types of risk 
mitigation mechanisms. It is important to investigate these issues in order to provide 
helpful insights on risk sharing and consumption smoothing motivations and 
mechanisms of these families. These issues are investigated in Chapter 5. The three 
  3
important mechanisms analyzed are – precautionary savings, risk sharing informal 
insurance and credit transactions. The household survey data from China and India 
provide significant inferences on the analytical results.   
Working on these building blocks, it is now the right time to address the issues related 
to the central theme of this dissertation i.e. the economics of informal lending. 
Apparently it is a response mechanism that the credit rationed people resort to satisfy 
their demands of credit needs. Also it may be the preferred way of arranging credits by 
some people. Also chapter 5 highlights the role of risk sharing informal credit 
transactions as one of the risk management mechanisms. Hence Chapter 6 is 
developed to understand the mechanics of such informal lending and borrowing. It 
attempts to analyze the underlying forces that sustain the informal lending practices in 
the rural areas of developing economies. Risk sharing motive has been proposed to be 
one of the important explanations that sustain informal financial transaction among 
relatives and friends.  Pursuing that line of research, a detail analysis of the risk 
sharing motive for informal financial transactions is presented, and useful results are 
obtained. The primary contribution of this chapter is to characterize the loan amount, 
state contingent repayments, and default rates in equilibrium. Also a simple test is 
suggested in the chapter to get inferences on risk sharing motives.  Further, these 
results are empirically tested using household survey data from China and India. 
Significant evidence is obtained that relates to risk sharing motives to explain informal 
lending and borrowing.   
However the risk sharing motive does not include social preferences such as altruism, 
trust, reciprocity and fairness, which seem to be important for these financial 
transactions. At least from a theoretical point of view a major contribution of this 
dissertation is the filling of the gap between theory and observations. Fairness is found 
to be an important motive underlying the informal financial transactions among 
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relatives and friends. This analysis is presented in Chapter 7. Using the fairness 
equilibrium framework proposed by Rabin (1993), important   results are obtained, 
which explain informal borrowing and lending as mutual-max fairness equilibrium 
outcome.  Here outcomes are mutual –max when each person maximizes the other’s 
material payoffs and mutual-min when each person minimizes the other’s payoff. 
Analytical results are obtained to explain the informal borrowing and lending as 
mutual-max fairness equilibrium outcome. These results are empirically tested using 
household survey data from China and India. In these surveys, specific questions were 
asked to respondents that would reveal whether the families have preferences for 
mutual-max or mutual-min social interactions. Overall about 75 percent families in 
China (65 percent in India) demonstrate preferences for mutual-max reciprocation, 
whereas these percentages for mutual-min reciprocation are respectively about 40 
percent and 50 percent for China and India. These findings suggest that mutual-max 
equilibrium is more likely to evolve in the fairness equilibrium context and it may be 
an important explanation of informal loan transactions among friends and relatives. 
These findings supplement our understanding about the underlying motives that can 
explain informal financial transactions among friends and relatives in the rural areas of 
developing countries. 
 In this dissertation analytical results are obtained on the issues discussed above. It is 
imperative to empirically validate these results using suitable household survey data 
and appropriate statistical and econometric methods. For that appropriate survey 
questionnaires were designed and household surveys were conducted in China and 
India. Chapter 2 presents a detailed description of these surveys and also presents 
summary statistics of responses. 
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1.3. Objectives of the Dissertation 
The introduction section summarily describes the conceptualization, development and 
organization of the dissertation. The purpose of this dissertation and the key questions 
which I attempt to investigate in this dissertation are formally mentioned here as 
following.  
 
1.3.1. Chapter 3:  Credit Rationing: A Theoretical and an Empirical Analysis  
Objective 1: Develop an analytical model that can explain both type I and type II 
credit rationing in the formal credit markets of the rural areas in the developing 
countries. This analysis helps in understanding the significance of various factors that 
influence credit rationing of the families in these areas. 
Objective 2: Understand the disaggregated welfare implications of such credit 
rationing.  This will help in understanding, in what manner different types of families 
are affected by such credit rationing. 
Objective 3: Analyze the price responsiveness of loan demand and also understand 
how it is associated with the household assets of a family. The analysis related with 
this objective and objective 2 have important policy implications related with Pareto 
improving interventions in these credit markets. 
Objective 4: Estimate the extent of credit rationing with the help of analytical results 
and by using household survey data from China and India and by employing suitable 
econometric methods. This analysis helps in understanding the severity of credit 
rationing in the formal credit markets of these rural areas and also helps in learning the 
significance of various factors that can explain such credit rationing. 
Objective 5: Investigate the prevalence of information asymmetry in the formal credit 
market of the rural areas of developing Countries. This analysis will help in validating 
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the assumption of prevalence of information asymmetry in the formal credit markets 
of these areas. This asymmetric information framework has been used in Objective 1. 
 
1.3.2. Chapter 4: Impact of Credit Constraints on Livelihood Choices 
Objective 1: Develop an analytical model that can help in understanding the effects of 
credit constraints on agriculture input applications.  
Objective 2: Develop an analytical model that can help in understanding the effects of 
credit constraints on the wage market outcomes for the families living in rural areas of 
the developing countries. 
Objective 3: Analyze the impact of credit constraints on various livelihood choices 
such as, capital investment (physical and human), consumption, leisure, and decision 
to either become an entrepreneur or wage seeker. This analysis has been done using 
dynamic optimization framework. The process of borrowing, investment, outcome, 
consumption, and repayment evolves over time in an individual’s life cycle.  Hence 
learning the dynamics (and steady state equilibrium –if that exists) of these choice 
variables may strengthen our understanding of the influence of borrowing constraints 
on these choices of an individual over her life cycle.  
Objective 4: Using household survey data from China and India, and suitable 
econometric methods; empirically investigate the effects of credit constraints on 
agriculture input applications, food security, and health and educational attainments. 
 
1.3.3. Chapter 5: The Economics of Risk Sharing and Consumption Smoothing  
Objective 1: Analyze the risk sharing and consumption smoothing motivations of the 
families who live in rural areas of the developing countries. This analysis will help in 
understanding the importance of risk sharing and consumption smoothing motives in 
the presence of credit constraints and incomplete insurance markets. 
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Objective 2: Investigate the risk sharing and consumption smoothing mechanisms of 
the families who live in rural areas of the developing countries. The three important 
mechanisms analyzed are – precautionary savings, risk sharing informal insurance and 
credit transactions.  
Objective 3: Using household survey data from China and India, and suitable 
econometric methods; empirically investigate the significance of the variables 
associated with these mechanisms.  
Objective 4: Using household survey data from China and India and the analytical 
results, empirically estimate the willingness of the families to pay for insurance 
coverage (in lieu of a steady income process) as a proportion of their annual income.   
 
1.3.4. Chapter 6: The Economics of Informal Lending and Risk Sharing Motive 
Objective 1: Investigate the significance of informal lending and borrowing among 
friends and relatives in rural areas of the developing countries. This analysis helps in 
understanding the magnitude of informal financial transaction among friends and 
relatives in these areas. 
Objective 2: Develop an analytical framework to investigate the risk sharing and 
consumption smoothing motive that may explain such informal financial transactions. 
This analysis helps in understanding the mechanics of informal financial transactions 
and also helps in characterizing the loan amount, state contingent repayments, and 
default rates in equilibrium.  
Objective 3:  Using household survey data from China and India, and suitable 
econometric methods; empirically investigate the significance of the risk sharing 
motive explaining the informal lending and borrowing among friends and relatives. 
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1.3.5. Chapter 7: The Economics of Informal Lending and Fairness Motive 
Objective 1: Risk sharing motive does not include social preferences such as altruism, 
trust, reciprocity and fairness, which seem to be important for these financial 
transactions. A growing body of evidence in literature suggests that people are also 
strongly motivated by these social preferences which can not be ignored in social 
interactions1.  Hence it is important to understand the significance of these social 
preferences that may supplement our understanding of the underlying motives that 
sustain the informal financial transactions among relatives and friends in rural areas of 
the developing countries. 
Objective 2:  Develop an analytical model using fairness equilibrium framework 
proposed by Rabin (1993) to explain the fairness reciprocity as an important motive 
underlying the informal financial transactions among relatives and friends. Here 
outcomes are mutual –max when each person maximizes the other’s material payoffs 
and mutual-min when each person minimizes the other’s payoff. And hence if mutual-
max equilibrium dominates the mutual-min equilibrium, then fairness can be advanced 
as an important motive for explaining such informal financial transactions. Informal 
borrowing and lending can be explained as mutual-max fairness equilibrium outcome.  
Objective 3: Using household survey data from China and India and suitable 
econometric methods and appropriate identification strategies, empirically investigate 
the results related to fairness reciprocation (mutual-max and mutual-min) motives and 
informal lending and borrowing.   In the survey conducted in India and China, specific 
questions were asked to families that would reveal whether the families have 
preferences for mutual-max or mutual-min social interactions.  
 
 
                                                 
1 For a good review see Fehr and Schimdt (2006) 
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Chapter 2:  Description of the Household Surveys of China and India 
 
Household surveys were conducted in rural areas of China (in years 2007 and 2008) 
and India (in year 2008-09). About 1550 families in China and 400 families in India 
were surveyed. The survey questionnaires were designed to elicit responses of families 
related to; (i) the credit rationing problems which they face, (ii) how credit rationing 
affects their livelihood choices, (iii) how they respond to overcome this problem, and 
(iv) the extent, types and motives for informal financial transactions among friends 
and relatives.    
The chapter is organized as following. Section 1 describes the design process of 
survey questionnaires and presents a brief discussion on the types and relevancy of the 
questions. Section 2 presents a brief discussion on the field implementation of survey 
in China and India. Section 3 presents summary statistics of responses of the heads of 
the households on the questions as discussed in section 1.  
 
2.1. Design of Survey Questionnaires 
The survey consisted of several parts. The questions are designed to elicit most 
appropriate responses of the head of the households that will help in empirically 
validating the results and hypotheses of various chapters of this dissertation. As 
discussed in the Chapter 1 the important objectives of this dissertation are -   
(i) To investigate the issues related to the need and availability of credits for the 
families, in the rural areas of developing countries, from formal credits markets 
(Banks and Rural Credit Cooperatives). Important objectives here are to 
understand the significance of various market conditions and variables that can 
explain the credit rationing phenomenon and estimate the extent of credit rationing 
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in these areas.  Also this dissertation aspires to get inferences on the prevalence of 
information asymmetry in these credit markets. 
(ii) To understand how the credit rationing problem affects various livelihood choices 
of the families such as, agricultural input applications, wage market outcomes, 
accumulation of physical capital and human capital, choices for preferred 
profession etc. 
(iii)To understand the importance of various types of risks and uncertainties faced by 
these families and the measures they take to mitigate the effects of these risks and 
uncertainties. Various measures studied are; precautionary savings, risk sharing 
with other villagers, and informal lending and borrowing among friends and 
relatives. 
(iv) To analyze the significance of underlying motives for informal lending and 
borrowing by these families among relatives and friends. One motive that is 
widely studied is risk sharing motive. This dissertation also wants to investigate 
the important issues related with the risk sharing motive. 
(v) Further this dissertation proposes the fairness motive (Rabin, 1993) to supplement 
the explanation of informal borrowing and lending among relatives and friends in 
these areas.  
Essentially the survey questions try to get most appropriate responses of the head of 
households in a most easy and accessible manner. The survey questions are designed 
under the close supervision and guidance of Prof. Calum Turvey. This has also 
benefited from the useful suggestions of Prof. David Just and Prof. Vicki Bogan and 
Professor Rong Kong of the Northwest Agricultural and Forestry University in 
Yangling, China.  The survey questions are broadly categorized into important 
sections, which are described as following. The English version, Chinese version, and 
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Oriya version of the survey are enclosed in Annexure 1, Annexure 2, and Annexure 3 
respectively.  
 
2.1.1 Demographic and Socio- economic Information 
The Questions, numbered from 0 to 10 provide information on important demographic 
and socio- economic variables such as, sex and age of the head of household, family 
size, educational attainment of the family members, household farm size, five 
important crops cultivated and income from farming,   household income, any major 
sickness in the family etc. Question 27 provides information on household assets. 
These variables are used as explanatory and control variables in most of the 
estimations.  
 
2.1.2 Sources of Risk and Risk Perceptions 
The questions, numbered from 11 to 23 provide information on various types of risks 
and uncertainties faced by these families and various measures they take to mitigate 
these risks and uncertainties. Important among these include, Information on 
uncertainties in crop yields and crop prices, rainfall variations, temperature variations, 
various risk management options, availability of crop insurance and willingness to buy 
crop insurance and other insurance products, and willingness to adopt new 
technologies and management practices in farming. These variables give an idea on 
volatility of income of these families and the extent of willingness to pay for premium 
to make the income steady, but are not used extensively in this study. 
 
2.1.3 Information on Household Debt 
The questions, numbered from 24 to 41 provide information on important features of 
the household debt. Important among these include, amount of debt, composition of 
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debt source wise, use of the credit for various purposes, perception on the heaviness of 
debt level, interest rates charged by different institutions, denial of credit by banks or 
rural cooperatives, reasons for such denials, delay or default in repayments, degree of 
flexibility of repayment terms of loans belonging to different sources. These variables 
give important information on credit availability, credit rationing, credit usage, and 
repayments of loans. 
 
2.1.4 Information on Trust and Guilt motives 
The questions, numbered from 42 to 55 provide information on the motives related to 
trust perceptions in financial transaction with various sources such as, banks, rural 
cooperatives, relatives, friends and moneylenders and also related to guilty feelings on 
defaulting  on repayment of loans. These variables are used as control variables in the 
estimations related to risk sharing motive and fairness motive explanation for informal 
borrowing and lending among relatives and friends. 
 
2.1.5 Information on Precautionary Savings   
The questions 57 and 58 provide information on savings and response to savings to 
reduction in uncertainty of income process. These variables are used to analyze the 
precautionary motives of saving for risk management and also control variables in 
other estimations. 
 
2.1.6 Information on Credit Rationing in Formal Credit Markets 
The questions, numbered from 59 to 76 provide information on credit needs, 
apprehensions in obtaining formal loans, credit rationing, and prevalence of 
information asymmetry such as adverse selection and moral hazard in the formal 
credit market. The responses to these questions are used to empirically investigate the 
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results related to credit rationing in the formal credit markets of rural areas in the 
developing countries.  
 
2.1.7 Information on Credit Rationing Impact 
The questions, numbered from 77 to 81 provide information on affects of credit 
rationing on various aspects of livelihood choices such as, agricultural input 
applications, educational and better health attainments, food availability etc.  The 
responses to these questions are used to empirically investigate the results related to 
impact of credit rationing on livelihood choices. 
 
2.1.8 Informal Borrowing and Lending among Friends and Relatives 
The questions, numbered from 82 to 118 provide information on various aspects of 
informal lending and borrowing among friends and relatives in rural areas of the 
developing countries. The questions, numbered from 82 to 89 provide information on 
the prevalence of gifts and loan transactions in these areas. The questions, numbered 
from 90 to 93 provide information on these financial transactions that seem to be 
motivated by altruistic beliefs. The questions, numbered from 94 to 105 provide 
information on risk sharing aspect of these financial transactions. The questions, 
numbered from 106 to 113 provide information on flexibility aspects of these loans 
related to repayment, preferences on delaying and defaulting on repayments of these 
loans. The responses to these questions are used to empirically investigate the 
significance of risk sharing motives of informal lending and borrowing among the 
friends and relatives in rural areas of the developing countries. The questions, 
numbered from 114 to 116 provide information on mutual max fairness motive 
(Rabin, 1993) underlying these informal financial transactions and the questions, 
numbered 117 and 118 provide information on mutual min fairness motive. The 
  15
responses to these questions are used to empirically investigate the significance of 
mutual max and mutual min fairness motives of informal lending and borrowing 
among the friends and relatives in rural areas of the developing countries. 
2.1.9 Field Experiment related to Assess Risk Aversion Coefficient 
The question 119 reproduced here helps in conducting a simple field experiment 
(based on Binswanger, 1981) to estimate the partial risk aversion coefficient of the 
participants. Furthermore, these results are used to estimate the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion using the approximations suggested in Anderson and Dillon (1992).  
"Imagine an honest stranger comes up to you and offers a gamble with the payout 
depending on the flip of a coin. If the coin lands heads you get the amount in the first 
column of Table 2A and if it lands tails you get the amount in the second column. 
Each has a 50% chance of occurring. If the gamble was repeated by many flips of the 
coin you would expect to receive the amount in the third column. While the odds of 
receiving the amount in the first column are the same as the odds in the second 
column the high and low values are different. Study the six gambles in the table and 
select the one gamble that you would prefer". 
Table 2A: Measurement of Risk Aversion Coefficient (Binswanger, 1981) 
 
Choice Gain in Good 
luck: (RMB): 
50% chance 
Gain in Bad 
luck: (RMB): 
50% chance 
Expected 
value (RMB) 
Risk 
Aversion 
class 
Coeff. Of 
partial risk 
aversion at all 
levels 
1 500 500 500 Extreme 7.5 
2 950 450 700 Severe 3.615 
3 1200 400 800 Intermediate 1.189 
4 1500 300 900 Moderate 0.506 
5 1900 100 1000 Slight to 
neutral 
0.168 
6 2000 0 1000 Neutral to 
preferred 
≤0 
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2.2. Field Implementation of the Household Survey 
The household survey in China was conducted in three phases. The first phase of 
survey was conducted in the year 2007. The survey was conducted with the help of 
Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University, China. Altogether 400 households 
spread over 4 villages in 1 province were covered. The Chinese survey was done 
under the supervision of Profs. Calum Turvey and Rong Kong.  In this survey the 
responses were collected for the questions numbered from 1 to 54. The second phase 
of the survey was conducted by Rong Kong in August 2008. In this phase also 400 
households spread over 4 villages in 1 province were covered. In this survey the 
responses were collected for the questions numbered from 1 to 57. The third phase of 
the survey was conducted in October 2008.  In this survey 756 households were 
covered spread over 12 villages in 2 other provinces. This phase of survey was also 
done under the supervision of Prof. Calum Turvey. In this survey the responses were 
collected for all the questions numbered from 1 to 119. The details of the survey plan 
and scheduling are presented in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Plan and Scheduling   of the Household Survey in China 
 
Region No. of 
Villages 
No. of Households Year of 
Suvey 
Questions 
Shaanxi  (5) 4 400 2007 1 to 54 
Henan (3) 4 400 August 08 1 to 57 
Gansu (2) 6 355 October 08 0 to 119 
Qianyang (4) 6 386 October 08 0 to 119 
Total 20 1541   
The household survey in India was carried out in December 2008 and January 2009. 
The survey was done in the Orissa state. The planning for the survey was made in July 
– August 2008, when I visited the state. For the field planning and implementation of 
the survey, I took the help of Assistant Director of State Institute of Rural 
  17
Development (Orissa, Bhubaneswar), Mr. Saroj Dash and Dr. Prabhat Mohapatra who 
is supervising an agency in Bhubaneswar related with the household surveys.  
We selected four districts distinctly lying in different agro climatic zones. Also these 
districts are quite different when socio- economic development indicators are 
considered. The four districts are Puri, Cuttack, Keonjhar and Mayurbhanj. Puri and 
Cuttack are comparatively close (30 miles) to capital city Bhubaneswar and these two 
districts are comparatively more economically developed regions. Other two districts, 
Keonjhar and Mayurbhanj are comparatively far (200 miles) from Bhubaneswar.  Also 
these districts are comparatively less economically developed. Moreover, in these 
districts, majority of the population belong to scheduled tribes, which are 
economically less developed compared to the other categories of people. 
In each district 5 villages were selected, which are well scattered and quite 
representative of the district. In each village, 20 households belonging to different 
economic categories are randomly selected for survey. Thus in each district 100 
households are selected and totally 400 households are surveyed. The survey was 
conducted under my supervision. The survey was generously supported and funded by 
the endowments chaired by Prof. Calum Turvey.  The details of the survey plan and 
scheduling are presented in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Plan and Scheduling of the Household Survey in India 
 
Region No. of 
Villages 
No. of 
Households 
Year of Suvey Questions 
Cuttack  (6) 5 100 Dec-08 and Jan-09 0 to 119 
Keonjhar (7) 5 100 Dec-08 and Jan-09 0 to 119 
Mayurbhanj (8) 5 100 Dec-08 and Jan-09 0 to 119 
Puri(9) 5 100 Dec-08 and Jan-09 0 to 119 
Total 20 400   
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2.3. Summary Statistics of Variables 
Summary statistics of responses of the heads of the households on the questions as 
discussed in section 1 are presented here as following. 
2.3.1 Summary Statistics of Demographic and Socio-economic Variables. 
Summary statistics of important demographic and socio- economic variables for India 
and China are presented in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 respectively. 
 
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics of Important Socio-Economic Variables (India) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
sex (Female=1) 399 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Age 399 47.45 11.54 22.00 92.00 
Education(1-7) 399 3.54 1.60 1.00 7.00 
Education (1-4) 399 2.52 0.82 1.00 4.00 
Household size 399 6.58 3.30 1.00 30.00 
Years of Farming 399 24.05 11.82 2.50 70.00 
Farm Size (acre) 399 2.96 2.39 0.15 20.00 
Income source(farm=1) 399 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Household Income (Rs.) 399 45440.85 37579.16 2400.00 300000.0 
Percent Farm income 399 57.40 25.86 3.00 100.00 
Household Asset Value (Rs.) 399 384313.30 359938.90 16000.00 2700000.0 
Per cap income (Rs.) 399 7362.76 5326.65 600.00 50000.00 
Per cap asset (Rs.) 399 64736.43 67422.58 1818.18 833333.3 
Log income 399 10.51 0.63 7.78 12.61 
Log asset 399 12.55 0.79 9.68 14.81 
Log per cap income 399 8.72 0.60 6.40 10.82 
Log per cap asset 399 10.76 0.80 7.51 13.63 
Sickness in family(1=yes) 399 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Income std. dev. 399 22299.04 44330.17 402.66 358209.1 
Income coeff. of variation 388 0.39 0.16 0.09 0.95 
Absolute risk aversion(*10-4) 399 0.11 0.17 0.00 2.00 
Relative risk aversion coeff 399 2.05 1.48 0.00 4.00 
Risk prone (1=yes) 399 0.98 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Education (1-7) : 1- no education, 2- primary grade education incomplete, 3- primary 
grade education complete, 4- secondary grade  education incomplete, 5- secondary 
grade education complete, 6- College/ University level education incomplete, 7- 
college/ University education complete. 
Education (1-4): 1- no education, 2- primary grade education, 3- Secondary grade 
education, 4- College/ University level education. 
Age: Age of the head of the household. 
Risk prone: The family has suffered crop or cattle loss, major sickness, death in 1 
year. 
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics of Important Socio-Economic Variables (China) 
 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sex (Female=1) 741 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Age 738 2.94 0.97 1.00 4.00 
Education(1-7) 739 3.36 1.52 1.00 7.00 
Education (1-4) 739 1.40 0.77 1.00 4.00 
Household size 1540 4.39 1.54 0.00 21.00 
Years of Farming 1538 27.35 13.14 0.00 70.00 
Farm Size (mu) 1540 5.39 3.29 0.30 25.00 
Income source(farm=1) 1540 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Household Income (RMB) 1522 10559.52 8090.53 0.00 50000.00 
Percent Farm income 1535 46.80 33.86 0.00 100.00 
Household Asset Value (RMB) 1416 51112.29 44605.24 1000.00 500000.00 
Per cap income (RMB) 1536 2707.55 2742.77 0.00 40000.00 
Per cap asset (RMB) 1413 12625.41 11702.82 250.00 100000.00 
Log income 1537 9.01 0.84 5.52 12.21 
Log asset 1416 10.48 0.93 6.91 13.12 
Log per cap income 1534 7.59 0.80 3.96 10.60 
Log per cap asset 1413 9.06 0.93 5.52 11.51 
Sickness in family(1=yes) 1540 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Income std. dev. 1540 6625.39 74472.76 0.00 2323063.00 
Income coeff. of variation 1469 0.31 0.16 0.00 0.99 
Absolute risk aversion(*10-4) 1136 1.51 2.89 0.00 40.00 
Relative risk aversion coeff 1136 2.77 1.52 0.00 4.00 
Risk prone (1=yes) 741 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Age: 1= (20-30) years; 2= (30-40) years; 3= (40-50) years; 4= over 50 years 
2.3.2 Sources of Risk and Risk Perceptions 
The summary statistics of important risks and uncertainties faced by the families are 
reported in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5: Percentage of Families Facing Various Risk and Uncertainties 
 
Variable Mean Value: 
China 
Mean Value : 
India 
Price Risk .07 .06 
Yield Risk .06 .10 
Weather Risk .05 .09 
Suffered Crop Loss, Cattle Loss .70 .90 
Suffered Death or Major Sickness in Family .68 .91 
The summary statistics of important risk management strategies of the families are 
presented in Table 2.6. 
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Table 2.6: Risk Management Options 
 
Risk Management Options 
(scale : 1-5) 
Mean. : India 
(N=400) 
Mean. : China 
(N=1200) 
Crops/ animal/ enterprise Diversification 3.94 3.95 
Geographic diversification of plots 3.53 3.42 
Irrigation 4.24 4.25 
Spreading of sale of crops 3.03 3.45 
Forward contracts of crops 2.84 3.45 
Government Programs 3.23 3.89 
Financial  Reserves 3.67 3.70 
Off farm income 3.59 3.99 
 
2.3.3 Information on Debt 
The summary statistics of important credit variables are presented in Table 2.7 and 
Table 2.8 for India and China respectively. 
 
Table 2.7: Summary Statistics of Important Credit Transaction Variables (India) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Whether any Debt Outstanding 399 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Amount of Debt (Rs.) 336 15659.08 21430.80 0.00 200000.0 
Formal Loan Percent 325 48.40 44.80 0.00 100.00 
Informal Loan Percent 325 36.25 42.44 0.00 100.00 
Informal loan Amount (Rs.) 325 4015.19 8477.11 0.00 84000.0 
Formal Loan Amount (Rs.) 325 10382.46 18877.72 0.00 200000.0 
Propensity of Formal Loan (1=yes) 325 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Propensity of Informal Loan (1=yes) 325 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Informal formal loan ratio 325 0.11 0.23 0.00 1.62 
Loan for production (1=yes) 389 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Loan for risk management (1=yes) 390 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Default on informal loan (1=yes) 399 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Delay on informal loan (1=yes) 399 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Default on formal loan (1=yes) 399 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Delay on formal loan (1=yes) 399 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Delay or default on formal loan (1=yes) 399 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Delay or default on informal loan (1=yes) 399 0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Prefer not to default on informal loan (1=yes) 399 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Prefer informal loan (1=yes) 399 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Informal loans are convenient (1=yes) 399 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Community Pressure Reduces Default (1=yes) 399 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Note: Formal loan means loan taken from banks and rural cooperatives. Informal loan 
means loan taken from relatives and friends. 
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Risk Management purposes include expenditure on health/medicine, funeral, 
consumption. Production purposes include expenditure on Agriculture inputs, 
machinery and equipment, education, house construction. 
 
Table 2.8: Summary Statistics of Important Credit Variables (China) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Whether any Debt Outstanding 1536 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Amount of Debt (RMB) 1015 13165.81 26268.60 0.00 480000.00 
Formal Loan Percent 809 34.72 42.00 0.00 100.00 
Informal Loan Percent 809 63.92 42.30 0.00 100.00 
Informal loan Amount (RMB) 800 8231.40 12475.78 0.00 150000.00 
Formal Loan Amount (RMB) 800 7900.17 22005.97 0.00 398400.00 
Propensity of Formal Loan (1=yes) 809 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Propensity of Informal Loan (1=yes) 809 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Informal formal loan ratio 791 1.46 3.31 0.00 50.00 
Loan for production 1354 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Loan for risk management 1354 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Default on informal loan (1=yes) 1499 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Delay on informal loan (1=yes) 1499 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Default on formal loan (1=yes) 1485 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Delay on formal loan (1=yes) 1540 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Delay or default on formal loan 1501 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Delay or default on informal loan 1511 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Prefer not to default on informal loan 739 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Prefer informal loan (1=yes) 674 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Informal loans are convenient 739 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Community Pressure Reduces Default 741 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Further the composition of debt (formal and informal loans) along increasing quintiles 
of assets is presented in Table 2.9.  Further Table 2.10 reports the usage of debt for 
risk management and production purposes along increasing quintiles of assets. 
Table 2.9: Composition of Loan Portfolio of Families in India and China (percentages) 
 
 India China 
Quintile 
Assets 
Formal 
Loan 
Informal 
Loan 
N Mean 
(Informal>0) 
Formal 
Loan 
Informal 
loan 
N N 
Informal>0 
1 32.82 35.5 72 .50 22.6 75.7 246 .84 
2 36.91 48.38 48 .66 33.3 66.0 104 .79 
3 46.29 44.66 67 .55 41.3 57.7 138 .73 
4 61.95 28.37 70 .32 38.8 60.1 128 .77 
5 63.22 26.2 57 .47 54.3 44.2 133 .66 
Total 48.40 36.29 314 .52 35.9 62.8 749 .77 
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Table 2.10: Purpose of Borrowing by Families (percentages) 
 
 India China 
Quintile  
Assets 
Loan risk  Loan 
production 
N Loan risk  Loan 
production 
N 
1 35 59 97 31 59 406 
2 29 55 58 22 65 165 
3 17 75 79 20 70 249 
4 23 68 86 16 75 221 
5 07 84 71 12 80 217 
Total 23 68 391 22 68 1258 
 
2.3.4 Information on Trust and Guilt motives 
The summary statistic of important trust and guilt motives are presented in Table 2.11 
and Table 2.12 for India and China respectively. 
 
Table 2.11: Summary Statistics of Important Social Preference Variables (India) 
 
Variable (Binary variables) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Risk share using gifts or loans 399 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Trusts that informal loan will be rapid (trust1) 399 0.79 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Will lend even does not trust that loan will be repaid(trust2) 399 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Will lend or borrow even they have refused earlier (alt1) 399 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Stronger version (and conditions) of (alt1) 399 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Strong guilty feeling on defaulting  informal loan 399 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Strong guilty feeling on defaulting  formal loan 399 0.32 0.45 0.00 1.00 
 
 
Table 2.12: Summary Statistics of Important Social Preference Variables (China) 
 
Variable (Binary variables) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Risk share using gifts or loans 741 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Trusts that informal loan will be rapid (trust1) 1535 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Will lend even does not trust that loan will be repaid(trust2) 1538 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Will lend or borrow even they have refused earlier (alt1) 740 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Stronger version (and conditions) of (alt1) 740 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Strong guilty feeling on defaulting  informal loan 1540 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Strong guilty feeling on defaulting  formal loan 1540 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Mutual-min Reciprocity 741 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Mutual max Reciprocity 741 0.73 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Mutual max and Mutual-min Reciprocity 1540 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
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2.3.5 Precautionary Savings 
The summary statistics of saving by the households is presented in Table 2.13. Further 
the changes in savings in response to reduction in uncertainty in income are reported 
in Table 2.14. 
Table 2.13: Saving Behavior of Families 
 
China India Proportion of  Household income
  saved  in a year 
 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
       (No saving) 367 48.61 114 28.50 
less than 5% 147 19.47 176 44.00 
between 5 and 10% 93 12.32 94 23.50 
More than 10% (High saving) 148 19.60 16 4.00 
Total 755 100.00 400 100.00 
 
Table 2.14: Response to Savings if there is Reduction in Uncertainty in Income 
 
China India Response to savings, if 
there is  a significant 
reduction in uncertainty in  
income  
Variable 
Remark 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Decrease savings and 
increase investment 
288 38.30 152 38.00 
Decrease savings and 
increase purchases 
91 12.10 32 8.00 
Decrease savings and 
increase travel/vacations 
Precautionary 
savings 
10 1.33 3 0.75 
Maintain the same amount 
of savings 
 50 6.65 18 4.50 
Increase savings slightly 158 21.01 135 33.75 
Increase savings a lot 
Increase savings 
155 20.61 60 15.00 
Total  752 100.00 400 100 
 
2.3.6 Credit Rationing Variables 
Table 2.15 reports the mean values of various types of apprehensions in obtaining 
formal loans. Table 2.16 reports the mean values of various reasons for denial of 
formal loans. 
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Table 2.15: Apprehension in Obtaining Loan from Banks and RCC 
 
Variable : Apprehension in getting loan due to 
Binary variable(1=yes, 0=no) 
Mean: India 
N=400 
Mean: China 
N=687 
Unpaid loans .44 .53 
Higher interest rate than that of friends or relatives .41 .70 
Unaffordable interest rate .35 .69 
Lack of collateral .46 .54 
Long delay in processing loan .92 .36 
Bribes .80 .28 
Prefer to borrow from friend or relative .51 .72 
Do not like to be indebted to bank or RCC .44 .68 
Table 2.16: Reason for Denial of Loan from Banks or RCC 
 
Variable: Denied loan due to Mean: India (N=180) Mean : China (N=524) 
Lack of collateral (1=yes) .50 .65 
Yield risk (1=yes) .1 .04 
Fail to replay past loan (1=yes) .32 .18 
Not trustworthy (1=yes) .25 .45 
Low income (1=yes) .16 .49 
 
The summary statistics on various sources of getting credit rationed are reported in 
Table 2.17. It also summarizes the extent of credit rationing in India and China, as 
directly observed in the data. 
Table 2.17: Description of Borrowing Behavior and Credit Constraint 
 
China India Variable (binary variables) : Values 
reported in percentage Mean Observations Mean Observations 
Loan application rejected (a) .31 1010 .41 399 
Could not get adequate loan for 
various purposes  (b) 
.30 756 .45 384 
Never get desired amount of loan (c) .38 1320 .62 400 
Sometimes got desired amount of loan .30 1320 .30 400 
Always got desired amount of loan .32 1320 .07 400 
Credit Rationed =1; if either of a,b,c=1 .58 1418 .66 400 
 
Further summary statistics of relevant credit rationing variables are presented in Table 
2.18 and Table 2.19 for India and China respectively. 
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Table 2.18: Summary Statistics of Important Credit Rationing Variables (India) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Denied formal loan 399 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Denied because of lack of collateral 399 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Interest rate unaffordable (highrate1) 399 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Likely to borrow more if interest rate is reduced (highrate2) 399 0.97 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Credit constrained (Creditconstr1) 399 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Credit constrained (Creditconstr11) 399 0.86 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Creditconstr1: Denied loan + could not borrow desired amount of loan for education, 
health, consumption, farming and business purposes; from formal sources 
Creditconstr11: Denied loan +Never got desired amount of loan + could not borrow 
desired amount of loan for education, health, consumption, farming and business 
purposes 
 
Table 2.19: Summary Statistics of Important Credit Rationing Variables (China) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Denied formal loan 1530 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Denied because of lack of collateral 521 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Interest rate unaffordable (highrate1) 674 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Likely to borrow more if interest rate is reduced (highrate2) 674 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Credit constrained (Creditconstr1) 1540 0.36 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Credit constrained (Creditconstr11) 1539 0.57 0.48 0.00 1.00 
 
2.3.7 Credit Rationing Impact 
The effects of credit rationing on agriculture input applications, food availability, and 
educational and health attainments along increasing quintiles of assets are reported in 
Table 2.20.  The percentage value indicates the percentage of families who believe 
that credit rationing has impacted the above choices. 
Table 2.20: Effects of Credit Constraints on Various Livelihood Choices (Percentage) 
 
 China (N= 743) India (N=400) 
Asset 
Quintile 
Low input Less 
food 
Less 
education 
Low input Less 
food 
Less 
education
1 80 22 64 78 65 67 
2 77 31 58 90 63 73 
3 75 20 45 81 50 64 
4 66 21 49 81 43 51 
5 71 16 37 61 38 43 
Total 74 21 50 78 52 60 
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2.3.8 Informal Borrowing and Lending 
The summary statistics of gifts and loan transactions among relatives and friends in 
rural areas of the developing countries are presented in Table 2.21. 
 
Table 2.21: Important Aspects of Informal Financial Transactions among Friends or Relatives 
 
Variable (mean value shows the fraction of respondents 
who agree to the question: 1=yes) 
Mean Value 
: India 
(N=400) 
Mean Value: 
China (N=739) 
Gift transactions among friends and relatives .67 .25 
Loan transactions among friends and relatives .97 .94 
Gift for emergency purposes .71 .59 
Loan for emergency purposes .96 .98 
Prefer loan for emergency purposes .88 .82 
Prefer loan for general  purposes .73 .84 
Prefer not to default on such loans .80 .93 
Community pressure helps in reducing default .76 .63 
The summary statistics of risk sharing using monetary gifts and loan transaction 
among relatives and friends are presented in Table 2.22 
Table 2.22: Risk Sharing Using Gifts and Loans 
 
Variable (Binary variables) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Risk share using gifts or loans (India)  399 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Risk share using gifts or loans (China)  741 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 
The summary statistics of important motivations for informal financial transactions 
among relatives and friends are presented in Table 2.23.  
 
Table 2.23: Important Motivations of Financial Transactions among Friends or Relatives 
 
Variable (mean value shows the fraction of respondents 
who agree to the question: 1=yes) 
Mean Value : 
India (N=400) 
Mean Value: 
China (N=739) 
Prefer to borrow from friends or relatives .50 .72 
Flexibility in loan repayment .87 .93 
Flexibility in interest amount  repayment .83 .76 
Borrowing from friends or  relatives convenient .89 .96 
Trust that loans given to friends or relatives will be 
repaid 
.79 .90 
Loans given even not trust that loan will be repaid .45 .63 
Agree to borrow or lend even they have refused earlier .27 .52 
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Table 2.24 presents summary statistics of default and delay in repayment of formal 
and informal loans. 
Table 2.24: Default and Delay in Repayment of Formal and Informal Loans 
 
Variable Mean Value (N=384) India Mean Value (N=1514) China 
Default on  formal Loan .23 .03 
Default on Informal Loan .20 .04 
Delay on  Formal Loan .51 .15 
Delay on Informal Loan .61 .38 
The summary statistics of mutual-max and mutual-min fairness reciprocity are 
presented in Table 2.25. 
Table 2.25: Summary Statistics of mutual-max and mutual-min Reciprocity 
 
Variable (Binary variables) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Mutual-min Reciprocity (India) 399 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Mutual max Reciprocity (India) 398 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Mutual max and Mutual-min Reciprocity (India) 399 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Mutual-min Reciprocity (China) 741 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Mutual max Reciprocity (China) 741 0.73 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Mutual max and Mutual-min Reciprocity (China) 1540 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
 
Further the summary statistics of mutual-max and mutual-min fairness reciprocity 
along increasing quintiles of assets are presented in Table 2.26 
Table 2.26: Percentages of Families Prefer to behave as Mutual-max and Mutual min 
 
India China Asset 
quintile mutual-max mutual -min N mutual-max Mutual- min N 
1 71 62 101 77 47 165 
2 58 43 60 68 44 88 
3 59 49 79 73 41 162 
4 54 41 88 65 32 152 
5 75 57 72 77 35 176 
Total 64 51 400 73 40 743 
Further the percentage distributions of the families demonstrating mutual-max, 
mutual-min and any combination of these have been reported in Table 2.27. 
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Table2.27: Categorization of Families along mutual-max and mutual-min (%) 
 
mutual-min (China) mutual-min (India) mutual-max 
0 1 Total 0 1 Total 
0 (0,0)19.44 (0,1)8.07 27.51  (208) 28.75 7.25 36.00 (144) 
1 (1,0)40.61 (1,1)31.9 72.49  (508) 20.00 44.00 64.00 (256) 
Total 60.1(454) 39.9(302) 100.0 (756) 48.75 51.25 100 (400) 
 
2.3.9 Field Experiment related to Assess Risk Aversion Coefficient 
The results of the experiment intended to estimate the partial risk aversion coefficient 
and also relative risk aversion coefficient (as discussed in section 1.9) are reported in 
Table 2.28. In the table the percentage distribution of the families are shown, who 
made choices of the given gambles.  
 
Table 2.28: Frequency Distribution of Families for Coefficient of Relative Risk 
Aversion 
 
India China Coefficient of 
Relative risk aversion (r.r.) Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
Risk Neutral :  0 63 15.79 15.79 137 12.06 12.06 
Low  Risk Averse: 0.5 36 9.02 24.81 57 5.02 17.08 
Moderate Risk Averse: 1 66 16.54 41.35 88 7.75 24.82 
High Risk Averse: 2 73 18.3 59.65 143 12.59 37.41 
Severe Risk Averse: 3 57 14.29 73.93 101 8.89 46.3 
Excessive Risk Averse: 4 104 26.07 100 610 53.7 100 
Total 399 100  1,136 100  
 
It is arranged in descending order of the choices. For example, the participants who 
chose gamble 1 are excessive risk averse and they are   shown in the last row. 
Similarly the participants who chose gamble 6 are risk loving or almost risk neutral 
and they are shown in the first row. 
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Chapter 3:  Credit Rationing: A Theoretical and an Empirical 
Analysis  
                                                 
The main objective of this chapter is to assess the credit rationing problem in the rural 
areas of developing countries. Using asymmetric information framework both type I 
and type II credit rationing are demonstrated. Equilibrium is attained using loan size, 
interest rate and collateral requirements as screening and incentive devices. Further, 
the welfare implications of credit rationing are analyzed. The analysis also suggests 
that the price elasticity of loan demand is inelastic, however price responsiveness of 
the borrowers having lower assets is found to be comparatively higher. These have 
important policy implications.  Then using household survey data from China and 
India, some of these results are empirically tested. Overall considerable amount of 
credit rationing is observed and assets endowment and ability to post collateral are 
found to be significant explanatory variables. Also a test for information asymmetry in 
these credit markets is proposed and significant results are obtained.  
 
3. 1.  Introduction 
Credit is a key input needed to undertake most economic production activities. 
However it is also known that credit markets function quite differently from standard 
markets2. The standard competitive market of a homogenous good works on the 
premise that agents are price takers, delivery of good and payment for transactions 
happen simultaneously and markets clear at the prevailing market price. But there is a 
finite time lag between the delivery of credit and repayment. Also when the borrower 
is protected by a limited liability clause; repayment is contingent on several factors 
such as project outcomes and incentives, which the borrower faces. Defaulting on loan 
                                                 
2 See, Jaffe and Stiglitz (1990). Credit Rationing, Chapter 16 for more on this. 
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repayments is a fact of reality. In such a scenario the price of credit may not be able to 
clear the market and there may be excess demand of credit. Hence credit rationing 
may occur which is observed in the credit market.  
The key objectives of this chapter are to investigate the phenomenon of credit 
rationing in the formal credit markets of rural areas in developing countries and 
estimate the propensity of credit rationing at the household level. The chapter is 
motivated by two important observations. First, in these areas income from agriculture 
constitutes a large portion of household income. Data obtained from household 
surveys (discussed later) in China and India reveals that farm income constitutes about 
48 and 57 percent of family income respectively of two countries. Second, credit is an 
important input for livelihood for many farm households in developing countries. 
Further formal credit markets; banks and rural credit cooperatives (RCC) are not well 
developed in such areas. All these factors provide an appropriate setting to conduct a 
theoretical and empirical analysis of credit rationing. 
Household surveys were conducted in rural areas of China (in years 2007 and 2008) 
and India (in year 2008-09). About 1500 families in China and 400 families in India 
were surveyed. The survey questionnaires are designed to elicit responses of families 
related to - (i) the credit rationing problems they face, (ii) how credit rationing affects 
livelihood choices, and (iii) how they respond to overcome credit rationing.   The 
survey data is used in this chapter to empirically investigate the credit rationing results 
and also to test for presence of information asymmetry in these credit markets.  
In order to motivate this chapter some initial findings are presented here. For example 
we find that more than 90 percent families in India and China are apprehensive about 
getting loans from banks or RCC for various reasons as summarized in Table 3.1. 
Further about 45 percent families in India and 30 percent families in China have been 
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denied loans from RCC or banks, for a variety of reasons, which are summarized in 
Table 3.2. Evidently lack of collateral seems to be a major reason for denial of loan. 
Table 3.1: Apprehension in Obtaining Loan from Banks and RCC 
 
Variable : Apprehension in getting loan due to 
Binary variable(1=yes, 0=no) 
Mean: India 
N=400 
Mean: China 
N=687 
Unpaid loans .44 .53 
Higher interest rate than that of friends or relatives .41 .70 
Unaffordable interest rate .35 .69 
Lack of collateral .46 .54 
Long delay in processing loan .92 .36 
Bribes .80 .28 
Prefer to borrow from friend or relative .51 .72 
Do not like to be indebted to bank or RCC .44 .68 
Table 3.2: Reason for Denial of Loan from RCC or Bank 
 
Variable: Denied loan due to Mean: India (N=180) Mean : China (N=524) 
Lack of collateral (1=yes) .50 .65 
Yield risk (1=yes) .1 .04 
Fail to replay past loan (1=yes) .32 .18 
Not trustworthy (1=yes) .25 .45 
Low income (1=yes) .16 .49 
 
It is also observed that families belonging to lower quintiles of assets depend more on 
informal loans (obtained from friends, relatives, and moneylenders) and families in 
higher quintiles of assets depend more on formal loans (obtained from banks and 
RCC). These facts demonstrate that a large number of families in these economies 
face substantial credit rationing.  
Credit rationing is normally understood as a situation when demand for loan exceeds 
its supply at the prevailing interest rate. Keeton (1979) defined credit rationing more 
formally and proposed two types of rationing.  
(a) Type I Rationing: some or all loan applicants get a smaller loan than they 
desire at the quoted loan rate of interest. 
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(b) Type II Rationing: Some loan applicants are denied a loan even though for the 
bank they are indistinguishable from accepted applicants. 
There are two strands of theories to explain credit rationing3: First, Hodgman (1960), 
Freimer and Gordon (1965), and Jaffee and Modigliani (1969), explain credit rationing 
based on various imperfections in loan markets. Applicants and loans are 
differentiated based on heterogeneities in a particular characteristic with respect to 
which they differ. Second, Jaffe and Russel (1976) and particularly Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), demonstrate credit rationing based on the prevalence of asymmetric 
information (between the borrower and lender) related to the types and incentives of 
the borrowers. 
Indeed there is a substantial amount of research that attempts to explain the 
phenomena equilibrium credit rationing in different contexts. This chapter builds upon 
this research and attempts to explain both type I and type II credit rationing in the rural 
credit markets. This chapter also aims to analyze welfare implications of credit 
rationing. A further contribution of this chapter is to conduct an empirical analysis to 
assess the extent of credit rationing at the household level and propose a test of 
information asymmetry in the credit market. The chapter is organized as following. 
A brief literature review on theory of credit rationing is presented in section 2.  As the 
main objective of this chapter is to study the credit rationing problem in rural areas of 
developing countries, an illustrative model of credit rationing is developed in section 3 
which studies both type I and type II credit rationing in equilibrium and important 
results are obtained.  Then section 4 presents a brief analysis on welfare implications 
of credit rationing. Further the analysis suggests that price elasticity of loan demand is 
inelastic, however the price responsiveness of the borrowers having lower assets is 
                                                 
3 See Jaffe and Stiglitz (1990), Chapter 16, and Clemenz (1986), chapter 1 for more on this. 
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found to be comparatively higher.  Also a brief suggestion on policy matters is 
presented here. Then in section 5, using these results empirical models have been 
developed that estimate extent of credit rationing at household level.  Further nature of 
associations of variables that may influence credit rationing has been studied here. 
Also a test has been proposed here to test for information asymmetry in credit market. 
Section 6 concludes with important observations.  
 
3. 2.  Literature Review 
Much of the earlier literature on credit rationing attempted to explain type I rationing. 
Hodgman (1960) explained credit rationing as a rational response by the lender to 
minimize the risk of default. He showed that the supply curve becomes vertical at a 
critical value of loan L* and beyond this the lender will not give loan at any higher 
interest rate, as the risk of default dominates the gain at higher interest rate beyond L*. 
If the borrower’s demand of credit is higher than L*, she is type I credit rationed. 
Freimer and Gordon (1965) demonstrated that there exists an interior optimal loan L* 
at interest rate R*, that maximizes the lender’s expected profit; a borrower asking for a 
loan more than L* will not get the loan, even if she is willing to pay more that R*. 
Jaffee and Modigliani (1969) explained credit rationing by using the assumption that 
the lender behaves as a discriminating monopolist. He extends differentiating loan 
contracts (loan amount and interest rate) to different groups of borrowers depending 
on firm size and risk. A more than optimal loan amount is not offered even though the 
borrower is willing to pay a higher interest rate.  
However the recent literature – starting with Jaffe and Russel (1976) and particularly 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), demonstrated credit rationing based on the prevalence of 
asymmetry in information related to the types and incentives of the borrower. Jaffe 
and Russel (1976) explained credit rationing by assuming two types of borrowers; 
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honest and dishonest, which is private knowledge of the borrower. Honest borrowers 
always repay the loan and dishonest borrower default on repayment, when the cost of 
default is no larger than cost of full repayment. This incentive for default by the 
dishonest borrower may make the loan supply function backward bending, which may 
lead to credit rationing in equilibrium. The honest borrowers may prefer rationed 
allocation as rational responses not to cross subsidize the dishonest borrower. As 
dishonest borrower’s utility is an increasing function of size of loan, the lender uses 
the loan size as contract parameter to induce self-selection between the honest and 
dishonest borrower.  
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) presented a detail description of type II rationing in 
equilibrium that consequently spawned a great amount of research in this area. The 
main ideas propounded in the paper are that:  (a) the lenders get a pool of projects with 
mean preserving spreads of returns (same mean with different variances) to finance. 
Lenders do not know the variance of projects, only borrowers know that; (b) Interest 
rate may itself affect the riskiness of the pool of loans or borrowers by adverse 
selection of pool of borrowers comprising of more risky projects and also moral 
hazard effect induces the borrowers to switch over to more risky projects as the 
interest rate increases; (c) The borrower is protected by a limited liability clause. 
Under these circumstances the expected profit (return) of the lender is not a 
monotonically increasing function of interest rate, hence the backward bending supply 
curve is obtained as shown in Figure 3.1. Hence market clearing Walrasian 
equilibrium may not be obtained and credit rationing is obtained in equilibrium; each 
lender optimally sets interest rate below that of market clearing level where demand of 
loan exceeds its supply.  
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The equilibrium is described by a configuration of loan contracts – {B,r*,C}, where B 
is the amount of borrowing, r* is the interest rate, and C is the collateral; such that all 
loan contracts offered yield the same expected return, and there does not exist another 
contract which can yield, a larger expected return. The lenders will not use the 
increasing of interest rates or higher collateral requirements to clear the market, as 
doing so may increase the riskiness of bank’s loan portfolio, either by lower rate of 
participation of safer borrowers or by inducing borrowers to undertake riskier projects.  
Subsequently several authors studied credit rationing under different contexts. 
Important among these are mentioned as following. 
Besanko and Thakor (1987 b) analyzed the possibility of credit rationing under 
monopolistic and competitive credit markets. They assumed that distribution of returns 
to a low risk borrower exhibits first order stochastic dominance over the distribution of 
returns to a high-risk borrower – this is in contrast with the assumption in Stiglitz and 
Weiss (SW-1981), where it was second order stochastic dominance. With this 
assumption, they observed that, with an increase in interest rate, high-risk borrowers 
first drop out and not the low risk borrowers. Their main results are: 
Figure 3.1: Credit Rationing Equilibrium in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
Loan 
amount 
Interest rate  
Loan 
Supply 
Loan Demand 
r* rc 
Credit 
Rationing 
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a) In the monopolistic setting, the collateral will not be used unless it is 
sufficiently valuable to the bank to make the loan riskless. 
b) In the same setting, bank’s credit policy discourages high-risk borrowers from 
applying for credit – it raises the interest rate to induce them to exit the market. 
c) In the perfectly competitive setting, collateral plays a useful role. Low risk 
borrowers choose contracts with low interest rates and high collaterals, 
whereas high risk borrowers make opposite choice.  
d) In this setting, insufficient borrower wealth endowments may result in some 
borrowers being denied credit.  So equilibrium credit rationing is possible even 
when collateral is available and deposit supply is perfectly elastic. 
Hence in contrast to a monopoly, the competitive equilibrium involves collateral as a 
sorting device, since posting collateral is more costly to the high-risk borrower. Low 
risk borrowers provide collateral and pay a lower interest rate, whereas the high-risk 
borrowers pay a higher interest rate and provide no collateral.  
Bester (1985) explained that no credit rationing would occur in equilibrium if banks 
use the contract instruments, interest rate and collateral requirement simultaneously 
rather than separately, as self-selection mechanism to sort the borrowers. It also 
assumes that there is no wealth constraint for posting collateral. Bester demonstrated 
that equilibrium in credit market is characterized by the separation of borrowers of 
different risks. There does not exist a pooling equilibrium; given pooling of different 
risks in one contract is not viable   (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) in a competitive 
equilibrium whenever self-selection mechanisms are available. If pooling occurs, then 
there exists another loan contract that is profitable since that contract will attract only 
safe borrowers from the pooling equilibrium. Since the pooling equilibrium is not 
viable if a signaling mechanism is available, there will not be credit rationing since a 
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credit rationing equilibrium always pools good and bad risks. Bester’s argument fails 
if wealth constraint binds, which in the context of the current chapter is probably true. 
Now building upon these works, an analytical model of credit rationing is presented in 
the following section that studies both type I and type II credit rationing.  
 
 3. 3.  An Illustrative Model for Credit Rationing 
As discussed earlier, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and many subsequent papers studied 
the type II rationing that emphasize the use of interest rate and collateral as screening 
and incentive devices. However, in the rural areas it is also observed that many people 
do get the credit but not to the extent that they need the loan (type I rationing), while 
many are not able to get the loan at all (type II rationing). Hence the objective of this 
section is to develop a model of credit rationing that demonstrates possibility of both 
type I and type II credit rationing equilibria.  The proposed model uses loan size as 
screening and incentive device, in addition to interest rate and collateral requirements. 
As discussed in earlier sections the likelihood of repayment may depend upon various 
factors, which the borrower can influence to a large extent. In response to this the 
lender designs the contract in such a manner that elicits the best possible information 
about the borrower (type of borrower, risks and so on) while influencing the 
borrower’s action suitably after signing the contract. The lender uses interest rate, 
collateral requirements, and loan size as screening and incentive devices which limits 
the power of these instruments to clear the market (price is not able to adjust to clear 
the market) and thus credit rationing is obtained in equilibrium.   
The model is developed from a number of important contributions including Besanko 
and Thakor (1987a) and Schmidt-Mohr (1997). Besanko and Thakor (1987a) used 
assumptions of risk neutrality of both borrowers and lenders and assume first degree 
of stochastic dominance relation of the project outcomes. Schmidt-Mohr (1997) used 
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assumptions of risk aversion of borrower and risk neutrality of the lender and assumes 
second degree of stochastic dominance relation of project outcomes.  
In this chapter, I assume that the borrowers are risk averse and the lenders are risk 
neutral. However, I add an additional and critical assumption that the probability of 
success of the project depends upon a vector of endowment characteristics (wealth, 
ability, honesty, entrepreneurship etc.) of the borrower. The wealthier (in the 
endowment vectors) the borrower is higher is her probability of success and hence 
higher is expected value of profit. This assumption is realistic in the sense that the 
endowment vectors of an entrepreneur positively affect the probability of success of 
the project as well as it enters in the production function to give advantage of scale. 
 
3.3.1. Main Assumptions and Description of the Economy 
3.3.1. A.  Borrower: Borrowers are assumed to be a heterogeneous pool of risk averse 
persons. Each one is endowed with different level of endowment Ai, which is used as 
a fixed factor in the production. The endowment Ai, may be a vector of characteristics 
such as wealth, ability, entrepreneurship etc. Now for working capital and other 
ancillary expenses for taking up a project, the borrower needs working capital Li. 
Assume that the production function g (Ai, Li) is same for all borrowers and is well 
behaved.  
...(3.1)                  0(.,.)g;0(.,.)g;0(.,.)g  ;0),(g;0),(g ALAALLAL  iiii LALA  
 
The differentials of the production function have standard interpretation. 
Assume that the borrower gets a loan contract {ri,Ci, Li}, where ri is the rate of interest 
on loan, Ci is the amount of collateral, and Li is the loan size.  The borrower is an 
expected utility maximizer. Assuming standard von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) 
utility function  
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U(.), with U’(.) > 0, U’’(.) < 0, borrower maximizes 
},,{
)(
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iEU  .It is assumed that the 
probability of success is p(Ai), where Ai is the borrower’s endowment vector, and 
p’(A) >0. In the case of failure borrower gets no return from the project. Also it is 
assumed that borrower has income in every period Wi.  
In the case of success, the borrowers earns profit πi from undertaking the project.  
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3.3.1. B. Bank: It is assumed that the bank functions in a perfect competitive 
environment; in the sense of free entry and no collusion of the banks. In equilibrium, 
the bank need to get the expected repayment equal to the cost of loan, which is 1+ρ, 
that satisfies zero profit criteria. Bank is assumed to be risk neutral. 
3.3.1. C. Information Structure: In the first best case, there is no information 
asymmetry. The bank knows the probability of success of each borrower and also 
there is no problem of strategic default. Alternatively, two types of information 
asymmetry can exist. One, the bank does not know the success probability of each 
individual, but knows the average success probability of the pool of borrowers – this 
gives rise to adverse selection problem. The borrowers can get a separating 
equilibrium using the collateral (also loan size) as a signaling device. This adverse 
selection may give rise to both type I and type II rationing.  Another information 
asymmetry problem arises from the strategic default decision of borrower – this gives 
rise to the problem of moral hazard. To resolve this problem, the bank may limit the 
size of loan, which can be less than that of first best contract under perfect information 
and this gives rise to type I rationing.  Also it may give rise to type II rationing if the 
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loan size is so restrictive that the borrower’s reservation utility is not met, and the 
borrower drops out of the loan market. 
 3.3.1. D. Concept of Equilibrium: It is now well studied that once the assumption of 
perfect information in the economy is dropped, several properties of the Arrow- 
Debreu model no longer hold. The asymmetric information may have the following 
consequences for market equilibria4 - (a) an equilibrium may not exist, (b) there may 
exist equilibria with price dispersion, (c) there may exist equilibria with rationing, and 
(d) there may exist Pareto-inefficient equilibria. 
In informational asymmetries, equilibrium is often guided by the strategic interplay of 
the agents. The concept of a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in a competitive setting 
seems most appropriate here. The basic idea behind competitive markets involves free 
entry and noncollusive behavior among the participants. More precisely, a Nash 
equilibrium is a set of credit contracts such that each contract yields non negative 
profits to the bank, and there does not exist any other set of contracts, which offered to 
in addition of this set, yields positive profit in the aggregate and non-negative profits 
individually. Thus no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally5. No formal proof 
is attempted here on the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for different cases.  
 
3. 3.1. E. Optimal decisions of Borrowers and Banks  
As said earlier, the borrower maximizes the expected utility conditional on the bank 
makes zero profit. The choice variables are loan size, interest rate and collateral 
amount. The optimal values of these variables in equilibrium will vary depending on 
the assumptions on the information structure of the economy. The next part of this 
section conducts analysis of credit rationing under different conditions. 
 
                                                 
4 Followed from, Clemenz, G., and Mona, R. (1992).  
5 Followed from, Louis (1988), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1986), and Besanko and Thakor (1987 b).  
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3.1 First Best Case (No Information Asymmetry) 
 In the first best case, when there is no information asymmetry, perfect competition 
equilibrium notion is applied. It is the benchmark case, against which other outcomes 
will be compared. Also by welfare theorems the equilibrium will be Pareto efficient. 
The analysis of equilibrium allocation is as following.  
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The interest rate faced by a borrower comes from the zero profit condition of the bank. 
Here, *iL  is the first best loan size in equilibrium.  Solving (3.3) (for neatness subscript 
i is dropped) following expressions are obtained. 
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The bank offers a set of credit contracts K= {ri,Ci, Li}, such that each one yields zero 
profit to the bank. This has been shown in Figure 3.2.  
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This equations says that, the (first best) optimal level of demand of size of loan is such 
that the marginal product of loan is equal to gross interest rate (i.e. marginal value= 
marginal cost) – which is a standard full information perfect competition result. 
Equation (3.5) implies that higher asset endowments lead to lower contractual interest 
L 
Profit 
g(A1,L1)-(1+r1)L1 
g(A2,L2)-(1+r2)L2 
L1* L2* 
Slope of tangent: 
(1+r1) for borrower1 
(1+r2) for borrower2 
A1 > A2 
r1 < r2 
Figure 3.2: First best case: loan amounts for borrower 1 and 2 in equilibrium 
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rate via higher p(A); and equation (3.4) suggests that higher p(A) and lower 

r  both 
lead to higher amount of contracted loan in equilibrium. This observation is 
summarized in Result 3.1.  
Result 3.1: In the first best case (no information asymmetry), a borrower with richer 
endowment set gets lower rate of contractual interest rate and higher amount of loan in 
equilibrium. The loan contract is characterized as K= {

r i ,0, L*i}.  
 
3.3.3. Cases of Adverse Selection  
When the lender does not know the risk type of borrower, i.e. the lender does not 
know probability of success of project, then both the separating and pooling equilibria 
are possible. These cases are discussed below. 
3.3. 3.1. Case 1: No use of Collateral 
Now assume that the bank does not know the individual probability of success. It only 
knows its mean value for the pool of borrowers, which is 
_
p  . In the simplest case, 
assume that collateral is not used. Then the zero profit condition of the bank implies  
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Equation (3.6) implies that, good borrower (p >
_
 p ) cross subsidizes the bad borrowers 
(low p). But that compels the good borrower to reduce the amount of loan demanded, 
compared to that of first best case (equation 3.5) and hence the good borrower is type I 
  45
rationed; the bad borrower gets higher amount of loan compared to the first best case.  
This leads to an inefficient use of loanable funds. Also if the proportion of bad 
borrowers exceeds a critical limit, then good borrowers may not take the loan because 
the pooled interest rate may be too high to satisfy the participation constraint. Thus 
type II rationing is observed in pooling equilibrium.  These observations are 
summarized in Result 3.2.  
Result 3.2: In the case of adverse selection when collateral is not used, pooling 
equilibrium (K= { 
_
 r  , 0, Li}) contracts are offered. A common interest rate 
_
r  is 
offered (Li will differ across borrowers) and the good borrower cross subsidizes the 
bad borrowers and he will be type I rationed.  Also if the proportion of bad borrowers 
exceeds a critical limit, then good borrowers may not take the loan because the pooled 
interest rate may be too high to afford and so he will be type II rationed. Thus in 
contrast with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), under these set of assumptions pooling 
equilibrium with both type I and type II credit rationing can arise.  
 
3.3. 3. 2. Case 2: Collateral as a signaling device 
It is assumed that the good borrower will attempt to separate themselves by using 
collateral as a signaling device to get better terms of contract (lower interest rate and 
higher amount of loan). When collateral is used as a signaling device and that is used 
by the lenders for computation of contracts then signaling equilibria (Spence,1973) are 
attained. In general there are many signaling equilibria, some of which may be 
noncooperative Nash equilibria. But Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have shown, Nash 
equilibrium may fail to exist in the insurance market. This may also occur in credit 
markets, because of the commonality of assumptions considered related to information 
asymmetry. Hence the alternative and more restrictive concept of a Riley Reactive 
Equilibrium (Riley, 1979) is considered. This is an equilibrium from which lenders 
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will not deviate because; (i) reactions by other lenders to possible deviations make the 
latter unprofitable, and (ii) such reactions are always to be expected6. In this sense, the 
signaling equilibria, which I derive later, are guaranteed to exist as Reactive 
Equilibrium.  
Further following the results of Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977), that 
under asymmetric information Nash equilibria are never pooling, it can be said that in 
competitive credit market equilibrium (if it exists) distinct credit contracts will be 
offered by banks. The set of contracts },,{ iii LCr  are incentive compatible.  
A good borrower provides collateral and pays a lower interest rate. The bad borrower 
pays a higher interest rate and provides no collateral, as it is riskier to post collateral 
with a higher default probability. Essentially each type of borrower gets a distinct 
contract in equilibrium suiting to his type. The zero profit equilibrium implies that no 
collateral is required from the most risky type. The most risky type receives the same 
contract as under perfect information. As there is no pooling of contracts, there is no 
cross subsidizing on interest rates and so there is no type II rationing. The good 
borrower may still be type I rationed. Type II rationing can occur only when wealth 
constraint binds and a separating equilibrium is not perfectly obtained.7    
To obtain the signaling equilibria, the revelation principle (Myerson, 1979) is used. 
The loan contracts are designed such that, each type of borrower has no incentive to 
choose the contracts of other types. Hence 
 
7) ...(3.            iborrower for   sconstraintity compatibil   incentive is IC   Where,
  borrowers) of(set  ji,  )(IC :   )()(E   and   )(IC:  )()(
i
ji  ijjjjiii EUUEUEU 
 
                                                 
6 Followed from, Louis (1988), 128-152, Besanko and Thakor (1987), and Schmidt- Mohr (1997).  
 
7 For details on these issues, see Bester (1987). 
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Let us first characterize the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) for a borrower i, 
between any pair of contract parameters. Equation (3.7) suggests that the MRS 
between interest rate r, and loan size L, for a loan contract Ki= {ri,Ci,Li} is given by 
 
 guranteed.not  isit however asymmetry n informatio of   presence In the elastic.
perfectly  is MRS so and borrowers allfor  zero isnumerator   the, casebest first  In the
...(3.8)                                   borrowers) ofset (             ,)1(),(
)/)(/(
)/)(/()|(
Lr,
,



i
L
rLAg
rEU
LEU
dL
drCK
i
iiiL
iii
iii
i
i
Lr
b
i 

  
Further for  L < L* (first best)  it is positive, which implies that all borrowers are 
willing to pay higher interest rate for a fixed increase in the size of loan until the first 
best loan amount is attained. Further equation (3.8) suggests that, the borrower with 
higher endowments has higher value of gL, hence )|( CKbi > )|( CKbj  for Ai >Aj. 
Hence type i with higher endowment level is willing to pay higher rate of interest for a 
fixed increase in the size of loan until the first best loan amount is attained, as 
marginal value of loan amount is higher because of complementary endowment effect.  
Similarly the MRS of a borrower i, for collateral C and the interest rate r is given by 
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Equation (3.9) implies that, for higher endowment borrower i (Ai > Aj and so pi >pj) 
the absolute magnitude of )|( LKbi  may be lower than  )|( LKbj  .This is possible 
when  
i
i
p
p1   dominates.  Hence, when  pi is sufficiently distinguishable from pj 
(pi>>pj), the good borrower is willing to provide more collateral for a reduction in 
interest rate. The indifference curve of the good borrower is less steep in C-r space 
than for the bad borrower. It is assumed that the wealth constraint does not bind for 
posting of collateral. 
But if the 
i
i
p
p1  term does not dominate the other term, then the above possibility 
fails and the possibility of type II rationing (of good borrower) or a pooling 
equilibrium arises. A simple illustration will highlight the two scenarios. I assume 
U(X) =X.5 and         g(A,L) =(AL).5.  The good borrower with higher endowments A is 
denoted as i and the bad borrower with lower endowments is denoted as j.   The loan 
amount is computed for first best value, L=L*. Further it is assumed that collateral is 
C= 0.5*L (and C≤W). The realistic values of parameters and results are shown in 
Table 3.3. The last column of the table shows the values of equation (3.9) for both 
types of borrowers. Clearly for these probability values the good borrower is willing to 
post comparatively more collateral to get a fixed amount of reduction in interest rate. 
Table 3.3: Demonstration of Willingness to Post Collateral 
 
Probability 
Of Success 
A L W C U'(.)numerator g(A,L) U'(.)denominator dr/dC: 
Value 
Of 
eq.(3.9) 
Good (i),p=0.7 20 4.14 5 2.06 0.29 9.09 0.16 0.18 
Bad(j),p=0.4 10 2.06 5 1.03 0.22 4.5 0.18 0.98 
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Further using above parametric values the graph in Figure 3.3 neatly demonstrates 
these assertions; also the probability of success is computed as a monotonically 
increasing function of asset endowment, p(A) = a.exp(-10/A), where a is a 
normalizing constant. For an assumed value of W=5, the graph is plotted for A≥10. 
Clearly the absolute value of  dr/dC is monotonically decreasing for  ]40,10[A . This 
range of A, from 2 times to 8 times of annual income is quite reasonable. Beyond that 
the wealth constraint on collateral posting is violated. Also it is seen that the higher the 
value of the productivity coefficient ψ on assets and loan, borrower is willing to post 
less collateral to get the same reduction in the interest rate. 
 
 
The purpose of this exercise was to demonstrate that under reasonable circumstances 
the borrower with higher endowments would be willing to pay higher amount of 
collateral to obtain a fixed reduction in the interest rate.  
Also, the MRS of bank, between r, and L for a contract K, for a borrower i, is given by 
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 
Asset :A
dr/ 
dC 
PSI=0.5
PSI=0.6
PSI=0.7
PSI=0.75 
Figure 3.3: Willingness to Post Collateral: Equation (3.9)  
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Comparing equation (3.11) and equation (3.9) and using zero profit condition, it can 
be shown that, | Cr
l
i LK ,)|( | < | Crbi LK ,)|( |, i.e. banker’s isoprofit curve is flatter 
than the borrower’s indifference curve in C-r space. This observation in conjunction 
with that of equation (3.9) suggesting that indifference curves of good borrower is 
flatter than that of bad borrower (single crossing property) is important. It leads to a 
set of separating equilibrium. The good borrower posts higher collateral and pays 
lower rate of interest, which is opposite to the preference of bad borrower.  But when 
the necessary conditions of wealth constraint is not binding on collateral and single 
crossing property does not hold (which has a reasonable possibility) then a perfect 
separating equilibrium may not be obtained and type II credit rationing may be 
obtained in equilibrium.  
Further comparing equation (3.8) and (3.10) implies that  
Lr
l
i CK ,)|( = Lrbi CK ,)|( ; iff gL(A,L) = ip/)1(  , i.e. expected marginal value of 
project equals marginal cost of the project. 
 
3.3.3.3 Sketch of Solution of Truth Revealing Program (3.7) 
A sketch of solution of truth revealing program (3.7) is presented in Appendix 3.1, 
therein equations– 3.12, 3.13, 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17 simultaneously determine r, C, L, 
and constraint coefficients. The equation (3.17) (reproduced below) helps in pinning 
down the equilibrium value of Li(index i here denotes good borrower). 
The first order derivative with respect to Li of the program (3.7) yields 
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This causes   three possibilities for the loan amount. 
Possibility1: If both terms on right hand side of equation (3.17) are positive, then, 
)1(),A(g iL ii rL  > 0. Hence the equilibrium value of loan size for good borrower 
will be less than compared to perfect competition (MV=MC) value. However 
as        bestlfirst signal
  ii rr , the loan size for her in the signaling equilibrium may be bigger 
or smaller than that of first best. 
Possibility 2:  If the first term is negative and dominates the second term (which is 
positive), then )1(),A(g iL ii rL  < 0. This is possible when Li is sufficiently higher 
than Lj. Hence the equilibrium value of loan size for good borrower exceeds than that 
in perfect competition. 
Possibility 3: If the first term is negative and smaller than the second term (which is 
positive), then )1(),A(g iL ii rL  > 0. Hence equilibrium loan size for good borrower 
is again smaller compared to that of in perfect competition. However, as mentioned in 
possibility 1 the loan size may be bigger or smaller that that of the first best solution.  
bestfirst signalbestfirst signal  L      L or                      L     L     , Hence iiii
   
In the first case the good borrower uses collateral to her advantage to get more loan 
compared to the first best value. However in the second case she gets less than the first 
best case and hence is type 1 rationed. 
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Thus loan size is used as a screening device. The good type is more willing to pay 
higher interest rate to get higher loan (equation 3.8), however to get the separating 
equilibrium, the bank’s optimal strategy does not allow that, as the bad borrower could 
mimic the good borrower. These observations are summarized in the Result 3.3. 
Result 3.3:  In the case of adverse selection, if wealth constraint on collateral is not 
binding, then collateral can be used as a signaling device yielding non rationing (type 
II) separating equilibria. The bad borrower gets the first best contract, whereas the 
good borrower posts collateral to bargain for lower interest rate – but their loan size 
may be larger or smaller than that of the first best solution. In the latter case good 
borrower is type I rationed. If the wealth constraint is binding, then perfect-separating 
equilibria (distinct contracts for all types) may not be obtained resulting in pooling 
equilibria with both types of rationing. 
This is demonstrated in Figure 3.4. The good borrower (index 1) gets contract A, and 
the bad borrower (index 2) gets contract B, such that r1 < r2 and C1 > C2. This 
demonstrates a separating equilibrium. Good borrower needs to post collateral C1, to 
separate himself from bad borrower. 
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K 
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The point D cannot be an equilibrium because bad one also likes that, but the bank 
will incur loss if such pooling contract is offered. Also bad borrower is indifferent 
between the contracts at A and B, but he can not pool at A, since then the bank can 
offer a contract at X, which is liked by both the good borrower and the bank – thus the 
pooling equilibrium at A will also not survive. Hence the only equilibrium that 
survives is the set of separating equilibria at A and B. The bad borrower receives the 
same contract as under perfect information.  
However the values of parameters may be such that the above described separating 
equilibrium may not be achieved, then the pooling equilibrium as described earlier 
may be obtained and that may lead to both type I and type II rationing. 
Further it can be shown that Nash equilibrium may not exist altogether. In figure 3.4, 
if the black continuous line is bank’s iso-profit curve for the population average, then 
the pair of contracts A and B cannot be a separating equilibrium. There exits a pooling 
contract as shown by K. The contract K is liked by both type of borrowers and also by 
the bank. The possibility of this increase as the proportion of good borrower increases. 
Hence the existence of pair of separating equilibrium is guaranteed only if the 
proportion of good borrowers is less than a critical value γ*. This leads to result 3.4.  
But as shown by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) a pooling Nash equilibrium does not 
exist. To overcome the nonexistence problem of Nash equilibrium, concept of Riley 
Reactive Equilibrium is used. The deviating lender would take into account that the 
competing banks would react by offering additional profitable contracts and if that 
implies the loss for the first bank, then it would not offer such deviating contract in the 
first place. So in such a framework the Reactive equilibrium is always separating (A, 
B).  This discussion leads to the following result. 
Result 3.4:  Under suitable parametric assumptions, the separating signaling 
equilibrium is obtained only if the proportion of good borrowers is less than a critical 
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value γ*.  However if the concept of RRE is used then the separating equilibrium 
always survives.  
Results 3.3 and 3.4 are demonstrated neatly in L- r plane with the help of Figure 3.5. 
 
 
The continuous blue line is demand curve of loan for both types of borrowers. It 
follows from equation (3.4) (which is hyperbolic), but a downward sloping line is used 
for simplicity of demonstration without distorting the results. Furthermore, a single 
demand curve has been used for both good and bad type of borrowers; again this is for 
simplicity. As evident from equation (3.4) demand curve for bad type of borrower 
with less assets (A) will be actually steeper, that will strengthen the depiction of 
results.  The continuous horizontal lines are supply curves of loan for different types 
of borrowers in the first best case. This follows from equation (3.5). The short dashed 
horizontal line is supply curve under adverse selection set up for pooling equilibrium. 
This follows from equation (3.6).  
In the first best situation the good type gets contract CG* (lower r* and higher L*) and 
the bad type gets contract CB*(higher r* and lower L*). In the adverse selection set up 
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Figure 3.5: Market Equilibria in First Best (FB) and Adverse Selection 
Condition
CB*: Contract for Bad Type in First Best 
CG*: Contract for Good Type in First Best 
CP : Contract in Pooling Equilibrium 
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Separating Equilibrium for Good Type 
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there are two possibilities- a pooling equilibrium and a separating equilibrium. In the 
case of a pooling equilibrium (no collateral is used) both types of borrowers get same 
contract CP, which follows from equation (3.6). Clearly good type borrower cross 
subsidizes the bad type borrower and incurs a welfare loss.  
But when collateral is used as a signaling device; signaling equilibria (separating in 
nature) are obtained as predicted by equations (3.8 -3.17: derived in Appendix 3.1). 
The bad borrower continues to get the first best contract at  CB*. The good borrower 
posts collateral and bargains for lower interest rate as predicted by equation (3.13), 
hence she faces a perfectly elastic supply curve rC shown by long dashed horizontal 
line. Also her demand curve rotates inside (steeper) as predicted by equations (3.3 and 
3. 13), as for same amount of loan she needs to pay a lower interest rate. Now 
depending upon the amount of tilt the good type of borrower gets either contract A1 
(L<L*), or contract A2 (L=L*), or contract A3 (L>L*). If the good borrower gets 
contract A1 then evidently she is type I rationed. 
 
3.3.4. Strategic Default and Limiting the Loan Size   
So far the asymmetric information problem in credit market has been analyzed in 
terms of hidden types of borrowers. But it may also come from hidden actions of the 
borrower – normally known as moral hazard. If a borrower gets loan larger than a 
certain value such that defaulting is rational, then she will strategically default. The 
bank is aware of such incentive problem and seeks an equilibrium on an amount of 
loan restrictL  , such that the borrower is indifferent between repaying the loan or 
defaulting.  Thus loan size is used as an incentive device to resolve the problem of 
strategic default. Now if restrictL , turns out to be less than L*, then type I rationing is 
observed. In this section I demonstrate the economics of moral hazard using 
  56
comparative analysis of net utility gain from repaying the loan or defaulting on the 
loan in an infinite time horizon set up.  
The maximum utility the borrower can get from defaulting is 
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 On the other hand, the minimum the borrower gets from perfect repayment is the 
discounted present value of utility, V(L) over an infinite horizon of lending and 
borrowing relationship. Participation constraint of the borrower is assumed to be 
satisfied for loan size more than and equal to a cut off value of   
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Equation (3.19) gives a ceiling on L such that strategic default is not obtained. The left 
hand side of equation (3.19) essentially shows extra gain in utility by not defaulting 
while the right hand side shows extra gain in utility by defaulting in an infinite time 
horizon framework.  The above equation is analytically characterized as following. 
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1. For reasonable values of parameters, assets endowment, income in every period, 
amount of loan L, and collateral C subject to satisfaction of wealth constraint; the left 
hand side (L.H.S.) of the equation (3.19) will be concave. It is demonstrated as 
following.  
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Because of concavity assumptions on U (.) and g (.) the terms in both parentheses are 
negative. However for reasonable parametric assumptions the first one is likely to 
dominate in magnitude and thus the second order derivative of left hand side of 
equation (3.19) at all points in the domain of reasonable values of L will be negative 
and hence it will be concave for such values of L. This is shown in Figure 3.6. 
2. The right hand side of the equation (3.19) is strictly convex in L and monotonically 
rising in L, as depicted in figure 3.6. It is shown as follows: 
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3. Since the L.H.S. of equation (3.19) is concave in L and the R.H.S. of the equation is 
monotonically rising in L and convex in L, there exists an internal L (which is Lrestrict) 
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such that the inequality of equation (3.19) is violated above Lrestrict . This observation 
is shown in Figure 3.6. 
4. Even if the L.H.S. of equation (3.19) for very large values of A is not concave, then 
because the R.H.S. of the equation is monotonically rising and convex in A, it will 
exceed the L.H.S. of the equation for some value of L and thus Lrestrict  will always be 
obtained. 
Hence under most reasonable conditions the lender will not provide a loan beyond 
Lrestrict, since that will induce the borrower to strategically default on the loan. 
 
 
These observations are neatly demonstrated with the help of Figure 3.6. Again the 
utility function is assumed to be   U(X) =X.5 and production function is   g(A,L) 
=(AL).5. The values of parameters assumed are; β=.8, p=.7, ψ=(.5 ,.4), A=40, and r=.1.   
Further it is assumed that collateral is C= 0.5*L (and C≤W). The value of income 
endowment in every period is assumed as W=10 and loan amount approved – L is at 
most two times of W , and collateral C is 50 percent of loan amount subject to 
satisfaction of wealth constraint. Evidently the R.H.S. of equation (3.19) crosses the 
L.H.S. of the equation L=17.5. Hence under this scenario Lrestrict =17.5, wheras 
L*(first best) = 8.26 – so for these parametric values type I rationing is not observed. 
L Lrestricted 
R.H.S. of 
Equation (3.19)
L.H.S. of 
Equation Value of 
L.H.S. 
and 
R.H.S of  
Equation
Figure 3.6: Loan Amount Restriction Due to Moral Hazarded  
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Further as observed from the Figure 3.7 the value of Lrestrict decreases with lower value 
of productivity coefficient (ψ) of capital. Now comparing with the first best scenario, 
we get 
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Further it is shown in table 3.4 that   Lrestrict  decreases with lower values of β (patience 
factor) and also it decreases with lower value of probability of success p. It is also 
evident that for specific lower values of β or p, Lrestrict <L* is obtained and hence type 
I rationing is attained in equilibrium. This leads to Result 3.5.  
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Figure 3.7: Loan Amount Restriction Due to Moral Hazard. 
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Table 3.4: Variation of  Lrestrict  and L*  with respect to β  and p 
 
Beta ,β Lrestrict (for p=0.7) L* Probability of success ,p (for β=.8) Lrestrict 
0.8 17.5 8.26 0.8 19.5 
0.7 14.5 8.26 0.7 17.5 
0.6 13.5 8.26 0.6 13.5 
0.5 11.5 8.26 0.5 10.5 
0.4 8.5 8.26 0.4 8 
0.35 7.5 8.26 0.3 5.5 
0.3 6.5 8.26   
Result 3.5: The lender uses the loan size as an incentive device to resolve the strategic 
default problem. If the restricted loan size for a borrower is less than the first best 
value then the borrower is type I rationed. The limit on loan size is found to be an 
increasing function of the borrower’s patience factor , and her endowment vector. 
Hence the borrowers who are poor in endowment and impatient (lower ) obtain 
smaller loans as a consequence of type I rationing.  This is shown in Figure 3.8. 
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3.3.5 Incentive Problem in Infinite Horizon Setup8  
Above strategic default analysis can be further formalized using equation (3.19) as 
following.  Reversing the inequality sign of equation (3.19), condition for strategic 
default is obtained as following 
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Further shuffling the terms, condition for strategic default obtained is: 
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Here, Y= net income in current period inclusive of endowments and project income, 
and R=(1+r)L = repayment obligations.  Equation (3.21) basically suggests that if net 
gains from not repaying in the current period are larger than the discounted sum of 
values of net gain from not defaulting for all future periods, then it is optimal to 
default in present 
Now equation (3.21) can be conveniently written in the following modified form. 
 
..(3.22)         U(W)}- )()1{()}()()1{(),( CWUpRYUCYUpRY    
Here ),( RY  can be considered as an index function, which represents a propensity to 
default on the loan strategically. 
The first term on the left hand side is multiplied by (1-β) that may be equal to 0.1 or 
so, which makes this term quite small in comparison to the second term, even though 
collateral amount is less than repayment obligations. Further, U (.) is a strictly concave 
function; these conditions imply that  
                                                 
8 Discussion here benefits from Allen (1983), and Eaton and Gersowitz (1981), and Frexias, Xavier and 
Rochet, Jean – Charles (1997). 
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 Equation (3.25) suggests that likelihood of strategic default increases as R i.e. 
repayment obligation (loan size, interest rate) increases or also when the Y the project 
output decreases.  These observations are summarized in Result 3.6. 
Result 3.6:  The borrower chooses to strategically default on the loan, when current 
output from the project is low compared to the repayment obligations. And the 
likelihood of strategic default increases with the quantity of repayment obligations. 
 
3.4. Welfare Implications of Credit Rationing 
The presence of asymmetric information among borrowers and lenders violates the 
completeness assumptions of credit market resulting in equilibrium outcomes that can 
be Pareto inefficient9. In the perfect competition framework loan is allocated such that 
marginal benefit (MB) of investing this loan equals its marginal cost (MC). But when 
credit rationing takes place, the MB is greater than MC introducing an efficiency loss. 
In the perfect competitive environment the equilibrium allocation needs to satisfy 
three necessary conditions; (i) Profit maximization by each firms, (ii) Utility 
                                                 
9 Followed from Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (henceforth MWG), 1995 – Chapter 10. 
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maximization by each consumers, and (iii) Market clearing for each good. However in 
the incomplete market set up, additional constraints need to be satisfied. For example 
in the case of adverse selection, the incentive compatibility constraint of the bad 
borrower binds in equilibrium in addition of satisfying of incentive compatibility and 
participation constraints of all agents.  Similarly in the case of moral hazard the above 
constraints need to be satisfied and often these constraints bind. These additional 
constraints lead to a set of admissible allocations, which is a subset of the allocations 
that are available in the case of perfect competition. Hence the equilibrium allocations 
in incomplete market are Pareto dominated by that of perfect competition.  
 
3.4.1. A Simple Analysis of Welfare Loss 
The measure of social welfare used here is aggregate surplus; the sum of surplus 
earned by the borrower and the lender. This measure of social welfare is justified 
under the assumption that markets for other goods are competitive9.  As mentioned 
earlier the borrower earns profit π from undertaking the project when it is successful 
with probability p (A). In the case of failure he loses the collateral. 
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It is evident that (L*,r) derived here is same as derived in equation (3.4); which shows 
that in perfect competition the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal. 
Now it is assumed that there are two types of borrowers in the economy; good 
borrowers with success probability p constitute µ fraction of the economy and bad 
borrowers with success probability q (p>q) constitute 1- µ fraction of the economy. 
The Aggregate surplus for good borrower is computed as  
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quation (3.28) shows that aggregate surplus is linearly increasing in L*. Hence if   L*  
is  restricted in the asymmetric information set up because of additional binding 
constraints then aggregate surplus decreases and  net loss of social welfare occurs. It 
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further shows that AS is linearly increasing in p (probability of success), and           
nonlinearly decreasing in r, the interest rate charged to the borrower. Hence the 
policies which help in increasing p and reducing r can be welfare improving. 
 
3.4.2 Welfare Loss in the case of Adverse Selection 
When the type of borrower is not known to the lender, then as analyzed in the 
foregoing section, both pooling equilibrium and separating equilibrium are possible, 
depending upon whether the wealth constraint is binding on collateral posting ability 
or not. Welfare evaluations are conducted next for these two possibilities.  
3.4.2.1. Wealth Constraint Binding on Collateral 
 It has been seen that when the wealth constraint is binding on collateral then a 
separating equilibrium may not be obtained. Consequently a pooling equilibrium may 
be obtained – in which the interest rate faced by the good borrower is higher than that 
for perfect competition. The interest faced by all borrowers is same, i.e.    
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Also this allocation is Pareto inefficient, with the good borrower suffering net surplus 
loss. There is net efficiency loss as the bad borrower gets more than Pareto optimal 
loan and the good borrower gets less than the Pareto optimal loan amount. Moreover if 
μ is sufficiently small, then _r  will be large such that the good borrower’s participation 
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constraint is violated and she drops out of the credit market. In such a scenario only 
bad borrowers are left in the credit market and now  
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3.4.2.2 Wealth Constraint not binding on Collateral  
When wealth constraint does not bind for collateral posting, then a perfect separating 
equilibrium is obtained. The bad borrower gets a first best contract (without collateral) 
and suffers no welfare loss. The good borrower posts collateral and obtains a loan at 
the lower interest rate   
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Further as discussed therein the loan amount obtained by good borrower may be 
smaller, equal or larger than that of first best. Hence signaling may lead to Pareto 
improvement or worsening for good borrower. Overall the net effects of signaling 
activities are ambiguous. However, the good borrower needs to post costly collateral 
to differentiate himself from the bad borrower, which may reduce his net surplus, as 
shown following. 
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This implies that the aggregate surplus is strictly lower than that of the perfect 
information model and hence it is a second best solution. 
 
3.4.3. Welfare Loss in the case of Moral Hazard 
As discussed earlier, the lender may restrict the loan size for a borrower such that the 
borrower is not tempted to strategically default on loan at a later date. Here usually 
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both the participation constraint and incentive constraint binds. Now if the restricted 
loan size for any type of borrower is lower than that of the first best solution, then 
again the net aggregate surplus is reduced leading to net welfare loss. 
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 In other words credit rationing reduces overall welfare. 
These observations can be neatly shown with the help of Figure 3.9. The continuous 
curve is AS curve (say for good borrower) under perfect competition and the dashed 
curve is AS curve under adverse selection set up. As discussed earlier it is quite 
possible that for the good borrower the loan size approved under adverse selection 
(LAs)  and moral hazard (LM)  will be smaller than L* , i.e.  LAs ≤ L* and also LM≤ L*. 
As a result aggregate surplus obtained under adverse selection (ASAs) and moral 
hazard (ASM) framework are less than that of perfect competition (AS*). 
 
 
These findings are summarized in Result 3.7. 
Result 3.7: Using aggregate surplus (borrower surplus plus lender surplus) for the 
measure of social welfare, it is found that aggregate surplus value under adverse 
L
L* 
AS 
LAs LM 
AS* 
ASAD 
ASM 
Continuous (dashed) curve: AS curve 
under Perfect Competition (Under 
Adverse Selection) .   L*, LAs, LM : 
Loan approved under perfect 
Figure 3.9: Aggregate Surplus under Different Market Conditions 
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selection or moral hazard conditions are strictly less than compared to the value 
obtained in perfect competition. Hence credit rationing reduces overall welfare. The 
policies which help in reducing information asymmetry may be welfare enhancing. 
Also the policies which help in increasing success probability q and reducing interest 
rate r can be welfare improving. 
 
3. 4.4 Interest Rate Elasticity of Loan Demand 
Price elasticity of loan demand has useful policy implications. Whether the demand 
for loan is price elastic or inelastic i.e., whether 1 percent reduction of the interest rate 
will lead to increase in demand of loan by more than 1 percent or less than this; 
whether the price elasticity value is uniform across all sections of people or it varies 
depending on assets endowments - these are some of the important policy questions.  
One earlier study by Weersink et al (1994) estimated the demand for agricultural 
credit in the USA using a dynamic duality approach that provided estimates of short 
run (inelastic) and long run (elastic) elasticities. Recently a renewed interest has 
developed to investigate these matters particularly related to rural credit markets. 
Dehejia et al (2007) in context of their studies of microfinance related credit market in 
Bangladesh, found the interest elasticities of loan demand ranging from (-0.73 to -
1.04). They also found that less wealthy borrowers are more price responsive than 
wealthier borrowers. Whereas,   Karlan and Zinman (2006) found the credit demand to 
be highly price sensitive in context of their studies in a South African Microfinance 
credit market. However, their result is based on a randomized experiment that 
estimates demand curve by using mail solicitation method rather than using the actual 
field data.  
Both these papers are empirical in nature and no analytical expression has been 
developed to estimate the price elasticity of loan demand. Benefitting from the 
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analytical framework developed in section 3, an expression for that is developed here. 
As close form solutions of loan demand for adverse selection and strategic default 
scenarios are cumbersome to obtain, the analysis is presented here for the first best i.e. 
perfect competition case. This may provide valuable insights into the above queries for 
the cases where information asymmetry can not be ignored.  
The expression for price elasticity is developed using the loan demand and supply 
equations of the perfect competition case, namely equations (3.4) and (3.5). 
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Interest elasticity of loan demand for a given value of L, and r is calculated using the 
standard first derivative method as following  
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Thus we obtain a simple expression for interest elasticity of loan demand and find that 
for any value of L and r, it depends directly on r only, and through r it depends on L* 
also.  Further, the absolute value of the elasticity is always less than 1, hence equation 
(3.4A) suggests that demand for loan is price inelastic. This result is in close 
conformity with the empirical findings of Dehejia et al (2007). Also we obtain 
following comparative statics 

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Hence, the absolute value of price elasticity is an increasing function of r. In the 
neighborhood of very low interest rates it is nearly zero, hence the loan demand is 
quite price inelastic for very low interest rates. The price responsiveness increases 
with increasing interest rates, but it always remains below unity. This implies that 
when interest rates are already very low, further reduction of interest rate will not help 
in increasing the demand much. However, when interest rates are high, further 
reduction in interest rates will help in increasing the loan demand but for all values of 
the interest rate the price responsiveness will be less than unitary.  
Further using loan supply equation (3.5), we can investigate the relationship of asset 
endowments and interest elasticity of loan demand as following: 
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Equation (3.4B) suggests that the households having lower assets are more price 
responsive. Hence the poorer families will increase the loan demand comparatively 
more if interest rate is reduced by same amount for all the families. This result is also 
in conformity with the empirical findings of Dehejia et al (2007). 
These findings are summarized in Result 3.8. 
Result 3.8: The interest rate elasticity of loan demand is found to be less than 1. 
Hence the loan demand is price inelastic. The absolute value of price responsiveness 
increases with interest rate. Also it decreases with increasing value of family assets. 
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3.4.5 Policy Intervention10 
 It has been demonstrated that information asymmetry in credit market generates 
Pareto inefficient contracts. A Pareto improving market intervention can be made only 
when the market equilibrium allocation fails to be a constrained Pareto optimum (an 
allocation that cannot be Pareto improved by an authority who is equally unable to 
observe agents’ private information). Some of the equilibria (separating and good 
borrower gets at least L*) discussed in adverse selection set up are essentially 
constrained Pareto optima. Furthermore, even if it is impossible to Pareto improve a 
constrained Pareto optimal allocation; market intervention could still be justified to 
attain specific distributional goals; for example the welfare of various types of 
borrowers are weighted differently then aggregate surplus can be raised from the 
equilibrium level although some of the borrowers are made worse off in the process.  
The welfare analysis conducted in section 4.3 and analysis of price elasticity of loan 
demand conducted in section 4.4 suggests following policy interventions that may 
improve aggregate welfare: 
1. The policies which may reduce information asymmetry. The microfinance credit 
programs (Morduch, 1999) essentially works on this principle that uses joint 
liability lending mechanism to mitigate the problems of information asymmetry.  
2. The policies which increase the success probability (q) of the bad borrower 
(having lower assets, here) and reduce interest rate r, are welfare enhancing. This 
essentially works on the principle that Pareto improving market interventions need 
to loosen the constraints imposed by adverse selection or moral hazard problem. 
These constraints essentially help the borrowers to self-select the contracts most 
suitable to their type. Basically the bad borrowers want to mimic the good 
borrowers. Hence the policies that help in loosening the incentive compatibility 
                                                 
10 Discussion benefits from Mas-Colell et al (1995)– Chapters 10, 13, and 23, and Gale (1989). 
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constraints of bad borrowers increase aggregate welfare. Increasing the probability 
of success q will reduce interest for the borrower. This will further reduce 
collateral requirements for the good borrower (following from incentive 
compatibility constraint) and this increases efficiency. Loan guarantees (full or 
partial) for bad borrowers effectively increase her probability of success q and 
hence will reduce interest for her.  
3. The Result 3.8 suggests that loan demand is price inelastic. However, it is 
comparatively more price responsive for the families having lower assets also the 
absolute value of price responsiveness increases with interest rate. Hence the bad 
borrowers, who have lower assets and face higher interest rates, may benefit more 
if interest rate is reduced for them. The loan demand and take-up may increase 
comparatively more by these families following interest rate reduction. Loan 
guarantees or subsidy may help in reducing interest rates faced by these families. 
 
3.5. Empirical Analysis 
The analytical framework developed in the earlier sections highlights the prevalence 
of information asymmetry in credit market as a major factor contributing to credit 
rationing. As explained earlier the information asymmetry arises because the borrower 
has private knowledge about his risk type (Asset endowment in this chapter) and the 
contracts (combination of interest, collaterals and loan size) may induce strategic 
default. Consequently we see that credit rationing can be explained by a metric of 
asset endowments, interest rates, collaterals etc. In this section empirical strategies are 
developed; (i) to measure the propensity of credit rationing at household level and to 
estimate the nature of associations of important factors which explain that, and (ii) to 
test for presence of information asymmetry in the credit market.   
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The demand and supply equations of loans developed in first best case will be used as 
the underlying model for econometric estimation. In first best case these are 
represented by equations 3.4 and 3.5, which are repeated here as following: 
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In the demand equation, interest rate r comes from supply equation (lender’s decision), 
which is a function of assets (A), collateral posted (C) and loan size (L). The supply 
equation is non linear in collateral and loan size. So there is a problem of simultaneity 
here.  Ideally these equations should be estimated as a system of equations using full 
information maximum likelihood (FIML) method. But that seems intractable. 
Alternatively demand equation can be estimated if an instrumental variable of interest 
rate is used. In absence of a good instrument for interest rate, it also seems difficult. 
To make the estimations tractable, the interest rate in demand equation is 
approximately replaced from the supply equation – noting the fact that interest rate is 
monotonically decreasing with the amount of collateral and varies in some nonlinear 
manner with asset size. But in the demand equation asset is already controlled for and 
the non-linearities can be approximately tackled by taking its powers or interactions 
with other covariates. So simply a collateral term is added in the demand equation – 
doing so, some efficiency is sacrificed, but that’s the best we can do here.  
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Where, X is a set of control variables, and ε is error term that helps in explaining the 
deviations from the first best case.  
The credit rationing equation (essentially supply equation: in the sense of supply of 
loan < demand of loan) is estimated using following estimation model 
...(3.36)                                            C X )A /1(      RationedCredit     
Here inverse of assets A is used, as A appears that way in the interest rate equation. It 
also ensures that a positive value of credit rationing is obtained, as every one is 
assumed to be credit rationed to some extent (between 0 and 1).  X is a set of control 
variables, and ν is error term. 
Next part of this section discusses identification strategy to consistently estimate 
above equations. 
 
3.5 A. Econometric Model of Credit Rationing  
The estimable demand and supply equations (3.35) and (3.36) will be used to estimate 
the extent of credit rationing in the rural areas of India and China using the household 
survey data mentioned earlier.  Based upon responses on a specific set of survey 
questions, a household belonging to any of the following categories has been assigned 
as credit rationed – (i) whose loan application is rejected, (ii) who could not get 
adequate credit for various purposes (consumption, education, health, farming or 
business), and (iii) who never obtained desired amount of credit.  
This measure of credit rationing suffers from serious limitations, such as – (i) It does 
not measure the propensity of credit constrainedness of a person.  Realistically every 
person depending upon her socio- economic conditions may be credit rationed to some 
extent. In a scale of zero to one; zero means not credit rationed at all and one means 
fully credit rationed and any value in between implies partially credit rationed. (ii) 
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Then in the data the first two categories of credit rationed families are explicitly 
identified. The third category, the desired amount of credit of a family is not observed.  
To overcome these two limitations econometric methods as discussed next are used to 
appropriately measure the extent of credit rationing and to understand the nature of 
associations of important observable covariates that explain credit rationing. The 
summary description of formal credit market related outcomes for the households are 
reported in Table 3.5.    
Table 3.5: Description of Borrowing Behavior and Credit Constraint 
 
China India Variable (binary variables) : Values 
reported in percentage Mean Observations Mean Observations 
Loan application rejected (a) .31 1010 .41 399 
Could not get adequate loan for various 
purposes  (b) 
.30 756 .45 384 
Never get desired amount of loan (c) .38 1320 .62 400 
Sometimes got desired amount of loan .30 1320 .30 400 
Always got desired amount of loan .32 1320 .07 400 
Credit Rationed =1; if either of a,b,c=1 .58 1418 .66 400 
 
3.5. A.1. Identification Strategy 
Our main objective is to consistently estimate equations 3.35 and 3.36 for whole 
sample. But the credit market outcomes modeled by these equations are estimated only 
for a subset of population for whom the outcomes have been observed. The Demand 
for credit is a latent variable and we observe only positive demand for a part of the 
population. So also supply decision of lender is a latent variable and only positive loan 
supply is observed for a part of this population. Similarly desired amount of credit for 
this part of population is a latent variable and we observe only the actual amount of 
credit the borrower gets. Thus there are sample selections in observations at two stages 
– one at demand stage and another at supply stage. Hence if a model is estimated to 
understand the relationship (causal or plain association) of explanatory variables with 
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the amount of credit obtained then the estimated coefficients suffer from selection 
bias, which need to be corrected. The correction is achieved using Heckman sample 
selection correction methodology, explained in Appendix 3.2.  
Essentially we proceed as follows. In first stage equations B1 and B2 (binary variants 
of equations 3.35 and 3.36 respectively) are estimated using probit regression method. 
In equation B1 the dependent variable Bd indicates whether the borrower has positive 
demand of formal loan. The families who are either successful in obtaining loan or 
who are denied loan are considered to have positive demand for loan, Bd =1 for them 
and zero for others. Apparently these two categories of families are characteristically 
different along some of the variables as shown in Table 3.6.  
 
Table 3.6: Summary statistics of important variables for the two types of households 
 
 India : N=400 China: N= 1418 
Variable Mean(success) Mean (denied) Mean(success) Mean (denied) 
Household size 6.94 6.04 (*) 4.62 4.50 (*) 
Education (1-4) 2.74 2.51  (*) 2.43 2.35 
Asset per capita 
(currency) 
71175.61 60930.76 (*) 15148.47 13326.36 (*) 
High saving (%) .04 .02  (*) .10 .16  (*) 
Informal loan 
(%) 
12.34 29.20 (*) 24.29 38.29 (*) 
N.B.   * Indicates the difference is statistically significant at 5% level. 
In equation B2 the dependent variable Bs indicates whether the borrower gets the 
desired amount of loan. It is an indirect measure of whether the borrower is not credit 
rationed. Hence for the families who are not found to be credit rationed, Bs=1 and zero 
otherwise.  Also the inverse mills ratios  Md and Ms  are computed for each 
observation from above estimations.   Then OLS model related to demand for loan 
(equation 3.35) is estimated using equation B7 in which the Md and Ms are included to 
control for selection problem.  These equations are shown as following. 
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3.5. A.3. Estimations of the Models 
For consistent estimation of the coefficients, it is necessary that E(X’ε) = 0. This 
assumption gets substantially violated when – (i) any of the explanatory variables is 
affected by the explained variable because of simultaneity; and (ii) any of the 
explanatory variables is not strictly exogenous and is determined by other observable 
and unobservable variables, which may be correlated with the error term. Basically the 
explanatory variables should be exogenous and not correlated with the error term.  
This requirement has been duly followed here when choosing explanatory variables 
for estimations of equations B1 and B2. The relevant explanatory variables used are 
sex, age, education, asset per capita, income source (farming major source=1), high 
saving category (saving > 10%), not prefer to be indebted to bank or RCC, and various 
types of apprehensions in obtaining loan such as unpaid debts, high interest rates, 
delay and bribe. Also regional dummies are used, 3 dummies in the case of India and 1 
in the case of China. As we have no data on amount of collateral posted, it is proxied 
by the belief of borrower related to his ability to post collateral (“lack collateral”) and 
whether the borrower has been denied loan because of collateral (“denied collateral”).  
The summary statistics of important household variables are presented in Table 3.7, 
and the summary statistics of other explanatory variables are reported in Table 3.8. 
These variables are used to control for some of the beliefs of the borrowers, which 
may affect his propensity of demand for loan from formal sources.  
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Table 3.7: Summary statistics of important Household Variables 
 
 China India 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Farm Size( mu /acre) 1556 5.47 3.99 400 2.98 2.40 
Household incomea 1555 11462.7 12176.89 400 45577.25 37631.05 
Asset Valuea 1419 52286.8 54910.84 400 408352.5 600320.7 
Income source (1=farm) 1419 .42 .49 400 .77 .41 
Education (1-4)b 754 2.40 .78 400 2.54 .82 
Sex  (1=female) 756 .10 .30 400 .003 (.05) 
Age (Years) 754 40-50 10 400 47.5 11.5 
Household Size 1155 4.4 1.55 400 6.6 3.5 
amount of debta 1020 13336.8 26585.34 337 15671.96 21400.19 
a. Units are local currency (RMB in China / Rupees in India).  b. Education: 1- No 
schooling, 2 – Primary schooling, 3- Secondary schooling, 4 – College and above.  
 
Table 3.8: Summary Statistic of Other Explanatory Variables (Beliefs of Borrower) 
 
Variable: Binary variables (1=yes, 0=no) Mean (s.d.)  : 
China (N=756) 
Mean (s.d.) : 
India (N=384) 
Lacks collateral .53 (.50) .47 (.50) 
Denied loan because of collateral .64 (.47) N=525 .50 (50) : N=175 
Apprehensions because of unpaid debts* .51 (.50) .46 (.50) 
Apprehensions because of high interest rates* .68 (.46) .34 (.47) 
Apprehensions because of delay and bribe* .45 (.50) .93 (.24) 
Do not like to be indebted to a bank or RCC .67 (.47) .44 (.50) 
High saving (>10% =1) .19 (.40) .04 (.19) 
 Note for *: Apprehensions means, apprehensions in obtaining formal loans 
 
Before explaining the estimation results, using equations 3.35 and 3.36 we can make 
key conjectures on natures of associations of variables, mentioned as following. 
1. Loan demand is likely to increase with age in the beginning as credit needs are 
high in the beginning of life cycle but later it decreases, hence square of age is 
used to control for that. Loan supply may also follow similar pattern. 
2. Loan demand is likely to increase with assets level, but as explained earlier both 
linear and quadratic terms are introduced.  
3. The loan supply is likely to increase with assets level. 
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4. Loan demand is likely to increase with ability to post larger amount of collateral. 
Loan supply is also likely to increase with this. 
5. Loan Demand is likely to increase with education level, as education and asset are 
found to be positively correlated. Loan supply is also likely to show similar 
behavior. 
6. Loan demand is likely to be negatively affected by various types of apprehensions 
as mentioned above. There are no a priori conjectures on supply part. 
These conjectures are also hypothesized to hold for Propensity of demand for loan.   
Now the probit estimation results of equation B1 (propensity of demand for formal 
loan) are reported in Table 3.9.  
 
Table 3.9:    Propensity of Demand of Formal Loan* = Xβ + εd (probit) 
 
India  (384) China (660) Positive  Demand for loan (1=yes, 0=no) 
(obtained and denied =1) Coef. Z Coef. Z 
Sex (Female=1)   -0.285 -1.68 
Age .068 1.44 -0.135 -0.39 
Age square -.0006 -1.43 0.026 0.41 
Household size -.051* -1.86 -0.094* -1.72 
Education .230* 1.98 -0.011 -0.16 
Income Source (Farm=1) .491* 2.24 -0.026 -0.24 
Asset  per capita -.161* -1.84 -0.610* -1.99 
Asset per capita sq .004 1.57 0.088* 2.07 
Lacks collateral (1=yes) -.47* -2.25 -0.077 -0.69 
Denied loan for collateral (1=yes) 2.10* 5.83 1.077* 7.08 
Apprehensions because of unpaid debts (1=yes) 1.14* 5.69 0.196* 1.82 
Apprehensions  of high interest rates (1=yes) -.35 -1.58 -0.113 -0.94 
Apprehensions   of delay and bribe (1=yes) .794* 1.93 0.278* 2.53 
Do not like to be indebted  to a bank or RCC 
(1=yes) 
-.20 -1.02 -0.27* -2.3 
High saving (1: saving>10% ) .510 1.20 -0.482* -3.46 
Asset quintile group (1 to 5 in increasing order) .30* 1.96 0.251* 2.3 
region6 .392 1.36 0.220* 1.85 
region8 0.89* 2.54   
region9 .474* 1.81   
India:  LR χ2 (19) =195.38;    Prob > χ2 = 0.00;     N=384;   Psudo R2 = 0.40                
China: LR χ2 (17) =  119.71 ;    Prob > χ2   =   0.00 ; Pseudo R2  =   0.14 
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Both probit regressions are significant (high χ2 statistic). Also many variables are 
individually significant. We are interested in the nature of associations rather than 
marginal effects of variables. From this regression following inferences are drawn: 
1. Age is found to be insignificant in the case of both China and India, but bears 
conjectured sign in the case of India.  
2. Education is found to be significant and positively associated with propensity of 
demand for India but not found to be significant for China. 
3. Household size is negatively associated in the case of both countries. It means that 
with increasing family size the likelihood of demand for formal loan decreases. 
4. In the case of India, apparently families depend more on credit for farming as this 
variable is found positively associated. 
5. The likelihood of demand for loan in both the countries seems to vary 
quadratically with asset size.  For low values of assets it is low and because of 
positive quadratic factor it increases in a convex manner with asset size. It is as per 
the conjecture.  
6. In the case of India, likelihood of demand for loan is negatively associated with the 
belief of lack of ability to post collateral – which is as per the conjecture.  Also in 
the case of both the countries the propensity of demand for loan is positively 
associated with the belief of denial a loan because of lack of collateral variable. 
This positive coefficient appears to be driven by the denied group of families, for 
whom propensity of loan demand is also 1. These findings highlight the role of 
collateral in non price credit rationing.  
7. In the case of both the countries the likelihood of demand of loan is negatively (not 
significant) associated with borrower’s apprehension of high interest rate. This 
finding gives evidence on downward sloping loan demand curve. Also in the case 
of both the countries it is negatively associated with the preference of borrower not 
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to be indebted to banks or RCC. But other two apprehensions (apprehensions of 
unpaid debts and apprehensions of delay and bribe) are found to be positively 
associated with propensity of demand for loan. The denied group of families 
apparently drives these two counterintuitive results.  
8. In the case of China, higher saving is negatively associated with the propensity of 
demand of a loan. Apparently families have less propensities to demand a loan, 
who save more. But in the case of India the relation goes otherwise. 
In the case of some of the variables the associations are found to go other way.  It may 
be happening because the dependent variable includes two types of families – one who 
got the loan and others who are denied. As shown earlier these two categories of 
families characteristically differ along some of the variables.  
Thereafter the inverse mills ratio (M1) is computed for the observations of both the 
countries and summary statistics are summarized in Table 3.10.  This variable is used 
in the estimation of equation (B2) i.e propensity of not being credit rationed. Loan 
supply is observed only for the families for whom binary loan demand variable is 1, 
others are artificially bunched at zero. The inverse mills ratio obtained from demand 
equation is used in the supply equation to control for this selection bias. 
Table 3.10: Summary statistics of Predicted values of Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR, M1) 
 
Country Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
India Inverse mills1 384 .600 .612 0 2.63 
China Inverse mills1 660 .714 .32 .004 1.71 
 
Thereafter equation B2 is estimated using probit regression method. The dependent 
variable is, whether the borrower gets desired amount of loan, i.e. not credit rationed. 
The results are reported in Table 3.11.  As suggested by equation 3.36, inverse of 
assets endowment is used as an important explanatory variable. Here collateral is 
proxied by combination of both proxies (“lack collateral” and “denied collateral”) and 
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denoted as “Collateral deficiency”, as we are no more interested in separately 
controlling for denied families. 
Table 3.11: Probit: Not Credit rationed (Supply ≥ Demand)    = Xδ  + εs 
 
India China Not credit rationed (1=yes) 
Coef. z Coef. Z 
Sex (Female=1)   -0.158 -0.9 
Age 0.037 0.88 0.422 1.24 
Age square 0.000 -0.46 -0.075 -1.23 
Household size 0.035 1.37 0.034 0.91 
Education 0.472* 4.13 0.007 0.11 
Inverse (asset per capita ) -6.730* -1.98 -0.118 -0.34 
Collateral deficiency (1=yes) -0.990* -2.57 -0.875* -3.56 
Likely to borrow more if interest rates are low 0.400* 1.99 -0.216* -1.81 
Apprehensions  because of delay and bribe -0.483* -1.55 0.006 0.06 
Do not like to be indebted  to a bank or RCC -0.842* -4.78 0.042 0.34 
No saving -0.417* -2.21 0.043 0.38 
Inverse mills ratio 1 (IMR 1) 0.797* 3.48 1.067* 3.79 
Region6 0.483 1.72 -0.097 -0.8 
Region8 -0.414 -1.38   
Region9 0.288 1.1   
India: N= 384  ;    LR χ2 (16)   =     159.71  ;    Prob > χ2   =  0.00 ;   Pseudo R2  =  0.27 
China: N = 660;  LR χ2 (15)    =      128.68;      Prob > χ2     =     0.00;  Pseudo R2   =  0.12 
 
Both probit regressions are quite significant (high χ2 statistic). Also many variables are 
individually significant. Again we are more interested in the nature of associations 
rather than marginal effects of variables. It is observed that in the case of India most of 
the variables bear sign as per conjecture and are also significant. However, the age 
variable is not found significant. Also the borrowers’ preference for not getting 
indebted to banks or RCC is found negatively associated with likelihood of not credit 
rationed – whereas it is conjectured to be positively associated.  Similar natures of 
associations are observed in the case of China with a few exceptions. One major 
exception is non-significance of inverse of asset size but it bears the desired sign. The 
education variable is also not found significant here. Furthermore significantly 
positive coefficient of interest reduction variable in the case of India suggests 
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negatively sloping loan demand curve. In the case of China, the negative coefficient of 
this may be driven by loan supply (which may be regulated by RCC) not matching 
with demand, hence increasing the propensity of credit rationing.  
Also selection bias is significantly observed in the case of both countries, as inverse 
mills ratio of first selection equation is significant. Exclusion of this variable would 
have made the estimations of the coefficients biased. The positive coefficient suggests 
that less credit rationing is observed once we control for the selection bias in the 
sample.  The inverse mills ratio (M 2) is computed and is summarized in Table 3.12.  
Table 3.12: Summary statistics of Predicted values of Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR, M2) 
 
Country Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
India Inverse mills2 384 1.42 1.00 .11 4.30 
China Inverse mills2 660 1.002 .49 .35 2.63 
 
Also the predicted values of probability of being credit rationed are computed and its’ 
probability density graph for China is shown in figure 3.10. Similar plot is obtained 
for India. Approximately these are normally distributed - note that we started with a 
binary measurement for credit rationing.  
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Figure 3.10: Probability Density of Predicted Values of Credit Rationed (China) 
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After estimating the two selection equations (related with propensity of demand and 
supply of desired amount of credit) the unconstrained debt equation (B7, or 3.35) is 
estimated. The estimable equation B7 essentially follows from equation 3.35. The 
dependent variable is log of loan amount of a family. Important explanatory variables 
are assets size and proxy for collateral. Also inverse mills ratio M1 and M2 are used as 
control variables to take care for selection problems.  Equation 3.35 suggests that the 
coefficient on the log of assets size gives a measure of productivity 
(ψ=coeff/(1+coeff)) of assets  and loan amount.  The results for both the countries are 
reported in table 3.13. 
Table 3.13:  OLS:  log (debt) = Xγ +b1 IMR1 + b2 IMR2 +  ε 
 
India China Log (debt) 
Coef. T Coef. T 
Sex   -0.330 -1.63 
Age 0.008 1.44 -0.024 -0.4 
Household Size 0.096* 4.36 0.140* 3.37 
Education 0.098* 2.13 -0.017 -0.46 
Major Sickness (1=yes) 0.232 1.83 0.167 1.32 
Log asset per capita 0.294* 3.47 0.521* 7.33 
Collateral deficiency(1=yes) -0.111 -0.49 -0.039 -0.08 
Apprehensions  because of delay and bribe -0.342 -1.19 -0.024 -0.21 
Apprehensions because of high interest rate -0.352* -2.37 0.160 1.06 
Inverse mills1 -0.823* -6.17 -0.401 -0.88 
Inverse mills 2 -0.112 -0.76 -0.201 -0.54 
region6 0.149 0.71 0.100 0.76 
region8 0.898* 4.27   
region9 0.746* 4.18   
India :   N=312;   F(15,299) = 24.70 ;       Prob>F =   0.00;          Adj. R-squared=0.52 
China : N= 368;  F( 12,   352) =    7.68;       Prob > F =  0.00;         Adj R-squared =  0.16 
Both OLS regressions are quite significant (high F statistic, in the case of China it is 
satisfactory). Also most variables are individually significant. Again we are more 
interested in the nature of associations rather than marginal effects of variables. It is 
observed that in the case of both the countries most of the variables bear   sign as per 
conjecture and are also significant. Household size, education, and asset endowments 
are positively associated with desired amount of credit. There are some exceptions 
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however. In the case of China the education variable is not significant. The “Collateral 
deficiency” variable bears appropriate sign but not significant in the case of both 
countries. One explanation for this is – collateral is more likely to influence the 
propensity of the formal loan demand (supported by the results of Table 3.10), but 
once a borrower decides to obtain a formal loan, then this may not be important, and 
loan amount is driven more by assets than collateral. Another explanation for this is 
that, this proxy variable for collateral may not be a very precise measure of collateral 
posting ability, and the household asset can also indicate the collateral posting ability.  
Again in the case of India significantly negative coefficient on the interest rate 
variable gives credence to negative sloping loan demand curve. In the case of China 
we do not get such result. Again this may be driven by regulated supply of loan by 
RCC, which needs further investigations. Furthermore two important findings are:  
1. The proposed model appears to show selection bias in the case of both the countries 
as inverse mills ratio of first selection equation is significant at 5% level in supply 
equation and further in the case of India it is also significant in the demand equation 
(B7).   
2. The estimated values of productivity coefficient ψ are .22 and .30 for India and 
China respectively - that seems realistic. 
Then using equation B7 the predicted values of desired amount of debt for families are 
computed and the results are reported in table 3.14.  Evidently the mean values of 
desired debt amount are higher than that of actual debt amount. 
Table 3.14: Summary statistics of Predicted values of debt and actual value of debt 
 
Country Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
India Actual Debt Amount 336 15659.08 21430.8 0 200000 
India Predicted  debt Amount 380 17746.42 17982.72 750.54 2333691.2 
China Actual Debt Amount 407 19597.05 31447.37 300 480000 
China Predicted  debt Amount 651 20324.34 10502.57 2225.6 116984.48 
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Further the predicted values of likelihood of credit rationed for each family is 
computed using equations B2 and B7. The predicted values of credit rationed 
following from equation B2 are approximately normally distributed between 0 and 1. 
It indicates the likelihood of getting credit rationed of a family.   But the predicted 
values from equation B7 are again a binary number (0 or 1). It indicates whether 
desired amount of credit is larger than actual amount of credit. The comparative mean 
values of credit rationing across the five quintiles of assets are reported in Table 3.15.  
Table 3.15: Summary statistics of Credit constraints of Households 
 
Quintile 
Assets:India 
Value of 
Credit 
constraint 
(binary) 
Predicted value of 
credit constraint 
(based on equation 
B2) 
(continuous) 
Predicted value of 
credit constraint 
(based on equation 
B7) 
(Binary) 
N 
1 0.703 0.720 0.66 96 
2 0.733 0.698 0.73 59 
3 0.646 0.655 0.73 76 
4 0.670 0.678 0.74 84 
5 0.451 0.490 0.67 69 
Total 0.65 0.651 0.70 (N=325) 384 
 
China 
1 0.570 0.608 0.72 146 
2 0.500 0.573 0.67 78 
3 0.593 0.572 0.68 147 
4 0.612 0.550 0.57 134 
5 0.483 0.527 0.73 146 
Total 0.555 0.567 0.68 (N=364) 651 
 
Evidently the first two measures seem to be decreasing with higher value of asset 
quintiles – implying that families having more assets are likely to be less credit 
rationed. However it is other way for the last measure of credit rationing. The last 
measure also exceeds uniformly other two measure across all quintiles – implying that 
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magnitude of credit rationing is understated for families in all assets quintiles and 
more so in higher assets quintiles, when the estimated value of desired loan amount is 
taken into account.  
Important findings from this empirical investigation are mentioned as following: 
1. A large percentage of rural families in India and China are credit rationed in the 
formal credit market. Both type I and type II credit rationing is observed. 
2. Important determinants of credit rationing are – household assets, household size, 
ability to post collateral, education level, and various types of apprehensions in 
obtaining formal loan such as, high interest rate of formal loan, delay and bribe, 
unpaid debts etc. 
 3. The sign and significance of coefficients of explanatory variables largely matches 
with the predictions of analytical results of section 3. 
4. Significance of collateral and various apprehensions to obtain formal loan, suggest 
prevalence of information asymmetry in the credit market. 
 Next part of this section develops a test to examine the prevalence of information 
asymmetry in the credit market. 
  
3.5. B. Test of Information Asymmetry 
The results derived in section 3 make following predictions:  
1. Result 3.1 says that in perfect information case, no collateral is required and there 
is no credit rationing in equilibrium. 
2. When the lenders do not know the types of borrowers then the problem of adverse 
selection arises. Here there are two possibilities on types of contracts offered in 
equilibrium. Result 3.2 says that when no collateral is used, then pooling 
equilibrium contracts are offered in which the good borrower cross subsidizes the 
bad borrower. The good borrower may be type I and type II credit rationed.  
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3. In the other scenario, Result 3.3 says that if wealth constraints are not binding on 
collateral then separating equilibrium contracts are offered. The bad borrower gets 
first best contract, whereas the good borrower posts collateral in lieu of reduced 
interest rate and her loan size may be smaller than that of first best. However if 
wealth constraint is binding then perfect separating equilibrium may not be 
obtained and pooling equilibria with type II and type I rationing may be obtained. 
4. Result 3.5 says that lender may restrict loan size to resolve strategic default 
problem. Further result 3.6 says that likelihood of strategic default increases with 
repayment obligations i.e. loan size and interest rate.  
Some important observations are made from survey data that gives at least naïve 
evidence on prevalence of information asymmetry in credit market of these 
economies. 
1. Almost 68 percent families (of survey sample) in the case of India and 58 
percent families in the case of China are found to be credit rationed. Also more 
than 50 percent families cited inability to post collateral as major reason for not 
getting formal loans. These findings suggest that perfect information is not a 
good assumption for formal credit market in these economies. 
2. Further about 60 percent respondents in both the countries stated that honest 
borrowers are compelled to pay higher interest rate, because some borrowers do 
not repay loans. Also about 70 percent and 35 percent respondents respectively 
in India and China cited the unaffordable interest rate for feeling apprehensive in 
obtaining formal loans. These findings suggest on cross subsidizing of bad 
borrowers because of adverse selection credit market.  But as collaterals are still 
needed to obtain loans, which corroborates against pooling equilibrium. 
3. Further as discussed in point 1, apparently wealth constraint is binding on 
collateral posting for a large number of families – hence perfect separating 
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equilibrium is not attainable in these economies. Some collateral constrained 
families may not be able to get loan at all and are thus type II rationed or they 
are able to get loan less than the desired amount and hence type I rationed. This 
is also corroborated by the data – as about 65 percent families in India and 38 
percent families in China said that they never got required amount of loan.  
4. Also the data reveals that there is considerable delay in repayment of such 
formal loans. About 40 percent families in India and about 20 percent families in 
China delayed in repayment of loans at least once. Also about 20 percent 
families in India and about 5 percent families in China have defaulted on loan 
repayments. Further more than 70 percent families in China and India believe 
that the borrowers who get loan at higher interest rate or disproportionate to their 
asset are more likely to voluntarily default on repayment obligations. These 
findings suggest the prevalence of strategic default (moral hazard) problem in 
credit market of these economies.   
5. It is also revealed that families having higher assets are more likely to get 
required amount of loan. In the case of India only 6 percent families belonging to 
lowest quintiles of assets received the required amount of loan in comparison to 
15 percent families belonging to highest quintile. In the case of China these 
percentages are 20 and 45 respectively. Restriction of loan size below L* (first 
best case) by the lender to resolve strategic default problems, may be one of the 
possible explanations for this.  
The findings suggest that these credit markets suffer from information asymmetry 
problem. But it is empirically difficult to isolate the adverse selection and moral 
hazard effects.  A host of data and econometric problems are discussed as following: 
1. Information on amount of collateral posted to obtain a loan is not available. In 
fact it is quite difficult to elicit this information from the respondents. 
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2. In the case of China few observations are available on interest rates charged by 
banks and RCC. Further, in both the countries the formal lending interest rates 
are usually regulated, so not much variation is observed in the interest rate. As 
revealed from the data the coefficient of variation of formal interest rate is just 
0.2 in the case of India and it is about 0.9 in the case of China.  
3. The respondents usually underreport the default rate. Moreover it is difficult to 
elicit the information whether the default is strategic or not.  
4. In cross section data we cannot control for unobserved individual 
heterogeneities. The distinction between adverse selection and moral hazard 
primarily depends on the interpretation on observed behaviors of borrowers. 
One interpretation is that unobserved heterogeneity across the borrowers is 
responsible for different contract choices and so the selection of contracts is 
endogenous. This is adverse selection interpretation. Another interpretation is 
that the contracts induce the observed behaviors through their underlying 
incentive structure – this is moral hazard interpretation (Salanie, 2005). 
5. Ideally randomized experiments should be conducted to isolate the selection 
and incentive problems such that the allocation of the contracts to different 
borrowers is exogenous – that takes care of selection problem. However such 
experiments are quite time consuming and costly. One such example is Rand 
Health Insurance Experiment (Manning et al 1987). 
6.  Another strategy is to use panel data. One advantage is that unobserved 
heterogeneities can be controlled. Other advantage is that dynamics of 
contracts can be studied. It could provide tests in which adverse selection and 
moral hazard generate opposite predictions (Chiappori and Heckman, 1999) 
and hence it is possible to test for adverse selection and moral hazard.  
 
One way to test the adverse selection, is to estimate the following model 
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But observations are not available on many of these variables; also it is difficult to get 
data on those variables. Hence this estimation method is not implementable here. 
However Chiappori and Salanie (2000) have developed a positive correlation test for 
asymmetric information in insurance market. In simple form it involves estimation of 
two equations which describes two different decisions of agents – one for choice of 
insurance coverage and another for claim of compensations. Under null hypothesis of 
no information asymmetry the residuals of the two equations should be uncorrelated. 
However in presence of adverse selection and moral hazard it can be predicted that 
those with more insurance are more likely to experience insured risk and so claim for 
more compensations and consequently the errors of these two equations will be 
positively correlated. Hence if errors are found to be significantly positively correlated 
  92
then the null hypothesis of no information asymmetry is rejected. However this test 
does not distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard.  
3.5. B.1. Positive Correlation Test for Information Asymmetry in Credit Market 
Using the above framework, two probit models are estimated. One is for the success in 
obtaining a formal loan and another for the defaulting on the formal loan.   
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Here y1* and y2* are latent variables – propensity of approval of loan and propensity 
of default conditional on approval of loan. The observed variables are y1 and y2 
respectively. These variables are observed as 1 if respective latent variables are 
positive and zero otherwise. In presence of adverse selection and moral hazard, the 
two decisions of borrowers; one to successfully obtain a loan (here the decision of 
lender is also implied), and conditional on this later to default on the loan, may not be 
independent. So rejection of null hypothesis of ρ = 0 suggests information asymmetry.    
Also Chiappori and Salanie (2000) have suggested that these two equations are 
estimated independently. It entails some efficiency loss but the null can be tested 
easily with respect to a test statistic. Then the generalized residuals 
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Under the null of conditional independence, cov(u1, u2) =0, W is distributed 
asymptotically as χ2(1). 
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The rejection of null provides a test for information asymmetry.  
 
3.5. B.2. Results on Information Asymmetry based on India and China data 
A summary statistics of demand of formal loan, delay and default on repayment of 
such loan are shown in Table 3.16.   
Table 3.16: Summary Statistic of Demand of Formal Loan, Default and Delay in Repayment 
 
Variables  (binary) Mean : India : N=384 Mean: China : N=1555 
Demand of formal loam .49 .25 
Default formal Loan .23 .025 
Delay formal Loan .51 .14 
Default/ Delay formal loan .51 .15 
 
First the two probit regressions are estimated independently and the results are shown 
in Table 3.17 and Table 3.18.   
Table 3.17:   probit: Demand of Formal Loan* = Xβ + εd 
 
India  (384) China (660) Dependent variable 
Propensity of Demand for loan (1=yes) Coef. Z Coef. Z 
Sex (Female=1)   -0.220 -1.26 
Age 0.124* 2.61 0.229 0.68 
Age square -.001* -2.7 -0.048 -0.8 
Household size 0.078* 2.51 0.061 1.74 
Education 0.411* 3.19 0.048 0.69 
Income Source (Farm=1) 0.589* 2.29 -0.218* -2.02 
Asset  per capita 0.107* 2.62 0.201* 1.86 
Asset per capita square -.002* -1.79 -.014 -0.6 
Lacks collateral (1=yes) -0.174 -0.75 -0.216* -1.97 
Apprehensions because of unpaid debts (1=yes) 1.673* 7.84 0.355* 3.35 
Apprehensions  because of high interest rates 
(1=yes) -0.280 -1.12 -0.108 -0.91 
Apprehensions  because of delay and bribe(1=yes) 0.797* 2.02 0.250* 2.32 
Do not like to be indebted  to a bank or 
RCC(1=yes) 0.061 0.28 -0.170 -1.5 
High saving (1=yes) -0.137 -0.3 -0.646* -4.36 
region6 -0.046 -0.15 0.275* 2.4 
region8 1.003* 3.05 
region9 -0.060 -0.2 
India:  N=384;   LR χ2 (17) =288.38;    Prob > χ2 = 0.00;      Pseudo R2 = 0.54              
China: N= 660; LR χ2 (17) =  77.27 ;    Prob > χ2  = 0.00 ; Pseudo R2  =   0.08 
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The regressors are satisfactorily exogenous and relevant to the decision model. Both 
the regressions are quite significant (high χ2 statistic) except one – Probit regression 
for default for China data.  A good number of variables are also individually 
significant, although we are mainly interested in the test statistic W. 
 
Table 3.18: probit Regression for Default on Formal Loan 
 
India China Dependent variable : 
Default on formal loan (1=yes) Coef. Z Coef. z 
Sex (1=Female)   0.739* 2.61 
Age 0.022 0.5 0.681 0.93 
Age sq 0.0003 -0.75 -0.135 -1.02 
Household size 0.064* 2.34 -0.051 -0.58 
Education -0.274* -2.4 0.182 1.19 
Income source 0.307 1.3 0.278 1.24 
Logasset per persion 0.112 0.98 -0.065 -0.47 
Lacks collateral 0.111 0.56 0.203 0.84 
Apprehensions because of unpaid debts (1=yes) 1.142* 6.15 0.262 1.14 
Apprehensions  because of high interest rates (1=yes) -0.406* -1.82 -0.340 -1.38 
Apprehensions  because of delay and bribe(1=yes) 0.992* 2.5 0.439* 1.84 
Do not like to be indebted  to a bank or RCC(1=yes) 0.288 1.53 0.109 0.45 
High saving (1=yes) -0.448 -1.02 -0.580 -1.38 
Loan from friend and relative (percentage) -0.007* -2.84 -0.001 -0.36 
region6 -0.645* -2.28 0.158 0.66 
region8 -1.320* -4.92   
region9 -0.685* -2.58   
N =  384; LR chi2(16)  = 101.08;   Prob > chi2  =  0.0000;   Pseudo R2   =  0.24  
N = 659; LR chi2(15)   = 22.55;    Prob > chi2  = 0.0942;   Pseudo R2     =  0.14 
 
Using above probit regressions the W statistic is obtained for India and China and the 
values are shown in Table 3.19. The value is statistically significant in the case of 
India, but it is not significant in the case of China. Hence the rejection of null in the 
case of India provides evidence for information asymmetry in credit market. Also both 
probits are jointly estimated and the coefficients of correlation (ρ) of two error terms 
  95
are obtained and theses are shown in the same table. Again it is observed that null of 
conditional independence of two equations are rejected in the case of India, but not in 
the case of China. 
Non rejection of null for China means that using this model and this data the evidence 
of information asymmetry is not obtained. Very low default rate recorded in the case 
of China may be one of the reasons for this. This conjecture is verified when in the 
second probit both delay or default in repayment of loan is used as dependent variable. 
Now the W statistic becomes significant and the null is rejected; also in the joint probit 
estimation significant value of ρ is obtained and the null of conditional independence 
is rejected.  
Table 3.19: W statistic and ρ values obtained from Probit Regressions 
 
Country (dependent 
variable in second probit) 
Test Statistic , W Biprobit (ρ) s.e. (ρ) Chi-
square(1) 
India (default) 30.39* 0.69* .07 38.56 
China (default) 2.46 0.20 .14 2.10 
China (delay or default)  38.10* 0.42* .06 38.86 
 
The significance of these  tests lie in presenting empirical evidence of prevalence of 
information asymmetry in credit markets in these economies although individual 
significance of adverse selection and moral hazard is not distinguished. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
The main objective of this chapter is to assess credit-rationing problem in formal 
credit markets of rural areas of developing countries. Using the asymmetric 
information framework and  assuming that probability of a project’s success positively 
depends on endowment vectors of a borrower, both type I and type II credit rationing  
have been demonstrated. It has been shown that market equilibrium is attained by 
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usage of loan size, interest rate and collateral requirements as screening and incentive 
devices.  
Further welfare implications of credit rationing has been analyzed and it has been 
demonstrated that net welfare loss occurs in equilibrium in which the good type 
borrower sustains loss in the case of adverse selection and both good and bad type of 
borrowers may sustain loss in the case of moral hazard problem. The analysis also 
suggests that the loan demand is price inelastic. It is further found that the absolute 
value of price responsiveness increases with interest rate and also it decreases with 
increasing value of family assets. Based on these findings it has been suggested that 
the policies which help in addressing these information asymmetry problems 
particularly loosening the incentive compatibility constraints of bad (poor) borrowers, 
such as loan guarantee, subsidies or other supports may increase efficiency.  
Then using the household survey data from China and India, some of these results are 
empirically tested. Overall it has been found that large parts of people in these areas 
suffer from considerable amount of credit rationing. The significance of assets 
endowment and collateral posting ability has been found as important explanatory 
variables for credit rationing. Also a test has been proposed to test for information 
asymmetry in these credit markets and significant results are obtained. However the 
empirical findings would have been more robust if data on actual amount of collateral 
posted could have been obtained, but apparently this is difficult. Another improvement 
in empirical analysis can be made if some good instrument of interest rate is identified 
to take care of endogeneity of interest rate. Also if panel data on observations are 
available then unobserved heterogeneities can be controlled and also adverse selection 
and moral hazard effects can be separated in assessing the prevalence of information 
asymmetry in the credit market. Future research may pick up on these ideas and can 
come up with more insights on functioning of credit markets. 
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APPENDIX 3.1 
  
3.3.3 Sketch of Solution: The good borrower maximizes expected utility subject to 
the incentive compatibility condition of bad borrower and zero profit condition of the 
lenders. Other constraints in (3.7) can be shown to be satisfied. 
 
subject to
        (3.12)                            ))(AC-)U(W(Ap-(1) )1(),)U(g(A(Apmax iiiiiiii},,{  iiiiLCr LrWL
 
     0  :                                                               0     : constraint Wealth (iii)
0 :         V ))(AC-)U(W(Ap-(1) )1(),)U(g(A(Ap 
     jborrower  for   condition ity Compatibil Incentive (ii)
0:                                 0)L(1-)Cp-(1)Lr(1p profit  sBank'  (i)
3
2bestfirst iijjjjj
1iiiiii






ii
iiji
WC
LrWL
In the equilibrium first two constraints must bind ( )0,0 21   . The competitive 
lending market ensures zero profit. The incentive compatibility of borrower j should 
also bind otherwise; good borrower will choose her first best contract. The type j 
borrower has incentive to pick up the contract of type i, hence in equilibrium the 
contracts will be offered such that her incentive compatibility constraint binds. 
The concavity assumptions on U (.) guarantee that the program (3.12) can be 
analytically solved using Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) optimization conditions 
(necessary and sufficient) as following. It is assumed that the wealth constraint is not 
binding on the collateral requirements.    
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:drawn are inferences following (3.15)equation  From
..(3.15) .             ) )1(),(g(AU'p][p ) )1(),(g(AU'p
0] )[ )1(),(g(AU'p][p ])[-L )1(),(g(AU'p
r repect towith condition order first   takingNow
j2ji1ii
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LrWLLrWL
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



 
(i) As the left hand side is positive and further it dominates the first term on the right 
hand side (follows from the fact that indifference curve in r-C space is steeper than 
bank’s isoprofit curve), then 2  > 0 and hence the borrower j’s incentive compatibility 
binds. Alternatively, it can be shown by substituting ri from zero profit constraint in 
the objective function and incentive compatibility constraint and ignoring the zero 
profit constraint and then 2  > 0 is conveniently obtained.  
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Similarly taking first order derivatives with respect to Li 
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APPENDIX 3.2 
 
5. A.2. Heckman Sample Selection Correction Methodology11 
Equations 5.1 and 5.2 sum up decisions of borrowers and lenders related to demand 
and supply of loan. These can be further described as following. The borrower may or 
may not have a positive demand for credit. This decision is influenced by several 
variables such as age, sex, income, asset endowment, educational level, occupational 
status, health status, and also by some unobservables, such as, social status, 
government policies and so on. Then conditional on positive demand for loan the 
borrower decides on desired amount of credit which is also influenced by several 
covariates as mentioned above. Then the lender can deny, approve partially or approve 
fully the loan request. If loan application is denied then the borrower is type II credit 
rationed, if it is partially allowed then she is type I rationed, and if she gets desired 
amount of credit she is not rationed. Hence there are two selection equations. The first 
one describes that whether the borrower has positive demand for loan and the second 
one describes that whether the borrower gets desired amount of loan conditional on 
having positive demand for loan. The outcome equation describes the amount of loan 
obtained by households. The estimation strategy is described as following. 
Now the propensity for loan demand function (binary variant of equation 3.4) is 
proposed as following: 
 
  ,parameters of vector a is   ,covariates   exogenous of vector a is X  otherwise.  zero   andloan   
for   demand positive  hasborrower       thei.e. , positive  is iablelatent var   theif   1  as  observed
 is which  - B  is    variableobserved  The  loan.for  demand of propensitylatent    theis  Here
...(B1)                          ),0( :      0)   X1(B  
d
d
*
2
ddd
*
d


d
dd
B
NB 
 
                                                 
11 This discussion is based on, Maddala (1983) - Chapters 2, 3, 7 and 10, Kochar (1997), Greene (2003) 
– chapter 22, and Chen and Chivakul (2008). 
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
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The supply function (binary variant of equation 3.5) is proposed as following, noting 
that supply is observed only for those observations who have positive demand for 
loan. 
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Then latent model for desired amount of debt D* (equation 3.35) is formulated as 
following: 
be  toassumed is that error term random a is  and parameters of vector is  decision, this
influences  that covariates of vector a is X  debt. ofamount   desired is *D Where
...(B3)                                                                                                         X   *

 D
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Under the assumption of trivariate normal distribution, this model can be estimated 
using full information maximum likelihood method (FIML) – however the estimation 
gets complicated, when convergence is not assured.   
 
Summarily the unconstrained debt equation (modified equation 3.35) is estimated as  
(B7) ...                                                                                         M   X D ssdd   M  
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Now if we have good number of sample observations on positive amount of debt 
which the persons are having, then ideally equations (B1), (B2) and (B7) can be 
estimated. Then the persons, for whom loan amount is less than the desired amount of 
loan, can be termed as credit rationed. 
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Chapter 4: Impact of Credit Constraints on Livelihood Choices 
        
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate the impact of credit constraints on 
various aspects of livelihood choices such as, physical capital formation, human 
capital formation, agricultural inputs application, consumption smoothing, whether to 
become entrepreneur or wage seeker etc. The analytical results demonstrate that farm 
input applications and wage market outcomes are adversely affected by the binding 
credit constraints. Also the results demonstrate that consumption smoothing, and 
physical capital and human capital accumulation are adversely impacted by the 
binding credit constraints. Some of these results are empirically investigated. Using 
suitable econometric methods and using the household survey data from China and 
India; it has been shown that credit constraints negatively affect food consumption, 
farm inputs applications, and health and educational attainments. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
It is well known fact that credit markets function differently from the standard 
markets12. The standard competitive market of a homogenous good works on the 
premise that the agents are price takers, the delivery of good and the payment for the 
transactions happen simultaneously and the market clears at the prevailing market 
price. But the same presumptions do not hold in the functioning of credit market. 
There is a finite time lag in the delivery of credit and contracted repayment of that. 
Further the limited liability clauses and imperfect enforcement of contracts by the 
courts of law substantially contribute to loan defaults.  Defaulting on repayment 
obligations is a fact of reality. Under such circumstances the price of credit (interest 
rate) may not be able to clear the market and there may be excess demand of credit – 
                                                 
12 See, Jaffe and Stiglitz (1990). Credit Rationing, Chapter 16 for more on this. 
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and then credit rationing may occur. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) demonstrated credit 
rationing based on imperfect information i.e. prevalence of asymmetry in information 
between the borrower and lender. Adverse selection and moral hazard of borrowers 
may engender backward bending credit offer curve, leading to credit rationing in 
equilibrium. These issues have been investigated in detail in Chapter 3. 
There is a huge literature on the theory of credit rationing, but apparently less work is 
done on analyzing the impact of credit constraints on various aspects of livelihood 
choices such as, physical capital formation, human capital formation, agricultural 
inputs application, consumption smoothing, whether to become entrepreneur or wage 
seeker etc. The objective of this chapter is to make a modest contribution in filling that 
gap. This chapter intends to develop an analytical framework to analyze how credit 
constraints impact such livelihood choices of people13.  Furthermore, the survey data 
from China and India is used to conduct empirical investigation of some of the results 
obtained. 
Credit constraints affect the people in several ways. A large number of people depend 
on agriculture and ancillary activities in rural areas for their livelihood. These sectors 
demand upfront investment to generate income at a later date and constraints on 
borrowing may severely hinder the capital investment activities directly affecting the 
production process, and it may itself become a cause of persistent poverty14. The 
Credit constraints may affect acquisition of physical capital and human capital-
education and health are important types of human capital (Schultz, 1993a).   
Once credit constrained, the people generally respond in various ways such as 
adopting safe but low yielding technologies, low level of schooling, suboptimal level 
                                                 
13 Credit constraints could mean – (i) Not able to get credit at all, (ii)  get less  of credit than  desired , 
(iii) do not try to get credit, anticipating  that loan application will be rejected. For formal definition see, 
Keeton (1979), and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
14 Galor and Zeira (1993) is a good description in this regard. 
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of health care utilization etc. Several studies explain the effects of credit constraints on 
consumption in general, for example, Zeldes (1989), Hayashi (1985) and so on. Some 
of the studies including Morduch (1995), and Rosenzweig et al (1993), demonstrate 
income smoothing and consumption smoothing strategies of people who are credit 
constrained. Moreover, suboptimal level of investments in human capital in early 
phase of life cycle may   influence earning potential and may become a persistent 
cause of poverty15. Becker (1975) is among the pioneers to highlight the issue of 
underinvestment in education, training and health because of imperfections of the 
capital market. He reasoned that it is difficult to borrow funds for investment in human 
capital activities (education, health etc.) as such capitals can not be offered as 
collateral. Following this Galor and Zeira (1993) is another significant work that 
attempts to explain the effect of imperfections in credit market on educational 
attainments. Jacoby (1994) conducts an empirical analysis of influence of borrowing 
constraints on schooling attainments in context of Peru. Another related work is that of 
Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) that attempts to unravel the underlying relationships of 
imperfections in financial markets and   human capital accumulation in a risky 
environment in developing countries. 
Most of these studies address the issues of credit constraint and consumption 
smoothing and also some of the studies have looked into human capital accumulation 
issues. However, not many studies appear to have investigated the effects of credit 
constraints on other aspects of livelihood choices mentioned earlier. Hence this 
chapter intends to develop an analytical framework to analyze how credit constraints 
                                                 
15 Important references are Mincer and Polachek (1974), Beherman and Deolalikar (1987), Sahn, D. and 
H. Alderman (1988), Schultz, T.P. (1993), Thomas, D. and J. Strauss (1996), and Glewee, P.  et al 
(2001).  
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impact such livelihood choices of people and also uses the survey data from China and 
India to conduct empirical investigation of some of the results obtained. 
At the outset, it is clarified that the effect of borrowing constraints is not the same 
thing as the effect of income poverty on livelihood choices. Suppose a person is poor 
but if she does not face any credit constraints then she can borrow the required 
(optimal) amount of money from the credit market and repay it later- such that 
marginal cost of borrowing equals perceived marginal benefit of these choices. But if 
she is credit constrained then she has to forego these choices that may ultimately affect 
her well being. Also the borrowing constrainedness of a person can be explained by 
several covariates such as her educational and occupational status, income and wealth 
level, health status, other observable and non observable factors such as 
neighborhoods, social status, and government policies related to credit access etc. The 
people whose loan applications are rejected or who are hesitant to ask for a loan are 
termed as borrowing constrained. 
Household surveys were conducted in rural areas of China (in years 2007 and 2008) 
and India (in year 2008-09). About 1500 families in China and 400 families in India 
were surveyed.  The survey questionnaires are designed to elicit responses of the 
families related to - (i) the credit rationing problems which they face, (ii) how the 
credit rationing affects their livelihood choices, and (iii) how they respond to 
overcome this problem.   This survey data provides good information on many 
variables related to credit constraints, and its felt impact on adequate food availability, 
farm input applications, and desired level of health and educational attainment. 
The survey data reveals that more than 75 percent families in both the countries are 
compelled to use lower level of agricultural inputs because of borrowing constraints, 
also more than 90 percent families stated that they need to supplement their income by 
wage income as they are not able to do the farming to the desired extent because of 
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borrowing constraints. Furthermore, more than 50 percent families in India and about 
25 percent families in China stated that they are not able to get adequate amount of 
food throughout the year because of borrowing constraints. Also more than 50 percent 
respondents in these countries said that they are not able to provide adequate level of 
health care and education to their family members. These rudimentary findings 
highlight the importance of borrowing constraints on important aspects of livelihood.  
The perceived impact of credit constraints is quantified along various dimensions such 
as inadequate food availability, lower level of input applications in farming, and less 
than desired level of health and educational attainment. A composite variable “Credit 
impact” is constructed using these variables, of which details are discussed in section 
four. The a-priori hypothesis is that people facing credit constraints face inadequate 
food availability, spend less on farm inputs and have lower level of health and 
educational attainments.   
Suitable econometric methods have been used to test this hypothesis. We are primarily 
interested in the coefficient on the variable related to credit constrainedness, “Credit 
Constraint”.  Also as discussed earlier it is not an exogenous variable; rather it can be 
explained by several covariates. Hence first an estimation equation has been specified 
for “Credit Constraint”, and then its predicted values have been used in the ensuing 
regressions. Probit regression method has been used to estimate the equation related 
with impact of the credit constraint.    The results broadly demonstrate that the credit 
constraint is positively associated with the “Credit impact” variable. 
The chapter is organized as following. Investigation of impacts of credit constraints on 
farm input applications and wage seeking has been done in section 2. The analysis has 
been done in a static optimization framework. The analysis of impact of the credit 
constraints on various livelihood choices such as, capital investment (physical and 
human), consumption, leisure, and decision to either become an entrepreneur or wage 
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seeker is presented in section 3.  The analysis has been done in a dynamic 
optimization setting. Some of these results are empirically investigated in section four. 
The household survey data from China and India are used in this chapter to analyze 
the effect of the credit constraints on various livelihood choices such as, food security, 
agriculture input applications, and better health and educational attainments. The 
results and inferences are discussed in section four. Section 5 concludes with 
important observations. 
 
4.2. Credit Constraints, Farm Input Applications and Wage Seeking   
In this section, an analytical framework is developed to understand the impacts of 
credit constraints on farm input applications. Also using a variant of Harris and 
Todaro model of migration, effect of credit constraints on the wage seeking behaviors 
is analyzed. The analysis proceeds with the assumption that people are risk averse and 
they may face credit constraint.  
Let the level of borrowing limit (
_
itB ) of a household i at time t is defined as a function 
of expected income in next period (Etyt+1) and poverty line (zt+1). In one period context 
it may be treated as steady state level of borrowing net of repayment. 
_
itB =φ(Etyt+1,zt+1)                                                                       …(4.1) 
The function φ (.,.) is non decreasing and concave in Eyt+1 and non increasing in zt+1. 
Further if  
_
itB  decreases below a critical limit,
_
*itB , then households prefer wage 
labor16.  
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Farming may not be profitable if credit availability is restricted beyond a certain limit, and then wage 
income fetches more income than from farming activities.  
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4.2.1 Influences on Production Decisions    
In agricultural production, variable inputs (seeds, irrigation, fertilizers etc.) are 
employed on fixed input (land). For production efficiency the optimal level of inputs 
should be such that the value of marginal product (MVPi) is equal to marginal cost of 
input (MCi). However if (MVPi) > (MCi), less than optimum input is used, and that 
leads to inefficient production. 
Let us consider first simple case – when there is no uncertainty in production. For 
neatness time subscripts are ignored.  The production function is described by 
            q = f(X): f `(X)> 0, f ``(X) <0, f (.) strictly concave in X                    ... (4.2)  
Where, X is vector of variable inputs. Let p be the price of product and w is the vector 
of input prices. Also I consider that the person need to buy the inputs from the market 
at prices w and her buying resources is bounded above by credit limit
_
B . The farmer 
chooses X to maximize her utility obtained from the profit income. 
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(4.7) ...                      0
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The above result can be also demonstrated more clearly if we directly substitute,        
w.X= y+ 
_
B , when the borrowing constraint is binding. Hence substituting          
w.X= y+
_
B ,  in  equation (4.4), and then differentiating with respect to
_
B ; 
0 hence And
negative arer denominato andnumerator both  f(.), and u(.)on concavity  of conditions with 
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Also, when X < Xoptimal , then q =f(X) <  qoptimal = f(Xoptimal)  
This derivation implies following result: 
Result 4.1:  The binding borrowing constraint leads to suboptimal level of input use in 
agricultural production activities. And more the constraint is binding (larger the 
shadow value of constraint), lower the level of input use. Alternatively the level of 
input application increases with increasing level of borrowing limit. 
This result holds well when the uncertainty is introduced in the production function. 
Let the production function (Just and Pope, 1979) is  
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q = f(X, 
_
itB ) + h(X, 
_
itB ) ε.                                                                     … (4.9)  
Where, X is vector of variable inputs, ε is a stochastic disturbance, with E (ε) = 0 and     
V (ε) >0. f(X), and h(X, _itB ) are strictly concave(in X) and continuous functions.  Let 
pt be the price of product and wt is the vector of input prices. 
Hence the expected profit is, πt =pt E [f(X, 
_
B ) +h(X, 
_
B ) ε] – wt.X      ...(4.10)  
Now risk averse farmer maximizes expected utility 
               Max.Xt  Et [u (π t)]                                                                   …(4.11)  
             Subject to: w.X≤ y+ _B  
Ignoring time subscripts, the necessary and sufficient first order conditions are 
      E [u’ (π) (pfi +phi ε – wi)] - λwi =0, i       
E[u’ (π)] E[(pfi +phi ε – wi)] +Cov[U’ (π), (pfi +phi ε – wi)]  = λwi  i    
E[(pfi +phi ε –wi)]+Cov[u’ (π), (pfi +hi ε – wi)]/ E[u’ (π)] =  
                                                                      λwi/E[u`(π)]  i                ...(4.12) 
Since, E [u’ (π)]  0 (monotonicity assumption); following inferences are drawn:  
Ideally in the complete market set up (when markets of land, labor, other inputs, 
credit, insurance, etc. are perfectly competitive) the utility maximization program is 
independent of profit maximization program. Complete separation is achieved for 
above two optimization programs17 . The farmer first maximizes profit independent of 
his utility preferences and then simply uses the income out of this profit to maximize 
her utility.   
  Cov [U’ (π), (pfi +hi ε – wi)] =0                                                    …(4.13)  
But when any of these markets are not complete, then preferences may affect profit 
maximization program and there will be a feedback between theses optimizations. 
  Cov [U’ (π), (pfi +hi ε – wi)]   0                                                           … (4.14) 
                                                 
17 For more on this see, Udry (1996). “Efficiency and Market Structure: Testing for Profit Maximization 
in African Agriculture”. http://www.econ.yale.edu/~cru2/pdf/separate.pdf 
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Hence when all the markets are complete (including no borrowing constraint), then 
using equations (4.13), (4.14), and λ =0, we get 
E[pfi(.) +hi(.)ε] = wi   pfi(.) = wi  MVPi = MCi                                  … (4.15) 
The equation (4.15) implies the optimal level of input use.  
But realistically, such separation is missing in presence of constrained credit and 
insurance markets. Now the production decisions are such that the marginal return on 
investment is positively correlated with income, and since marginal utility of income 
decreases with income, the covariance term turns to be negative. Consequently using 
equations (4.12), (4.14), and λ > 0 , we get 
E[pfi(.) +hi(.)ε] >  wi   pfi(.) >  wi  MVPi >  MCi                               …(4.16) 
Again implication of equation (4.16) is that suboptimal levels of inputs are employed. 
In presence of uncertainty, Result 1 gets amplified -  in the sense that even if there is 
no borrowing constraint, but suppose that insurance needs are not fully met, then the 
covariance term drives the sub optimality result. Lack of insurance opportunities 
induces feedback between the profit maximization and utility maximization programs. 
People are compelled to apply sub optimal level of inputs (with using less of X, 
uninsured losses in the case of bad outcomes are reduced). These observations are 
noted in Result 4.2.  
Result 4.2:  In the case of uncertainty in production, Result 1 gets amplified. 
Incompleteness of other markets (say insurance markets) through the covariance 
relation of profit maximization and utility maximization program strengthens the 
suboptimal level of input use. To clarify this, suppose that there is no borrowing 
constraint, but if insurance requirements are not fully met, then still suboptimal level 
of inputs will be used. 
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The upshot of this result is that when the farmers realistically face lot of downside risk 
in agricultural production, then availability of insurance markets are as important as 
that of credit markets.  This can be demonstrated using above set up as following.  
Let there be no credit constraint, hence λ = 0.  
Now consider that there are insurance opportunities available such that when bad state 
occurs (income less than mean level of π); she gets insurance payments and she pays 
premium in all the states. The payments are such that the income is smoothed across 
all the states of outcome. Hence now, 
u `(πs + ts) = μ : for all states s S ; ts is net insurance payment in state s    …(4.17)  
This implies that now covariance term is zero. 
Using the equation (4.17) in the equation (4.12) and noting that λ = 0 
E[(pfi +phi ε –wi)]+Cov[u’ (π), (pfi +hi ε – wi)]/ E[u’ (π)] = λwi/E[u`(π)]  i 
  E[(pfi +phi ε –wi)] = 0  p fi = wi      MVPi = MCi 
Thus with no borrowing constraints and with provision of adequate insurance use of 
optimal level of input is now possible. 
 
4.2.2 Wage Market Outcome 
Borrowing constraints may also influence outcomes in wage market. In rural areas a 
large number of households depend on wage market for their livelihood. Also with 
increasing borrowing constraint the borrower may not be able to arrange requisite 
amount of inputs for farming at remunerative prices; and if credit constraint tightens 
beyond a limit, then families may prefer wage labor as it may fetch more income than 
the income from farming. Thus apparently number of wage seeker may increase with 
increasing borrowing constraints and that my put downward pressure on wages. In this 
background, a variant of Harris and Todaro (1970) two sector model of rural economy 
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seem to be an appropriate framework to investigate this issue. The analysis proceeds 
with following assumptions:  
(a) Two sectors – one farming and another ancillary sector (food processing etc.) exist 
in rural areas. The credit constrained families seek employment in both sectors. (b) As 
argued in section 2.1, in presence of borrowing constraints farming sector pays wage 
less than the value of labor marginal productivity. (c) The ancillary sector pays wage 
equal to marginal productivity. The model is described as following.  
Let Y1 = agriculture output, L1 = labor force in agriculture, A = technology level, Land 
is fixed input, say =1.  
Y1=A (L1β +L1α ε),0<α, β≤ 1,                                                                …(4.18) 
ε: stochastic disturbance, E (ε) = 0 and V (ε) >0     
The ancillary sector uses capital (K) and labor (L2). Let C= level of technology, the 
ancillary production Y2 (no uncertainty) is,Y2 = CKαL21-α,  0<α≤1.          … (4.19)                                   
The marginal product of labor, 
2
2
L
Y

  = (1-α) Y2/ L2                            … (4.20) 
It is assumed that the ancillary sector functions on the hypothesis of profit 
maximization; hence wage (w2) in this sector equals its marginal product value.  
                w2* = (1-α)CK*(α)L2*(-α)                                                         …(4.21) 
 
Let, p = relative price of agriculture goods (in terms of ancillary good), determined as 
following18:  p =ρ( Y2/Y1)    :      ρ `>0                                                   …(4.22) 
The expected marginal product of labor in agriculture  
=E[
1
1
L
Y

 ]=βY1/L1*w1* =pβA(L1*) β-1                                        …(4.23) 
                                                 
18 A sufficient condition for this assumption is that all agents in the economy have same homothetic 
preferences. 
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Also it is assumed that the ancillary sector is not credit constrained, hence K* is 
pinned down by equating marginal productivity of capital to the borrowing interests 
rate r.  
                   r* = CK*(α-1)L2*(1-α)                                                     …(4.24)  
Now in the spirit of Harris and Todaro model, wage in agricultural sector (w1) is 
proportional to w2 and coefficient of proportionality (k (L1)) is less than 1 and k1 ` (.) 
<0. This ensures continuous flow of labor from farming sector to ancillary sector19.   
Now let at any instant, L1* + L2* +Lt = L                                   … (4.25) 
Since sum of optimal amount of labor in both sectors (labor input such that marginal 
productivity equals wage in these sectors) may not be able to clear the labor market 
and there will be additional labor force looking for employment in these sectors. Now 
tighter the borrowing constraint is more the number of wage seeker will be and so 
bigger will be Lt. The job- searchers first try to get higher wage job w2*, but only L2*, 
can be accommodated there. So L-L2* (= L1* + Lt =L1), which may be bigger than 
L1*,  get accommodated in agriculture sector depressing the wage there to w1- i.e. 
                w1 = w1*.L1* /(L-L2*) = w1*.L1*/L1  <     w1*                         … (4.26) 
Now in equilibrium the expected wages in both sectors are same 
  w2*.Probability of getting employment in ancillary sector = w1 
w2*.(L2*/L2*+Lt) = w1=  w1*.(L1*/L1)  =  w1*.(L1*/L1*+Lt)             …(4.27) 
And the labor market clears  
L1 +L2* = L                                                                           … (4.28) 
Solving these set of equations (4.18 to 4.28) the equilibrium outcomes of production 
level, wages, prices, and employment levels in both sectors, (Y1,Y2,p,w2*,w1,w1*,  
                                                 
19 In Harris and Todaro (HT) model k is a function of (L1 and L2). Ancillary sector absorbs laborers on 
first come first serve basis upto its capacity. 
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K*,L2*,L1,) are determined20. Using these equilibrium values, we can carry out 
comparative statics analysis which may elicit informative results. Using,                
w*2= p (1-α) BK*αL2-*α, and w2*. (L2*/L2*+Lt)= w1 ,   the following comparative 
statics  are  obtained.                           
...(4.30)                                                0                and               0
*
...(4.29)                                                                                               0
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These findings are summarized in the following result: 
Result 4.3:  Constraints on borrowing increases the number of job seekers in rural 
areas.   In the framework of Harris and Todaro equilibrium model of migration and 
wages, higher level of wages in ancillary sector absorbs number of laborers upto its 
optimal level and farming sector absorbs additional job seekers that puts downward 
pressure on wages in this sector. Wage laborer gets less than its marginal value 
product in farming sector. And wages in this sector is a decreasing function of number 
of additional job seekers. 
 
4.2.3 Determination of Critical Borrowing Limit 
Essentially it has been asserted that farming operations require appropriate amount of 
credit. It follows that if level of credit decreases beyond a critical limit, wage labor 
fetches more income than the income from farming21. Now a brief analytics is 
presented here to derive that critical level of *
_
B ; *
_
B  is identified as that level of 
borrowing constraint, such that the borrower is indifferent between farming and 
seeking employment in any of the above sectors.  The analysis is as following:  
                                                 
20 The household sector part analysis is in background here – assuming that preferences are such that 
labor supply (L) matches labor demand (L), and demand for both goods separately matches to Y1 ,and 
Y2.  
21 Two explanations: (i)With increasing borrowing constraint the borrower may not be able to arrange 
requisite amount of inputs for farming at remunerative prices, (ii) Many of the vulnerable poor people 
may not be having farming land and so they depend on wage market for their livelihood 
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The income from farming is: π = pf(X) + H(X)ε + w.X 
Using equations (4.15) to (4.19) ; following  cases of utility maximization program are 
obtained. 
bindingnon  constraintcredit  :...(4.31)                  *).*)(*)(Eu()Eu( XwXhXpf    
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Equation (4.34) pins down the critical value of borrowing limit. The comparative 
statics of this equation suggests that (after replacing, wBX / ) 
0*      and      ;0
*
* 


C
B
K
B                                                                    … (4.35) 
Also as level of credit availability increases, farming becomes more remunerative and 
less is the number of job seekers and hence less is downward pressure on wages. Let  
*
_
B  is the critical borrowing limit. Now suppose the critical borrowing limit increases 
then value of cumulative density function G(
_
B *) also increases . G(
_
B *) is interpreted 
as fraction of households whose critical  borrowing limit is below 
_
B *. Now the 
households whose critical borrowing limit is beyond 
_
B *, for them farming is not 
remunerative and they become the job seekers. Implicitly it implies that as credit 
availability increases, more numbers of families get credit beyond the critical 
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borrowing limit and the number of wage seekers decreases in both sectors. The 
following comparative statics is evident.  
]
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These observations are summarized in Result 4.4. 
Result 4.4:   As the limit of critical borrowing constraint increases (implicitly the 
availability of credit increases), the number of people searching for both farming and 
ancillary sector employment decreases. This increases equilibrium wage both in 
ancillary sector and also in farming sector.  
This simple analysis explains that, with increasing borrowing constraint, the income 
earning prospect of the poor people may deteriorate and it may itself become a cause 
of persistent poverty. Hence understanding the determinants of credit constraints and 
resolving such constraints is an important policy question. 
 
4.3. Borrowing Constraints and Livelihood Choices 
In this section I will attempt to find answers for the following simple question: “How a 
credit constraint can affect an agent’s decision of accumulation of physical capital, 
human capital (schooling) – that may impact her choice of profession (entrepreneur or 
worker) and thus her income, consumption and leisure choices?”  
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Some of these questions are investigated in static setting in section 2. However the 
process of borrowing, investment, outcome, consumption, and repayment evolves over 
time in an individual’s life cycle.  Hence learning the dynamics (and steady state 
equilibrium –if that exists) of these choice variables may strengthen our understanding 
of influence of borrowing constraints on life cycle paths of these variables.  This 
section attempts to analyze the effects of borrowing constraints on above choices of an 
individual over her life cycle.  
In recent literature several papers have analyzed the affects of borrowing constraints 
on consumption path during the life cycle of a representative agent.22  In a significant 
empirical study, Zeldes (1989) found that an inability to borrow against future labor 
income affects the consumption of a significant portion of population. His estimations 
indicated that, borrowing constraints caused annual food consumption growth 1.7 
percentage points higher compared to the situation of no such constraint. Deaton 
(1991,1993) observed that the precautionary demand for savings interact with 
borrowing constraints to provide a motive for holding assets which induces 
postponement of present consumption; however it is empirically difficult to separate 
out the effects of precautionary saving motives and that of borrowing constraints. 
Gregorio (1996) studied the effect of borrowing constraints on human capital 
accumulation and economic growth. He has used overlapping generation model with 
endogenous growth framework. He observed that, borrowing constraints increases 
aggregate savings and this may increase growth, but he also observed that, by reducing 
human capital accumulation it may negatively affect the economic growth.  
Bernhardt and Backus (1990) studied the effect of borrowing constraints on 
occupational choice and labor supply decisions. They have used life- cycle theory of 
labor supply and consumption decisions framework. They observed that, (i) 
                                                 
22 Deaton (1991, 1993), and Zeldes (1989) are important references on this.   
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consumption is non-decreasing and is increasing when the borrowing constraint binds, 
(ii) labor supply is increasing at t=0, but decreasing near the terminal date T, when the 
borrowing constraint binds. They also observed that, if the worker switches from one 
profession to another profession – then the switch is from low skill profession to 
higher skill profession. 
However these papers have not used borrowing rate or debt explicitly in their models 
and so the study of debt dynamics and evaluation of steady state optimal values of 
debt have been left unattended. Moreover a comprehensive model that attempts to 
analyze the effect of borrowing constraints on the decisions related to consumption, 
leisure, accumulation of physical capital and human capital, job choices and their 
mutual interrelations in a life cycle framework has not been apparently studied. This 
chapter attempts to conduct such an integrated analysis.  
First a simple example is presented – which demonstrates that the stochastic income 
process of a poor person may endogenously spur the credit constrainedness23.  
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23 I am thankful to Prof. Jon Conrad, for suggesting this analysis. 
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This implies that there is a finite probability of non-zero level of default, and such 
non-zero default probability may endogenously engender borrowing constraints. Table 
4.1 presents some of the results of such simulation. 
Table 4.1: Monte Carlo Simulation Results of Endogenous Borrowing Constraint 
 
Simulation g l Mean c Probability of 
default 
1 6 2 4 4 0.5 
2 5 3 4 4 0.45 
3 4.5 3.5 4 4 0.42 
4 5 3.5 4.25 4 0.05 
5 5.5 3 4.25 4 0.2 
6 7 2 4.5 4 0.2 
7 7 3 5 4 0.02 
8 8 3 5.5 4 0.01 
 
Some of the noteworthy points are as following: 
1. More the income in bad state (l) decreases (keeping the mean income same), more 
the probability of default increases – this highlights the high downside risk to 
income process in rural areas.  
2. Even the mean of income is larger than the subsistence consumption level; there is 
always a non zero probability of default. This highlights the risk of uncertainty in 
income process in rural areas.  
Now a general set-up is presented as following. 
 
4.3.1 Borrowing Constraint and Livelihood Choices 
Here effects of borrowing constraints on a person’s livelihood choices-related to 
borrowing, consumption, leisure, choice of job, and accumulation of physical capital 
and human capital over her life cycle is investigated in a  dynamic optimization 
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framework. Before description of the model is presented, a brief note on the main 
features of dynamic optimization methodology is presented. 
In the maximum principles (using Hamiltonian)24, the value of co-state variables are 
interpreted as shadow price or value of an additional unit of that state variable. The 
current value Hamiltonian corresponds closely to the economist’s notion of current 
income. The value function V(c(X),h(X)) , is a concave , non decreasing, and non 
negative function. Also when the optimized value function is obtained, its marginal 
value with respect to a state variable equals the value of the corresponding co-state 
variable. 
)).(*(')(varcos tXVtiabletate X     Here X is vector of state variable. 
For example, value of )(tK  implies that – how much value of the optimized value 
function increases by usage of one additional unit of state variable K.  And also when 
the current value Hamiltonian is optimized, it is characterized as 
)).(*())(),(*( tXVttXHC    
The above equation implies that optimized  HC is income or return on wealth V.  
Maximizing the Hamiltonian implies that net income (HC) – with net investment 
evaluated at its correct efficiency price is being maximized at each instant of time 
(Weitzman: 103). The first order necessary and sufficient conditions (maximal 
conditions, co-state equations and transversality conditions) describe an economy 
wide dynamic competitive equilibrium with a perfect capital market. This synthesizes 
optimization over time and market equilibrium over time and in the words of 
Weitzman (104) – “Each representative agent in the competitive federation is 
optimizing the same optimal control problem against the external world, but internally 
all must compete for capital on perfectly competitive capital markets.” And when we 
add constraints on this optimization program – then constrained optimal solutions may 
                                                 
24 Good references on this topic are: (1) Weitzman, M.L.(2003). (2) Kamien and Schwartz (1991) 
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be a corner solution (Maximum Rapid Approach Path (MRAP)) or interior solutions – 
that may reduce the value of the optimized value function (in the case of corner 
solution)  in comparison to that of unconstrained program. 
The effects of borrowing constraint are of central importance here and hence effects of 
risk and uncertainty are assumed away and a deterministic framework is used. 
The analytical model is described as following. Here time subscripts represent values 
of relevant variables at time t.  
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The first order necessary and sufficient conditions and relevant observations follow. 
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Result 4.5: When the marginal gain from borrowing is more than the marginal cost of 
borrowing, then optimally borrowing rate increases and in the reverse case borrowing 
rate decreases and possibly repayment is made. However this optimality is not 
achieved in presence of binding constraints on the life time borrowing limit. 
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These findings are summarized in result 4.6. 
Result 4.6: Along optimal path, the part of time endowment devoted to schooling is 
such that the marginal productivity of human capital investment equals the marginal 
value of work. Also when marginal productivity of human capital investment exceeds 
that of physical capital investment, then optimal value of human capital investment is 
an increasing function of physical capital and human capital level. 
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Result 4.7: Along optimal path, the non schooling time should be so divided between 
leisure and work, such that, marginal utility of leisure equals marginal value of work. 
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Along optimal path, optimal values of (K, H) may be different under the two regimes. 
Hence if borrowing constraint affects accumulation of physical capital more, then an 
entrepreneur may become wage seeker. Above findings are summarized in result 4.8. 
Result 4.8: Along optimal path, if net earning from entrepreneurship is larger than the 
net income from wage works, then agent chooses to be entrepreneur. As borrowing 
constraints affect accumulation of physical capital and human capital and if the 
marginal effect is different then borrowing constraint may compel an entrepreneur to 
become wage seeker or vice versa. This description is graphically shown in Figure 4.1. 
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Before examining the co-state equations, the dynamics of equations (4.37), (4.38), 
(4.39) and (4.40) are analyzed. 
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For ensuing analysis it is assumed that agent optimally prefers entrepreneurship, ν=1.  
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Figure 4.1: Wage – entrepreneur choice 
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Also taking log of equation (4.41) and differentiating with respect to time implies: 
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Equation (4.49) describes dynamics of consumption c and also helps in pinning down 
K* value of physical capital in steady state equilibrium. 
Here the value of µB is interpreted as gain in additional lifetime utility that would 
result from able to borrow an extra dollar today, consume its proceeds, and reduce 
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consumption appropriately next period. Since agents are constrained from borrowing 
more, but not from saving more, at the constrained optimum, the marginal utility from 
consuming an extra unit today is always greater than or equal to the marginal utility 
from waiting until tomorrow to consume the extra amount (Zeldes, 1989).  
Then the co- state equation for state variable H is as following:  
obtained. is expression following ,for   (4.46)equation  from ngSubstituti
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Equation (4.51) describes dynamics of human capital investment rate h and also helps 
in pinning down H*, value of human capital in steady state equilibrium. 
The co- state equation for state variable B is as following:  
obtained. is expression following ,for   (3.9)equation  from ngSubstituti
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Equation (4.53) describes dynamics of borrowing rate b and also helps in pinning 
down B*, value of human capital in steady state equilibrium. 
 
4.3.2 Analysis of the above framework 
The equations (4.36, 4.39, 4.41, 4.47, 4.49, 4.51, and 4.53) and laws of motion 
describing dynamics of K, H, and B with initial conditions, constraints and 
transversality conditions, form a system of equations – that determine the dynamics of 
control, state, and co-state variables and also their values in steady state equilibrium. 
We are mainly interested in understanding the effects of borrowing constraint on 
steady state values of consumption c*, human capital investment h*, borrowing rate 
b*, leisure γ*, physical capital K*, human capital H*, and debt B*, and also on the 
dynamics of these variables. As this system is described by large number of variables, 
it is analytically tractable to characterize the dynamics and steady state expressions of 
these variables rather than trying to obtain close form solutions.   
 
4.3.2.1 Dynamics of consumption ‘c’  
Movement of c over time (until its steady state) is described by equation (4.49) , which 
is reproduced as following. 
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Also for simple case when it is assumed that η =1 (linear growth of debt), and s = 0 
(no set up cost of debt), then equations (4.37, 4.38, and 4.53) imply  
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The above analysis is summarized in following result.  
 Result 4.9:  When a person is borrowing constrained, his optimal consumption path is 
not smoothened across time, even when the discount factor and interest rate are same. 
It induces increasing consumption path. This suggests that the person may not be able 
to get her subsistence level of consumption in initial periods and she has to postpone 
the consumption – and because of concavity assumptions on the utility function, it 
may lead to overall loss of her welfare. 
 
4.3.2.2 Value of K* (in Steady State Equilibrium): Using equation (4.49, and 4.54) 
which assumes that the agent optimally chooses entrepreneurship: ν=1. In steady state 
.
c =0. Hence  
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Also equation (4.55) suggests that in steady state, both K*, and H* are complementary 
to each other. 
 .constraint  borrowing reduced with statesteady in  *K of uehigher val  toleads This .constraint
borrowing  therelaxes a'' of   valuesincreasing hence , 0)a, (  HaKB and 0 Now  B
 
...(4.56)                                                                                         0
a
*K  
  
Higher H* promotes higher value of K* and vice versa. The above observations are 
summarized in the following result. 
Result 4.10: In the steady state, value of physical capital and human capital are 
complimentary to each other. Higher value of human capital promotes higher value of 
physical capital and vice versa. Also, with relaxation of borrowing constraints, the 
steady state value of physical capital increases. 
Survey Findings: Household assets are observed to be positively correlated 
(correlation coefficients are .12 and .10 respectively for China and India) with 
educational attainments of the respondents. 
4.3.2.3. Value of H*and h* (in Steady State Equilibrium): Using equation (4.51), 
value of   H* can be obtained and then using state equation of H, value of h* is 
obtained. 
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 Ideally in steady state, if there is no depreciation of human capital, then h* should be 
zero. But when there is depreciation of H involved, then h* should be that much – 
which is able to replete the depreciated part.  Hence 
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For the reasons explained above, understanding the optimal value of ‘h’ across time is 
more important rather than examining the value of h* in steady state. This may throw 
light on the facts that on the life cycle path how h should optimally be invested. For 
this consider the equation (4.39) 
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When there is no constraint on borrowing, this prescription is not problematic. One 
can borrow in the beginning to make desired level of human capital investement. It 
will further augument the earning potential. But when the persion is credit constrained, 
then suboptimal ‘h’ is obtained, which further restricts the earning potential. 
 
But in presence of borrowing constraint  λK is  decreasing (equation 4.44) – implying 
that initially it may be dominating over λH    and  hence maximum value of ‘h’ is not 
obtained in beginning of life cycle.  
  h'.'   of  uehigher val  toleads     and  ,  ,  of uehigher val that suggests (4.60)Equation H 
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Two important implications of equation (4.51) are as following:  
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 2. If K and H are increasing at same rate towards its steady state value along optimal 
path, then in presence of  borrowing constraint ‘h’ is also increasing ( as dynamic 
terms of K and H cancel each other and then ‘h’ follows same trend as that of ‘c’). 
This shows that optimally maximum ‘h’ is not attained in the beginning of life cycle. 
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In presence of borrowing constraint, first term on the right hand side is negative, the 
second and third terms may cancel each other and last term is positive, then λH may be 
increasing over time if last term dominates, otherwise it may be decreasing.    
The above observations are summarized in the following result: 
Result 4.11: Relaxation of borrowing constraint, helps increase the value of human 
capital (H*) and also its investment rate (h*) in steady state. Optimally human capital 
investment rate should be maximum (higher hopt) in the beginning of the life cycle and 
may decline to its steady state value in the later part of life cycle. If an agent is 
constrained in borrowing, then she can not possibly devote hopt for schooling and then    
Relaxation of borrowing constraint facilitates in achieving this optimality. 
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4.3.2.4. Value of B*and b* (in Steady State Equilibrium) 
Equation (4.53) pins down the steady state value of B*, and then using state equation 
of B, value of b* is obtained in steady state equilibrium. 
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In steady state equilibrium, following expression for B is obtained. 
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These findings are summarized in the following result. 
Result 4.12: The optimal value of debt in the steady state is an increasing function of 
discount rate, and decreasing function of interest rate, and set-up cost of debt. The 
borrowing constraint reduces the optimal value of debt in steady state. 
The survey results reveal that more than 85 percent respondents in both the countries 
agree that they would be willing to borrow more if interest rates and other costs of 
debts are reduced. 
Equation (4.53) also describes the dynamics of borrowing rate b. In presence of 
borrowing constraint consumption increases over time, hence first term on the right 
hand side of the equation is negative, also second term is negative. However third term 
and last term are positive. Equation (4.53) is transformed to describe dynamics of b 
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and presented in equation (4.62). If last two terms jointly dominate the first two terms 
then borrowing increases over time, otherwise it decreases over time.  
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If there is no borrowing constraint, maximum borrowing is done in the beginning for 
investment in physical and human capital and after that it will be decreasing over time 
to its steady state value of zero. In presence of borrowing constraint, such optimality is 
not attained. Now for, 1Tt0  (T1 is such that the last two terms dominate) rate of 
borrowing is positive and increases steadily. After that the first two terms dominate 
and then borrowing starts declining until in steady state it becomes zero.  
 
4.3.2.5 Dynamics of Leisure (γ)  
Equation (3.11) describes the dynamics of leisure, which is reproduced below. In 
presence of borrowing constraint, the first term on the right hand side of the equation 
is negative and the last two terms are positive. Hence leisure is increasing over time if 
the first term dominates otherwise it decreases over time.  
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Also steady state equilibrium value of leisure is guided by equation (4.41) which is 
reproduced below. Assuming ν =1  
.*H and *K of uehigher val with reduces and*c with increases  *
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These findings lead to result 4.13. 
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Result 4.13:  In presence of borrowing constraint leisure increases or decreases over 
time depending on whether consumption term dominates the trajectory of capital 
(physical and human) term. Also steady state equilibrium value of leisure increases 
with higher value of consumption and decreases with higher values of physical or 
human capital amount. 
 
4.3.3 Borrowing Constraints, Capital Formation and Consumption  
 The general set up proposed in section 3.2 helps in understanding the impact of 
borrowing constraint on the trajectory of relevant control and state variables and also 
its effect on their steady state values. However large numbers of variables make it 
difficult to obtain explicit expressions related to dynamics and steady state values of 
the state and control variables. Now to illustrate the earlier description, a simpler 
model is being presented in this sub section, involving choices of only borrowing, 
capital (physical and human combined) investment, and consumption. The description 
of model is as following:  
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Again infinite time horizon optimization set up is considered. The borrower borrows 
money every period to invest it for production purposes. Outputs obtained from 
production are used for consumption, loan repayment and also to pay for set up cost of 
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debt.  The relevant optimization problem which optimizes amount of borrowing every 
period is described as following.  
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This optimization program will be solved using dynamic programming method. 
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Integrating equation (4.69) and using boundary conditions expression for value 
function can be obtained. However, first optimal feedback policy, )(* tt KB  , 
determined by equation (4.67) is obtained as following  
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Equation (4.71) determines the optimal feedback policy, )(* tt KB   
Once the feedback policy is determined, the optimal trajectory of Kt+1 is iteratively 
worked out as described following.  
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Steady state value of K* is computed using equation (4.71) and (4.63) and using the 
fact that in steady state, ct= c* and Kt= K* for all t 
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Equation (4.74) shows that credit constraints lead to lower steady state value of 
capital. Further simple close form expression of optimal feedback policy is obtained if 
it is assumed that the agent is risk neutral – hence the preferences are represented by 
linear utility function, i.e. u(c) =c. Then equation (4.71) yields following expression.  
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Essentially the optimization program is characterized by following equations: 
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Equation (4.76) describes the optimal borrowing amount in every year. However if the 
borrower can not borrow beyond a certain amount, say Bt≤Bmax then the optimal 
trajectory of capital formation, and utility attainment is disrupted and it takes longer 
duration to achieve the lower level of  steady state equilibrium, that clearly 
demonstrates welfare loss as value of the value function (equation 4.77) is reduced. 
These findings are summarized in result 4.14. 
Result 4.14:  Borrowing constraint reduces the steady state equilibrium values of 
capital and borrowing rate, which in turn adversely affects consumption in steady 
state. Also in presence of borrowing constraint it takes longer duration to attain steady 
state. As a result the borrower incurs welfare loss. 
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A simple example demonstrates above observations, using following parametric 
values: 
 borrowing  nedunconstrai of casein   ; 3.14  *B  , 151.15  *K  
 0.0  K  0.96,    0.02, d  , 75  s , 1.5  b   500, a 0

 
 
The trajectories of capital formation for different levels of credit rationing have been 
shown in Figure 4.2. Clearly the steady state values of capital decreases with stricter 
level of credit rationing and also it takes additional numbers of years to attain steady 
state values, when borrowing is not unconstrained; Table 4.2 summarizes that. 
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Figure 4.2: Capital Formation under Various Credit Rationing Regimes 
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Table 4.2: Numbers of years Needed to Attain Steady State Equilibrium 
 
Sl. 
Number 
Credit 
Rationed at 
Bmax 
Value of 
Constraint 
Coefficient 
Steady 
State 
Value of 
Capital 
Value 
Function 
Number of 
Years Needed 
to attain Steady 
State 
Equilibrium 
1 Unconstrained ρλ = 0 151.15 1015421 20 
2 Bmax =20 ρλ = 244.75 74.1 716018 28 
3 Bmax =10 ρλ = 362.33 37.04 410488 34 
4 Bmax =5 ρλ = 421.12 18.52 218406 40 
 
4.4. Empirical Investigations 
Some of the survey questions specifically elicited information from the respondents on 
various types of problems they confront because of credit constraints, such as, food 
insecurity, less input application in farming, inadequate education and health care 
attainments etc. Table 3 enumerates the percentages of families across the quintiles of 
assets for both countries, who stated that they were compelled to use lower level of 
inputs (“Low input”) for farming, who do not get adequate amount of food (“Less 
food”), and who are not able to provide desired level of health care and education 
(“Less education”), because of credit constraints. It is generally decreasing with higher 
level of quintiles. Apparently people having fewer assets are more credit constrained 
and hence compelled to use suboptimal level of inputs. 
Table 4.3: Effects of Credit Constraints on Various Livelihood Choices (Percentage) 
 
 China (N= 743) India (N=400) 
Asset 
Quintile 
Low input Less 
food 
Less 
education 
Low input Less 
food 
Less 
education
1 80 22 64 78 65 67 
2 77 31 58 90 63 73 
3 75 20 45 81 50 64 
4 66 21 49 81 43 51 
5 71 16 37 61 38 43 
Total 74 21 50 78 52 60 
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The purpose of this section to develop an appropriate econometric model to 
investigate the nature of associations (or causality) between credit constraints and 
above said variables. For tractability of analysis a composite binary variable “Credit 
impact” is created as following;  
Credit impact =1, when food insecurity =1 or less education =1 or less inputs =1;  
Otherwise, Credit impact = 0.  
Similarly another composite binary variable “Credit impact1” is created with “and” 
conditions in place of “or” conditions. The summary statistics of these variables for 
both the countries, India and China are reported in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Mean Values of Credit impact and Credit Impact1 (binary variables) 
 
Country N Credit impact Credit impact1 
India 399 0.81 0.44 
China 741 0.85 0.14 
 
4.4.1 Econometric Model and Identification Strategy  
The a-priori hypothesis is that in presence of credit constraints, it may be difficult to 
afford the cost of optimal level of some of the livelihood choices such as, food 
consumption, farm inputs, and health and educational attainments. Also the propensity 
to use these choices may be negatively affected. Credit constraints can thus have 
causal effects on these choices, which have been analyzed in sections 2 and 3.  
To infer causality, we need data with natural experiments or ideally randomized 
experiments. But it is difficult, expensive and time consuming to get access to such 
data sets. Hence this chapter attempts to investigate underlying nature of associations 
of credit constraints and “Credit impact”. However using suitable econometric 
methods (discussed later) we can still infer causality.  
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We are primarily interested in the coefficient on the variable related to credit 
constrainedness.  However, as discussed earlier the binary variable “Credit Constraint” 
is not an exogenous variable, rather it can be explained by several covariates – hence 
first an estimation equation has been specified for “Credit Constraint”, and then the 
predicted values of “Credit Constraint” have been used in the ensuing regressions. 
Probit regression method is used to estimate the equations related with impact of credit 
constraint.     
Hence the following system of equations needs to be estimated  
 
   d.distributeNormally  bivariate X2)X, |u ,(  and , constraintCredit   B , Where
...(4.79)                                                       ) N(0,~ X2) |(u     ;u       X2' B 
...(4.78)                         ),0(~)|(  ; B} {X1,XLet   ;     X1'  
2
2
2
1





 NXBC
 
Here C is “Credit impact” variable, B is “Credit Constraint” (binary) variable.  X1 is a 
set of control variables such as age, sex, socio-economic variables etc.  X2 is another 
set of control variables – it includes X1 variables and also additional variables 
(instruments) in order to satisfy exclusion criteria for identification of the coefficients. 
The main coefficient of the interest is γ. 
For consistent estimations of {β,γ} , it is necessary that E(X’ε) =0. This requires that 
the explanatory variables are exogenous i.e. not correlated with the error term. 
This assumption gets substantially violated; (i) when any of the explanatory variables 
is not strictly exogenous and is determined by other explanatory variables and some of 
the unobservables  correlated with the error term, (ii) when any of the explanatory 
variables is affected by the explained variable because of simultaneity,  and (iii) when 
we are not able to measure any of the explanatory variables appropriately and then use 
a poor proxy variable  or it is measured with systematic  errors.  
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We can justify the orthogonality and adequate identification of most of the control 
variables, but that of B is evidently suspected here.  
Usually a household or individual is identified as borrowing constrained only if she 
has a positive demand for credit and she is not able to get desired amount of credit. So 
in the data set the following categories of people are termed as borrowing constrained: 
i. People who are apprehensive to enter the credit market - they think that they 
will be refused. 
ii. People who apply for a loan and get refused by the lender. 
iii. People who apply for a loan and get a loan amount, but less than the requested 
amount. 
If a person belongs to any of these categories then she is assumed to be borrowing 
constrained and “Credit Constraint” is specified as   a binary variable (1 or 0). In the 
data the first two categories are explicitly identified. The third category is not directly 
identified. If it is ignored then the level of borrowing constrainedness in the sample is 
understated. However if we use econometric methods to estimate the desired amount 
of credit implicitly then it is open to subjective evaluation.  
The binary variable specification of the “Credit Constraint (B)” is problematic mainly 
because of two reasons – (i) the credit constrainedness is an outcome of several 
decisions of the demanders and suppliers of the credit. The borrowing constrainedness 
of a person can be explained by several covariates such as her educational and 
occupational status, income and wealth level, health status, other observable and non 
observable factors such as neighborhoods, social status, and government policies 
related to credit access etc. So the orthogonality of B is not guaranteed; and (ii) it does 
not measure the propensity (or level) of borrowing constrainedness of a person.  
Realistically every person depending upon her socio- economic and other conditions 
may be credit constrained to some extent. In a scale of zero to one – zero means not 
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credit constrained at all and one means fully credit constrained and any in between 
value implies partial credit constrained. 
 Ideally the above system of equations should be estimated using Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood method which is most efficient. However it is found to be 
complicated to implement. So the next best alternative is to use Limited Information 
Maximum Likelihood Method. This however still requires a sound modeling of 
correlations of errors of the two equations – which is realistically difficult. Hence to 
make the things simpler, the correlation of the errors of the two equations is ignored. It 
may affect efficiency of the estimations. In the present set up this assumption is 
reasonable, as Credit impact variable is not likely to affect credit constraint variable, 
B. For ease of computations this approximation may not be bad.  The degree of 
correlations of errors of two equations can be measured to check the validity of this 
simplification.  With these simplifications, two stage least square (2SLS) method is 
used.  We are losing some efficiency here, but that eases the computations25.  
Hence in the first stage the second equation related to the Credit Constraint is 
estimated. The set of instruments in this regression satisfy the exclusion criteria. Then 
in the second stage, in place of credit constraint, the predicted values of credit 
constraint from first stage are used in the first equation. 
Thus for consistent estimation following specification is estimated. 
 
 0. )E(X' now and . ),0()PBC ,1|(  ; PBC} {X1,XLet  
...(4.80)                  PBC)constraintCredit  of  valuePredicted(  X1'  C
2 
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

NX
 
This strategy leads to consistent estimation of the coefficients (β, π).   
4.4.1. A Major Hypothesis: The major hypotheses related to the analytical model in 
section 3 and the econometric models described in this section is as following.  
                                                 
25  For detail discussion on this; see Greene (2003) – chapters 14, and 15. 
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Hypothesis 1: The Null is that the increasing level of credit constrainedness is not 
associated with the “Credit impact” variable, and the alternative is that these are 
positively associated.  
Also we can claim causality here based on selection on observables principle, using 
the relevant instruments in the first stage that may allow us to measure the effect of 
exogenous variation of borrowing constraint on “Credit impact” variable.  
The summary statistics of important control variables are presented in Table 4.5, and 
description of credit related outcomes are reported in Table 4.6. The summary 
statistics of excluded variables / instruments used in the first stage regression are 
reported in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.5: Summary statistic of important variables 
 
China India Variable 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Farm Size( mu /acre) 1556 5.47 3.99 400 2.98 2.40 
Household incomea 1555 11462.7 12176.89 400 45577.25 37631.05
Asset Valuea 1419 52286.8 54910.84 400 408352.5 600320.7
Income source (1=farm) 1419 .42 .49 400 .77 .41 
Education (1-4)b 754 2.40 .78 400 2.54 .82 
Sex  (1=female) 756 .10 .30 400 .003 (.05) 
Age (Years) 754 40-50 10 400 47.5 11.5 
Household Size 1155 4.4 1.55 400 6.6 3.5 
amount of debta 1020 13336.8 26585.34 337 15671.96 21400.19
a. Units are local currency (RMB in China / Rupees in India).  b. Education: 1- No 
schooling, 2 – Primary schooling, 3- Secondary schooling, 4 – College and above.  
 
Table 4.6: Description of Borrowing Behavior and Credit Constraint 
 
China India Variable (binary variables) : Values 
reported in percentage Mean Observations Mean Observations 
Loan application rejected .31 1010 .41 399 
Could not get adequate loan for 
various purposes 
.30 756 .45 384 
Never get desired amount of loan .38 1320 .62 400 
Sometimes got desired amount of loan .30 1320 .30 400 
Always got desired amount of loan .32 1320 .07 400 
Credit Rationed (1,0) .58 1418 .66 400 
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It appears that borrowing opportunities are limited in both countries.  
A household belonging to any of the following categories has been assigned as credit 
rationed – (i) Loan application rejected, (ii) Could not get adequate credit various 
purposes (consumption, education, health, farming or business), and (iii) Never 
obtained desired amount of credit.  
Table 4.7: Summary Statistics of excluded variables/ instruments 
 
Variable (1=yes) Mean (s.d.)  : 
China (N=756) 
Mean (s.d.) : 
India (N=384) 
Lacks collateral  .53 (.50) .47 (.50) 
Denied loan because of collateral   .64 (.47) : N=525 .50 (50) : N=175 
Apprehensions because of unpaid debts .51 (.50) .46 (.50) 
Apprehensions  because of high interest 
rates 
.68 (.46) .34 (.47) 
Apprehensions  because of delay and bribe .45 (.50) .93 (.24) 
 
4.4.2 Estimation Model for Credit Constraints  
As generally agreed the positive demand for credit by a person is an outcome of her 
decision process that is influenced by several covariates such as; age, sex, income, 
wealth endowments, educational level, occupational status, health status and so on. 
Similarly the lending decisions of a lender are influenced by several variables such as; 
income of the borrower, bankability of the project, etc. And so also the desired amount 
of credit of a borrower is influenced by several covariates. These three decision 
processes can be estimated using full information maximum likelihood (FIML) 
method following Heckman selection procedure or Heckman two step procedure. 
However another simpler approach is followed here as described below. 
Let us assume that the amount of desired debt of any person is D*, and also assume 
that amount of available loan to him is S*. Then the person is assumed to be 
borrowing constrained iff; D* > S*. This excess demand for credit is, Z* = D* - S*.  
  156
(4.81) ....                               ),0(   :                   X'   *
        X '  - X'     *S - *D   *
    X '  *S           and       ;  X'  *D
: followingasmadebecan  *Sand*Dofn formulatio iablelatent var  The
2
S DSD
SS DD



NZ
Z



 
.1 that assumed isit  and ,  varianceand zeromean  with ddistributenormally 
  be  toassumed ,error term random a is   .parameters of vctor a is  loan,for  demand
  excess eexplain th that  variablesexogenous of vector a is X iable,latent var is * ZWhere
22  

 
d.constraine borrowingnot  isperson  The  otherwise.   : 0   Zand
...(4.82)         dconstraine borrowing isperson  The   0 μ     Xα'   *       Ziff       1  Z
:following as  defined
 is  Zabledummy vari a usingfunction criterion  a Hence not.or   dconstraine  borrowing
isperson   a whether - outcomebinary  aonly   observe   what we; observednot  is  * ZNow


 
The vector of parameters α is estimated using linear probability model estimation 
method. Then the predicted value of Credit Constraint (PCC) is computed for use in 
ensuing estimations. 
The excluded variables/instruments used in the first stage to estimate the credit 
constraints equation are – inability to post collateral, diverted loans on earlier 
occasions (type of moral hazard), willingness to borrow more if interest rates are 
reduced, bureaucratic delay and bribes in the sanction of a loan, prefer to borrow from 
friend and relative, and percentage of loan amounts borrowed from friend and 
relatives. These additional instruments realistically influence the level of borrowing 
constraints of a person, but do not directly affect the “Credit impact” variable. If first 
stage regression comes out to be significant enough (say F statistic bigger than 10), 
implying that instruments are relevant and strong, then it strengthens the inferences of 
second stage estimations and gives credible evidence of causality. Some of the 
additional potential instruments could be - proximity to a bank, government’s specific 
enabling legislations related to access to credit etc. 
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The first stage linear probability regression results are reported in Table 4.8. The Wald 
statistic is satisfactorily high in the case of India which implies good significance of 
the estimation model. However in the case of China it is on lower side, but the 
significance of regression remains valid. Also many variables are individually 
significant in the case of India. We are not interested in analyzing the marginal effects 
of variables rather we are more interested in the second stage regression and inferring 
on causal effect of credit constraints on food security, input applications in farming, 
and health and educational attainments represented by a composite variable “Credit 
Impact”.  It is evident that the education, household assets and income, ability to post 
collateral, preferences of borrowing are important explanatory variables for credit 
constrainedness.  
 
Table 4.8: First Stage Linear Probability Regression Results 
 
India China Dependent variable : Credit constraint
Coef. Std. Err. T Coef. Std. 
Err. 
t 
Age -0.01 0.01 -0.91 -0.13 0.12 -1.1 
Age sq (7.87e-5) 0.00 0.00 0.7 0.023 0.02 1.03 
Household size -0.02* 0.007 -2.5 -0.002 0.01 -0.18 
Education -0.085* 0.030 -2.87 0.005 0.03 0.19 
Income Source 0.148* 0.061 2.42 0.002* 0.00 2.04 
Log asset per capita -0.093* 0.033 -2.79 0.034 0.03 1.35 
Log income per capita -0.105* 0.043 -2.46 -0.032 0.03 -1.07 
Lack collateral -0.09* 0.048 -1.89 0.12* 0.04 3.04 
Moral hazard 0.127* 0.049 2.59 0.050 0.04 1.15 
Likely to borrow if interest rates are low -0.30* 0.121 -2.47 -0.042 0.05 -0.81 
Bureaucratic delay and bribe 0.23* 0.095 2.45 0.036 0.04 0.9 
Prefer to borrow from friend and relative -0.15* 0.048 -3.12 0.001* 0.00 1.82 
Percentage of  loan owed to friends 0.00 0.001 0.74 -0.131 0.12 -1.06 
region6 -0.036 0.070 -0.51 0.14* 0.04 3.29 
region8 0.356 0.074 4.83    
region9 -0.035 0.066 -0.53    
_cons 3.152 0.503 6.26 0.375 0.36 1.04 
India : N = 399 ;   F( 16,   382) = 8.00 ;  Adj R-squared =  0.22 
China: N = 659; F (13,   645) =    3.26;   Adj R-squared = 0.043 
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 The second stage equation (4.80) is estimated using probit regression method and the 
results are reported in table 4.9. The dependent variable is “Credit impact” in the case 
of India, however in the case of China its stronger version “Credit impact1” is used. 
Table 4.9: Second Stage Probit Regression Results 
 
India China Dependent Variable : Credit impact 
Coef. z Coef. Z Coef. z 
Predicted value of Credit Constraint 2.90* 3.42 1.39* 2.43 0.71 0.9 
Age 0.03 0.73 -0.36 -0.92 -0.45 -1.1 
Age square (7.87*10e-5) 0.00 -0.68 0.06 0.86 0.08 1.07 
Household size 0.03 1.03 -0.05 -0.94 -0.04 -0.9 
Education 0.32* 2.18 -0.02 -0.18 -0.01 -0.2 
Income Source (Farming=1) 0.19 0.63 0.00 0.8 0.00 1.18 
Log asset per capita 0.19 1.32 -0.08 -0.92 -0.05 -0.6 
Log income per capita 0.24 1.19 0.06 0.59 0.05 0.48 
region6 -7.04* -2.24   0.23 1.26 
region8 -5.76* -1.73     
region9 -6.66* -2.11     
_cons -0.61 . -0.8 -0.61 -0.80 -0.6 
India: N =  399 ;  LR chi2(11)  = 135.09 ;   Pseudo R2 = 0.35 
China: N  = 645; LR chi2(8)    =  12.35; Prob > chi2  = 0.12;    Pseudo R2  =0.0239 
China:  N = 645 ;LR chi2(9) = 13.94 ; Prob > chi2 = 0.12 ;  Pseudo R2=     0.0269 
Clearly the regression results are quite significant in the case of India because of 
highly significant likelihood ratio statistic, but the regression results does not seem to 
be significant in the case of China , however these are nearly significant at 10 percent 
significance level.  Again we are not interested in the marginal effects of variables. 
Our main interest lies in the sign and significance of the predicted value of credit 
constraint variable obtained from the first stage. Following these regression results, 
important inferences are stated as following: 
1. In the case of India, the predicted value of credit constraint is found to be positive 
and significant. It is also found to be robust when other variables are included or 
excluded. This finding gives credence to hypothesis 1 and we reject the null in 
favor of alternative that a credit constraint is positively associated with Credit 
impact. Also as discussed earlier we can make causal claim that credit constraints 
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affect food security, input applications in agriculture, and better health and 
educational attainments.  
2. In the case of China, also the predicted value of credit constraint is found to be 
positive and significant. But it is not found to be robust, as by adding the regional 
dummy its significance vanishes, however it bears the desired sign. The results are 
shown in the columns 8 and 9 of the table 12.  This finding gives weak credence to 
hypothesis 1.  
3. Further the probability of Credit impact =1 is plotted against predicted values of 
credit constraint in Figure 4.3. It is apparent that in the case of both the countries 
the probability of credit impact =1 is increasing with higher values of credit 
constraint.  This gives credence to  hypothesis1, that higher values of credit 
constraint adversely affects food security, input applications in farming, and health 
and educational attainments represented by a composite variable “Credit Impact” 
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Figure 4.3: Positive relation between Credit constraints and Credit impact 
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As this methodology does not provide robust evidence in the case of China, further 
investigations are made using propensity score method. In its simplest form following 
steps are followed: (i) Binary variable Credit constraint is regressed on explanatory 
variables using probit regression and predicted values (propensity scores) are 
generated. (ii) Then Credit impact is regressed on Credit constraint variable 
controlling for propensity score obtained from first stage regression and also the 
interaction term. (iii) The significant coefficient on the “Credit Constraint” indicates 
causal effect of credit constraint on “Credit impact”. 
The results are reported in Table 4.10. Clearly in the case of China the credit 
constraint variable turns out to be significantly positive, which indicates causal effect 
as conjectured and evidence in support of the hypothesis is obtained in the case of 
China also.  However in the case of India, we do not get significant results as 
coefficient of credit constraint is not positively significant. However coefficient of 
predicted values of credit constraint is positive and significant that indicates desired 
causal effect in addition to indicating that credit constraints are not randomly assigned. 
Further when only interaction term is used as additional control then the desired causal 
effect is obtained. 
 
Table 4.10: Causal Effect of Credit Constraint on Credit impact using Propensity 
Score Method 
 
China India Dependent Variable : Credit 
impact Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Credit constraint 0.37* 2.88 -0.14 -0.69 .37* 2.4 
Predicted values of credit 
constraint: p1 
2.11* 2.57 2.42* 4.13   
Interaction of Credit constraint 
and mean removed value of p1 
 
-1.69 -1.57 -0.71 -0.96 1.7* 3.7 
_cons -2.35 -5.55 -0.45 -1.67 .59* 5.3 
China: N = 659;   LR chi2(3) = 17.97; Prob > chi2 =   0.0004; Pseudo R2 =  0.0340 
India : N  =   399 ;  LR chi2(3)  =  43.16;  Prob > chi2 =  0.00;      Pseudo R2  =0.11 
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Also the mean values of “Credit impact” are computed for the two categories of 
respondents – namely, one who are credit constrained and another who are not credit 
constrained as assigned in the data. It is further subcategorized along the increasing 
quintiles of propensity score of credit constraints. The results are reported in Table 
4.11. Two key inferences are evident from this table as mentioned below: 
1. The value of “Credit impact” is normally increasing for higher quintiles of 
propensity score for both categories of people. 
2. The value of “Credit impact” is normally higher for people who are assigned as 
credit constrained in comparison to that of people who are assigned as not credit 
constrained, for each quintiles of propensity score of credit constraint. 
These two key findings give credence to hypothesis 1 – that credit constraints are 
positively  associated (also causality)  with “Credit impact” or increasing levels of 
credit constraints negatively affect food security, input applications in farming, and 
better health and educational attainments. 
 
Table 4.11: Mean Values of Credit impact for 5 quintiles of Propensity Score 
 
China India Quintile of 
Propensity 
Score 
Impact for 
Credit 
Constraint=1
Impact for 
Credit 
Constraint=0
Impact for 
Credit 
Constraint=1 
Impact for 
Credit 
Constraint=0
1 0.125 0.032 0.67 0.549 
2 0.214 0.065 0.76 0.718 
3 0.125 0.116 0.74 0.814 
4 0.219 0.220 0.87 0.947 
5 0.202 0.071 0.93 0.9 
Total 0.181 0.094 0.82 0.719 
These observations are graphically shown in Figure 4.4. Clearly in the case of both the 
countries higher values of credit constraint are normally associated with higher values 
of “Credit impact” and also these values are usually higher for the people who are 
assigned as credit constrained. 
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Essentially it has been shown that credit constraints adversely affect key livelihood 
choices such as, food consumption, farm input applications, and health and 
educational attainments.  
 
4.5. Conclusion  
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate the  impact of credit constraints on 
various aspects of livelihood choices such as, physical capital formation, human 
capital formation, agricultural inputs application, consumption smoothing, whether to 
become entrepreneur or wage seeker etc.  Investigation of impacts of credit constraints 
on farm input applications and wage seeking has been done using a static optimization 
framework. The analysis demonstrates that a credit constrained farmer uses 
suboptimal amount of farm inputs when the credit constraint is binding. Furthermore, 
if credit constraint tightens beyond a threshold level then the farming may not be 
remunerative and he prefers wage labor. However, increasing number of wage seekers 
Figure 4.4: Positive Relation of Credit Constraint and Credit impact 
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put a downward pressure on wage and thus wage market outcome is also adversely 
affected.  
Analysis of impact of credit constraints on various livelihood choices such as, capital 
investment (physical and human), consumption, leisure, and decision to either become 
an entrepreneur or wage seeker has been done using dynamic optimization framework.  
The results demonstrate that credit constraints affect consumption smoothing, and 
physical capital and human capital accumulation are also adversely affected. 
Furthermore comparative levels of physical capital and human capital accumulation 
influence the decisions of becoming an entrepreneur or wage seeker.   Some of these 
results are empirically investigated using the household survey data from China and 
India. Using suitable econometric methods it has been shown that credit constraints 
negatively affect food consumption, farm inputs applications, and health and 
educational attainments. 
However the empirical findings would have been more robust if data can be obtained 
either pertaining to some natural experiment or ideally relating to a randomized 
experiment. However, it is difficult, expensive and time consuming to get access to 
such data sets. Also if panel data on observations are available then unobserved 
heterogeneities can be controlled. Future research may pick up on these ideas and can 
come up with more insights on impacts of credit constraints. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  164
REFERENCES 
 
Banerjee, Abhijit and Newman, Andrew, F. (1994). “Occupational Choice and the 
Process of Development,” Journal of Political Economy, 101, 2, 274-298. 
 
Basu, K. (2000). Analytic Development Economics: The Less Developed Economy 
Revisited. The MIT Press, Cambridge, U.S.A. 
 
Becker, Gary S. (1975). Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. 
NBER, U.S.A. 
 Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education, 2nd  
Behrman, Jere and Anil Deolalikar. (1987). “Agricultural wages in India: The role of 
health, nutrition, and seasonality,” in: David E. Sahn, ed., Seasonal variability in Third 
World agriculture: The consequences for food security (Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore, MD.  
 
Bernhardt, Dan and Backus, David (1990). “Borrowing Constraints, Occupational 
Choice, and Labor Supply,” Journal of Labor Economics, 8, 1. 
 
Calvo, Cesar and Dercon, Stefan (2005). “Measuring Individual Vulnerability,” 
Oxford University, Discussion Paper Series Number 229. 
 
Deaton, A. (1991). “Savings and Liquidity Constraints,”Econometrica, 59, 1221-1248. 
 
Deaton, A. (1993). Understanding Consumption. Oxford University Press. U.S.A. 
 
Dercon Stefan (2005). “Vulnerability: A micro perspective,” Presented at ABCDE for 
Europe World Bank Conference, Amsterdam. 
Galor, Oded and Joseph Zeira (1993). "Income Distribution and Macroeconomics,” 
Review of Economics Studies, 60, 35-52. 
 
Glewee, P., Jacoby, H.G., and King, E.M. (2001). “Early Childhood Nutrition and 
Academic Achievement: A Longitudinal Analysis”, Journal of Public Economics, 
81:345-368. 
 
Greene, William H. (2003). Econometric Analysis. Prentice Hall, N.J., U.S.A. 
 
  165
Gregario, J.De. (1996). “Borrowing Constraints, Human Capital Accumulation and 
Growth,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 37, 49-71. 
 
Harris, John R.  and Todaro, Michael P. (1970). “Migration, Unemployment, and 
Development: A two Sector Analysis,” American Economic Review, 60, 1, 126-142. 
 
Hayashi, Fumio (1985). "Tests for Liquidity Constraints: A Critical Survey,” NBER 
Working Papers 1720 
 
Jacoby, H. (1994)."Borrowing Constraints and Progress through School: Evidence 
from Peru,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 76, 151-160. 
 
Jacoby, G. Hanon and Skoufias, Emmanuel (1997). “Risk, Financial Markets, and 
Human Capital in a Developing Country,” The Review of Economic Studies, 64, 3 , 
311-335 . 
 
Jaffe, D. and Stiglitz, J.E. (1990). Credit Rationing, in: B.M. Friedman and F.H. Hahn, 
eds., Handbook of Monetary Economics, Vol.II (Elsevier Science, Amsterdam) 837-
888. 
 
Just, R.E. and Pope, R.D. (1979). “Production function estimation and related risk 
consideration,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 69, 276-284. 
 
Kamien, Morton I. and Schwartz, Nancy (1991). Dynamic Optimization: The Calculus 
of Variation and Optimal Control in Economics and Management. Elsevier Science. 
 
Keeton, W. (1979). Equilibrium Credit Rationing, New York, Garland Press, 1979. 
 
Mincer, J. and S. Polacheck. (1974). “Family investments in human capita: Earnings 
of women,” Journal of Political Economy 82, 76108. 
 
Morduch, Jonathan (1995). “Income smoothing and consumption smoothing,” The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 3,103-114. 
 
Rosenzweig, Mark and Wolpin, Kenneth (1993). “Credit Market Constraints, 
Consumption Smoothing, and the Accumulation of Durable Assets in Low-Income 
Countries: Investments in Bullocks in India,” Journal of Political Economy, 101(2), 
223-44. 
  166
Sahn, D. and Alderman, H. (1988). “The effect of human capital on wages and the 
determinants of labor supply in a developing country”, Journal of Development 
Economics, 29 (2), 157-183. 
 
Schultz, T.P. (1993). “Investments in the schooling and health of women and men: 
quantities and return,” Journal of Human Resources, 28 (4), 694-734. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Weiss, Andrew (1981). “Credit Rationing in Markets with 
Imperfect Information,” American Economic Review, 71, 3, 393-410. 
 
Thomas, D. and J. Strauss (1996). “Health and wages: Evidence on men and women in 
urban Brazil,” Journal of Econometrics, 77(1), 159-186. 
 
Udry (1996). “Efficiency and Market Structure: Testing for Profit Maximization in 
African Agriculture,” http://www.econ.yale.edu/~cru2/pdf/separate.pdf 
 
Weitzman, M.L. (2003). Income, Wealth, and the Maximum Principle. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A. 
 
Zeldes, S. (1989). “Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: an Empirical 
Investigation,” Journal of Political Economy, 97,305-46. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  167
Chapter 5: The Economics of Risk Sharing and Consumption 
Smoothing  
 
In the rural areas of developing countries people face various types of risks and 
uncertainties. Well functioning credit and insurance markets usually enable people to 
face these risks and uncertainties in the developed countries. However, as investigated 
in Chapter 3, it is evident that a large proportion of people in the rural areas of 
developing countries face credit rationing. Similarly these people have limited access 
to insurance markets.  This chapter’s main contribution is to provide helpful insights 
on risk sharing and consumption smoothing motivations and mechanisms of these 
families. The three important mechanisms analyzed are – precautionary savings, risk 
sharing informal insurance and credit transactions. The household survey data from 
China and India provide significant inferences on the analytical results. It has been 
found that the families are willing to pay for insurance coverage as high as 15-20 
percent of the annual income.   
 
5.1. Introduction 
In the developing countries particularly in the rural areas, people face severe 
challenges in arranging finance for consumption and production purposes. The 
standard assumptions of complete markets including that of credit and insurance 
markets generally do not hold in reality. The price mechanism particularly in credit 
and insurance market is intrinsically limited by transaction costs and information and 
enforcement costs26. Consequently   optimal allocation of resources and hence 
fulfillment of effective demand of credit and insurance is not attained. The issues 
                                                 
26 See Hoff, Braverman, and Stiglitz (1993) for more on this. 
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related with credit rationing in formal credit market in these areas have been 
investigated in detail in Chapter 3. 
Furthermore, heavy dependence on farm related activities expose these families to 
substantial fluctuations in their income. In absence of adequate access to credit and 
insurance arrangements often these fluctuations (partially) translate into consumption 
fluctuations (Udry 1994, Townsend 1994, Townsend 1995).  Consumption 
fluctuations are usually painful for the families and these imply welfare loss for the 
risk averse agents having convex preferences over goods across various states and 
time periods.   In absence of well functioning credit and insurance markets these 
families resort to various ex ante and ex post measures to smooth their consumptions 
(Morduch 1995, Kochar 1995). Risk sharing using financial (gifts and loan 
transactions) and non financial transactions among close acquaintances is a widely 
documented method to smooth consumption intertemporally (Udry 1994, Townsend 
1994, Townsend 1995, Rosenzweig 1988). Several studies including the above have 
shown that the friends and relatives give gifts and advance credits at low interest rates 
as a mutual support and insurance arrangements.   The next chapter aims to develop an 
analytical framework to investigate the underlying motives for such financial 
transactions among friends and relatives in these areas, and also to empirically test 
some of the results obtained from this analysis.  
In the literature risk sharing motive has been advanced as an important explanation of 
informal financial transactions among relatives and friends. Hence this chapter’s main 
objectives are - (i) to understand the importance of various types of risks and 
uncertainties faced by these families, (ii) to understand the economics of risk sharing 
and consumption smoothing, and (iii) to investigate into the significance and 
mechanics of widely used risk sharing and consumption smoothing mechanisms of the 
risk averse agents. 
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Household surveys were conducted in rural areas of China (in years 2007 and 2008) 
and India (in year 2008-09). About 1500 families in China and 400 families in India 
were surveyed. The survey questionnaires are designed to elicit responses of families 
related to; (i) the credit rationing problems which they face, (ii) how it affects their 
livelihood choices, (iii) how they respond to overcome this problem, and (iv) the 
extent, types and motives for financial transactions among friends and relatives.    
Some of the important findings from the survey are as following:  
 (i) The families in these areas mostly depend on farm related activities. The survey 
data reveals that farm income constitutes about 48 and 57 percent of income of these 
families respectively in China and India. The coefficients of variation of farm income 
in both the countries are found to be around 34 percent, which is reasonably high. This 
creates substantial uncertainties in their income. So insurance and credit becomes an 
important input for livelihood for most of the families.  
(ii)  Further formal credit markets - banks and rural credit cooperatives (RCC) are not 
well developed in such areas. The data reveals that more than 60 percent of these 
families have been either denied loan or got less than the asked amount of loan from 
the banks and credit cooperatives. Also in these areas   informal borrowing constitutes 
a large portion of total borrowing. The data reveals that informal borrowing constitutes 
about 64 and 37 percent of total borrowing of these families respectively in the case of 
China and India. The data further reveals that these loan are taken not only for 
production purposes, but also to meet the urgent needs such as, consumption, health, 
funeral expenses etc.; in both the countries almost 25 percent of the borrowings seem 
to be done for such purposes. 
(iii) So also the insurance markets are not well functional in these areas. For example, 
in the case of India 90 percent families show their willingness to buy crop insurance, 
whereas only 34 percent families have actually bought this, in the case of China these 
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percentages are 75 and 18 respectively. In absence of well functioning insurance 
markets, the importance of credit is further enhanced (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1989).   
(iv) Also the data reveals that large percentages (50 percent) of the families actually 
prefer informal loans to formal loans. 
These findings considerably motivate this chapter. This chapter’s main contribution is 
to provide helpful insights on risk sharing and consumption smoothing motivations 
and mechanisms of the families living in rural areas of developing economies. The 
chapter is organized as following.  
Section 2 examines risk sharing and consumption smoothing in a competitive 
environment and also expressions related with socially optimal level of risk sharing 
have been obtained. Further the risk sharing insurance arrangements are explained 
here using simple examples. Section 3 investigates into the matters related with 
various ways of insuring against risk. The three important mechanisms analyzed are; 
precautionary savings, risk sharing insurance and credit arrangements. A simple 
analysis related with each of these mechanisms is presented here and useful results are 
obtained that attempt to explain these mechanisms.  Section 4 uses the household 
survey data from China and India to conduct empirical investigation into the 
significance of the important results obtained in sections 3. Suitable econometric 
methods and appropriate identification strategies have been proposed to get evidences 
on the results related to precautionary savings, risk sharing insurance arrangements 
and risk sharing credit arrangements.  The inferences and evidences are discussed in 
this section. The findings demonstrate that risk is a major concern for these people and 
they are willing to pay for insurance coverage as high as 15- 20 percent of annual 
income. Also satisfactory evidences of life cycle and precautionary motives for 
savings are obtained. Further, significant evidences are obtained related to risk sharing 
  171
insurance arrangements and risk sharing credit arrangements. Section 5 concludes with 
important observations.  
 
5.2. Analysis of Risk Sharing 
The benefit of risk sharing and consumption smoothing is demonstrated by a simple 
example as following. The household is assumed to be risk averse with strictly 
concave utility function u(w) = ln(w). His mean income in any period is $750 and he 
faces a mean zero risk (-$250, 0.5; $250, 0.5) in every period. The utility function and 
income realizations are shown in Figure 5.1. Because of strict concavity of the utility 
function the utility gain (cd) in good state is always less than the loss (ab) in bad state. 
ab =  [ln(750) – ln(500)] = 0.40      >            cd =  [ ln(1000) – ln(750)]  = 0.28 
So if the household maintains autarchy then over his finite life period her overall 
utility will be less compared to the situation in which he enters into agreement with 
another household and tries to smooth the consumption at $750 in each period. 
Further, it is assumed that there are two households A and B - the expected utility of 
each household in any period when they do not share risk is  
[Eu( Ay
~
) = Eu( By
~
)]no risk share = 0.5(ln1000 +ln500) = 6.56 
But when they share the risk, then  
[Eu( Ay
~
) = Eu( By
~
)]share risk = ln750 = 6.62  > 6.56 
Hence,   [Eu( Ay
~
) = Eu( By
~
)]share risk ≥  [Eu( Ay
~
) = Eu( By
~
)]no risk share    
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This simple example neatly demonstrates the benefits of risk sharing and consumption 
smoothing.  
5.2.1 Competitive Risk Sharing and Consumption Smoothing27  
First risk sharing and consumptions smoothing issues are examined in a competitive 
economic environment. As a benchmark case, the optimal consumption under no 
information asymmetry and no borrowing constraints is characterized. The risk 
sharing in this framework is mediated by savings and credit market. The households, 
who get less than average income in a period, borrow from the market in that period to 
smooth consumption. The needed supply comes from the households who get more 
than average income in that period. The borrowed amount is repaid by the households 
when they get more than the average income.  
Let us consider that there are two households. I assume that the households live for T 
periods.  Each one faces stochastic income  Tttty 01 , and    Tttty 02  over a horizon of 
time period T. The consumption process of the households are similarly denoted as    Ttttc 01  and    Ttttc 02  .  The household with discount factor β chooses consumption 
each period to maximize expected lifetime utility over his life time of period T. The 
                                                 
27 Good references are, Townsend (1994), Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Schlesinger (2005). 
500 1000 750 Income 
Utility 
a
b 
d
Figure 5.1: Utility representation of a risk averse agent 
a 
c 
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utility function u(cit) is assumed to be time and state separable and also assumed to be 
well behaved (u’(.)>0, u’’(.)<0), which satisfies necessary and sufficient conditions for 
utility optimization. The consumption plan in equilibrium is obtained by solving  
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Simplifying the above equation, following expression is obtained.  
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The equations (5.2), (5.4)  and (5. 6) have important implications:  (i) the concavity of 
the utility function (u``< 0) implies aversion to consumption fluctuation from period to 
period, the household attempts to smooth consumption over time; (ii)  if aggregate 
income is same in all periods, then each household completely smoothes his 
consumption in equilibrium; and (iii) the household who starts with lower income gets 
less amount of consumption in all periods compared to the household who starts with 
higher income.  These observations are summarized in the following result. 
Result 5.1: In the perfect competition, the equilibrium consumption plan displays 
constant amount of consumption in each period. If income fluctuates over the life 
cycle of a household, the optimal saving or borrowing strategy in any period t, 
amounts to save or borrow an amount equal to (yt –ct). 
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5.2.2. Socially Optimal level of Risk Sharing and Consumption Smoothing 
The needy families engage in mutual risk sharing as discussed in introductory section. 
In a heterogeneous economy, when the competitive market enables the households to 
trade in idiosyncratic risks, it improves economic efficiency. However, when the 
competitive market environment is not available, and assuming that there is a social 
planner which maximizes the aggregate social welfare of the households; we obtain 
the same results as obtained in the competitive market environment as analyzed below. 
This assumption for informal financial transactions among close acquaintances in rural 
areas is realistic, as among friends and family members in rural areas, information 
flow is quite symmetric and such risk pooling has been empirically verified to a large 
extent28. Using the framework of section 3.1, we can solve for social optimality.  It is 
assumed that Pareto weight of the welfare of household 1 is )1,0( . Hence the social 
planner maximizes  
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28 Good references are, Townsend (1994), Coate and Ravallion (1993), Ligon, Thomas and Worrall 
(2001), and Fafchamps and Lund (2003) 
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However complete risk sharing needs satisfaction of two necessary conditions29 –       
(i) there is no aggregate uncertainty across periods, and (ii) the risk averse agents have 
same priors about the states of uncertainty in each period.  These conditions are quite 
strict and in reality we observe only imperfect risk sharing. 
 
2.3 Risk Sharing using Informal Insurance Arrangements 
 Now the question arises- if mutual risk sharing is so beneficial for the members of a 
village, then why such risk sharing arrangements do not sustain on its own. As risk 
sharing entails intertemporal optimization of utility, one important factor which 
determines the sustenance of risk sharing arrangements is the patience factor (β) of the 
participating households. Depending on the stochastic income process and the time 
horizon perspective of the agents, it requires that β > β * (where β * is a threshold 
value of patience factor) to sustain the mutuality. However, if β < β *, then the 
household may find it beneficial to defect as the short term gain may exceed the long 
term gain achieved from the mutuality. This is demonstrated in an infinite horizon 
expected utility optimization framework as following30.  
Let us consider an economy populated with large number of people with identical 
preferences, described by utility function u(c) =ln(c). It is assumed that the people 
maximize their utility in an infinite horizon time frame. The people are divided into 
two categories – each category of people receives endowments of 2 units with 
probability 0.5 and 4 units with probability 0.5 in every period, and the endowment  of 
these categories of people are perfectly negatively correlated. Hence in every period 
per capita availability of endowment is 3 units of consumption good. Also it is 
assumed that there are no borrowing and lending opportunities available to the people.  
                                                 
29 This follows from Mas-colell and others (1995), chapter 19 
30 This illustration draws ideas from Ljungqvist, L. and Sargent, T. J. (2004), Chapter 20. 
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Now let us examine the utility maximization of the people in following arrangements. 
5.2.3.1 Arrangement 1: Autarchy 
 In this arrangement people consume their own endowment. The expected utility level 
associated with this arrangement is, 
0.8 ratediscount for  ; 20.5
1
04.1)]4(5.0)2(5.0[
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5.2.3.2 Arrangement 2: Perfect Insurance 
It is assumed that there is a social planner who ensures perfect insurance to all agents 
such that every one is ensured 3 unit of consumption good in each period. The utility 
level associated with this arrangement is, 
0.8 ratediscount for  ; 50.5
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5.2.3.3 Arrangement 3: Self Sustaining Insurance 
It is realistically assumed that there is no social planner. People enter into insurance 
arrangements with each other with an objective to smooth their consumption. For self 
sustaining of such arrangements it is required that the participation constraint of each 
of the agents is satisfied in every period.  
Let us consider that this arrangement delivers consumption level of c and 6-c to the 
agents with current endowment of 4 and 2 units respectively. Obviously the 
participation constraint of the former agent will be binding and the participation 
constraint of the latter agent will be always satisfied. 
...(5.9)                                                                       )4()( autcont UuUcu     
Here contU  is agent’s continuation value of remaining in this arrangement – that 
satisfies 
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The value of c turns out to be 3.2.  The optimal contract has c=3.2 and that attains the 
expected utility level 
47.5
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This level of expected utility is smaller than that of perfect insurance but bigger than 
that of autarchy with no insurance at all. Thus if people enter into insurance 
arrangements then the consumption can be smoothed to a large extent and higher 
expected utility level can be achieved.  Also for a sufficiently higher value of β 
(people are patient enough); the perfect insurance arrangement can be achieved. Such 
value of β is calculated as following 
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Hence if people value greatly the future streams of consumption then perfect insurance 
arrangement can be self sustained and highest level of expected utility can be attained. 
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5.2.3.4 Pareto Frontier Plotting 
 These arrangements are diagrammatically shown in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3. The 
utility function is assumed to be ln(c+b), where b=5 is a constant and non varying 
endowment and c is the varying part of endowment. The endowment of type 1 agent is 
ty  and the endowment of type 2 agent is 1- ty , where ty  is assumed to independently 
and identically distributed such that 
4;S       S;1,2,..,s  ;/y   ;/1)(Pr s  SsSyyob sst   
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1
 

s
Ss
s
saut yuU  
Also the perfect risk sharing arrangements entails,  
 1
)1(  U,
1
)(
21
cuandcuU . The 
graph ( 1U , 2U ) plots the Pareto frontier as c varies from 0 to 1. 
Further the self sustaining participation constraints are described as following: 
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The above participation constraints imply values of 21 V and V  that solve 
autSautS UyuUyuV   )1(V and          ;)( 21  
1V  is the minimum value of U such that the participation constraint for type 1 agent 
will never bind , and similarly 2V is for type 2 agents. Now in the plotted graph, 
evidently there is a part of the ( 1U , 2U ) frontier which satisfies, 2211  and  VUVU   as 
shown in Figure 5.2. However if β is lowered enough then such region disappears and 
perfect risk sharing can not be achieved anymore, as shown in Figure 5.3, for β=0.8 . 
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5.3.   Ways to Insure Against Risks 
If people have access to credit and insurance markets in these areas then combination 
of these contracts can be used to attain consumption smoothing, as shown in 
Townsend (1994). Credit contracts helps in adjusting consumption across time and 
insurance contacts takes care of idiosyncratic shocks. But as investigated in Chapter 3 
recourse to this option is limited because of various reasons.  
Figure 5.2 : Informal Insurance Arrangements for β=.95 
0 5 10 15 20
0
5
10
15
20
utility of person 1
ut
ili
ty
 o
f p
er
so
n 
2
Pareto Frontier  Plotting for beta =0.95
 
U1≥V1  and  U2≥V2   
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Utility of person 1
U
til
ity
 o
f p
er
so
n 
2
Pareto Frontier Plotting for beta =0.8
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Informal Insurance Arrangements for β =0.80 
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The wealth endowment of a household is an important factor which influence the 
credit availability from the formal credit market for two reasons31 - (1) More the 
wealth endowments, more the own fund can be invested in the project and less the 
amount of credit is needed to take up a project of specified loan and that weakens the 
moral hazard constraint. (2) More the wealth a borrower has, more the collateral he 
can post and bargain for better terms for lending that weakens the adverse selection 
effect.  
The credit rationing issues have been examined in detail in Chapter 3. These rural 
families face similar problems related to agricultural and related insurance markets. 
However the survey data reveals that the people are much willing to pay premiums to 
get such insurance coverages.   The poor families with lower wealth endowments may 
get credit rationed in the formal market and then they may turn to informal sector to 
meet their credit requirements. Further they may enter into informal risk sharing 
insurance arrangements. Also the families depending on their financial capacity and 
risk perception engage in precautionary savings. These issues are examined next. 
 
5.3.1 Willingness to pay for Insurance Coverage 
As discussed in the introduction, a large percentage of the rural families show their 
willingness to buy crop and livestock insurances. This demonstrates their desire to 
smooth consumption. Here a brief analysis is presented to quantify this willingness to 
pay for the premium and also evidence is presented using the survey data from China 
and India.  
In absence of credit market, consumption equals income in any period. Consumption 
can be smoothened through insurance arrangements, using premium ‘π(y)’ such that;   
u(ym- π(y)) =  E[u(yt)]  , where ym   =  E[yt] 
                                                 
31 Followed from  Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) 
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The premium amount π(y) shows the intensity of desire to smooth consumption over 
time in absence of credit market.   
Taking first order Taylor expansion of u(ym- π(y))  around  ym and second order 
Taylor expansion of  E[u(y)] (subscript t dropped for neatness) around ym,   we get:   
 
u(ym) – u’(ym) π   E[u(ym) + u’(ym) (y- ym) +u``( ym) (y- ym)2/2 ]  
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The multiplicative factor, γ(y)   -yu``(y)/u`(y) is called the measure of relative 
fluctuation aversion (empirically observed in the range of .5 to 4) and is an analogue 
to the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion (Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and 
Schlesinger, 2005). It basically illustrates the negative welfare costs of uninsured risks 
(Morduch, 1995) measured by the amount of money a family is willing to pay for 
completely removing the variability in income to smooth the consumption. These 
observations are summarized in the following result:  
Result 5.2: If σ2 is the variance of income realizations over a period T and ym is the 
mean value of income, and coefficient of variation, CVy = σ/ym  , then the risk 
premium can be defined as the minimum amount which a risk averse agent is willing 
to pay to avoid fluctuations in her consumption across dates and is expressed as: 
π(y) /ym      =   (1/2)(σ/ym)2 γ(y)   =   (1/2)(CVy)2 γ(y)                        
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5.3. 2 Precautionary Savings 
If people have sufficient income (endowments) in good times then they can use these 
assets in bad times to smooth consumption. Also the assets may be transferred to 
deficit families to smooth consumption. Precautionary saving is more than optimal 
amount of saving which is motivated by uncertainty in income prospects and risk 
aversion –Sandmo (1970)32.  This is briefly illustrated as following.  
5.3.2.1 Uncertainty and Precautionary Savings33  
A simple two period model is considered with a sure income y0 in period 0, but an 
uncertain income 1
~
y  in the second period. The household chooses s the amount of 
savings (or borrowings) at date 0 to maximize life time utility: 
Max(s) V(s) = u0(y0 –s) + δEu1((1+r)s+ 1
~
y )                                          … (5.12)  
With usual concavity assumptions of u (.), the first order condition (necessary and 
sufficient) for s* is written as: 
u`0(y0 –s*)  = (1+r) δ Eu`1((1+r)s*+ 1
~
y )    ..                                       …(5.13) 
The uncertainty affecting future incomes induces the precautionary motive for saving, 
s* which relies on a prudent behavior (u```> 0).  
s* exceeds optimal saving 

s , when the uncertain income process 1
~
y  is replaced by its 
expectation: 
maxs V

(s) = u0(y0 –s) + δu1((1+r)s+E 1
~
y )   ..                 (5.14) 
Now the first order condition (necessary and sufficient) for 

s  is written as:  
u`0(y0 –

s )  = (1+r) δ u`1((1+r) 

s  + E 1
~
y )    ..               (5.15)  
Now comparing equations (5.13) and (5.15) and using Jensen’s inequality, it can be 
verified that  

s  < s*. This observation is expressed in the following result. 
                                                 
32 Good references are Browning and Lusardi (1996), Kimball and Weil (2004) etc. 
33 The ideas are followed from, Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Schlesinger (2005). 
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Result 5.3:  A prudent household saves more in the face of uncertain prospects of 
income. Such excess savings may lock up productive assets, which could have been 
used productively to improve the income streams of the household.  
It is further shown that the mutual risk sharing arrangements Pareto dominates the 
precautionary saving strategy in the sense that it may not attain the level of utility as 
that is achieved from complete risk sharing.  It is assumed that the households are 
prudent, i.e. the coefficient of absolute prudence, P (w) = - u```(w)/u``(w) > 0 , 
(Kimball ,1990 ) .  
As there are two states of the nature ( ))5.0,;5.0,(
__~
xyxyy  , but only one asset (risk 
free saving assets with gross return rate (1+r)) is available, hence the risk cannot be 
hedged and the households must bear the risk. Now I assume that at date 0 an agent’s 
wealth endowment is $750 and at date 1 she faces the above uncertainty of income. It 
is also assumed log utility function for the household. ; u(c) = log(c)  
Now using the first order condition of equation (5.13): 
u`0(y0 –s*)  = (1+r) δ Eu`1((1+r)s*+ 1
~
y )    ..                         (5.13) 
]
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1
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*))0((
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r
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   
Then using the values as mentioned above and for simplicity assuming δ =1, r =0, we 
get s* = 39.6 and , gross expected utility of period 0 and period 1 is (6.56 + 6.61) – 
which is less than 6.62 in each period achieved from mutual sharing of risk.  
Also if u```> 0 then fully differentiating equation (5.13) with respect to x (amount of 
uncertainty), we get 
        
2222
22222
1
)*)1((  and      )*)1((     ,5.0*)1(  where,
...(5.16)                                          0  }11{}
*))0((
1{*
xysraxysrbrd
ab
d
a
d
b
d
sydx
ds



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      Hence,               ds*/dx > 0                                                                          ... (5.17) 
 i.e. precautionary savings increases with the amount of uncertainty. The following 
result summarizes above observations. 
Result 5.4: Risk sharing leads to increased expected utility of agents in every period. 
If risk sharing opportunities are not available then agents may engage in precautionary 
savings. However the gain in expected utility from precautionary savings will be less 
in comparison to gain from efficient risk sharing. 
 
5.3.3 Credit Transactions among Family Members and Friends 
As discussed earlier, because of wealth endowment and risk type heterogeneity a large 
number of households are credit rationed in these areas. These credit rationed 
households obtain loans from relatives and friends.  Moreover  in rural societies, 
where the family and friends networks are well functioning – the households may 
enter into mutual support system of helping each other by means of advancing loan at 
low interest rate. Usually in such risk sharing credit transactions the repayment is state 
contingent (Udry, 1994). The issues related with informal credit transactions and risk 
sharing motives are investigated in chapter 6. However, a simple illustration and later 
a simple analytical model is presented, which lays the foundation for the next chapter.  
5.3.3.1 Illustration of Loan and Insurance Arrangement  
Let us assume that A and B are two types of agents. A’s income in odd periods is $500 
and $1000 in even periods. B’s income follows opposite of this. If the households 
engage in mutual risk sharing, then each consumes $750 in each period. So the 
aggregate discounted utility is 
 
 

 1
62.6
1
750ln)750ln(
0
t
t
t  
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Now the household whose income is $1000 in period 0, defects and consumes 
expected income for remaining life time, her aggregate discounted expected utility is  
 
]
1
56.6*))1/(90.6[()]500ln()1000[ln(
0
2
22
 
t
t
t

  
Now mutuality will be beneficial for the families only if 
URisk Share ≥ UBetter income at date 0 + EUAutarchy 
 
162.6  ≥ 22 1
21.6*))1/(90.6[( 
  ]              β   ≥   0.72 = β *  
So if families’ patience factor is less than β *, then mutuality breaks down. However 
the introduction of loan element can alleviate the situation.   
A very simple endowment and loan scheme (for four periods) between household A 
and B is shown in the Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1: Example of Informal Credit Transactions 
 
Period A's  
endowment 
Loan from 
A 
Post 
loan 
income 
B' s 
endowment 
Loan to 
B 
Post 
loan 
income 
1 500 250 750 1000 250 750 
2 1000 -270 730 500 -270 770 
3 500 250 750 1000 250 750 
4 1000 -270 730 500 -270 770 
 
Household A begins in period 1 with lower endowment of $500, whereas the 
Household B starts with better endowment of $1000 – A takes a cheap loan of $250 in 
period 1 and pays back $270 next period. After each two period the cycle repeats. 
From A’s side there is no problem in participation. He is ready to participate for all 
values of δ <1.0.  Now the participation constraint of B is examined. The discounted 
sum of utility of B if he participates in the loan process is as following 
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And the discounted sum of utility if he does not avail the loan scheme is  
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Hence the minimum value of β that sustains this arrangement requires that 
)1(
)770ln(
)1(
)750ln([ 22 

  ] ≥       22 1
21.6*
1
90.6 

    
Hence,        β ≥ 0.63 = β *loan   ;     and      β *loan < β * = 0.72 
 This observation is expressed in the following result:  
Result 5.5: Introducing a loan element in the process of risk sharing, enables the 
process to sustain with more impatient agents. It appears that it is a commitment 
device which secures the participation of more impatient agents – where the plain 
mutual risk sharing would have broken down.  
 
5.3.3.2 A Simple Model of Loan Transactions and Risk Sharing 
It is assumed that there are two agents. Each one faces stochastic income  Tttty 01 , 
and    Tttty 02  (with mean value ym and variance σ2) over a horizon of time period T. It 
is further assumed that they enter into an arrangement of risk sharing using credit 
transactions such that, when an agent faces bad period he borrows from the other on 
who faces good period of income and borrowed amount is repaid when the first agent 
faces good period. 
It is further assumed that in a period t, the agent 1 gets lower than the average income 
and the agent 2 gets higher than the average income. In order to smooth his 
consumption the agent 1 borrows an amount L from the agent 2 at an interest rate i. 
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Using this loan amount consumable good q is produced according to a well behaved 
production function,  
p)bL]-(1  [paL-yq  c n,consumptiofor  availableamount   Hence
...(5.18)                                      )  N(0,~               ,                    21
5.05.0

  LLq
 
Here, [paL+(1-p)b L] is repayment obligation, which is state contingent – if good 
income is obtained in the next period with probability p then aL amount is repaid 
otherwise bL amount is repaid . The factors a and b are two decision variables. 
However for simplicity we replace this with a weighted expression gL and g is a single 
decision variable. 
It is further assumed that the agents preferences for consumption is displayed by an 
exponential utility function; u(c) = -exp (-rc), where r is the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion. In this set up, it is well analyzed that the utility maximization decision is 
equivalent to maximization of certainty equivalent income, CE, which is  
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Now if it is assumed that each agent gets good and bad period alternatively, then 
discounted sum of certainty equivalent for agent 1 and agent 2 at t = 0 is  
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There are two decision variables here – (i) Loan amount L which is borrowed by the 
agents in alternate period, starting with agent 1 in t =0, and (ii) repayment factor g 
such that the repayment obligation is g L.  
The risk sharing arrangement is considered a collective decision of these agents; hence 
a weighted sum of certainty equivalents of both the agents is maximized as following;  
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Then using the expressions of  CE1  and CE2  from equations (5.19) and (5.20), we get 
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Equation (5.24) can be written as following 
...(5.24)                                                                                   )(21)('2 ggg    
This equation pins down the optimal value of repayment factor g. For example, if  
α(g) = g0.5 , then  g* = 0.11.  The left hand side of the equation (5.24) is monotonically 
increasing function of g and right hand side of the equation is monotonically 
decreasing function of g, hence a solution of g in the domain of 0 to 1 is guaranteed. 
This is neatly demonstrated with the help of figure 5.4. 
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Further using the equation (5.23) the comparative statics of the optimal loan amount 
L* with respect to repayment factor g is obtained as following 
 
Figure 5.4: Optimal Value of Repayment factor (g) 
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Equations (5.23), (5.24), and (5.24) provide helpful insights related to the factors 
which influence the optimal loan amount and repayment factor for risk sharing 
purpose. We can draw following inferences – (i) Optimal loan amount increases with 
the productivity factor γ of the production function. (ii)  Optimal loan amount is lower 
for the agents who are more risk averse. (iii) It decreases with increasing uncertainty 
(variance) of production process. (iv) If income and production process are positively 
correlated, then optimal loan amount also decreases with increasing uncertainty of 
income process. (v) The optimal value of repayment factor is determined by the 
weight function α(g). (vi) The optimal loan amount increases with optimal repayment 
factor g. This is also quite intuitive, higher repayment commitments leads to larger 
optimal loan amounts and hence more efficient risk sharing. These findings are 
summarized in Result 5.6. 
Result 5.6: The risk sharing loan amount and repayment rate are collectively 
determined by the participating agents. The loan amount decreases with increasing 
uncertainty in income and production process and also with increasing risk aversion of 
the agents. It   increases with increasing values of repayment factor and productivity 
factor of production function. 
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 5.4. Empirical Analysis 
It has been emphasized that the income of the families living in rural areas of the 
developing countries are quite volatile showing high values of coefficient of variation. 
The families in these areas face various types of risks (yield risk, price risk, and 
weather risk) and uncertainties (illness, cattle loss etc.), as evident from Table 5.2.  
 
 
Table 5.2: Percentage of Families Facing Various Risk and Uncertainties 
 
Variable Mean Value: 
China 
Mean Value : 
India 
Price Risk .07 .06 
Yield Risk .06 .10 
Weather Risk .05 .09 
Suffered Crop Loss, Cattle Loss .70 .90 
Suffered Death or Major Sickness in Family .68 .91 
 
One of the fallout of these risks is that large percentage of families particularly 
belonging to lower assets quintiles are not able to smooth food consumption 
throughout the year as reported in Table 5.3.  This finding in conjunction with Result 
5.1 provides evidence of imperfect credit market in these areas. 
 
Table 5.3: Percentage of Families Unable to Get Adequate Food throughout the Year 
 
Quintile :Assets 
(N) 
Quintile 
1 
Quintile 
2 
Quintile 
 3 
Quintile 
 4 
Quintile 
 5 
Total 
Food Scarcity:  
India 
 .65 
(101) 
.63 (60) .50 (79)  .43 (88) .38 (72) .52 (400) 
Food Scarcity: 
China 
 .22 
(132) 
.31 (74) .20 (237)  .21 (122)  .16 (190) .21 (755)  
 
To mitigate these risks, these families adopt various ex ante and ex post risk 
management options – some of these are summarized in Table 5.4.  
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Table 5.4: Risk Management Options 
 
Risk Management Options 
(scale : 1-5) 
Mean. : India 
(N=400) 
Mean. : China 
(N=1200) 
Crops/ animal/ enterprise Diversification 3.94 3.95 
Geographic diversification of plots 3.53 3.42 
Irrigation 4.24 4.25 
Spreading of sale of crops 3.03 3.45 
Forward contracts of crops 2.84 3.45 
Government Programs 3.23 3.89 
Financial  Reserves 3.67 3.70 
Off farm income 3.59 3.99 
  
One ex post mechanism is to borrow to meet the expenses requirements. In both the 
countries almost 25 percent of the borrowings seem to be done for such purposes.   
To smooth their consumption and satisfy other needs they usually take recourse to - 
(a) borrow from formal credit market, (b) do precautionary savings, (c) enter into 
mutual risk sharing arrangements, and (d) depend on informal borrowing from friends 
and relatives. In the foregoing sections precautionary savings, risk sharing insurance 
mechanisms and risk sharing credit transactions mechanisms have been analyzed.  
The issues related with credit rationing have been investigated in the previous chapter. 
Here empirical strategies are developed to infer the significance of precautionary 
savings and importance of risk sharing insurance and credit arrangements, using the 
household survey data from China and India.  
 
4.2 Precautionary Savings 
Result 5.3 asserts that a prudent household saves more in the face of uncertain 
prospects of income. In this section it will be tested econometrically. Table 5.5 
presents the saving behavior of the households. In the case of China about 50 percent 
of the households are not able to save anything, whereas in the case of India this 
percentage is 28.50. Also only about 30 percent families in both the countries are 
found to be saving more than 5 percent. 
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Table 5.5: Saving Behavior of Families 
 
China India Proportion of  Household income
  saved  in a year 
 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
       (No saving) 367 48.61 114 28.50 
less than 5% 147 19.47 176 44.00 
between 5 and 10% 93 12.32 94 23.50 
More than 10% (High saving) 148 19.60 16 4.00 
Total 755 100.00 400 100.00 
 
Further Table 5.6 describes the response of the households related to change in 
savings in response to reduction in uncertainty in their income. About 50 percent of 
the households in both the countries want to reduce saving – indirectly it corroborates 
to the findings of the Result 3 that large numbers of families are engaged in 
precautionary savings. Also about 40 percent of the households in China (about 50 
percent for India) intend to save more – implying that these households attach high 
importance to savings and they do not desire to reduce saving even if the uncertainty 
in their income process is reduced.  
Table 5.6: Change in Savings in Response to Reduction in Uncertainty in Income 
 
China India Response to savings, if there 
is  a significant reduction in 
uncertainty in  income  
Variable 
Remark 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Decrease savings and 
increase investment 
288 38.30 152 38.00 
Decrease savings and 
increase purchases 
91 12.10 32 8.00 
Decrease savings and 
increase travel/vacations 
Precautionary 
savings 
10 1.33 3 0.75 
Maintain the same amount of 
savings 
 50 6.65 18 4.50 
Increase savings slightly 158 21.01 135 33.75 
Increase savings a lot 
Increase savings 
155 20.61 60 15.00 
Total  752 100.00 400 100 
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5.4.3 Empirical Analysis of Saving and Precautionary Savings 
There is a huge literature on analytics and empirics of savings34. However here 
savings and its’ determinants is discussed in the backdrop of its use mainly as risk 
mitigation tool by families in these areas. Savings is hypothesized to be driven by 
mainly life cycle motives and precautionary motives. In cross section data it is 
difficult to identify and isolate the motives of savings mainly because of measurement 
issues, risk heterogeneity, time preference heterogeneity, and adjustment in 
consumption related to income shocks actually require dynamic data.  
 Before proposing any econometric model, the natures of association of savings and 
household income have been shown by the graphs in Figure 5.5 for India and China. 
These are cumulative density functions (CDFs) of log of income for different saving 
rates. Evidently the CDF related to higher saving rates are dominating (second order) 
the CDF of lower saving rates.  Thus household savings seems to be positively 
associated with household income.  
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34 Horioka and Watanabe (1997), Deaton (1993), and Lim and Townsend (1998), Browning and 
Luscardi (1996), Carroll and Samwick (1995) are good references.  
Figures 5.5: Cumulative Density Functions of log assets for different  saving rates. 
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4.3.1 An Econometric Model of Savings and Identification Strategy 
In the present survey, the savings are measured on ordinal scale. Families with zero 
savings are placed in group 1, with less than 5% savings in group 2, between 5% and 
10% in group 3, and above 10% in group 4.  
Such type of response assumes that the observed saving groupings are related to an 
underlying latent continuous variable. The range of this latent continuous variable is 
divided by a number of threshold values representing the ordinal responses. The latent 
continuous variable s* is expressed as a linear combination of explanatory variables 
and normally distributed error term. 
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Maximum likelihood method is used to estimate this model. For that log-likelihood 
function is defined as following. 
.(5.27) otherwise zero and j,option  chooses ifamily  if  1 Z where; )log(log ij
1 0
 



Ni
i
kj
j
ijij PZL
 
.1 )(  var and  ,0 , assumingby    identified  are    and   parameters  The 20    
  197
Then equation (5.27) is estimated using ordered probit   model. As discussed earlier, it 
is not empirically possible to isolate the various motives that influence saving 
behaviors in cross section data. Hence the variables compatible with both life-cycle 
hypothesis and precautionary motives will be used as explanatory variables. As per 
life cycle hypothesis (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1953) savings (dissavings) are done 
to smooth consumption as yearly income varies. So income is used as an explanatory 
variable. Also savings vary in quadratic fashion with respect to age – saving is peaked 
at middle age.  According to assets based theories of savings (Tobin, 1951, 
Houthakker and Taylor, 1970) savings is positive when wealth falls below the family’s 
optimal level of wealth. As data on optimal wealth is not available, household assets 
are used as a control variable. According to precautionary motives (Leland, 1968 and 
Sandmo, 1970) families save to meet the urgencies arising out of uncertainties in 
income process, hence perceived variance in income is used to control for this. Also 
family size, education, and magnitude of credit constrainedness are used as other 
explanatory variables as these variables also affect savings according to above said 
theories.  Also according to equations (5.13) and (5.15) savings is a function of 
income, wealth, uncertainty in income (variance), interest rate and discount rates. 
These variables are reasonably exogenous. Only doubt may arise on exogeneity of 
wealth as this may depend on savings. But here saving is measured as percentage of 
annual income and assets are measured mainly in terms of house, land etc. which are 
long time  durable and the markets for these assets are quite illiquid, hence the savings 
can not be easily transformed into assets, and so assets is satisfactorily exogenous 
here. Table 5.7 reports the summary statistics of these variables.   
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Table 5.7: Summary Statistics of Important Variables 
 
Variable India China 
 Mean 
(N=384) 
Std. Dev. Mean 
(N=756) 
Std. Dev. 
Sex (1=female)   0.10 0.31 
Saving (0-3) 1.02 0.82 1.03 1.18 
Log income 10.51 0.64 9.02 0.84 
Log asset 12.55 0.79 10.50 0.95 
Log income std.dev. 9.03 1.27 6.83 1.43 
Age 47.58 11.58 3.75 5.98 
Percentage of farm income 56.50 25.76 47.13 33.90 
Household size 6.58 3.31 4.41 1.57 
Education (1-4) 2.53 0.82 2.39 0.78 
Major sickness (1=yes) 0.38 0.48 0.20 0.40 
Buy crop insurance (1=yes) 0.34 0.48 0.17 0.38 
Abs. risk aversion coeff. *10-3 0.11 0.17 1.49 2.88 
Want to increase saving (1=yes) 0.49 0.50 0.41 0.49 
Risk prone (1=yes) 0.98 0.13 0.77 0.42 
Credit constrainedness (0-1) 0.65 0.24 0.57 0.13 
Note: Age groupings in the case of China: 20-30 years=1, 30-40 years=2, 40-50 years=3, above 50 
years =4 
Risk prone families are identified as those who have suffered crop or livestock loss, major illness or 
death of a family member in previous year. Absolute risk aversion coefficient is approximately 
computed based on Binswanger (1981) question, discussed latter. 
 
The equation (5.27) is estimated using ordered probit model. The results are reported 
in table 5.8. The coefficients have no marginal effects interpretations. A significantly 
positive (negative) coefficient of a variable indicates that higher values of that variable 
are associated with bigger probability of being in higher (lower) saving group. 
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Table 5.8: Ordered probit Estimation of Savings 
 
India China Dependent Variable 
Saving (0,1,2,3) Coef. Z Coef. Z 
Sex (1=Female)   0.193 0.78 
Log income 1.281* 5.19 0.481* 3.5 
Log asset 0.414* 1.98 0.036 0.27 
Log standard deviation income -0.294* -2.15 0.024 0.39 
Percent Farm Income 0.026* 4.15 0.003 0.8 
Age -.008 -.14 -1.258* -2.48 
Age square 0.000 -0.26 0.188* 2.04 
Household Size 0.050 1.26 -0.020 -0.38 
Education -0.044 -0.29 0.219* 2.09 
Sickness (1=yes) -0.592* -2.41 -0.406* -2.03 
Buy crop insurance (1=yes) -0.204 -0.83 0.740* 3.9 
Absolute risk aversion coeff 1.830* 2.41 0.070 1.04 
Increase savings 0.686* 2.75 0.489* 3.05 
Risk prone (1=yes) 0.181 0.22 0.024 0.13 
Credit Constrainedness -1.764* -2.67 -2.455* -2.94 
/cut1 : µ1 14.649* 4.68 2.643 1.41 
/cut2 : µ2 17.245* 5.44 3.561* 1.75 
/cut3:  µ3 19.766* 6.15 4.313* 2.2 
India: N = 384; LR chi2(16)  =  151.47; Log likelihood = -377.73694;  Pseudo R2  = 0.1670 
China: N= 642; LR chi2 (16) = 96.76; Log likelihood = -741.0395; Pseudo R2= 0.062 
Important findings from this estimation are discussed as following:  
1. The coefficients on the income and assets are positive. The families with higher 
income and assets save more, as predicted by life cycle hypothesis and assets based 
theories.  
2. The coefficient on the family size is not significantly negative as per the conjecture. 
Theoretically larger family size is associated with lower probability of higher savings, 
as bigger the family size is more the consumption needs are and less the savings are. 
3. The coefficients on the age and age square are not as per the conjecture. In the case 
of China it is actually other way. Apparently savings starts increasing beyond a 
threshold age in China as earning prospects get better with increasing age and the 
families may be saving for bequest purpose. 
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4. The coefficient on the sickness is negative. Apparently if there is a major sickness 
in family, then prospects of savings decreases, the families may be actually dissaving.   
5. When the families buy crop insurance, then as per the precautionary motives, the 
savings should be reduced. In the case of India, the sign on the variable is right but not 
significant and in the case of China it is actually significantly positive. Apparently the 
families save not only to fend from crop losses but also from other urgencies. 
6. The coefficient on the absolute risk aversion coefficient is positive (also significant 
in the case of India) implying that the families who are more risk averse tend to save 
more. In a way it supports the precautionary motives. 
7. The coefficient of the “Increase savings” variable is significantly positive, implying 
that the families who attach high importance to savings actually save more.  
8. The coefficient on the log of standard deviation income is not significantly positive 
as per the conjecture of precautionary motives – more uncertainty in income leads to 
more savings. On reason for this can be that it is actually perceived variance in income 
as believed by the families and not actual variance in income. Another reason may be 
that  even if the families want to save more they may not be able to do that and then 
they may be depending on post facto borrowing from informal or formal sources. 
9. In the data the families are identified risk prone based on certain features (such as, 
families suffered crop loss, cattle loss etc., suffered death, major sickness of a family 
member); as per precautionary motives these families should save more. In the result 
we get the right sign but the coefficients are not significant. 
10. The coefficient on the credit constraint variable is significantly negative. 
Apparently more credit constrained families are able to save less. 
11. The threshold parameters are significantly positive, that validates the ordering of 
saving rates in data and appropriateness of ordered probit estimation method. 
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Further the change in likelihood of being in various saving groups with increasing 
income has been shown in Figure 5.6. Evidently with increasing income the 
probability of no savings and small savings decreases and probability of medium 
savings and large savings increases.  Overall we get evidence of life cycle and 
precautionary motives for savings and so also for the Result 5.3. However some of the 
coefficients are not as per conjecture; one reason may be that many families are unable 
to save as much as they wish and post facto they may resort to borrowing from 
informal and formal sources.  
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5.4.2 Estimation of Willingness to Pay Premium for Insurance Coverage 
Result 2 describes the risk premium as the minimum amount which a risk averse agent 
is willing to pay to avoid fluctuations in her consumption across dates. This can be 
estimated using the equation (5.11), which requires the values of coefficient of relative 
Figure 5.6: Change in Likelihood of being in Various Saving Groups with 
Increasing Income (India and China respectively) 
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risk aversion. Using cross section data, it is difficult to estimate the risk preference 
parameters of people mainly because of non separation of utility maximization and 
profit maximization decisions of the households in an incomplete market setting35. 
However, using a survey question related to Binswanger (1981) experiment and also 
using approximations as suggested in Anderson and Dillon (1992) and Hardaker et al 
(2004), the coefficient of relative risk aversion  of the people are computed. It is 
acknowledged that this way of measuring relative risk aversion coefficient may not be 
rigorous, however for the limited purpose of estimating risk premium of the 
households this may be adequate. Table 5.9 reports the frequency distribution of the 
families belonging to different levels of relative risk aversion coefficient. 
 
Table 5.9: Frequency Distribution of Families for Coefficient of Relative Risk 
Aversion 
 
India China Coefficient of 
Relative risk aversion (r.r.) Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
Risk Neutral :  0 63 15.79 15.79 137 12.06 12.06 
Low  Risk Averse: 0.5 36 9.02 24.81 57 5.02 17.08 
Moderate Risk Averse: 1 66 16.54 41.35 88 7.75 24.82 
High Risk Averse: 2 73 18.3 59.65 143 12.59 37.41 
Severe Risk Averse: 3 57 14.29 73.93 101 8.89 46.3 
Excessive Risk Averse: 4 104 26.07 100 610 53.7 100 
Total 399 100  1,136 100  
 
Further, the natures of association of risk aversion and household assets have been 
shown by the graphs depicting cumulative density functions (CDFs) of log of asset for 
different level of risk aversions in Figure 5.7 respectively for India and China. 
Evidently the CDF related to lower level of risk aversions dominate the CDF of higher 
                                                 
35 Followed from Prof. Just, David (2008) class note for AEM 702 course , available on  
http://summer.blackboard.cornell.edu/courses/1/AEM702-Just - spring2008/content/_1021457_1/   
RiskNotesPartV.pdf 
  203
level of risk aversions. Thus level of risk aversions of household seems to be 
negatively associated with household assets. 
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Furthermore, even no analytical framework has been developed here to understand the 
determinants of the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the families; we have tried 
to learn that using Ordered Probit regression method. This method has been used 
because of the ordinal nature of the dependent variable – as explained before where 
the empirics of precautionary savings are studied. The estimation results are reported 
in Table 5.10.  Apparently higher level of household assets, income, and education 
level are associated with lower level of risk aversion. Also the level of risk aversion 
seems to be increasing with age of the respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Cumulative Density Functions of Log Assets for Different Levels of Risk 
Aversion 
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Table 5.10: Ordered Probit Estimations of Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion 
 
India China Dependent variable: 
Coeff. Of Relative Risk Aversion Coef. z Coef. z 
Age 0.01 0.19 0.19* 2.68 
Household Size -0.01 -0.44 -0.03 -0.91 
Education -0.10 -0.77 -0.11 -1.22 
Log asset -0.28* -2 -0.07 -0.77 
Log income -0.36* -1.92 -0.11 -1.02 
Income Source (Farm=1, yes) -0.26 -0.98 0.10 0.68 
region6 -0.84* -2.85   
region8 -0.15 -0.5   
region9 -0.90* -3.3 -0.28* -1.96 
India : N =  399; LR chi2(10) =  48.80; Prob > chi2  =  0.00;  Pseudo R2  =  0.04 
China : N =  731; LR chi2(10) =  23.28; Prob > chi2  =  0.00;  Pseudo R2  =  0.01 
Using the survey data from China and India, the magnitude of the proportionate risk 
premium is computed and reported in Table 5.11.   The mean farm income and 
standard deviation of the farm incomes have been computed based upon the farmer’s 
responses on the questions related to their expectations on prices and yields of the five 
important crops. Then coefficient of variations of farm income is computed. The 
proportional risk premium is computed in two ways. First, it is computed assuming the 
value of coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to two for everyone. Secondly the 
proportional risk premium values are computed by using the values of coefficient of 
relative risk aversion (r.r.) as explained earlier. The values of coefficient of variation 
of income and that of proportional risk premium seem to be reasonable and no trend is 
apparent across the asset quintiles. However the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
seems to be decreasing with higher level of quintiles of assets. Also the values of risk 
premium are found to be marginally higher in the case of India.  
This demonstrates that risk is a major concern for rural people and they are willing to 
pay for insurance coverage is as high as 15- 20 percent of annual income.  
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Table 5.11: Values of Proportional Risk Premium for Rural Families in China and 
India 
 
Asset 
Quintiles 
China 
N Family  
income 
(RMB) 
Mean farm 
income 
(computed) 
(RMB) 
S.d. of 
income 
(computed) 
(RMB) 
 
Coeff. of 
Variation 
of income 
(computed) 
Prop. 
Risk 
Prem., 
assuming 
r.r.=2 
Coeff. 
Of 
Relative 
Risk 
Aversion 
Prop. 
Risk 
Premium
, 
assuming
, variable 
r.r. 
1 453 7441.47 3885.35 1263.25 0.32 0.13 2.98 0.16 
2 181 9276.33 5173.88 1736.05 0.34 0.14 2.57 0.15 
3 263 11770.7 10302.54 3735.72 0.32 0.13 2.67 0.15 
4 243 13348.2 9818.78 4010.93 0.32 0.13 2.82 0.17 
5 245 17324.4 13679.87 5615.34 0.34 0.13 2.54 0.16 
Total 1385 11274.9 8033.25 3041.05 0.33 0.13 2.77 0.16 
 
Asset 
Quintiles 
India 
N Family  
income 
(Rs.) 
Mean farm 
income 
(computed) 
(Rs.) 
S.d. of 
income 
(computed) 
(Rs.) 
 
Coeff. of 
Variation 
of income 
(computed) 
Prop. 
Risk 
Prem., 
assuming 
r.r.=2 
Coeff. 
Of 
Relative 
Risk 
Aversion 
Prop. 
Risk 
Premium, 
assuming, 
variable 
r.r. 
1 101 29954.5 15653.6 7295.2 0.38 0.17 2.45 0.19 
2 60 33083.3 22401.6 10064.5 0.36 0.16 2.12 0.12 
3 79 42063.3 51617.7 20725.9 0.36 0.15 2.1 0.14 
4 88 50619.3 47685 25989.2 0.37 0.16 1.93 0.15 
5 72 7597.22 105196 52236.6 0.43 0.21 1.51 0.16 
Total 400 45577.3 46933.2 22565.3 0.38 0.17 2.05 0.16 
 
5.4.3 Informal Lending and Borrowing: Risk Sharing Motive 
Result 5.5 asserts that introducing a loan element in the process of risk sharing, 
enables the process to sustain with more impatient agents. Money gifts and informal 
loan transactions among friends and relatives are important ways of risk sharing.  
It has been highlighted in the introduction that; i) large percentage of people depends 
on informal loans for their credit needs, almost 50 percent in India and 70 percent in 
China; (ii) informal loans constitute substantial part of total loan portfolios, almost 40 
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percent in India and 60 percent in China, particularly for families belonging to lower 
quintiles of assets. Further the data reveals that in both the countries more than 70 
percent families and 90 percent families have engaged in gift transactions and loan 
transactions respectively in emergencies. This demonstrates that people do share risk 
on a large scale and moreover preference for loan transaction dominates. These 
findings give credence to Result 4 and Result 5. Also more than 80 percent families do 
not prefer to default on such loans and further almost same percentage of families 
agree that community pressure helps in reducing defaults on such loans. These finding 
give credence to Result 5.6.    
Table 5.12 reports various key aspects of gifts and credit transactions among the 
friends and relatives. Evidently preferences for loan transactions are much higher than 
for gifts transactions in both countries. In emergency situations gifts transactions take 
place on a large scale, although the loan transactions dominate. Also major fractions of 
families prefer loan transactions in both normal and emergency conditions. Large 
fractions of families also agree that community pressure helps in reducing defaults.  
Table 5.12: Important Aspects of Informal Financial Transactions among Friends or Relatives 
 
Variable (mean value shows the fraction of respondents 
who agree to the question: 1=yes) 
Mean Value 
: India 
(N=400) 
Mean Value: 
China 
(N=739) 
Gift transactions among friends and relatives .67 .25 
Gift transactions(stronger version: both gave and received ) .36 .05 
Loan transactions among friends and relatives .97 .94 
Loan transactions(stronger version: both lent and borrowed) .60 .70 
Gift for emergency purposes .71 .59 
Loan for emergency purposes .96 .98 
Prefer loan for emergency purposes .88 .82 
Prefer loan for general  purposes .73 .84 
Prefer not to default on such loans .80 .93 
Community pressure helps in reducing default .76 .63 
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Further important motivations for such financial transactions are reported in Table 
5.13.  Evidently large percentage of families prefer to borrow (lend) from friends and 
relatives. Substantial percentages of families find this convenient and also loan and 
interest repayment terms are found to be flexible. Considerable percentages of families 
do such financial transactions as they trust that loans will be repaid. But also a good 
percentage of families agree to give loans even they do not trust that loan will be 
repaid and also a good percentage of families agree to borrow or lend even they have 
been refused earlier by their friend and relatives. 
Table 5.13: Important Motivations of Financial Transactions among Friends or Relatives 
 
Variable (mean value shows the fraction of 
respondents who agree to the question: 1=yes) 
Mean Value : 
India 
(N=400) 
Mean Value: 
China 
(N=739) 
Prefer to borrow from friends or relatives .50 .72 
Flexibility in loan repayment .87 .93 
Flexibility in interest amount  repayment .83 .76 
Borrowing from friends or  relatives convenient .89 .96 
Trust that loans given to friends or relatives will be repaid .79 .90 
Loans given even not trust that loan will be repaid .45 .63 
Agree to borrow or lend even they have refused earlier .27 .52 
 
These findings clearly highlight the importance of informal financial transactions 
(gifts and loans) for the risk sharing purpose. 
Using the framework of collective utility maximization of the participating agents in 
risk sharing, the equations (5.23), (5.24) and (5.25) are obtained which determine the 
risk sharing loan amount and repayment rate. The Result 5.6 summarizes the findings - 
the loan amount decreases with increasing uncertainty in income and production 
process and also with increasing risk aversion of the agents. It   increases with 
increasing values of repayment factor and productivity factor of production function. 
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5.4.3.1 An Econometric Model of Informal Borrowing and Identification Strategy 
Ideally to empirically test the findings of Result 6, we need the observations on 
amounts of loan transactions a household makes with his friends and relatives repeated 
over a certain period of time. Also we need data on variance of income over this 
period and also a reliable estimate of absolute risk aversion coefficient. Furthermore, 
repayment rates of these informal loans in different states need to be known.  
But it is very arduous and time consuming to get hold of such an ideal data set. The 
present data set has information for only one year. It has information on total 
outstanding informal loan amount for each family and we do not have data on pair 
wise loan transactions. Furthermore the income variance and absolute risk aversion 
coefficient have been measured, based on responses of the families to a specific set of 
questions that may not be quite rigorous. However, we can still obtain satisfactory 
inferences on result 5.6, if the explanatory variables are satisfactorily exogenous.  
Basically the following equation is estimated using OLS regression method. 
 
...(5.28)                                        )N(0,~ :     X Loan  Informal Log 2  Z  
Where, X= explanatory variables such as, absolute risk aversion coefficient, 
coefficient of variation of income (for uncertainty in income process), repayment rate. 
Z= Control Variables such as, household asset, education, household size, credit 
constrainedness of the family, preferences for borrowing from friends and relatives – 
convenience and flexibility.  
The absolute risk aversion coefficient is computed using the values of the relative risk 
aversion coefficient, dividing it by the household asset. We have no data on the 
repayment rates on the risk sharing informal loans, hence we are using a related 
variable – delay or default in repayment of informal loans as a proxy for repayment 
rates. This is the best we can do here. For consistent estimate of the coefficients, it is 
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necessary that the right hand variables are exogenous. This requirement seems to be 
satisfied here. The credit constrained status of a family is realistically an explained 
variable, hence the predicted value of credit constraints (obtained from first stage 
regression of credit constraints on a set of explanatory variables; discussed in Chapter 
3) is used in the regression. Further, in the cross section data, we are not able to 
control for the unobserved heterogeneities of the people, this may induce some bias in 
the coefficients; this weakness of the proposed estimation is acknowledged here. The 
OLS estimation results are reported in Table 5.14. 
Table 5.14: OLS Results of Log Informal Loan 
 
India China Dependent Variable :Log informal Loan 
Coef. t Coef. t 
Absolute risk aversion coefficient -2.03* -2.47 -0.29* -3.2 
Coefficient of variation of income 0.61 0.77 -1.97* -2.54 
Delay or default in repayment 1.75* 6.93 0.99* 4.6 
Education 0.03 0.18 -0.02 -0.13 
Log asset -0.04 -0.18 0.27 1.58 
Household size 0.01 0.15 0.05 0.7 
Predicted value of credit constraint -0.31 -0.47 5.41* 4.82 
Borrowing from Friend and relative convenient 1.97* 4.92 0.36 0.63 
Flexible repayment terms  (1=yes) 0.14 0.42 0.65* 2.07 
region6 1.45* 3.4   
region8 0.69* 1.79   
region9 1.23* 3.68 -1.43* -5.05 
_cons 3.13 1.18 1.31 0.61 
India : N = 305; F( 12,   292) =   8.95; Prob > F =  0.00;   Adj R-squared =  0.24 
China : N = 344; F( 10,   292) =  9.95; Prob > F =  0.00;   Adj R-squared =  0.20 
 
Important inferences of this estimation are mentioned as following:  
1. Regression results for both the countries are quite significant, as F statistics are 
quite satisfactory and R squared values are quite high. 
2. In both the estimations the absolute risk aversion coefficient is found to be 
significantly and negatively associated with the informal loan amount. This is 
as per the conjectures of result 5.6. 
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3. In the case of China, the coefficient of variation of income is found to be 
significantly and negatively associated with the informal loan amount, which 
supports the assertions of result 5.6. However, in the case of India no 
significant result is obtained. 
4. However, in both the estimations the delay or default on loan repayment is 
found to be significantly and positively associated with the informal loan 
amount, which is against the conjectures of result 5.6. It may be happening for 
two reasons. One, this variable may not be a good proxy for repayment rates. 
Two, the delay and to some extent the default on informal loan repayments 
also demonstrate the flexibility of such loans related to schedule of repayments 
and that may actually encourage more informal borrowing. 
5. No significant relations are found for the household asset in these regressions. 
In the case of China, the credit constraints in the formal markets is found to be 
significantly and positively associated with the informal loan amount. This 
finding is as per the conjecture that the families who are credit constrained are 
compelled to depend on informal loans. 
6. Further the convenient aspect of informal borrowing and flexibility aspect of 
such borrowing are also found to be positively associated with the informal 
loan amount.  These findings are also as per the conjecture that many families 
prefer to borrow from the friends and relatives. 
Overall we obtain the inferences that broadly support the findings of result 5.6 - the 
informal loan amount decreases with increasing uncertainty in income and production 
process and also with increasing risk aversion of the agents. However, we could not 
get supporting inferences for positive association of informal loan amount with 
repayment factor. 
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5.5. Conclusion 
Majority of the families living in rural areas of the developing countries are exposed to 
income process which is quite volatile showing high values of coefficient of variation. 
The families in these areas face various types of risks and uncertainties as shown here. 
In absence of well functioning credit and insurance markets, consumption smoothing 
is a big challenge for these families and they resort to various ex ante and ex post 
measures to smooth their consumptions. To smooth their consumption and satisfy 
other needs they usually take recourse to - (a) borrow from formal credit market, (b) 
do precautionary savings, (c) enter into mutual risk sharing arrangements, and (d) 
depend on informal borrowing from friends and relatives.  
This chapter’s main objective is to present a detail analytics of risk sharing and 
consumption smoothing motives of risk averse agents. Further we have investigated 
into the matters related with various ways of insuring against risk. The three important 
mechanisms analyzed are; precautionary savings, risk sharing insurance and credit 
arrangements. Useful results are obtained which attempt to explain these mechanisms.  
The household survey data from China and India are used to conduct empirical 
investigation into the significance of the important results obtained here. Suitable 
econometric methods and appropriate identification strategies have been proposed to 
get evidences on the results related to precautionary savings, risk sharing insurance 
arrangements and risk sharing credit arrangements.   
An estimate of coefficient of relative risk aversion and coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion are needed to measure the risk premium and optimal informal loan amount. 
Risk premium is defined as the minimum amount which a risk averse agent is willing 
to pay to avoid fluctuations in her consumption across dates. The coefficients of 
relative risk aversion of the people have been estimated using a survey question 
related to Binswanger (1981) experiment and also using further approximations. It is 
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acknowledged that this way of measuring relative risk aversion coefficient may not be 
rigorous, however for the limited purpose of estimating risk premium of the 
households this may be adequate. Apparently higher level of household assets, 
income, and education level are associated with lower level of risk aversion. Also the 
level of risk aversion seems to be increasing with age of the respondent. 
Using the survey data from China and India, the magnitude of the proportionate risk 
premium is computed which is found to be in the range of 15-20 percent. This 
demonstrates that risk is a major concern for rural people and they are willing to pay 
for insurance coverage as high as 15- 20 percent of annual income.  
Satisfactory evidences of life cycle and precautionary motives for savings are 
obtained. Higher level of household assets and income are found to be positively 
associated with the savings. Also higher values of absolute risk aversion are found to 
be positively associated with the savings. It is also observed that a large number of 
families are not able to save but they seem to attach high importance to the savings. 
Also significant evidences are obtained related to risk sharing insurance arrangements 
risk sharing credit arrangements. It has been observed that in both the countries more 
than 70 percent families and 90 percent families have engaged in gift transactions and 
loan transactions respectively in emergencies. This demonstrates that people do share 
risk on a large scale and moreover preference for loan transaction dominates.  
Further the empirical investigation suggests that the informal loan amount decreases 
with increasing uncertainty in income process and also with increasing risk aversion of 
the agents. However, we could not get supporting inferences for positive association 
of informal loan amount with repayment factor. 
Some of the weaknesses of the estimations are as following: 
1. The coefficients of relative risk aversion and absolute risk aversion of the families 
are measured approximately. Rigorous estimations of these coefficients using 
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repeated observations on the choices made by the families related to consumption 
and production activities (Bar-Shira et.al., 1997) may improve the inferences on 
the results.  
2. The variability of the income of the households is also measured based on the 
perceptions of the families. Here also using repeated observations on income, may 
give better measurement of the variance of households’ income. 
3. Also in a cross section data, we are not able to control for the unobserved 
heterogeneities of the households. The availability of panel data may resolve the 
omitted variable bias caused by this inadequacy. 
All the same this chapter provides helpful insights on risk sharing and consumption 
smoothing motivations and mechanisms of the families living in the rural areas of 
developing economies. 
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Chapter 6: The Economics of Informal Lending and Risk Sharing 
Motive 
In the rural areas of developing countries informal lending and borrowing among 
friends and relatives are observed to be quite prevalent. The main objective of this 
chapter is to analyze the significance and underlying motives of such informal 
financial transactions.  In the literature risk sharing motive has been advanced as an 
important explanation of these informal financial transactions. Pursuing that line of 
research, a detailed analysis of risk sharing motive for informal financial transactions 
has been presented, and useful results are obtained. The primary contribution of this 
chapter is to characterize the loan amount, state contingent repayments, and default 
rates in equilibrium. Also a simple test is suggested in the chapter to get inferences on 
risk sharing motives.  Further, these results are empirically tested using household 
survey data from China and India. Significant evidences are obtained related to risk 
sharing motives explaining the informal lending and borrowing.   
 
6.1. Introduction 
In the developing countries particularly in the rural areas people face severe 
challenges in arranging finance for consumption and production purposes. The 
standard assumptions of complete markets including that of credit and insurance 
markets generally do not hold well in reality. The price mechanism particularly in 
credit and insurance market is intrinsically limited by transaction costs and 
information and enforcement costs36.  Consequently fulfillment of effective demand of 
credit and insurance is not attained. In response to these imperfections, several 
institutional mechanism have developed in these areas such as, sharecropping (Cheung 
1969, Stiglitz 1974 ), informal lending and insurance arrangements (Udry 1994, Coate, 
                                                 
36 See Hoff, Braverman, and Stiglitz (1993) for more on this. 
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S. and Ravallion, M. 1993, Eswaran and Kotwal 1989, Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall 
2002) etc.  
The vigorous coexistence of formal and informal credit market in rural areas is well 
documented37. The commercial banks and rural cooperatives predominantly constitute 
formal credit institutions that usually mobilize savings and advance loans. They 
advance loans mainly for productive usages at low interest rates, but also they insist on 
collaterals, which poor families are often unable to post. In the informal credit 
markets, money is lent by private individuals – moneylenders, traders, landlords, 
friends, relatives etc. The loan contracts are quite diverse in nature. Moneylenders 
generally advance credits at high interest rates, the traders and landlords advance loans 
at low rate of interests in lieu of reciprocal services to be rendered to them, and friends 
and relatives advance credits at low interest rates as a mutual support and insurance 
arrangements.  
The main objective of this chapter is to develop an analytical framework to investigate 
the underlying motives for such financial transactions among friends and relatives in 
the rural areas of developing countries, and also to empirically test some of the results 
obtained from this analysis. 
This study is important for following reasons:  
(i) The families in these areas mostly depend on agriculture and ancillary 
activities. The household survey data from China and India reveals that farm 
income constitutes about 48 and 57 percent of family income respectively in 
China and India. The coefficient of variation of farm income in these countries 
are usually high, it is estimated around 34 percent. This creates substantial 
uncertainties in their income. So insurance and credit becomes an important 
                                                 
37 See Bell (1990) for a good reference. 
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input for livelihood for most of the families. Families need credit for 
consumption, production, and other investment purposes. 
(ii) Further formal credit markets - banks and rural credit cooperatives (RCC) are 
not well developed in such areas. In these areas   informal borrowing 
constitutes a large portion of total borrowing. The Data reveals that informal 
borrowing constitutes about 64 and 37 percent of total borrowing respectively 
in the case of China and India. 
(iii) So also the insurance markets are not well functional in these areas. For 
example, in the case of India 90 percent families show their willingness to buy 
crop insurance, whereas only 34 percent families have actually bought this, in 
the case of China these percentages are 75 and 18 respectively. In absence of 
well functioning insurance markets, the importance of credit is further 
enhanced (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1989).   
(iv) Also the data reveals that large percentages (50 percent) of the families 
actually prefer informal loans to formal loans. 
Household surveys were conducted in rural areas of China (in years 2007 and 2008) 
and India (in year 2008-09). About 1200 families in China and 400 families in India 
were surveyed. The survey questionnaires are designed to elicit responses of families 
related to; (i) credit rationing problems which they face, (ii) how it affects their 
livelihood choices, (iii) how they respond to overcome this problem, and (iv) the 
extent, types and motives for financial transactions among friends and relatives.   The 
surveys data are used in this chapter to analyze the informal lending results.  
Some  initial findings are mentioned here that considerably motivates this chapter.  
1. About 45 percent families in India and 30 percent families in China have been 
denied loan from RCC or banks, because of various reasons as summarized in 
Table 6.1. Evidently lack of collateral seems to be major reason for denial of loan. 
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Table 6.1: Reason for Denial of Loan from RCC or Bank 
  
Variable : Denied loan due to Mean: India (N=180) Mean : China (N=524) 
Lack of collateral (1=yes) .50 .65 
Yield risk in crop (1=yes) .1 .04 
Fail to replay past loan (1=yes) .32 .18 
Not  trustworthy (1=yes) .25 .45 
Low income (1=yes) .16 .49 
Further about same percentages of families in India and China told that they could not 
get needed amount of loan from these sources for various consumption and production 
purposes.  These facts demonstrate that large number of families in these economies 
face substantial credit rationing from formal sources.  
2. Table 6.2 summarizes the composition of loans of the families in these two 
countries. The loans obtained from banks and RCC belong to formal loan and the 
loans borrowed from friends and relatives belong to informal loan. Following facts 
are evident- (i) large percentage of the families depends on informal loans; (ii) 
informal loans constitute substantial part of total loan portfolios; and  (iii) families 
belonging to lower quintiles of assets depend more on informal loans. 
Table 6.2: Composition of Loan Portfolio of Families in India and China (percentages) 
 
 India China 
Quintile 
Assets 
Formal 
Loan 
Informal 
loan 
N Mean 
(Informal>0) 
Formal 
Loan 
Informal 
loan 
N N 
(Informal>0 
1 32.82 35.5 72 .50 22.6 75.7 246 .84 
2 36.91 48.38 48 .66 33.3 66.0 104 .79 
3 46.29 44.66 67 .55 41.3 57.7 138 .73 
4 61.95 28.37 70 .32 38.8 60.1 128 .77 
5 63.22 26.2 57 .47 54.3 44.2 133 .66 
Total 48.40 36.29 314 .52 35.9 62.8 749 .77 
 
3. Loans are taken for both production purposes and emergent needs such as, 
consumption, health, funeral expenses etc. In both the countries about 25 percent 
of the borrowings seem to be done for such purposes, as shown in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3: Purpose of Borrowing by Families (percentages) 
 
 India China 
Quintile  
Assets 
Loan risk  Loan 
production 
N Loan risk  Loan 
production 
N 
1 35 59 97 31 59 406 
2 29 55 58 22 65 165 
3 17 75 79 20 70 249 
4 23 68 86 16 75 221 
5 07 84 71 12 80 217 
Total 23 68 391 22 68 1258 
Evidently in both the countries larger percentages of families in lower quintiles of 
assets have borrowed to meet the urgent needs. 
4. Limited access and availability of formal loans may compel the families to depend 
on informal borrowings.  Also the data reveals that large percentages (50 percent) 
of families actually prefer informal loans to formal loans. 
Informal financial transactions among close acquaintances (friends, and relatives) are 
usually characterized by (Udry, 1994; Fafchamps, 1999; Lund and Fafchamps, 2003):   
(i) no prescription of formal contracts; (ii) no explicit interest rates; (iii) state 
contingent repayment of loans, (iv) role reversal of agents as borrowers and lenders; 
and  (vi) less importance of information asymmetry. 
Investigation of financial transaction among relatives and friends is an evolving field 
of study. In the literature, risk sharing and consumption smoothing motives are given 
as important explanations for such financial transactions – a summary of which is 
briefly presented in section 2.  
The chapter is organized as following. A brief literature review on informal lending 
and borrowing is presented in section 2.  Then section 3 presents a formal analysis of 
informal lending among relatives and friends based on risk sharing and consumption 
smoothing motive. This analysis builds upon the works of Fafchamps (1999), Ligon, 
Thomas, and Worrall (2002), Thomas and Worrall (2002), Udry (1994) and 
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Koherlakota (1996). The analysis is enriched by explicit modeling of default in loan 
repayment and then attempting to solve the model explicitly. The primary contribution 
of this chapter is to characterize the loan amount, state contingent repayments, and 
default rates in equilibrium. This line of reasoning explains the risk sharing credit 
transactions as a sub game perfect equilibrium outcome of repeated interactions 
among the households. Also a simple test is suggested in the chapter to get inferences 
on risk sharing motives. 
Household survey data from China and India have been used to conduct empirical 
investigation into the significance of some of the results obtained in section 3 and the 
inferences and evidences are discussed in section 4.   Suitable econometric methods 
and appropriate identification strategies have been proposed to get evidences on the 
results related to risk sharing motives for informal lending and borrowing.  Significant 
evidences are obtained related to risk sharing motives explaining the informal lending 
and borrowing. Section 5 concludes with important observations.  
 
6.2. Literature Review 
A brief review of important works related with informal financial transactions among 
relatives and friends is presented here.  
Scott (1976) has explained such transactions as influenced by village level customs 
and mutual support in traditional societies. The transactions manifest in forms of gifts 
giving, reciprocal interest free credit, shared meals, and communal access to lands, 
sharing bullocks and work sharing arrangements.   
Platteau and Abraham (1987) highlight such credit transactions as a mechanism of 
reducing risk in agrarian societies. They emphasize  three different types of insurance 
through credit : (i) credit is a way to insure against the risk of falling into distress (ii) 
credit is given with a view to minimize the risk of income losses due to lack of labor, 
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and (iii) credit is given to make access to output as secure as possible. Their analysis 
was based on evidence from two village economies of small-scale marine fishermen in 
Kerala (India). They called such transactions as quasi credit – as debt repayment 
obligations are contingent on realized shocks that affect borrower and lender.  
Coate and Ravallion (1993), using repeated game framework, have characterized the 
informal insurance arrangements that can be sustained as a non cooperative 
equilibrium for risk sharing purpose. Their analysis also suggested that divergences 
from optimal insurance arrangements will be greater in societies in which different 
incomes are less likely and time preference rates are high.   
Udry (1994) has highlighted the role of credit as insurance in rural economy in 
contexts of rural credit markets in Northern Nigeria. He found the minimal use of 
collateral, very low interest rate charges, and need based access of loan. He argues that 
element of information asymmetry is not important here. In such information 
environment, credit transactions function as state contingent contracts that allow risk 
pooling between the debtor and creditor. He emphasizes that repayment obligations 
are usually renegotiated to accommodate shocks affecting lender and borrower.  
Lund and Fafchamps (1997) in their study of rice farmers in Philippines observed that 
gifts and informal loans among friends and relatives are partly motivated by 
consumption smoothing motives but do not serve to efficiently share risk. They also 
find little evidence that transfers are motivated by altruism or by collateral constraints. 
Fafchamps (1999) argue that informal credit between friends and relatives is a hybrid 
transaction of market exchange and gift giving, whose purpose is to overcome the 
enforcement problems of pure income pooling arrangements.   
Thomas and Worrall (2002) have characterized the gift and loan transactions among 
friends and relatives as an outcome of dynamic game when reciprocation is voluntary 
action of agents. They describe this as quasi-credit transactions meant for informal 
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insurance arrangements. Further the nature of such quasi-credit transactions depend 
upon a host of parameters such as size of risk faced by families, coefficient of risk 
aversion coefficient, rate of time preferences etc.  
Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002) using general dynamic model come out with the 
findings that complete risk pooling is not attained because of limited commitment of 
agents. With limited commitment the mutual insurance arrangement can work only if 
promises of future reciprocity are sufficiently attractive and credible. Loan and gift 
transactions help in making such arrangements work. 
 
6.3. Analysis of Informal Loan Transaction among Relatives and 
Friends 
In Chapter 5, a simple example demonstrates the significance of informal loan 
transactions in solving the commitment problems in risk sharing. In these areas 
families interact over a long period of time – such interactions can be captured by    
infinitely repeated games framework wherein cooperation can be attained as sub game 
perfect equilibrium outcome. The history of cooperation is reciprocated with 
cooperation in next stage and any past deviation is punished in the next stage. The risk 
sharing arrangement thus becomes self-sustaining based on voluntary participation. 
 Now an analytics of loan transaction among family members and friends is presented 
here. This analysis builds upon works of Fafchamps (1999), Ligon, Thomas, and 
Worrall (2002), Thomas and Worrall (2002), Udry (1994) and Koherlakota (1996). 
Basically a two period loan transaction process is repeated ad infinitum and then the 
sub game perfect equilibrium concepts is used.  Further the analysis is enriched using 
explicit modeling of default in loan repayment and then attempt has been made to 
solve the model to get explicit results.    
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6.3.1 Description of the Model 
I assume that there are two households. Each one faces stochastic income  Tttty 01 , 
and    Tttty 02  over a horizon of time period T. Now a simple illustration of lending and 
state contingent repayment is considered. For a simple and tractable analysis I 
consider a two period analysis. In each period, household 1 gets income either 11 z  
with probability p or 11 z  with probability 1-p. Similarly household 2 gets income 
22 z  with probability q and 22 z  with probability 1-q. Suppose further that in 
the year 0, the household 1 gets income 11 z  and household 2 gets income 22 z . 
They enter into loan transaction agreement such that, the household 2 lends $B and 
also they agree for state contingent repayment Rs1  in next period as shown in Table 
6.4. Here R is the minimum repayment amount that is paid in the case of bad outcome 
in the next period – which can be thought of as a function of risk premium which the 
household is willing to pay to avoid the risk (equation 5.8). And C1 is additional 
repayment in good state of income.  So for a risk premium of  π(y) = (1/2)σ2 γ(y)/ym  
and a choice parameter k ,let us assume that 
 
...(6.1)        s allfor     y R   and    ; BR  and      ;/)(k(1/2)  (y)k  R 1s
2  myy  
The income, repayment and lending process in next period is shown in Table 6.4.  
Table 6.4: Income, Lending and Borrowing and Repayment in the Next Period 
 
Probability for 
different states s 
Income of 
household 1 1sy  
Income of household 
2  2sy  
Repayment/ Transfer 
from household 1 1SR
pq = 1  11 z  22 z  R+C1 ≥ B 
p(1-q)= 2  11 z  22 z  R+C1  ≥ B 
(1-p)(1-q)= 3  11 z  22 z  R 
(1-p)q= 
1
4  11 z  22 z  R 
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This repayment scheme assumes that there is no default. But it can not be ruled out – 
as empirically some default has also been observed. Now it is assumed that there is 
probability of default θ, which is uniformly distributed - ],[ 

  . In the present set 
up we simply assume 0≤ θ ≤ 1. Hence in the period 1 the resource available to 
household 1 is, ))1(( 11 Ssss Ryc   and the resources available to household 2 
is, ))1(( 22 Ssss Ryc  . Also it is assumed  that the household 1 faces social sanction 
for default that costs him utility loss of ),(1 Ss RD   , where  ),(1 Ss RD   is increasing in 
both arguments, convex in θS and RS,  and 0),(1 Ssi RD  , 0),(2 Ssi RD  ., i.e. more 
punishment is needed to check bigger temptation of default in the higher repayment 
state to sustain the loan transaction process. It is also assumed that these two periods 
lending, borrowing and repayment arrangement is repeated over time. Using separable 
well behaved von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, the household 1’s net 
discounted utility (in infinite horizon) maximization program is as following: 
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6.3.2 Pareto Efficient Arrangements 
First I characterize the unconstrained Pareto efficient arrangement, by maximizing the 
sum of weighted utility of the agents subject to overall resource constraints; 
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Here λ is the relative weight of utility of agent 2. For optimal values of decision 
variables, differentiating the sum of utilities with respects to   1sc  and 
2
sc  respectively 
and then taking the ratio we get 
 
U11( 1sc ,θs)/ U21( 2sc ,θs)  = 1/λ   :          for all s (states) and time periods          … (6.4) 
This finding is summarized in the Result 6.1.  
Result 6.1:  The allocation is Pareto efficient, if in all states the ratio of marginal 
utility of consumption is a constant.  Further it can be shown that the optimal level of 
default θs is zero, otherwise the constancy requirement of equation (6.4) will be 
violated. So any default observed in decentralized equilibrium is inefficient.  
If the social planner induces renegotiation between the parties that reduces default, 
then utility of both parties can be improved and hence zero value of θ is optimal. Once 
the default level is zero then equation (6.4) reduces to perfect risk sharing equation. 
This is the benchmark case from which all deviations (achieved in decentralized 
equilibrium) is to be measured in terms of aggregate efficiency loss. In the first best 
case the agents smooth their consumption across time and states. 
 
6.3.3   Equilibrium Outcome 
Having studied the nature of first best results, the equilibrium allocations are 
characterized. The agents participate in the mutual lending and repayment process as a 
part of agreement to cooperate and play high payoff equilibrium if each one 
cooperates, otherwise low payoff equilibrium is played and agents go back to the 
autarchy position. For such repeated interactions, the  concept of subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium (Selten 1965)38  is appropriate–in which the credible threats and 
                                                 
38 Followed from Gibbons, Robert (1992). 
  229
promises about future behavior can influence present behavior. The key elements of 
subgame perfect equilibrium are:  
1. A strategy profile for both agents, such that after observing a history of outcomes 
the actions of an agent are optimal given the strategy profile of other player.  
2. Prescribing the credible punishment element, which each agent faces in the case of 
deviation from prescribed strategy in the previous outcome.  
3. The players’ strategies constitute Nash equilibrium in every subgame. 
In the present set up the two period interaction is a subgame (also stage game) which 
is repeated over time and the outcomes in each such repetitive two stage interaction 
will be similar except that agent 1 and agent 2 may change their role (of borrower or 
lender) depending on the outcome of endowments and also on the history of actions. 
Essentially the subgame perfect equilibrium prescribes for self-enforceable incentive 
compatible contracts. Hence following program need to be solved:  
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Among these constraints the first two constraints do not bind, if the first one binds 
then the third constraint will be violated and also if the second constraint binds then 
the first agent actually gets less than what she could get in autarchy. Intuitively the last 
constraint binds otherwise the agent 1 can borrow more without violating other 
constraints. This implies that µ = 0, ν1 = 0, and ν2 > 0. The last constraint with 
equality sign can be used to preliminarily find the value of B with reasonable 
assumptions on parameters and values. If this constraint is transformed as difference 
of left hand side and right hand side of the equation, then it is a monotonically 
decreasing function of B. This is shown in Figure 6.1. For example, if agent 1 and 
agent 2 get income 500 and 1000 alternatively in each period (agent 1 starts with the 
lower one), and all states are equally probable, β=0.90, default rate θ = 0.1, and 
repayment amount R = 200, then equilibrium value of B= 200 is obtained. Note that 
the first best value (perfect risk sharing) of B is 250. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 100 150 200 250 300-1 
-0.5
0 
0.5
1 
1.5
Value of B 
Value (difference) of I.C. of Agent 
2 
Figure 6.1: Amount of Borrowing as determined by Incentive Constraint of Agent 2 
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Now program (6.5) will be solved to find the expressions of the choice variables in 
equilibrium. For tractability, the program will be solved in stages and the expressions 
of choice variables will be characterized to get insights into the mechanics of informal 
lending, borrowing and repayments.  
 
6.3.3.1. Characterization of Default Level in Equilibrium 
  
Household 1 will choose s , which maximizes his expected utility in period 1. 
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                     … (6.6) 
This gives first order necessary and sufficient conditions as, 
...(6.7)           s allfor  )),((.)         0))],((.)[( 11
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The equation (6.7) pins down the level of default in equilibrium in each state.
 This simply tells that in equilibrium the quantum of default θ is such that marginal 
benefit from defaulting equals to its marginal cost. For a fixed value of R we can plot 
u1` (.)Rs   and )),(11 ss RD   against θ on X axis. Note that u1(.) is strictly concave, hence                
u1`( .))1(1 sss Ry  Rs   is decreasing in   but increasing in R, and )),(11 ss RD  is 
increasing in θ and R because of our assumptions 0),(1 Ssi RD  , 0),(2 Ssi RD   
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D11 
θ0 θ1θ2
U1`0 
U1`1
D11,0 
D11,1
Figure 6.2: Equilibrium level of Default and Repayment 
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In figure 6.2 for a given value of R the intersection of U1` 0 and D11,0  represents 
equilibrium level of default. With increasing level of transfer or repayment 
obligations, R the equilibrium level of default may increase or decrease depending on 
the relative shifts of the two curves -as shown in the figure 6.2.  If with increasing R,  
D11,1 shifts a lot compared to that of shift of  U1`1 , then the default level θ2 actually 
decreases. But with shifts of the curves within reasonable limits, θ actually increases 
to θ1 with higher transfer or repayment obligations. A simple example demonstrates 
this. Let u(c) =ln(c); and   D1(θ, R) = exp (θ) θ Ra ; where a is a  constant.  Then 
default constraint implies that 
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For example Table 6.5 summarizes the default level for different combinations of y 
and R representing for bad and good state of agent 1 (here a = 1/1000).  
Table 6.5: Default rates in Bad and Good State 
 
 y=500; R=200: bad state y=1000; R=280: good state
Default level =  .50 .14 
 
This shows that with increasing income the default percentage decreases in 
equilibrium and also for fixed value of y it increases with repayment obligations. 
However if the default punishment function is strictly convex in R such that the 
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marginal cost of default increases sharply with increasing repayment obligations then 
the equilibrium level of default will actually decrease. For example if D1(θ, R) = 
exp(θ)θR2a , then   
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These observations are summarized in the following result. 
Result 6.2: The equilibrium level of default tends to increase with repayment or 
transfer obligations and decreases with increasing income level. The same can 
decrease if the default punishment function is made increasing and strictly convex in R 
such that the marginal cost of default increases more than the marginal gain with 
increased R.  
6.3.3.2. Characterization of Amount of Borrowing in Equilibrium 
Now expression for the equilibrium level of B satisfying the subgame perfect program 
(6.5) and the constraint R + C1 ≥ B is obtained. Let µ, ν1 and ν2 be the Lagrange 
multipliers associated with the first three constraints (Reservation utility level of agent 
2, self enforcing conditions for agent 1 and agent 2 respectively) in (6.5) and ψ be the 
Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint  R + C1 ≥ B.  All the multipliers are 
non negative. Using first order condition for B we get: 
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The above result is quite intuitive. When R+C1 (repayment in good state) strictly 
exceeds B (loan amount) then more borrowing is possible compared to the case when 
R+C1  just equals B. Now for simple illustration, let us assume that u(c) = ln(c) for 
both agents and examining for interior solutions only – we get following first order 
condition 
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For example, if y1 = 500, and y2 =1000, 01  (agent 1’s incentive constraint not 
binding), and 1)2(2    and  ,0 2   .15, then B = 200, which is quite realistic. 
 
0. y1B/ and 0  y2B/   get,    we(6.11)equation   from Also   
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Hence the loan amount decreases with borrowers income and increases with lender’s 
income, which is realistic. Also this result indicates that when ψ =0 (i.e. R+C1 > B), 
then µ and ν2 simultaneously can not be zero, otherwise B = y2, which violates the 
positive consumption constraint for each one. This finding corroborates to the earlier 
observation that ν2 >0.  The lending partner agrees to lend to the point where her self 
enforcing constraint binds. These findings are summarized in the Result 6.3. 
Result 6.3: Equilibrium loan amount B is a monotonically decreasing function of the 
borrower’s income and monotonically increasing function of the lender’s income. The 
maximum possible borrowing takes place when the repayment in good state of 
borrower strictly exceeds the borrowed amount. Also lender’s self enforcing constraint 
binds in equilibrium.  Hence the first best result is not attained in equilibrium.  
Another interesting observation is that δB/δν1 > 0. Hence maximum level of 
borrowing that sustains in equilibrium is when the self enforcing constraint of agent 1 
does not bind (ν1= 0) – and the moment this constraint binds (ν1> 0) borrowing tends 
to increase abruptly, which will violate other constraints.  If both of the self enforcing 
constraints are not binding (ν1 and ν2 equal to zero) then it approaches the first best 
result which is attained if default level θ is zero.  However the incentive constraint of 
agent 2 binds (ν2>0), otherwise agent 1 may further increase his borrowing without 
compromising the constraints; hence the first best result is not attained in equilibrium.  
 
6.3.3.3. Characterization of Additional Repayment Amount C1  in Equilibrium 
Now I will attempt to characterize C1, the additional repayment (more than R) optimal 
in good state of agent 1. Using the first order conditions with respect to C1:  
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Again the result is quite intuitive – subject to the repayment constraint, the optimal 
value of C1 in equilibrium is such that the marginal cost of repayment in good state 
equals the marginal benefit gained from this. Now using the value of ψ = 0, we get: 
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Solving the above equation – we can get an expression of C1 such that  
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Again for simple elucidation – let us use u(c) = ln(c) for both agents and                           
D (.) = (exp (θ) θR a)s; then using the equation (6.13) we get 
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The left hand side of the equation (6.15) is monotonically increasing in C1  and the 
right hand side is monotonically decreasing in C1 ,hence  real value of C1 is 
guaranteed. Also for a reasonable values of endowments and parameters as shown 
below, value of C1 = 45 is obtained, which is realistic. It is to be noted that with these 
values, loan amount in equilibrium, B*= 200 was found earlier. This is also shown in 
Figure 6.3. Important characterization of C1*  is mentioned in the Result 6.4.   
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Result 6.4 : The optimal value of C1 in equilibrium, as expressed in equation (6.14),  
is a function of income endowments, states probabilities, and default probabilities 
across states, constraint coefficients, and the minimum payment in all states. Also C1* 
monotonically increases with the income of borrower and monotonically decreases 
with the income of lender in all states. Maximum value of C1* is achieved when the 
repayment in good state of borrower strictly exceeds the borrowed amount B. 
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Figure 6.3: Value of Additional Payment in Good Period 
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6.3.3.4. Characterization of Minimum Repayment Amount R, in Equilibrium 
So far the expressions and comparative statics of θs (default probability across states), 
B (amount of borrowing) and C1 (additional repayment in good state of borrower) 
have been characterized. Also it has been assumed that the minimum repayment across 
all states R is a function of risk premium of the borrower as expressed by equation 
(6.1) : R = k π(y) = k (1/2)σ2 γ(y)/ym , where k is a choice parameter. Then using the 
program (6.5) optimal value of k can be pinned down, but it gives a complicated 
expression. Alternatively a value of k can be chosen mutually by the households 1 and 
2; which may depend on local conditions, customs and household characteristics 
(land/asset endowments, earlier default history, indebtedness etc.). Then using k as a 
parameter, optimal values of  θs, B and C1 can be obtained using earlier expressions. 
The equations 6.6, 6.9, and 6.12 describe the first order conditions for equilibrium 
values for θs, B and C1 . Further the program 6.5 prescribes three self enforcing 
constraints. Using these equations, constraints, and value of k, the equilibrium values 
of choice variables R, θs, B and C1 can be obtained – but solving this way becomes 
intractable. Hence sequential way of solving has been demonstrated here for 
illustration. The tractable way of logically analyzing this program is summarized as 
following: (i) Value of R is fixed as suggested above. (ii) Using this value of R value 
of θ is obtained using equation (6.6). (iii) Using equations (6.9) and (6.12) and 
constraints in program 6.5, and also logical assumptions on constraint coefficients µ, 
ν1, and ν2, values of B and C1 and constraint coefficients can be obtained.  
 
6.4. Empirical Analysis: Risk Sharing Motive for Informal Loan Transactions 
Analytical framework developed in the foregoing section helps us in understanding the 
mechanism of risk sharing credit transactions among close acquaintances, which is 
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quite prevalent in the rural areas of developing countries. These financial transactions 
are done both for undertaking production activities and also to meet urgent needs.  
It has been emphasized that the income of the families living in rural areas of the 
developing countries are quite volatile showing high values of coefficient of variation. 
The families in these areas face various types of risks (yield risk, price risk, and 
weather risk) and uncertainties (illness, cattle loss etc.), as evident from Table 6.6.  
Table 6.6: Percentage of Families Facing Various Risk and Uncertainties 
 
Variable (1=yes, 0=no) Mean Value: 
China 
Mean Value : 
India 
Price Risk .07 .06 
Yield Risk .06 .10 
Weather Risk .05 .09 
Suffered Crop Loss, Cattle Loss .70 .90 
Suffered Death or Major Sickness in Family .68 .91 
To mitigate these risks, these families adopt various ex ante and ex post risk 
management options – some of these are summarized in table 6.7.  
Table 6.7: Risk Management Options for Families in Rural Areas 
 
Risk Management Options 
(scale : 1-5; in the order of  increasing 
importance) 
Mean. : India 
(N=400) 
Mean. : China 
(N=1200) 
Crops/ animal/ enterprise Diversification 3.94 3.95 
Geographic diversification of plots 3.53 3.42 
Irrigation 4.24 4.25 
Spreading of sale of crops 3.03 3.45 
Forward contracts of crops 2.84 3.45 
Government Programs 3.23 3.89 
Financial  Reserves 3.67 3.70 
Off farm income 3.59 3.99 
  
One ex post mechanism is to borrow to meet the expenses requirements. In both the 
countries almost 25 percent of the borrowings seem to be done for such purposes.   
To smooth their consumption and satisfy other needs they usually take recourse to - 
(a) borrow from formal credit market, (b) do precautionary savings, (c) enter into 
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mutual risk sharing arrangements, and (d) depend on informal borrowing from friends 
and relatives.  
A large number of families have been found to be credit rationed in these areas; these 
issues have been analyzed in Chapter 3. Here empirical strategies are developed to 
infer the significance of risk sharing motivations for informal lending and borrowing 
among friends and relatives. 
Result 5.5 asserts that introducing a loan element in the process of risk sharing, 
enables the process to sustain with more impatient agents. Also Result 6.1 states that 
in the first best case the optimal level of default θs is zero. So any default observed in 
decentralized equilibrium is inefficient. If the social planner induces renegotiation 
between the parties that reduces default, then utility of both parties can be improved 
and hence zero value of θ is optimal. Money gifts and informal loan transactions 
among friends and relatives are important ways of risk sharing.  
 It has been highlighted that; i) large percentage of people depends on informal loans 
for their credit needs, almost 50 percent in India and 70 percent in China; (ii) informal 
loans constitute substantial part of total loan portfolios, almost 40 percent in India and 
60 percent in China, particularly for families belonging to lower quintiles of assets.  
Further the data reveals that in both the countries more than 70 percent families and 90 
percent families have engaged in gift transactions and loan transactions respectively in 
emergencies. This demonstrates that people do share risk on a large scale and 
moreover preference for loan transaction dominates. These findings give credence to 
Result 5.5. Also more than 80 percent families do not prefer to default on such loans 
and further almost same percentage of families agree that community pressure helps in 
reducing defaults on such loans. These finding give credence to Result 6.1.    
Table 6.8 reports various key aspects of gifts and credit transactions among the friends 
and relatives. Evidently preferences for loan transactions are much higher than for 
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gifts transactions in both countries. In emergency situations gifts transactions take 
place on a large scale, although the loan transactions dominate. Also major fractions of 
families prefer loan transactions in both normal and emergency conditions. Large 
fractions of families also agree that community pressure helps in reducing defaults.  
 
Table 6.8: Important Aspects of Informal Financial Transactions among Friends or 
Relatives 
 
Variable (mean value shows the fraction of respondents who 
agree to the question: 1=yes) 
Mean Value 
: India 
(N=400) 
Mean Value: 
China (N=739) 
Gift transactions among friends and relatives .67 .25 
Gift transactions(stronger version: both gave and received ) .36 .05 
Loan transactions among friends and relatives .97 .94 
Loan transactions(stronger version: both lent and borrowed) .60 .70 
Gift for emergency purposes .71 .59 
Loan for emergency purposes .96 .98 
Prefer loan for emergency purposes .88 .82 
Prefer loan for general  purposes .73 .84 
Prefer not to default on such loans .80 .93 
Community pressure helps in reducing default .76 .63 
 
Further important motivations for such financial transactions are reported in Table 6.9.  
Evidently large percentage of families prefer to borrow (lend) from friends and 
relatives. Substantial percentages of families find this convenient and also loan and 
interest repayment terms are found to be flexible. Considerable percentages of families 
do such financial transactions as they trust that loans will be repaid. But also a good 
percentage of families agree to give loans even they do not trust that loan will be 
repaid and also a good percentage of families agree to borrow or lend even they have 
been refused earlier by their friend and relatives. 
These findings clearly highlight the importance of informal financial transactions 
(gifts and loans) for the risk sharing purpose.  
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Table 6.9: Important Motivations of Financial Transactions among Friends or 
Relatives 
 
Variable (mean value shows the fraction of respondents 
who agree to the question: 1=yes) 
Mean Value : 
India (N=400) 
Mean Value: 
China (N=739) 
Prefer to borrow from friends or relatives .50 .72 
Flexibility in loan repayment .87 .93 
Flexibility in interest amount  repayment .83 .76 
Borrowing from friends or  relatives convenient .89 .96 
Trust that loans given to friends or relatives will be 
repaid 
.79 .90 
Loans given even not trust that loan will be repaid .45 .63 
Agree to borrow or lend even they have refused earlier .27 .52 
Further, Table 6.10 reports the percentage of families defaulting and delaying on 
repayment of formal and informal loans. Clearly default percentage on both types of 
loan is almost same, but delay in repayment of informal loans is significantly higher 
than that of formal loans.  This in a way shows the flexibility of repayments of 
informal loans.  
Table 6.10: Default and Delay in Repayment of Formal and Informal Loans 
 
Variable Mean Value (N=384) 
India 
Mean Value (N=1514) China 
Default on  formal Loan .23 .03 
Default on Informal Loan .20 .04 
Delay on  Formal Loan .51 .15 
Delay on Informal Loan .61 .38 
 
6.4.1 Econometric Model of Choice of Formal and Informal Credits 
Before proposing the estimation model of risk sharing motives of informal credits, it is 
important to understand choice process of formal and informal loans. It has been 
observed in the data  that some families have taken only informal loans, some have 
taken only formal loans and some families have taken both types of loans and some 
families have taken neither type of loans. Important household characteristics seem to 
be significantly different for families taking either formal or informal loan as shown in 
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Table 6.11. Evidently families taking formal loan on average are having more assets 
and income, more education, bigger family size, bigger loan size, and more savings. 
Also these families are using larger percentage of loan for production purposes.  
 
Table 6.11: Important Household Characteristics of Families Taking Formal and 
Informal Loans 
 
Variable (India) Mean (Only Informal) Mean (Only 
Formal) 
Mean 
(Both) 
Mean 
(None)  
N  104 127 66 28 
Farm Size (acre) 2.35 3.59 3.47 1.70 
Household income 36033.6 54755.9 43659.1 44085.7 
Percent Farm income 52.65 62.07 62.98 45.54 
Household size 6.03 7.37 6.05 5.82 
education (1-4) 2.43 2.77 2.71 2.18 
Sickness (1=yes) 0.35 0.46 0.52 0.07 
Amount of debt 7338.9 19300.8 29287.8 4071.4 
Asset Value 321644.2 462126.0 421818.2 283928.6 
Saving(0-3) 0.85 1.05 1.14 0.79 
Trusts that loan will be repaid 0.78 0.80 0.82 0.64 
Denied loan for collateral 0.26 0.18 0.38 0.07 
Loan for risk management 0.40 0.12 0.17 0.11 
Loan for production 0.48 0.84 0.73 0.86 
 
Table 6.11 (continued)  
 
Variable (China) Mean (Only Informal) Mean (Only Formal) Mean 
(Both) 
Mean 
(None) 
N  429 174 198 8 
Farm Size (acre) 4.67 6.61 5.90 5.35 
Household income 9065.47 14341.49 12208.15 8287.50 
Percent Farm income 48.05 45.44 39.90 31.06 
Household size 4.43 4.71 4.52 4.38 
education (1-4) 2.29 2.42 2.42 2.50 
Sickness (1=yes) 0.22 0.19 0.26 0.63 
Amount of debt 10310.1 17888.4 28657.4 21437.5 
Asset Value 39639.2 63886.2 65441.2 51000 
Saving(0-3) 0.82 0.81 0.51 1.50 
Trusts that loan will be repaid 0.90 0.88 0.87 1.00 
Denied loan for collateral 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.75 
Loan for risk management 0.28 0.10 0.21 0.20 
Loan for production 0.64 0.87 0.65 0.80 
 
Now each of these decisions can be estimated using the following equations. 
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6.4.1.1 Identification Strategy 
These two decisions by a household are realistically interrelated implying that the 
correlations of these equations’ disturbances may be significant. Hence the estimation 
of the parameters may be consistent but not efficient if the two equations are estimated 
independently.  Hence the parameters are estimated using the multivariate probit 
model, assuming the regressors are exogenous. Important explanatory variables are 
family asset, income, education, family size, age, preference for informal loan etc. The 
model is described as following.  
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6.4.1.2 Estimation of the Model 
The summary statistics of important socio-economic, credit rationing, credit 
transactions, and social preference variables for India and China are presented in 
Tables 6.12, 6.13, 6.14, 6.15, 6.16, 6.17, 6.18, and 6.19.  
 
 
  245
Table 6.12: Summary Statistics of Important Socio-Economic Variables (India) 
 
Variable (India)  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
sex (Female=1) 399 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
age 399 47.45 11.54 22.00 92.00 
Education(1-7) 399 3.54 1.60 1.00 7.00 
Education (1-4) 399 2.52 0.82 1.00 4.00 
Household size 399 6.58 3.30 1.00 30.00 
Years of Farming 399 24.05 11.82 2.50 70.00 
Farm Size (acre) 399 2.96 2.39 0.15 20.00 
Income source(farm=1) 399 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Household Income (Rs.) 399 45440.85 37579.16 2400.00 300000.0 
Percent Farm income 399 57.40 25.86 3.00 100.00 
Household Asset Value (Rs.) 399 384313.30 359938.90 16000.00 2700000.0 
Per cap income (Rs.) 399 7362.76 5326.65 600.00 50000.0 
Per cap asset (Rs.) 399 64736.43 67422.58 1818.18 833333.3 
Log income 399 10.51 0.63 7.78 12.61 
Log asset 399 12.55 0.79 9.68 14.81 
Log per cap income 399 8.72 0.60 6.40 10.82 
Log per cap asset 399 10.76 0.80 7.51 13.63 
Sickness in family(1=yes) 399 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Income std. dev. 399 22299.04 44330.17 402.66 358209.1 
Income coeff. of variation 388 0.39 0.16 0.09 0.95 
Absolute risk aversion(*10-4) 399 0.11 0.17 0.00 2.00 
Relative risk aversion coeff 399 2.05 1.48 0.00 4.00 
Risk prone (1=yes) 399 0.98 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Income difference 399 0.00 36194.45 -255900.00 47150.0 
Risk prone: The family has suffered crop or cattle loss, major sickness, death in 1 
year. 
 
Table 6.13: Summary Statistics of Important Credit Rationing Variables (India) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Denied formal loan 399 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Denied because of lack of collateral 399 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Interest rate unaffordable (highrate1) 399 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Likely to borrow more if interest rate is reduced (highrate2) 399 0.97 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Credit constrained (Creditconstr1) 399 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Credit constrained (Creditconstr11) 399 0.86 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Predicted value of credit constrained (Pcreditconst) 384 0.65 0.27 0.02 1.00 
Creditconstr1 : Denied loan + could not borrow desired amount of loan for education, 
health, consumption, farming and business purposes; from formal sources. 
Creditconstr11: Creditconstr1 +Never got desired amount of loan . 
Pcreditconst: Predicted value of credit constraint, obtained from regressing 
Creditconstr1 on a set of explanatory variables such as age, education, asset, 
preferences for formal loans etc. 
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Table 6.14: Summary Statistics of Important Credit Transaction Variables (India) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Whether any Debt Outstanding 399 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Amount of Debt (Rs.) 336 15659.08 21430.80 0.00 200000.0 
Formal Loan Percent 325 48.40 44.80 0.00 100.00 
Informal Loan Percent 325 36.25 42.44 0.00 100.00 
Informal loan Amount (Rs.) 325 4015.19 8477.11 0.00 84000.0 
Formal Loan Amount (Rs.) 325 10382.46 18877.72 0.00 200000.0 
Propensity of Formal Loan 325 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Propensity of Informal Loan 325 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Informal formal loan ratio 325 0.11 0.23 0.00 1.62 
Loan for production 389 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Loan for risk management 390 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Default on informal loan 399 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Delay on informal loan 399 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Default on formal loan 399 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Delay on formal loan 399 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Delay or default on formal loan 399 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Delay or default on informal loan 399 0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Prefer not to default on informal loan 399 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Prefer informal loan 399 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Informal loans are convenient 399 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Community Pressure Reduces Default 399 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 
 
 
Table 6.15: Summary Statistics of Important Social Preference Variables (India) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Risk share using gifts or loans 399 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Trusts that informal loan will be rapid (trust1) 399 0.79 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Will lend even does not trust that loan will be repaid(trust2) 399 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Will lend or borrow even they have refused earlier (alt1) 399 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Stronger version (and conditions) of (alt1) 399 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Strong guilty feeling on defaulting  informal loan 399 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Strong guilty feeling on defaulting  formal loan 399 0.32 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Mutual min Reciprocity 399 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Mutual max Reciprocity 398 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Mutual max and Mutual Min Reciprocity 399 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
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Table 6.16: Summary Statistics of Important Socio-Economic Variables (China) 
 
Variable (India)  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
sex (Female=1) 741 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Age 738 2.94 0.97 1.00 4.00 
Education(1-7) 739 3.36 1.52 1.00 7.00 
Education (1-4) 739 1.40 0.77 1.00 4.00 
Household size 1540 4.39 1.54 0.00 21.00 
Years of Farming 1538 27.35 13.14 0.00 70.00 
Farm Size (mu) 1540 5.39 3.29 0.30 25.00 
Income source(farm=1) 1540 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Household Income (RMB) 1522 10559.52 8090.53 0.00 50000.0 
Percent Farm income 1535 46.80 33.86 0.00 100.00 
Household Asset Value (RMB) 1416 51112.29 44605.24 1000.00 500000.0 
Per cap income (RMB) 1536 2707.55 2742.77 0.00 40000.0 
Per cap asset (RMB) 1413 12625.41 11702.82 250.00 100000.0 
Log income 1537 9.01 0.84 5.52 12.21 
Log asset 1416 10.48 0.93 6.91 13.12 
Log per cap income 1534 7.59 0.80 3.96 10.60 
Log per cap asset 1413 9.06 0.93 5.52 11.51 
Sickness in family(1=yes) 1540 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Income std. dev. 1540 6625.39 74472.76 0.00 2323063.00 
Income coeff. of variation 1469 0.31 0.16 0.00 0.99 
Absolute risk aversion(*10-4) 1136 1.51 2.89 0.00 40.00 
Relative risk aversion coeff 1136 2.77 1.52 0.00 4.00 
Risk prone (1=yes) 741 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Income difference 1522 0.00 7242.38 -38879.07 14847.46 
Risk prone: The family has suffered crop or cattle loss , major sickness, death in 1 
year. 
 
Table 6.17: Summary Statistics of Important Credit Rationing Variables (China) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Denied formal loan 1530 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Denied because of lack of collateral 521 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Interest rate unaffordable (highrate1) 674 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Likely to borrow more if interest rate is reduced (highrate2) 674 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Credit constrained (Creditconstr1) 1540 0.36 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Credit constrained (Creditconstr11) 1539 0.57 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Predicted value of credit constrained (Pcreditconst) 660 0.57 0.13 0.20 0.83 
Creditconstr1 : Denied loan + could not borrow desired amount of loan for education, 
health, consumption, farming and business purposes; from formal sources 
Creditconstr11: Creditconstr1 +Never got desired amount of loan  
Pcreditconst: Predicted value of credit constraint, obtained from regressing 
Creditconstr1 on a bunch of explanatory variables such as age, education, asset, 
preferences for formal loans etc. 
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Table 6.18: Summary Statistics of Important Credit Variables (China) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Whether any Debt Outstanding 1536 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Amount of Debt (RMB) 1015 13165.81 26268.60 0.00 480000.0 
Formal Loan Percent 809 34.72 42.00 0.00 100.00 
Informal Loan Percent 809 63.92 42.30 0.00 100.00 
Informal loan Amount (RMB) 800 8231.40 12475.78 0.00 150000.0 
Formal Loan Amount (RMB) 800 7900.17 22005.97 0.00 398400.0 
Propensity of Formal Loan 809 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Propensity of Informal Loan 809 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Log informal loan 624 8.68 1.17 4.61 11.92 
Log formal loant 371 9.14 1.13 4.61 12.90 
Informal formal loan ratio 791 1.46 3.31 0.00 50.00 
Loan for production 1354 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Loan for risk management 1354 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Default on informal loan 1499 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Delay on informal loan 1499 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Default on formal loan 1485 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Delay on formal loan 1540 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Delay or default on formal loan 1501 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Delay or default on informal loan 1511 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Prefer not to default on informal loan 739 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Prefer informal loan 674 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Informal loans are convenient 739 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Community Pressure Reduces Default 741 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 
 
Table 6.19: Summary Statistics of Important Social Preference Variables (China) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Risk share using gifts or loans 741 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Trusts that informal loan will be rapid (trust1) 1535 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Will lend even does not trust that loan will be repaid(trust2) 1538 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Will lend or borrow even they have refused earlier (alt1) 740 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Stronger version (and conditions) of (alt1) 740 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Strong guilty feeling on defaulting  informal loan 1540 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Strong guilty feeling on defaulting  formal loan 1540 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Mutual min Reciprocity 741 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Mutual max Reciprocity 741 0.73 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Mutual max and Mutual Min Reciprocity 1540 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
 
The estimation results of equation (6.18) are reported in Table 6.20.  The estimation 
models for both the countries are quite significant, as Wald Chi square statistics are 
significantly high.  
  249
Also the variation of propensity of formal and informal loan with income is shown in 
Figure 6.4, for India, which shows that the propensity to choose formal loan increases 
with income and the propensity to choose informal loan decreases with income. In the 
case of China, this nature of association is not found to be significant. 
 
Table 6.20: Multivariate Probit Estimation of Formal and Informal Loans 
 
 India China 
 Coef. Z Coef. Z Coef. z Coef. Z 
 Formal (yes=1) Informal 
(yes=1) 
Formal (yes=1) Informal 
(yes=1) 
Sex (1=female)     -0.24 -0.9 0.40 1.38 
Age 0.057 1.15 .02 0.46 -0.01 -0.03 0.07 0.16 
Age sq 0.000 -0.8 .000 -0.57 -0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.05 
Percent Farm income 0.01* 1.7 -.001 -0.22 0.00 -0.89 0.00 -1.73 
Household size 0.09* 2.88 -.07* -2.41 0.01 0.22 -0.06 -1.05 
Education 0.36* 2.86 -.163 -1.52 0.10 1 -0.01 -0.09 
Log asset 0.043 0.25 -.091 -0.57 0.45* 3.45 -0.20* -1.83 
Log income 0.48* 2.64 -.33* -2.17 -0.19 -1.48 -0.03 -0.26 
Prefer  informal loan -0.84* -4.25 .17 1.09 -0.75* -3.89 0.41* 2.73 
Loan Production 1.17* 3.47 -.79* 2.67 -0.11 0.44 -0.93* 3.03 
Loan Risk 0.43 1.17 -.005 0.02 -0.62* 2.11 -.31 0.93 
region6 -0.282 -0.82 .084 0.27 -0.55* -3.05 0.64* 3.83 
region8 0.65* 2.08 -.05 -0.19     
region9 -0.94* -3.47 .076 0.32     
Denied  loan for 
collateral 
-.24 1.1 .52* 2.71 -0.12 -1.11 0.15 0.85 
Constant -9.84* -3.51 5.66* 2.33 -1.29 -0.7 2.15 1.27 
Rho -.77* 11.2   -.79* 11.2   
India : N =  314 ; Wald chi2(28) = 123.32;  Prob > chi2 =  0.00;  
China: N = 356; Wald chi2 (26) = 75.75; Prob > chi2    = 0.00 ;  
 
Important findings from this estimation are discussed as following:  
1. In the case of India families with higher income tend to prefer formal loan. 
However in the case of China the coefficient on the income is not significant and 
families with higher asset tend to prefer formal loan over informal loans. This is as 
per conjecture as families with higher income or asset are more capable of posting 
collateral and hence formal loan is accessible to them. 
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2. Also more education is associated with higher propensity of formal loan and lower 
propensity for informal loan (coefficient not significant in the case of China) – 
again formal loans may be more accessible for families with more education. 
3. In the case of India higher percentage of farm income is associated with higher 
propensity of formal loan. The reason may be that formal loans are mostly used for 
capital investment in farm activities and also for agriculture input requirements. 
4. Family size is positively associated with higher propensity of formal loan. The 
bigger families may be able to post more collateral and also they may need more 
loan. 
5. Other demographic variables, age and sex are not found to be significant 
explanatory variable for preferring formal or informal loan. 
6. Formal loans seem to be motivated by production purposes (agriculture inputs, 
capital investments, house construction etc.) and informal loans seem to be 
motivated by risk management purposes (health, funeral, consumption etc.). 
Figure 6.4: Variation of Propensity of Formal and Informal Loan with Income: India 
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7. Propensity for informal loans is apparently higher for the families who have been 
denied formal loan for want of collateral. 
8. The correlation coefficient (ρ) is negative and significant for both the countries– 
which validates our hypothesis that the two decisions are significantly correlated. 
Overall it is inferred that – (i) informal loans are preferred by families having less 
assets and income, (ii) Informal loans are preferred by families who have been denied 
formal credit more often for lack of collateral, (iii) informal loans are of comparatively 
smaller size, (iv) more informal loans are taken by families who prefer taking loans 
from friends and relatives, and (v) informal loans are more often used for risk 
management purposes.  
Next, risk sharing motive of informal loan transactions will be explored 
econometrically. 
 
6.4.2 Econometric Model of Risk Sharing and Identification Strategy 
Important elements of  risk sharing are guided by the program (6.5) and the  equations 
(6.7, 6.9, and 6.12) and the minimum repayment equation; which solve for the  values 
of  default rate, loan amount, and additional repayment amount, and minimum 
repayment amount (θs,B,C1,and R) in equilibrium. Hence ideally the data on loan 
transactions among friends and relatives after some shocks are needed to test for the 
risk sharing. Also observations on repayment and default are needed. However such 
requirements are quite stringent and collecting such data is greatly time consuming   
and arduous.  Hence to overcome this complexity, we simply estimate linear 
estimation model variant of equations 6.9. Equation (6.9) gives expression for optimal 
loan amount, which is a function of several variables, such as, income level of self, 
partner’s income level, default rates, minimum repayment amount and other constraint 
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coefficients. Equation 6.11 (equation 6. 9 with particular assumption on preferences) 
is reproduced below.   
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quation (6.11) can be used to form an estimation equation as following 
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Hence taking log on both sides, we get 
log (B) = log (y2 – e1y1) – log(1+e1) ; where e1 = ν2(2-β2)                      …(6.19) 
The constraint coefficient ν2 is a function of minimum repayment R, additional 
repayment C1, default level θ, income endowments etc. as discussed earlier. 
Further equation 6.19 can be simplified into estimation equation as following 
 
          .  variablesseveralby   explained is  itselfloan    informalon  default   As
...(6.20)                    1)loan informalon  (defaulted :             Z default         and
Xdefault  (asset) log )difference log(income  )loan  Informallog(

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

 
Where income difference = Average Village Income – Family Income 
And X is a set of other control variables such as, age, education, risk perception, 
preference for lending and borrowing from friends and relatives. Z is a set of 
explanatory variable that explain default probability, such as income, savings, guilty 
feelings, community pressure, preference for not defaulting on such loans etc.  
The identification strategy used here is that, lower the income of a family from the 
average village income is, more the informal borrowing will be done by that family for 
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the risk management. This is the best approximation devised here in absence of data 
on partner’s income with him a particular household is doing financial transactions.  
Our conjecture is that the informal loan will increase with increasing income 
difference,  β > 0 is hypothesized to give evidence for risk sharing opportunities. A 
graphical depiction of this has been shown in Figure 6.5. Also the size of informal 
loan is conjectured to decrease with increasing default rate.  
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6.4.2.1 Estimation of the Model 
The default propensity in the first equation is a variable which is practically influenced 
by several variables such as income, saving, risk perceptions, guilty feelings, 
preference for not defaulting, risk shocks, illness, etc. Hence the assumption of 
exogeneity for this variable may not be appropriate. In such a situation the parameters 
estimated using OLS method may not be consistent and so not properly identified. To 
address the problem of endogeneity of an explanatory variable, instrumental variable 
method is usually used. Before discussing these matters, the OLS results of estimation 
of equation (6.20) are reported in Table 6.21.  In this regression our main interest lies 
Figure 6.5: Informal Loan vs.  Income Difference (Mean village income- family income) 
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in the coefficient of log of income difference variable, β. We reject (at 10% 
significance) the null hypothesis of β=0 in favor of β>0 only in the case of China.  
However, the coefficient of the variable, Delay or default on informal loan is 
significantly positive – which is against the conjecture.   
 
Table 6.21: OLS Results of Regression of Informal Loan Amount 
 
India China Dependent Variable : log informal 
Loan Amount Coef. T Coef. T 
Sex (1=Female)   0.145 0.39 
age 0.07 1.28 -0.634 -0.92 
Age sq 0.00 -1.38 0.118 0.93 
Household size -0.02 -0.65 -0.129 -1.41 
education -0.08 -0.57 -0.044 -0.27 
Percent farm income 0.00 0.46 -0.007 -1.49 
Log asset 0.21 1 -0.131 -0.68 
Risk share 0.13 0.65 0.239 1.01 
Trust 0.14 0.56 -0.732* -1.96 
Prefer  friend relative 0.07 0.31 0.474* 1.84 
Abs risk coefficient -1.49* -1.87 -0.273* -3.03 
Log income diff (β) 0.54 1.26 5.07 1.66 
Loan  production -1.17* -3.05 -0.817* -2.08 
Loan  risk management -0.21 -0.5 -0.001 0 
Financial Reserves -0.08 -0.69 -0.011 -0.12 
region6 0.66 1.51 0.953* 3.84 
region8 -0.41 -1.07   
region9 0.65* 1.88   
risk1 0.27 0.35 -0.228 -0.82 
Denied collateral 0.65* 2.56 0.204 0.73 
Delay or default on  informal Loan 1.65* 6.99 0.838* 3.68 
_cons -11.08 -1.54 -60.134 -1.56 
India : N = 323;  F( 21,   301) =  8.46 ;  Prob > F  = 0.00;    Adj R-squared = 0.32 
China: N = 276;  F (20,   255) = 8.37;     Prob > F = 0.00;          Adj R-squared = 0.35 
 
Consistent estimation of the coefficients requires that E(X’ε) =0. This assumption gets  
Substantially violated when – (i) any of the explanatory variables is affected by the 
explained variable because of simultaneity; and (ii) any of the explanatory variables is 
not strictly exogenous and is explained by other variables which may be correlated 
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with the error term. Here delay or default on informal loan variable arguably falls in 
the second category and hence the OLS estimations may not be consistent. Also the 
endogeneity test (Wu–hausman, and Durbin, Wu- Hausman tests) of “Delay or default 
on informal loan” has been reported there in Table 6.22. Evidently in the case of India 
the null hypothesis of exogeneity of this variable is rejected, hence instrumental 
variable method is appropriate here. However in the case of China the null hypothesis 
is accepted, so ordinary least square (OLS) parameters may be consistent here. 
Table 6.22: Endogeneity Test of “Delay or default on informal loan” 
 
India China Variable : Delay 
or Default on 
Informal Loan 
Loan 
Wu- Hausman 
Test  (p value) 
Durbin-Wu-
Hausman chi-
sq test 
Wu- Hausman 
Test  (p value) 
Durbin-Wu-
Hausman chi-sq 
test 
F / Chi-sq stat.  F(1,299)    
=7.75 
Chi-sq(1)  
=8.15 
F(1,251)=1.57 Chi-sq(1)   =1.69 
p value  0.005 0.004  0.21 0.19 
Note:  Inference : Null hypothesis of exogeneity of “Delay or default on informal 
loan” is rejected in the case of India  and not rejected in the case of China 
Hence the estimation model (6.20) consisting of two equations is estimated using 
Limited Information Maximum Likelihood Model (LIML), a variant of instrumental 
variable method39. In this method the estimation is done in two stages. In the first 
stage the endogenous explanatory variable “Delay or default on informal loan” is 
regressed on a set of exogenous variables which includes the excluded instruments 
(not used in the second stage regression). The excluded instruments used are – 
sickness, food scarcity, guilty feeling, prefer not to default, community pressure, and 
altruistic preferences. The results are reported in Table 6.23.  In the case of both the 
countries the exclusion criterion is nearly satisfied as p values are .07 and .06 for 
China and India respectively, and both the regressions are statistically significant. 
Even the instruments seem to be weak but to achieve consistency in the estimation of 
                                                 
39 Followed from Baum, C.F., et al (2007), and Greene (2006). 
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parameters, this is the best we can do here. Our main interest lies in the estimation of 
second stage equation. However it can be reasonably inferred that higher opportunity 
of risk share, higher productive usage of loan, lower sickness level, and guilty feelings 
for default are associated with lower propensity of delay or default on informal loans. 
 
Table 6.23: First Stage Results of Regression Model 6.20 (IV – LIML Method) 
 
India China Dependent variable 
Delay or default on informal loan Coef. T Coef. T 
Sex (1=Female)   0.032 0.31 
age 0.005 0.33 0.149 0.79 
Age sq 0.000 -0.61 -0.033 -0.97 
Household size -0.008 -0.84 -0.020 -0.81 
education 0.002 0.06 -0.021 -0.49 
Percent farm income -0.002 -1.14 0.001 0.64 
Log asset 0.080 1.47 -0.027 -0.51 
Log income 0.006 0.09 0.101 1.34 
Risk share -0.041 -0.79 -0.129* -1.95 
Prefer  friend relative 0.126* 2.06 0.108 1.48 
Abs risk coefficient 0.294 1.51 0.005 0.2 
Log income diff 0.300* 2.48 1.510 1.13 
Loan  production -0.202* -2.08 -0.159 -1.48 
Loan  risk management -0.044 -0.43 -0.017 -0.14 
Financial Reserves 0.016 0.57 -0.020 -0.75 
region6 -0.253* -2.02 0.040 0.54 
region8 0.232* 2.16   
region9 0.057 0.49   
Denied collateral 0.098 1.57 0.112 1.45 
Delay formal -0.145* -2.1 0.146* 2.14 
Sickness (1=yes) -0.043 -0.71 0.135* 1.85 
Food scarcity (1=yes) -0.013 -0.22 -0.006 -0.07 
Guilty  feeling(1=yes) -0.116 -1.67 -0.173* -2.68 
Altruistic Preferences -0.088 -1.52 -0.041 -0.66 
Prefer not to  Default 0.025 0.33 -0.151 -0.89 
Community pressure 0.132* 1.95 0.144* 1.92 
_cons -4.134* -1.96 -19.184 -1.11 
China: N= 272; F (29,   242) =     1.64; Prob > F      =   0.02; Centered R2   =   0.16;               
Uncentered R2 =   0.56; F (9,   242) =     1.80;   Prob > F      =   0.07 
India: N= 323;    F (30, 292) =3.42;   Prob> F=0.00;     Centered R2   =   0.26; 
Uncentered R2 =   0.75; F (9,292) =1.81; Prob>F =0.06; 
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In the second stage regression, the predicted values of “Delay or default on informal 
loan” are used as an explanatory variable. Here the dependent variable is log of 
informal loan amount.  The second stage estimation results are reported in Table 6.24.  
 
Table 6.24: Second Stage Results of Regression Models 6.20 (IV-LIML Method) 
 
India China Dependent variable 
Log informal loan Coef. Z Coef. Z 
Sex (Femal=1)   0.00 0 
Delay or default on informal loan -2.248 -1.448 0.74 0.79 
Age 0.085 1.164 -0.69 -1.01 
Age sq -0.001 -1.497 0.14 1.08 
Household size -0.037 -0.743 -0.14 -1.67 
Education -0.051 -0.287 -0.07 -0.46 
Percent farm income -0.008 -1.039 -0.006 -1.53 
Log asset 0.529* 1.822 -0.14 -0.77 
Risk share -0.042 -0.157 0.19 0.76 
Trust 0.044 0.140 -0.74* -1.95 
Prefer  friend relative 0.337 1.048 0.47* 1.85 
Abs risk coefficient -0.183 -0.170 -0.26* -3.08 
Log income diff : β 1.945* 2.971 5.71* 1.95 
Loan  production -1.461* -2.527 -0.90* -2.19 
Loan  risk manage -0.321 -0.596 -0.08 -0.19 
Financial Reserves 0.067 0.463 -0.01 -0.15 
region6 -0.715 -1.023 1.00* 4.18 
region8 0.419 0.813   
region9 -0.245 -0.537   
Denied collateral 1.089* 2.955 0.30 1.08 
Delay formal -2.308* -5.986 -0.70* -2.69 
_cons -31.503* -3.078 -67.81* -1.85 
China : N =  272; F( 21,   250) =   7.73;    Prob > F  =  0.00 ;Centered R2 = 0.42 ; 
Uncentered R2 =   0.9509  Sargan Statistic of over identification test of all 
instruments:   2.187;    Chi-sq(8) P-val =    0.97 
India: N=323; F (22,300) =5.05; Prob>F=0.00; Centered R square = -0.05;;       
Uncentered R square= 0.89;  Sargan Statistic of over identification test of all 
instruments: 5.52;    Chi-sq (8) P-val =    0.70 
 
The regressions for both the countries are statistically significant. Also Sargan’s 
statistics for test of over identification leads to acceptance of null hypothesis of 
validity of instruments.  In this regression our main interest lies in the coefficient of 
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log of income difference variable, β. Evidently for both the countries we reject the null 
hypothesis of  β=0 in favor of β>0 .  Also as per conjecture the coefficient of the 
variable “Delay or default on informal loan” is negative in the case of India, but not 
significant. In the case of China, it is positive but not significant.   
Essentially the significantly negative coefficient (β ) on the “log income difference” in 
the case of both the countries suggest that risk sharing motives significantly influence  
informal loans transactions in rural areas of developing countries.  Further, it can be 
reasonably inferred that higher preference of informal loan, lower productive usage of 
loan, lower values of collateral posting ability, are associated with higher informal 
loan amounts. 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
It has been emphasized that large numbers of families in rural areas of developing 
countries engage in informal lending and borrowings among friends and relatives, and 
informal debts constitute a large percentage of total loan portfolios of these people. 
Many of these families depend on such borrowing as they are credit rationed in the 
formal market and also many families prefer informal loans. It has been observed that 
in both the countries more than 70 percent and 90 percent families have engaged in 
gift and loan transactions respectively in emergencies. This demonstrates that people 
do share risk on a large scale and moreover preference for loan transaction dominates. 
Analysis of household survey data from India and China about informal loans reveal 
that– (i) these are preferred by families having less assets and income, (ii) these are 
preferred by families who have been denied formal credit more often for lack of 
collateral, (iii) these loans are of comparatively smaller size, (iv) these loans are often 
taken by families who prefer taking loans from friends and relatives, and (v) informal 
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loans are more often used for risk management purposes. These findings   have 
important policy implications.  
The main objective of this chapter is to analyze the significance and underlying 
motives of such informal financial transactions.  In the literature risk sharing motive 
has been advanced as an important explanation of this. Pursuing that line of research, a 
detail analytics of risk sharing motive for informal lending and borrowing among 
friends and relatives has been presented, and useful results are obtained. This line of 
reasoning explains it as a sub game perfect equilibrium outcome of repeated 
interactions among the households.   The primary contribution of this chapter is to 
characterize the loan amount, state contingent repayments, and default rates in 
equilibrium. Also a simple test is suggested to get inferences on risk sharing motives.    
These results are empirically tested using household survey data from China and India. 
To test for risk sharing ideally the data on loan transactions among friends and 
relatives after some shocks are needed. Also observations on repayment and default 
are needed. However, collecting such data is greatly time consuming   and arduous. To 
resolve this problem, a simple strategy is devised, that may identify risk sharing 
motive.  The identification strategy employed is that lower the income of a family 
from the average village income is more the informal borrowing will be done by that 
family for risk management. This is the best approximation achieved in the absence of 
availability of data on partner’s income with whom a particular household is doing 
financial transactions. For both the countries significant evidences are obtained related 
to risk sharing motives explaining informal lending and borrowing.  
However, for improved inferences on the risk sharing motives of informal loan 
transactions following suggestions are made: 
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1. For better inferences on risk sharing motives, data on loan transactions among 
friends and relatives after some non covariant shocks are needed. Also observations on 
repayment and default are needed.  
2. Also in a cross section data, we are not able to control for the unobserved 
heterogeneities of the households. The availability of panel data may resolve the 
omitted variable bias caused by this inadequacy. 
3. Well measured values of the coefficients of relative risk aversion and absolute risk 
aversion of the families (as suggested in the Chapter 5) may help us in understanding 
the nature of associations of risk aversion of the families and informal loan transaction 
among friends and relatives.  
Despite these limitations, this chapter provides helpful insights on risk sharing motives 
of informal lending and borrowing among close acquaintances   of the families living 
in rural areas of developing economies. 
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Chapter 7: The Economics of Informal Lending and Fairness 
Motive 
 
In the rural areas of developing countries informal lending and borrowing among 
friends and relatives are observed to be quite prevalent. Risk sharing motive has been 
advanced as an important explanation of such informal financial transactions. 
However, risk sharing motive does not include social preferences such as altruism, 
trust, reciprocity and fairness, which seem to be important for these financial 
transactions. The primary contribution of this chapter is to investigate the fairness 
reciprocity, in terms of fairness equilibrium framework (Rabin, 1993), as an important 
motive underlying the informal financial transactions among relatives and friends.  
Here outcomes are mutual –max when each person maximizes the other’s material 
payoffs and mutual-min when each person minimizes the other’s payoff. Analytical 
results are obtained to explain the informal borrowing and lending as a mutual-max 
fairness equilibrium outcome. Using household survey data from China and India and 
suitable econometric methods, the empirical findings suggest mixed evidences on 
fairness reciprocity as underlying motives for these informal financial transactions. A 
preference for mutual-max reciprocity is found to be positively associated with 
informal loan amount.  Significant evidences obtained for mutual-max reciprocities, 
suggest that fairness can be advanced as an important motive for explaining informal 
financial transactions. However mixed evidences are obtained for mutual-min 
reciprocity. In totality Rabin’s model of fairness and reciprocity when applied to 
explain the informal lending and borrowing is not perfect but this seems to be an 
excellent starting place to incorporate social preferences for explaining the informal 
lending and borrowing among relatives and friends.  This investigation supplements 
the existing knowledge in this field.   
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7.1. Introduction 
In the developing countries particularly in the rural areas people face severe 
challenges in arranging finance for consumption and production purposes. The 
standard assumptions of complete markets including that of credit and insurance 
markets generally do not hold well in reality. The price mechanism particularly in 
credit and insurance market is intrinsically limited by transaction costs and 
information and enforcement costs40.  Consequently fulfillment of effective demand 
of credit and insurance is not attained. In response to these imperfections, several 
institutional mechanism have developed in these areas such as, sharecropping 
(Cheung 1969, Stiglitz 1974 ), informal lending and insurance arrangements (Udry 
1994, Coate, S. and Ravallion, M. 1993, Eswaran and Kotwal 1989, Ligon, Thomas, 
and Worrall 2002) etc.  
The vigorous coexistence of formal and informal credit market in rural areas is well 
documented41. The commercial banks and rural cooperatives predominantly constitute 
formal credit institutions that usually mobilize savings and advance loans. They 
advance loans mainly for productive usages at low interest rates, but also they insist on 
collaterals, which poor families are often unable to post. In the informal credit 
markets, money is lent by private individuals – moneylenders, traders, landlords, 
friends, relatives etc. The loan contracts are quite diverse in nature. Moneylenders 
generally advance credits at high interest rates, the traders and landlords advance loans 
at low rate of interests in lieu of reciprocal services to be rendered to them, and friends 
and relatives advance credits at low interest rates as a mutual support and insurance 
arrangements.  
                                                 
40 See Hoff, Braverman, and Stiglitz (1993) for more on this. 
41 See Bell (1990) for a good reference. 
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The main objective of this chapter is to develop an analytical framework to investigate 
the underlying motives for such financial transactions among friends and relatives in 
the rural areas of developing countries, and also to empirically test some of the results 
obtained from this analysis. 
This study is important for following reasons:  
(i) The families in these areas mostly depend on agriculture and ancillary activities. 
The household survey data from China and India reveals that farm income constitutes 
about 48 and 57 percent of family income respectively in China and India. The 
coefficient of variation of farm income in these countries are usually high, it is 
estimated around 34 percent. This creates substantial uncertainties in their income. So 
insurance and credit becomes an important input for livelihood for most of the 
families. Families need credit for consumption, production, and other investment 
purposes. 
(ii) Further formal credit markets - banks and rural credit cooperatives (RCC) are not 
well developed in such areas. In these areas   informal borrowing constitutes a large 
portion of total borrowing. The Data reveals that informal borrowing constitutes about 
64 and 37 percent of total borrowing respectively in the case of China and India. 
(iii)So also the insurance markets are not well functional in these areas. For example, 
in the case of India 90 percent families show their willingness to buy crop insurance, 
whereas only 34 percent families have actually bought this, in the case of China these 
percentages are 75 and 18 respectively. In absence of well functioning insurance 
markets, the importance of credit is further enhanced (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1989).   
(iv) Also the data reveals that large percentages (50 percent) of the families actually 
prefer informal loans to formal loans. 
Household surveys were conducted in rural areas of China (in years 2007 and 2008) 
and India (in year 2008-09). About 1500 families in China and 400 families in India 
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were surveyed. The survey questionnaires are designed to elicit responses of families 
related to; (i) credit rationing problems which they face, (ii) how it affects their 
livelihood choices, (iii) how they respond to overcome this problem, and (iv) the 
extent, types and motives for financial transactions among friends and relatives.   
 The surveys data are used in this chapter to analyze the informal lending results.  
Some of the initial findings are mentioned here that considerably motivates this 
chapter.  
1. About 45 percent families in India and 30 percent families in China have been 
denied loan from RCC or banks, because of various reasons as summarized in Table 
7.1. Evidently lack of collateral seems to be major reason for denial of loan. 
Table 7.1: Reason for Denial of Loan from RCC or Bank 
  
Variable : Denied loan due to Mean: India (N=180) Mean : China (N=524) 
Lack of collateral (1=yes) .50 .65 
Yield risk in crop (1=yes) .1 .04 
Fail to replay past loan (1=yes) .32 .18 
Not  trustworthy (1=yes) .25 .45 
Low income (1=yes) .16 .49 
Further about same percentages of families in India and China told that they could not 
get needed amount of loan from these sources for various consumption and production 
purposes.  These facts demonstrate that large number of families in these economies 
face substantial credit rationing from formal sources.  
2. Table 7.2 summarizes the composition of loans of the families in these two 
countries. The loans obtained from banks and RCC belong to formal loan and the 
loans borrowed from friends and relatives belong to informal loan. Following facts are 
evident- (i) large percentage of the families depends on informal loans; (ii) informal 
loans constitute substantial part of total loan portfolios; and  (iii) families belonging to 
lower quintiles of assets depend more on informal loans. 
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3. Loans are taken not only for production purposes, but also to meet emergent needs 
such as, consumption, health, funeral expenses etc. In both the countries almost 25 
percent of the borrowings seem to be done for such purposes, as shown in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.2: Composition of Loan Portfolio of Families in India and China (percentages) 
 
 India China 
Quintile 
Assets 
Formal 
Loan 
Informal 
loan 
N Mean 
(Informal>0) 
Formal 
Loan 
Informal 
Loan 
N N 
(Informal>0 
1 32.82 35.5 72 .50 22.6 75.7 246 .84 
2 36.91 48.38 48 .66 33.3 66.0 104 .79 
3 46.29 44.66 67 .55 41.3 57.7 138 .73 
4 61.95 28.37 70 .32 38.8 60.1 128 .77 
5 63.22 26.2 57 .47 54.3 44.2 133 .66 
Total 48.40 36.29 314 .52 35.9 62.8 749 .77 
 
Table 7.3: Purpose of Borrowing by Families (percentages) 
 
 India China 
Quintile  
Assets 
Loan risk Loan 
production 
N Loan risk Loan 
production 
N 
1 35 59 97 31 59 406 
2 29 55 58 22 65 165 
3 17 75 79 20 70 249 
4 23 68 86 16 75 221 
5 07 84 71 12 80 217 
Total 23 68 391 22 68 1258 
Evidently in both the countries larger percentages of families in lower quintiles of 
assets have borrowed to meet the urgent needs. 
4. Limited access and availability of formal loans may compel the families to depend 
on informal borrowings.  Also the data reveals that large percentages (50 percent) of 
families actually prefer informal loans to formal loans. 
Informal financial transactions among close acquaintances (friends, and relatives) are 
usually characterized by (Udry, 1994; Fafchamps, 1999; Lund and Fafchamps, 2003):   
(i) no prescription of formal contracts; (ii) no explicit interest rates; (iii) state 
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contingent repayment of loans, (iv) role reversal of agents as borrowers and lenders; 
and  (vi) less importance of information asymmetry. 
Investigation of financial transaction among relatives and friends is an evolving field 
of study. In the literature, risk sharing and consumption smoothing motives are given 
as important explanations for such financial transactions. This line of reasoning has 
been investigated in detail in the previous chapter.  
So far the informal loan transactions have been explained as a device to resolve 
commitment problems in mutual risk sharing. It has been shown as a subgame perfect 
outcome of repeated interactions of risk averse and credit constrained households in 
quest of risk sharing and consumption smoothing. The analysis has been made in the 
standard economic framework in which material self interest is considered as the sole 
motivation of all economic transactions. However a growing body of evidence in 
literature suggests that people are also strongly motivated by social preferences such 
as altruism, trust, fairness, and reciprocity; which can not be ignored in social 
interactions42.  
The risk sharing motive does not take care of many social preferences such as 
altruism, trust, reciprocity and fairness.  Hence only risk sharing motive for informal 
loan transactions appears to be an incomplete explanation.  We need to look beyond 
the pecuniary aspects of such transactions. The primary contribution of this chapter is 
to explain these social preferences as the driving force for sustaining the informal 
financial transactions among relatives and friends, using fairness equilibrium 
framework proposed by Rabin (1993). Here outcomes are mutual –max when each 
person maximizes the other’s material payoffs and mutual-min when each person 
minimizes the other’s payoff. And hence if mutual-max equilibrium dominates the 
                                                 
42 For a good review see Fehr and Schimdt (2006) 
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mutual-min equilibrium, then fairness can be advanced as an important motive for 
explaining such informal financial transactions.  
The chapter is organized as following. Section 2 briefly presents a review on the 
importance of social preferences in economic transactions.  Section 3 uses fairness 
equilibrium (people like to help those who are helping them, and to hurt those who are 
hurting them) framework proposed by Rabin (1993) to come up with alternative 
explanation of such informal loan transactions.  A formal analysis of informal lending 
and borrowing among relatives and friends using the fairness equilibrium framework 
is presented and useful results are obtained in this section.  
Household survey data from China and India have been used to conduct empirical 
investigation into the significance of these results. The inferences and evidences are 
discussed in section 4.   Suitable econometric methods and appropriate identification 
strategies have been proposed to get evidences on the results related to fairness 
reciprocation (mutual-max and mutual-min) motives related to informal lending and 
borrowing.  Significance on preferences for mutual-max reciprocations is obtained in 
the estimation model of informal loan amounts. This finding suggests that mutual-max 
fairness can be advanced as an important motive for explaining informal financial 
transactions.   Section 5 concludes with important observations.  
 
7.2. Social Preferences and Economic Transactions 
Normally the economic analysis follows the dictum of self utility maximization, 
without caring for others material payoffs, behaviors or intentions – that allows 
parsimonious models with tractable solutions. This way of analysis predicts behavior 
well in many contexts particularly when markets are competitive and transaction costs 
are ignorable – such as experimental researches related to transactions in competitive 
markets (Smith and Williams, 1990), one sided auction with independent private 
  271
values (Cox and Oaxaca, 1996) etc. However when markets are incomplete or 
transaction costs are non-ignorable, this framework predicts poorly. Arrow (1974) 
described trust as a positive externality and observed that in presence of transaction 
costs trust influences almost every economic transaction. Further Bowles and Gintis 
(1993) observed that in incomplete markets transactions, outcomes depend on 
participants’ level of altruism, strategic behavior, sentiments, and other social and 
cultural preferences.  Experimental researches have  reported findings where the 
outcomes are at variance with the predictions1 - such examples include ultimatum 
games (Slonim and Roth, 1998), voluntary contribution to public goods game or free 
riders game (Fehr and Schimdt, 1999) and many variants of trust and investment 
games (Cox 2006, Cox 2004, and Cox et al. 2001).  
Such departures from pure self interests have stimulated models of social preferences. 
In literature the two approaches to incrporate social preferences are discussed below43.  
 
1. Outcome based approach in which people are concerned about payoffs of others. In 
this approach transaction are motivated to reduce differences in payoffs between 
oneself and others. The choices may be Pareto improving or Pareto damaging 
depending upon self’s reference point.  Important studies that underline such social 
preferences include; inequity aversion preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), equity, 
reciprocity and competition (ERC) preferences (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), 
altruistic preferences and quasi-maximin preferences (Andreoni and Miller, 2002).  
Quasi maximin preferences Combines the assumption that people are motivated to 
maximize the payoff to the minimum-payoff person with the desire to increase total 
payoffs yields. Such preferences do not induce Pareto damaging behavior.  
                                                 
43 Followed from   Charness and Rabin (2002).  
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2. Intentions based approach in which agent cares about the intentions behind the 
behaviors of others and reciprocates based on beliefs about whether the other player is 
treating her fairly. The beliefs are used as arguments in utility functions44. Hence this 
approach is different from normal game theories in which beliefs affect strategies 
which affects payoff indirectly. Here a person derives utility both from material payoff 
and from her belief that she is treated kind and moreover she is able to treat other 
kindly (unkindly) given that she is treated kindly (unkindly) . Rabin (1993) in his 
seminal paper proposes fairness equilibrium that demonstrates intentions based 
reciprocity for simple two-player normal form game.  Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
(2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) have extended Rabin (1993) model to explain 
behavior in sequential games.  
Before proceeding further, definitions of these social preferences are presented: 45   
Following from Andreoni and Miller (2002), Charness and Rabin (2002); Altruism is 
defined as a form of unconditional kindness.  A person is altruistic if the first partial 
derivative of u(x1, …xN) with respect to x1,…,xN is strictly positive, where x1,…,xN 
are allocations of individuals 1,..,N. The opposite of this is envy.  
A conditional form of altruism / envy is inequity aversion – Fehr and Schmidt (1999), 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002). An individual is inequity 
averse if, in addition to his material self-interest, his utility increases if the allocation 
becomes more equitable.   
 Positive reciprocity is a motivation to respond kindly if others have treated one 
kindly.   Negative reciprocity is a motivation to respond unkindly, even harming 
oneself; if other person’s intentional behavior was perceived to be harmful. Rabin 
(1993) using these social preference formalized fairness equilibrium. Reciprocity in 
                                                 
44 For theoretical formalization see, Geanakoplos, Pearce and Staccheti (1989). 
45 Followed from, Cox (2006), and Fehr, and Schimdt (2006), chapter 8 
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one shot interaction as defined above differs basically from cooperative or punitive 
behavior in repeated interactions which is motivated by future material gains.  Also 
type based reciprocity has been studied (Levine, 1998)-where type of person (not 
intentions) influences preferences.   
Trust is basically an agent’s belief about the behavior of other person. Trusting action 
creates the possibility of mutual benefit or risk of loss to the trustor depending on 
whether the other person cooperates or defects.  
Essentially in addition to the material resources, a person may also care about1: (i) the 
material resources allocated to others, (ii) the fairness of the behavior of agents, (iii) 
whether the agents have selfish, altruistic, or fair minded preferences. 
 
7.3. Informal Lending and Borrowing and Fairness Equilibrium 
The empirical evidence about informal loan transactions among friends and relatives 
has been reported earlier. The credit rationed families engage in such transactions to 
help each other in the time of need or also they prefer such transactions. Such choices 
may also be driven by above described social preferences.  As discussed earlier 
incorporation of these social preferences in analysis comes at a cost – the model is less 
parsimonious and solutions may not be clean. Important social preferences underlying 
such transactions may be trust and reciprocity and analysis of    trust or reciprocity 
requires introductions of belief   (also notion of perceived intentions) into theory. In 
this chapter, I am using the fairness equilibrium framework proposed by Rabin (1993) 
to incorporate trust and reciprocity to explain the informal loan transactions among 
friends and relatives. These informal loan transactions can be considered as an 
outcome of fairness game - simply implying that people like to reciprocate in a 
manner which either maximizes the aggregate payoff (being kind to each other – 
mutual-max) or minimizes the aggregate payoff (being hostile to each other – mutual-
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min).  Rabin (1993) showed that every mutual-max or mutual-min Nash equilibrium is 
fairness equilibrium.  
This framework has been used for its multiple appealing features: 
1. It realistically captures the essence of transactions. People generously help each 
other if each one expect other to be kind (close acquaintances), but if each one 
expect other to defect (distant neighbors) then they won’t be helping each other. 
The person with lower income in one period gets help from other person with 
higher income in that period has kind feeling for him and so reciprocates positively 
when the other person needs help.   
2. It precisely defines reciprocity and provides insights of behaviors and outcomes.  
3. It investigates motivations of hostile behaviors when the other agent takes unfair 
actions or display unfair intentions.  
4. It formalizes and demonstrates the existence of fairness equilibria.  
5. Most importantly this framework is analytically tractable to handle beliefs, and 
notions of reciprocity; needed to analyze the equilibrium outcomes.  
This framework has also some deficiencies:  
1. It provides distinctive insights when transactions are limited to smaller values.  
2. It lacks consistency, as monetary payoff ($) is added to the dimensionless kindness 
function [-1, 0.5] in the utility term. This becomes less important when the payoffs 
are high.  
3. It provides cardinal properties to utility function.  
4. Multiplicity of equilibria leads to poor prediction of outcome. 
However the informal loan transactions considered here are usually of small amounts, 
thus the social preferences reflected in kindness functions maintain their significance. 
Hence despite these shortcomings, the fairness equilibrium framework seems to be 
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most promising way to investigate the importance of trust and reciprocity motives 
underlying the informal loan transactions. 
 
7.3.1 Findings from Survey in India and China 
Before analytical framework of fairness motives for informal financial transactions is 
presented, the major findings from the surveys related to various aspects of informal 
financial transactions among friends or relatives are reported in Table 7.4. Evidently 
preferences for loan transactions are much higher than for gifts transactions in both 
countries. In emergency situations large numbers of families do give and receive gifts, 
although the loan transactions dominate. Also major fractions of families prefer loan 
transactions in both normal and emergency conditions. Large fractions of families also 
agree that community pressure helps in reducing defaults.  
Table 7.4: Important Aspects of Informal Financial Transactions 
 
Variable (note: mean value shows the fraction of 
respondents who agree to the question: 1=yes) 
Mean 
Value : 
India 
(N=400) 
Mean Value: 
China 
(N=739) 
Gift transactions among friends and relatives .67 .25 
Gift transactions(stronger version: both gave and received ) .36 .05 
Loan transactions among friends and relatives .97 .94 
Loan transactions(stronger version: both lent and borrowed) .60 .70 
Gift for emergency purposes .71 .59 
Loan for emergency purposes .96 .98 
Prefer loan for emergency purposes .88 .82 
Prefer loan for general  purposes .73 .84 
Prefer not to default on such loans .80 .93 
Community pressure helps in reducing default .76 .63 
Further important motivations for such financial transactions are reported in Table 7.5.  
Evidently large percentage of families prefer to borrow (lend) from friends and 
relatives. Substantial percentages of families find this convenient and also loan and 
interest repayment terms are found to be flexible. Considerable percentages of families 
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do such financial transactions as they trust that loans will be repaid. But also a good 
percentage of families agree to give loans even they do not trust that loan will be 
repaid and also a good percentage of families agree to borrow or lend even they have 
been refused earlier by their friend and relatives. Noteworthy findings are that 
substantially large percentages of families believe in mutual-max reciprocity which 
dominates the mutual-min reciprocity. 
 
Table 7.5: Important Motivations of Informal Financial Transactions 
  
Variable (note: mean value shows the fraction of 
respondents who agree to the question: 1=yes) 
Mean Value : 
India (N=400) 
Mean Value: 
China 
(N=739) 
Prefer to borrow from friends or relatives .50 .72 
Flexibility in loan repayment .87 .93 
Flexibility in interest amount  repayment .83 .76 
Borrowing from friends or  relatives convenient .89 .96 
Trust that loans given to friends or relatives will be 
repaid 
.79 .90 
Loans given even not trust that loan will be repaid .45 .63 
Agree to borrow or lend even they have refused earlier .27 .52 
Mutual-max reciprocity .64 .73 
Mutual-min reciprocity .51 .40 
These findings clearly convey the message that the social preferences such as altruism, 
trust, reciprocity and fairness play significant roles in explaining informal financial 
transactions among friends and relatives. 
 
7.3.2 Description of Important Elements of Fairness Equilibrium 
As laid out in section 4, let us consider, there are two households (agents) 1 and 2. In 
every period t they get stochastic income endowments denoted by  Tttty 01 and  
  Tttty 02  respectively with mean y1m  and y2m  and variance σ1 and σ2. The endowment 
process is assumed to be stationary. The families enter into an agreement to mutually 
lend and borrow an amount equal to xt. Starting in any period, the family which gets 
the lower income borrows from the household which gets higher income. The 
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borrowing household makes state contingent repayment in the next period and this 
process keep repeated over time. The history of mutual utility maximizing outcomes 
generates kind feelings and kind reciprocations (mutual-max) takes place. But if there 
is a history of deviation then it may generate hostile feelings and then hostile 
reciprocation (mutual -min) takes place.  
Rabin (1993, p.1282) used three stylized facts in his paper as mentioned here: (A) 
People are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to help those who are 
being kind. (B) People are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to punish 
those who are being unkind. (C) Both motivations (A) and (B) have a greater effect on 
behavior as the material cost of sacrificing becomes smaller.   
Further the equilibrium outcome is characterized as following: 
(i) Any Nash equilibrium that is either a mutual-max outcome or mutual-min outcome 
is also fairness equilibrium. 
(ii) If material payoffs are small, then roughly an outcome is a fairness equilibrium if 
and only of it is a mutual-max or a mutual-min outcome. 
(iii) If material payoffs are large, then roughly an outcome is a fairness equilibrium if 
and only of it is a Nash equilibrium. 
Further following concepts are explained to describe the fairness equilibrium outcome  
1.Strategies 2211  and SaSa  represent the strategies of two players. 
2211  and SbSb  represent, respectively player 2’s belief about the strategy chosen by 
player 1, and vice versa. 2211 c and SSc   represent player 1’s belief about what 
player 2 believes player 1’s strategy is, and vice versa. 
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2. Kindness Functions:  Player 1’s kindness to player 2 is expressed by 
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And player 1’s belief about kindness of player 2 is given by  
[-1,1/2] interval in the lie ),( and ),(f Also
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3. Utility Functions:   The payoffs in such a framework depend not only on players 
actions (conventional game theory) but also depend on player’s beliefs. The utility 
function which incorporates both her material utility and shared notion of fairness is 
defined as  
(7.3) ...                                    )],(1).[,(),(),,(
~
12 jiiijjjiiii bafcbfbacbaU    
 
Player i’s utility is moderately increased or decreased by her belief of kindness with 
player j treats her and then in response to that the way player i reacts. For example if 
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player 1 believes that player 2 is treating her badly - ),( 12
~
2 cbf  <0, then player 1 also 
reciprocates by choosing an action a1 such that f1(.,.) is low or negative. As kindness 
functions are bounded above and below, such construction of utility function reflects 
the stylized fact C: notion of fairness is significant for small material payoffs and as 
the material payoffs increases the reciprocation guided by fairness loses its 
significance.  
4. Definition of Fairness Equilibrium:  The pair of strategies ),(),( 2121 SSaa   is a 
fairness equilibrium if, for i =1, 2, j i     
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6. Fairness equilibrium and Nash equilibrium: Rabin (1993) has formalized several 
propositions related with the concept of fairness and Nash equilibrium. We mention 
here three of those. Proposition 1 says that, if (a1,a2)  is a Nash equilibrium, and either 
a mutual-max outcome or a mutual-min outcome, then (a1,a2) is a fairness equilibrium. 
Proposition 2 says that, every fairness equilibrium outcome is either strictly positive      
(fi >0) or weakly negative (fi <=0). Proposition 3 says that for any outcome (a1, a2) that 
is either a strictly positive mutual-max outcome or a strictly negative mutual-min 
outcome, there exists an ),(0,X allfor  such that, ,
__
XX  (a1, a2) is a fairness 
equilibrium in G(X). 
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7.3.3 Analysis of Loan Transactions Using Fairness Equilibrium 
Now the fairness equilibrium outcome in two period interactions between the 
households 1 and 2 is considered. Suppose in period 0 household 1 gets endowment 
y01 (y01< 
_
1y ) and household 2 gets endowment y02 (y02 > 
_
2y ). To smooth his 
consumption or to meet other needs the household 1 borrows from household 2 
amount x (assuming y02 > y01). Now in next period (period 1) assume that household 1 
gets better endowment y11 (y11>
_
1y ) so that she can repay the loan. It is further 
assumed that: ),;,( 21
1
1
1
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2
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2
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2
0 yyyyyyyy  - i.e. in date 0 household 2 gets better 
endowment and household 1 gets poorer endowment and in date 1 the situation 
reverses. Now the household has two choices of action: either repay (a=R) amount αx 
(α≥1) or default (a=D). We also assume that both households have a well behaved 
utility function say, log utility function. The payoff over two periods is written as: 
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Now let us analyze this model for mutual-min and mutual-max outcome. In  
conventional game theoretic analysis, in one shot, the situation is similar to a 
continuous strategy prisoner’s dilemma game – the household 1 chooses to default in 
period 1 (dominant strategy) and for a=D, household 2 maximizes her payoff by 
setting x=0.  So (a=D, x=0) is a dominant strategy Nash equilibrium. And if we 
characterize this outcome in the fairness setup then, the lender believes that borrower 
is intentionally cheating in the next period and so in the first period he feels hostile 
and intentionally does not lend, even this may hurt him later. In this equilibrium both 
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players feel hostile to each other and so the kindness functions (f1( ), and f2( ) ) assume 
value of -1, that leads to the payoff functions as that in conventional game theory and 
the  mutual-min outcome is realized. Then using proposition 1, it is characterized as 
mutual-min fairness equilibrium. These findings are reported in Result 7.1. 
Result 7.1: Using conventional game theoretic framework, in one shot game of 
borrowing/lending and repayment the Nash equilibrium is (a=D, x=0), which is a 
mutual-min outcome and so also a mutual-min fairness equilibrium.  
Now the possibility of mutual-max outcome in this one shot game is considered, 
which will yield positive fairness equilibrium. For that the kindness functions are 
evaluated 
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Equation (7.7) is both necessary and sufficient condition for maximization, subject to 
constraint that the borrower repays the amount in the next period.  
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These values are quite reasonable. Intuitively the kindness value, demonstrated by the 
borrower (by not defaulting) and perceived by the lender, encourages him to lend. 
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Similarly the kindness value, demonstrated by the lender (by lending) and perceived 
by the borrower, encourages him not to default. Hence when both the borrower and 
lender have kind feelings for each other, maximum lending takes place. 
Now getting explicit expression for x* using equation (7.7) appears cumbersome. But 
we can characterize the solution, which throws useful insights.  The values of 
parameters are such that, α ≥ 1, β <1, and   is a monotonically decreasing function of 
ratio 10
2
0 / yy (when 
1
0
2
0 / yy  =1, γ =∞, 1020 / yy =2, γ =1.23, 1020 / yy =3, γ =0.72 and so on).  
Let us consider the extreme case of γ =0 (i.e. 1020 / yy  = very large) – then 
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Further the left hand side (L.H.S.) of equation (7.7) is a monotonically decreasing 
function of x, at x=0, L.H.S. = 1
0
2
1 yy
   and as x increases upto xmax (xmax 
= 2/)( 10
2
0 yy  ) it decreases continuously and monotonically; and the right hand side 
(R.H.S.) is a monotonically increasing function of x. At x=0, R.H.S.= 1
1
2
0
1
yy
  and 
as x increases till xmax, it increases continuously and monotonically. The L.H.S. sums 
up value of marginal utility gained from receiving loan (by agent 1) and from getting 
repayments –by agent 2. The R.H.S. sums up value of marginal utilities lost from 
giving loan (by agent 2) and from making repayments – by agent 1. Now with our 
assumptions on endowments and parameters we can reasonably have 
( 1
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  > 1
1
2
0
1
yy
 ) and hence the R.H.S. curve and L.H.S. curve will intersect at a 
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positive value of x* and so the solution exists such that [*x 0, xmax]. This is shown in 
figure 7.1. 
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So, this simplification (symmetric case) tells that the informal loan transaction under 
the framework of fairness equilibrium works well if the ratio of endowments of agents 
x* x 
L.H.S 
and 
R.H.S. 
Values 
L.H.S. of 
Equtaion 
(7.7) 
R.H.S.of 
Equtaion 
(7.7) 
xmax 
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Figure 7.1: Fairness Equilibrium in One Shot Borrowing- Lending Game 
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in good and bad time is bounded between 1 and 2.30. This result is driven by the 
reasoning that their will be increasing temptation to default with larger sums of money 
in one shot game. Hence too much income differences may not sustain the informal 
loan transaction process.  
This is illustrated by a simple example as following. 
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In Figure 7.2  the values of left hand side (L.H.S.) and right hand side (R.H.S.) of 
equation (7.11) is plotted against x and evidently x* = 250 is obtained. 
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The value of x*=250, for a high patience factor β =.90, matches with xoptimum =250 
associated with complete consumption smoothing.  
Figure 7.2: Value of Loan Amount in Mutual-max Equilibrium 
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 Also the comparative statics of x* with respect to γ (implicitly with respect to 2
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In the above computation,  y20 =1000 is  fixed and y10 is allowed to vary with γ. 
Evidently x* is found to be decreasing with higher values of γ.  The above finding is 
also quite intuitive: as γ increases, 1
0
2
0
y
y  decreases and so the lending and borrowing 
level in equilibrium decreases. These findings are presented in Result 7.2. 
Result 7.2: In the fairness equilibrium framework, with reasonable assumptions on 
endowments of the agents in the two periods, the lending and borrowing sustains in 
even one shot game. Strictly positive mutual-max outcome (a=R, x=x*>0) is obtained 
as a fairness equilibrium (not possible in conventional game theory without a 
punishment clause). In this mutual-max outcome both households have kind feelings 
Figure 7.3: Variation of mutual-max Loan Amount with factor γ 
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for each other. Moreover the mutual-max fairness equilibrium works well if the ratio 
of endowments of agents in good and bad time is bounded between 1 and 2.30.  
Further if 2
1
2
0
y
y = 1
0
2
0
y
y 2, then the lending/borrowing amount (x*) is quite close to that 
of perfect consumption smoothing level. Further x* tends to increase with the ratio 
1
0
2
0
y
y in its neighborhood. Evidently the mutual-max fairness equilibrium (a=R, x*=250) 
Pareto dominates the mutual-min fairness equilibrium (a=D, x*=0). 
Hence when the endowment differences between the households and across periods is 
bounded (say the upper ratio =2.3), then motivated by the feeling of helping each other 
(may be an outcome of good trust building exercise), lending/ borrowing and 
repayment process sustains on its own without any punishment mechanism. Hence 
trust and benevolent feelings may be an important driving force of informal loan 
transactions among family members and friends. 
 
7.4. Empirical Analysis on Fairness Motive and Informal Lending and Borrowing 
As discussed earlier risk sharing motive may not in itself be complete explanation for 
the informal financial transactions. People are also strongly motivated by social 
preferences such as altruism, trust, fairness, and reciprocity; which can not be ignored 
in social interactions. In this subsection significance of these social preferences will be 
investigated empirically, particularly in contexts of the results 7.1 and 7.2.  
Result 7.1 asserts that in one shot game of borrowing/lending and repayment the Nash 
equilibrium is (a=D: default, x=0: no lending), which is a mutual-min fairness 
equilibrium. Here both participants feel hostile to each other.  Result 7.2 asserts other 
way that the lending and borrowing sustains even in one shot game; strictly positive 
mutual-max outcome (a=R: repayment, x=x*>0: positive lending) is obtained as a 
mutual-max fairness equilibrium. In this mutual-max outcome both households have 
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kind feelings for each other. Moreover the mutual-max fairness equilibrium works 
well if the ratio of endowments of agents is bounded between 1 and 2.30, as too much 
income differences may prompt bigger default with larger sums of money in one shot 
game.  Further x* tends to increase with the income ratio of lender and borrower.  
In the survey conducted in India and China, specific questions were asked to families 
that would reveal whether the families have preferences for mutual-max or mutual-
min social interactions. The mean values of mutual-max and mutual-min across the 
quintiles of assets for both counties are reported in Table 7.6. Overall about 75 percent 
families in China (65 percent in the case of India) demonstrate preferences for mutual-
max reciprocation, whereas these percentages for mutual-min reciprocation are about 
40 percent and 50 percent for China and India respectively. These findings suggest 
that mutual-max equilibrium is more likely to evolve in the fairness equilibrium 
context and it may be an important explanation of risk sharing behaviors. 
Table 7.6: Percentages of Families Prefer to behave as Mutual-max and Mutual min 
 
India China Asset 
quintile mutual-max mutual min N mutual-max mutual min N 
1 .71 .62 101 .77 .47 165 
2 .58 .43 60 .68 .44 88 
3 .59 .49 79 .73 .41 162 
4 .54 .41 88 .65 .32 152 
5 .75 .57 72 .77 .35 176 
Total .64 .51 400 .73 .40 743 
    
The preferences for mutual-max and mutual-min reciprocations are not mutually 
exclusive.  As reported in Table 7.7, many families reveal preferences for both type of 
reciprocations and also good number of families show preferences for neither of these. 
In fact in both the countries only about 8 percent of the respondents prefer to 
exclusively behave as mutual min, and about 40 percent respondents in China and 20 
percent respondents in India prefer to exclusively behave as mutual-max. This finding 
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is not in contradictions with the stylized facts A, B, and C of Rabin (1993).  It appears 
that preference for mutual-max dominates the preference for mutual-min behavior. 
 
Table7.7: Categorization of Families along mutual-max and mutual-min (percentages) 
 
mutual-min (China) mutual-min (India) mutual-max 
0 1 Total 0 1 Total 
0 (0,0)19.44 (0,1)8.07 27.51  (208) 28.75 7.25 36.00 (144) 
1 (1,0)40.61 (1,1)31.9 72.49  (508) 20.00 44.00 64.00 (256) 
Total 60.1(454) 39.9(302) 100.0 (756) 48.75 51.25 100 (400) 
 
7.4.1 Econometric Model and Identifications Strategies of Fairness Reciprocities 
The previous paragraphs show preliminary evidence on domination of mutual-max 
preferences that may explain the significance of social preferences in informal 
borrowing and lending. Here the same will be investigated econometrically. Equation 
(7.9) predicts that maximum informal lending in mutual-max case will be, xmax = 
.85y11 (y11 = income of borrower in good period); Table 7.8 reports the mean and 
maximum of ratio of informal debt and income. Ignoring few outliers, the mean value 
of these ratios are .12 and .81 respectively for India and China and maximum values 
are respectively .80 and 4.8. The high value of maximum value of ratio obtained for 
China, may be because of some of incomes reported by the families may be low 
belonging to bad periods. Overall the prediction matches satisfactorily with the data. 
Table 7.8: Average and Maximum Values of Ratio of Informal Debt and Income 
 
 India (N=183) China (N=340) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Informal debt:1 4221.12 8047.32 0 50000 6349.74 9350.59 0 81600 
Income:  2 36854.27 19553.16 2400 92000 11052.60 7497.24 250 50000 
Ratio (1/2) 0.12 0.23 0 0.8 0.81 1.22 0 4.8 
Before discussing the empirical evidence on nature of associations of mutual-max and 
mutual-min reciprocations with informal borrowing outcomes, first the empirics of 
mutual-max and mutual-min will be investigated.  
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7.4.1.1 Empirics of mutual-max and mutual-min fairness 
The preferences for mutual-max and mutual-min reciprocations are guided by 
kindness functions specified by equations (7.6). In that equation important variables 
are incomes of the borrower and lender, discount factor, repayment rates etc.  Here 
agnostic of any particular functional form, we simply investigate the nature of 
association of important explanatory variables with mutual-max and mutual-min 
reciprocations, using following estimation models. 
Each of these reciprocations can be estimated using following equations. 
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7.4.1.2 Identification Strategy and Estimation of the Model 
The two types of reciprocations by a household are realistically interrelated; so the 
correlations of these equations’ disturbances may be significant. Hence the estimation 
of the parameters may be consistent but not efficient if the two equations are estimated 
independently.  Hence the parameters are estimated using the multivariate probit 
model. Important explanatory variables are family asset, income, education, family 
size, age, preference for informal loan, trusting behavior, guilty feeling, etc. These 
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variables are satisfactorily exogenous in this framework.  The model is described as 
following.  
...(7.16)                                                                   
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The summary statistics of important socio-economic, credit rationing, credit 
transactions, and social preference variables for India and China are presented in 
Tables 7.9, 7.10, 7.11, 7.12, 7.13, 7.14, 7.15, and 7.16.  
 
Table 7.9: Summary Statistics of Important Socio-Economic Variables (India) 
 
Variable (India) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
sex (Female=1) 399 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
age 399 47.45 11.54 22.00 92.00 
Education(1-7) 399 3.54 1.60 1.00 7.00 
Education (1-4) 399 2.52 0.82 1.00 4.00 
Household size 399 6.58 3.30 1.00 30.00 
Years of Farming 399 24.05 11.82 2.50 70.00 
Farm Size (acre) 399 2.96 2.39 0.15 20.00 
Income source(farm=1) 399 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Household Income (Rs.) 399 45440.85 37579.16 2400.00 300000.0 
Percent Farm income 399 57.40 25.86 3.00 100.00 
Household Asset Value (Rs.) 399 384313.30 359938.90 16000.00 2700000.0 
Per cap income (Rs.) 399 7362.76 5326.65 600.00 50000.00 
Per cap asset (Rs.) 399 64736.43 67422.58 1818.18 833333.3 
Log income 399 10.51 0.63 7.78 12.61 
Log asset 399 12.55 0.79 9.68 14.81 
Log per cap income 399 8.72 0.60 6.40 10.82 
Log per cap asset 399 10.76 0.80 7.51 13.63 
Sickness in family(1=yes) 399 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Income std. dev. 399 22299.04 44330.17 402.66 358209.10 
Income coeff. of variation 388 0.39 0.16 0.09 0.95 
Absolute risk aversion(*10-4) 399 0.11 0.17 0.00 2.00 
Relative risk aversion coeff 399 2.05 1.48 0.00 4.00 
Risk prone (1=yes) 399 0.98 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Income difference 399 0.00 36194.45 -255900.00 47150.00 
Risk prone: The family has suffered crop or cattle loss, major sickness, death in 1 
year. 
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Table 7.10: Summary Statistics of Important Credit Rationing Variables (India) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Denied formal loan 399 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Denied because of lack of collateral 399 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Interest rate unaffordable (highrate1) 399 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Likely to borrow more if interest rate is reduced (highrate2) 399 0.97 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Credit constrained (Creditconstr1) 399 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Credit constrained (Creditconstr11) 399 0.86 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Predicted value of credit constrained (Pcreditconst) 384 0.65 0.27 0.02 1.00 
Creditconstr1 : Denied loan + could not borrow desired amount of loan for education, 
health, consumption, farming and business purposes; from formal sources 
Creditconstr11: Denied loan +Never got desired amount of loan + could not borrow 
desired amount of loan for education, health, consumption, farming and business 
purposes 
Pcreditconst: Predicted value of credit constraint, obtained from regressing 
Creditconstr1 on a bunch of explanatory variables such as age, education, asset, 
preferences for formal loans etc. 
 
Table 7.11: Summary Statistics of Important Credit Transaction Variables (India) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Whether any Debt Outstanding 399 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Amount of Debt (Rs.) 336 15659.08 21430.80 0.00 200000.0 
Formal Loan Percent 325 48.40 44.80 0.00 100.00 
Informal Loan Percent 325 36.25 42.44 0.00 100.00 
Informal loan Amount (Rs.) 325 4015.19 8477.11 0.00 84000.0 
Formal Loan Amount (Rs.) 325 10382.46 18877.72 0.00 200000.0 
Propensity of Formal Loan 325 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Propensity of Informal Loan 325 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Log informal loan 170 8.22 1.30 4.32 11.34 
Log formal loan 193 9.30 1.09 4.32 12.21 
Informal formal loan ratio 325 0.11 0.23 0.00 1.62 
Loan for production 389 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Loan for risk management 390 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Default on informal loan 399 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Delay on informal loan 399 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Default on formal loan 399 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Delay on formal loan 399 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Delay or default on formal loan 399 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Delay or default on informal loan 399 0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Prefer not to default on informal loan 399 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Prefer informal loan 399 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Informal loans are convenient 399 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Community Pressure Reduces Default 399 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 
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Table 7.12: Summary Statistics of Important Social Preference Variables (India) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Risk share using gifts or loans 399 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Trusts that informal loan will be rapid (trust1) 399 0.79 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Will lend even does not trust that loan will be repaid(trust2) 399 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Will lend or borrow even they have refused earlier (alt1) 399 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Stronger version (and conditions) of (alt1) 399 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Strong guilty feeling on defaulting  informal loan 399 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Strong guilty feeling on defaulting  formal loan 399 0.32 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Mutual-min Reciprocity 399 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Mutual max Reciprocity 398 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Mutual max and Mutual-min Reciprocity 399 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 
Table 7.13: Summary Statistics of Important Socio-Economic Variables (China) 
 
Variable (India) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sex (Female=1) 741 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Age 738 2.94 0.97 1.00 4.00 
Education(1-7) 739 3.36 1.52 1.00 7.00 
Education (1-4) 739 1.40 0.77 1.00 4.00 
Household size 1540 4.39 1.54 0.00 21.00 
Years of Farming 1538 27.35 13.14 0.00 70.00 
Farm Size (mu) 1540 5.39 3.29 0.30 25.00 
Income source(farm=1) 1540 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Household Income (RMB) 1522 10559.52 8090.53 0.00 50000.00 
Percent Farm income 1535 46.80 33.86 0.00 100.00 
Household Asset Value (RMB) 1416 51112.29 44605.24 1000.00 500000.00 
Per cap income (RMB) 1536 2707.55 2742.77 0.00 40000.00 
Per cap asset (RMB) 1413 12625.41 11702.82 250.00 100000.00 
Log income 1537 9.01 0.84 5.52 12.21 
Log asset 1416 10.48 0.93 6.91 13.12 
Log per cap income 1534 7.59 0.80 3.96 10.60 
Log per cap asset 1413 9.06 0.93 5.52 11.51 
Sickness in family(1=yes) 1540 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Income std. dev. 1540 6625.39 74472.76 0.00 2323063.00 
Income coeff. of variation 1469 0.31 0.16 0.00 0.99 
Absolute risk aversion(*10-4) 1136 1.51 2.89 0.00 40.00 
Relative risk aversion coeff 1136 2.77 1.52 0.00 4.00 
Risk prone (1=yes) 741 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Income difference 1522 0.00 7242.38 -38879.07 14847.46 
Risk prone: The family has suffered crop or cattle loss, major sickness, death in 1 
year. 
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Table 7.14: Summary Statistics of Important Credit Rationing Variables (China) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Denied formal loan 1530 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Denied because of lack of collateral 521 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Interest rate unaffordable (highrate1) 674 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Likely to borrow more if interest rate is reduced (highrate2) 674 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Credit constrained (Creditconstr1) 1540 0.36 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Credit constrained (Creditconstr11) 1539 0.57 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Predicted value of credit constrained (Pcreditconst) 660 0.57 0.13 0.20 0.83 
Creditconstr1 : Denied loan + could not borrow desired amount of loan for education, 
health, consumption, farming and business purposes; from formal sources 
Creditconstr11: Denied loan +Never got desired amount of loan + could not borrow 
desired amount of loan for education, health, consumption, farming and business 
purposes 
Pcreditconst: Predicted value of credit constraint, obtained from regressing 
Creditconstr1 on a bunch of explanatory variables such as age, education, asset, 
preferences for formal loans etc. 
 
Table 7.15: Summary Statistics of Important Credit Variables (China) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Whether any Debt Outstanding 1536 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Amount of Debt (RMB) 1015 13165.81 26268.60 0.00 480000.00 
Formal Loan Percent 809 34.72 42.00 0.00 100.00 
Informal Loan Percent 809 63.92 42.30 0.00 100.00 
Informal loan Amount (RMB) 800 8231.40 12475.78 0.00 150000.00 
Formal Loan Amount (RMB) 800 7900.17 22005.97 0.00 398400.00 
Propensity of Formal Loan 809 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Propensity of Informal Loan 809 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Log informal loan 624 8.68 1.17 4.61 11.92 
Log formal loan 371 9.14 1.13 4.61 12.90 
Informal formal loan ratio 791 1.46 3.31 0.00 50.00 
Loan for production 1354 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Loan for risk management 1354 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Default on informal loan 1499 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Delay on informal loan 1499 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Default on formal loan 1485 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Delay on formal loan 1540 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Delay or default on formal loan 1501 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Delay or default on informal loan 1511 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Prefer not to default on informal loan 739 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Prefer informal loan 674 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Informal loans are convenient 739 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Community Pressure Reduces Default 741 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 
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Table 7.16: Summary Statistics of Important Social Preference Variables (China) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Risk share using gifts or loans 741 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Trusts that informal loan will be rapid (trust1) 1535 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Will lend even does not trust that loan will be repaid(trust2) 1538 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Will lend or borrow even they have refused earlier (alt1) 740 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Stronger version (and conditions) of (alt1) 740 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Strong guilty feeling on defaulting  informal loan 1540 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Strong guilty feeling on defaulting  formal loan 1540 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Mutual-min Reciprocity 741 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Mutual max Reciprocity 741 0.73 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Mutual max and Mutual-min Reciprocity 1540 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
 
The estimation results of equation (7.16) are reported in Table 7.17. The estimation 
models for both the countries are significant, as Wald Chi square statistics are 
significantly high.   
Important inferences from the above estimations are mentioned as following: 
1. Household asset or income is not significantly associated with mutual-max or 
mutual-min in the case of India. But in the case of China income is positively and 
significantly associated with mutual-max and family asset is significantly and 
negatively associated with mutual-min reciprocation.  Apparently the families with 
higher income more often reciprocate in mutual-max manner and the families having 
higher assets less often reciprocate in mutual-min manner. Variation of propensity of 
all possible combinations of mutual-max and mutual-min preferences with income has 
been shown in Figure 7.4. Apparently in the case of both the countries probability of 
showing preferences for both mutual-max and mutual-min increases with income.   
2. Demographic variables, sex, age etc. are not significantly related with mutual-max 
or mutual-min in both countries, except that in the case of China, mutual-min seems to 
decline with age in the beginning, but beyond a critical age it starts increasing. 
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Table 7.17: Multivariate Probit Estimation of mutual-max and mutual-min 
 
Variables mutual-max: India mutual-min: India mutual-max: 
China 
mutual-min: 
China 
 Coeff. Z stat Coeff. Z stat Coeff. Z stat Coeff. Z stat 
Sex (Female=1)     -0.19 0.74 0.14 0.56 
Age -0.03 -0.63 0.08 1.6 -0.49 0.98 -0.92* 2.06 
Age sq 0.00 0.59 0.00 -1.4 0.08 0.86 0.19* 2.32 
Family size 0.00 -0.06 0.03 0.8 -0.10 1.66 0.08 1.39 
Education -0.19 -1.55 0.05 0.4 0.05 0.49 -0.16 1.58 
Farm income 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.1 0.00 1.48 0.00 0.72 
Log asset -0.15 -0.81 -0.13 -0.7 -0.04 0.27 -0.25* 2.05 
Log income -0.27 -1.29 -0.29 -1.5 0.30* 2.4 0.00 0.03 
Prefer friend 0.06 0.25 0.10 0.4 -0.30 1.63 -0.08 0.47 
Abs risk 
aversion 
-0.21 -0.33 -0.27 -0.4 0.05 0.82 -0.11 1.56 
Denied collateral -0.57* -2.47 -0.26 -1.2 0.23 1.15 0.18 1.04 
Saving 0.10 0.73 -0.10 -0.8 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.4 
Precaution -0.55* -2.22 0.07 0.3 -0.17 1.09 0.27* 1.81 
Sickness 0.34 1.59 0.67* 3.2 0.09 0.47 -0.06 0.36 
Food 0.51* 2.4 0.47* 2.29 -0.04 0.21 0.58* 3.28 
guilty -0.24 -0.9 -0.13 -0.5 -0.04 0.24 -0.20 1.28 
Altruism 0.30 1.34 -0.12 -0.6 0.42* 2.59 -0.31* 2.07 
Risk share -0.21 -1.12 -0.29 -1.6 0.67* 4.09 -0.12 0.79 
Trust 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.3 -0.08 0.33 0.57* 2.46 
Trust2 0.92* 4.06 0.19 0.9 0.37* 2.28 -0.04 0.25 
Prefer not 
default 
1.02* 3.81 0.59* 2.2 0.56 1.59 0.07 0.2 
region6 1.52* 3.13 -0.21 -0.5 0.31* 1.8 0.40* 2.45 
region8 0.28 0.75 -1.53 -4     
region9 0.98* 2.42 0.38 1.0     
_cons 5.38 1.83 -0.61 -0.2 -2.76 1.41 2.60 1.44 
/atrho21 0.48 3.89   .26 2.8   
rho21 0.45 4.52   .25 2.93   
India: N  =  324; Wald chi2(50)   =     174.17; Prob > chi2  =  0.00 
China : N = 367; Wald chi2(48)   =     102.88;   Prob > chi2     =     0.00 
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3. Education is not significantly related with the mutual-max or mutual-min 
reciprocation in the case of both countries. However in the case of India it is 
negatively associated with mutual-max whereas in the case of China it is negatively 
associated with mutual-min. 
4. Preference of loans from friends and relatives is not significantly associated with 
mutual-max and mutual-min in the case of both the countries. 
5. Household savings is not significantly associated with either mutual-max or mutual-
min in the case of both the countries. However, the families having more 
precautionary savings apparently less often behave as mutual-max in the case of India 
and more often behave as mutual-min in the case of China.  
6. Major sickness in family is positively associated with mutual-min in the case of 
India, but no significant association is observed in the case of China. Also the families 
having food shortage problems seem to behave more often as mutual-min in the case 
of China and both mutual-max and mutual-min in the case of India. 
7. Propensity for mutual-max is higher for the families who have altruistic attitude and 
also propensity for mutual-min is lower for those families. The results are significant 
in the case of China. Apparently the people having altruistic preference are more 
likely to behave as mutual-max and less likely to behave as mutual-min. 
8. In the case of China risk sharing is positively associated with mutual-max and 
negatively associated with mutual-min. This way it lends credence to the assertion that 
both risk sharing motive and fairness reciprocations are needed to explain the informal 
lending.  
9. Trusting preferences does not seem to be significantly associated with mutual-max. 
However in the case of China the people having trusting preferences are more likely to 
behave as mutual-min.  
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10. The correlation coefficient (ρ) is positive and significant for both the countries– 
which validates our hypothesis that the two decisions are significantly correlated. 
Overall it is inferred that social preferences for mutual-max and mutual-min can be 
explained by several demographic, socio-economic and other behavioral variables. 
Moreover both these preferences are positively correlated, implying that for a large 
number of people both these types of reciprocations go together, that may depend on 
the circumstances of interactions. However, in the aggregate preferences for mutual-
max dominate. And such type of fairness motives may be helpful in explaining 
informal lending and borrowing, which will be empirically investigated next.  
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7.4.2. Empirics of Fairness Reciprocations and Informal Lending 
The main objective of the proposed analysis is to understand the nature of association 
of mutual-max and mutual-min reciprocations with informal lending and borrowing. 
One complexity arises here; preferences for mutual-max and mutual-min are not found 
to be mutually exclusive, as reported in Table 7.7.  A good number of observations are 
found to be in each cell of 2 ×2 Table, where rows are described by mutual-max (1 
Figure7.4: Variation of Various Combinations of mutual-max and mutual-min with Income 
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and 0) and columns are described by mutual-min (1 and 0).  In this scenario it is 
arguable to set the reference cell from which comparisons can be made of the 
outcomes of the other cells.  
For example if we want to analyze - how the mutual-max is associated with informal 
lending and borrowing, then we have two options. One to just  choose cell (1,0) i.e. 
mutual-max=1, and mutual-min=0 (which can be said as pure mutual-max behavior) 
then about 40 percent respondents in China and 20 percent respondents in India  fall  
in this category and analyze the relevant query. But here we are losing the information 
of cell (1, 1) i.e. mutual-max=1, and mutual-min=1. Hence another related option is to 
choose both cells (1,0) and (1,1)  and analyze the query. Such analysis related to 
percentage of informal loans and actual amount is reported in Table 7.18 and Table 
7.19. 
Table 7.18:  Fairness Reciprocity and Informal Loan Percentage 
 
mutual-min(China) mutual-min(India) mutual-max 
0 1 Total 0 1 Total 
0 42.62 53.76 45.56 (110) 35.76 25.36 33.70 (126) 
1 42.15 39.8 41.17  (287) 33.01 40.5 37.86 (199) 
Total 42.3(249) 42.5(148) 42.4 (397) 34.6 38.03 
 
36.25 (324) 
Average Informal Debt Percentage : India: 36.25; China: 63.92. 
 
 
Table 7.19: Fairness Reciprocity and Informal Loan Amount 
 
mutual-min  (China) mutual-min (India) mutual-max 
0 1 Total 0 1 Total 
0 5138.8 7405.2 5741.8  (110) 2519.5 7398 3487.5 (126) 
1 7196.2 5817.5 6628.6  (287) 4039.8 4517.3 4349.4 (199) 
Total 6530(249) 6132 
(148) 
6382.5 
(397) 
3141.8 
(171) 
4984.5 
(154) 
4015.8  
(324) 
Average Informal Loan Amount: India: 4015.18, China: 8231.00 
Clearly in the case of India informal loan percentage and amount are higher for 
mutual-max in second option, but in first option only informal loan percentage is 
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higher. In the case of China both percentages and amount are lower for mutual-max in 
both options.  These findings essentially clarify the above stated complexity. 
The problem is that we are making inappropriate comparisons here. The proper way to 
get right identification on differences is that outcomes observed for mutual-max 
reciprocation for a person need to be compared to the outcomes if that person does not 
behave in mutual-max manner. This is a counterfactual query that can not be observed. 
However with recent advances in econometrics – namely propensity score methods 46 
this complexity can be overcome. The same is described next. 
 
7.4.2.1 Comparisons Using Propensity Score Method 
Let Y1i be potential informal borrowing outcome for an individual i if the 
reciprocation is mutual-max and Y0i be potential outcome when the reciprocation is 
mutual-min.  
iY01i
i                 0i
i1i
Y  is  outcomein  difference   of  measure  desired  The
...(7.17)                 
0 M max,-mutual  ifY
1 M max,-mutual  if           Y
    Outcome  Borrowing Informal





 
But the fundamental problem of causal inference is that we can only observe one of 
the above outcomes for a specific individual.  The best we can do is to measure the 
average of   Y1i- Y0i   for a group of people who show mutual-max reciprocations.   i.e. 
E[Y1i- Y0i | Mi=1].  Now the observed differences in informal borrowing outcome is,   
E[Yi| Mi = 1]-E[Yi| Mi = 0]  =   E[Y1i- Y0i | Mi=1]  +  
                                                          {E[Y0i | Mi=1] - E[Y0i | Mi=0]}             …(7.18) 
Where the first term on the right hand side (R.H.S.) of equation (7.18) is called as 
Average treatment effect on the treated (TOT) and second term is known as selection 
bias. If selection bias turns out to be positive (assuming potential outcome is higher for 
mutual-max reciprocation), then the observed difference will be exaggerated.   Also 
                                                 
46 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Dehejia  and Wahba (1999) , Angrist and Pishke(2009)  
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another measure of the desired difference is known as average treatment effect – i.e. 
comparing the potential outcome if everyone demonstrates mutual-max behavior to 
the potential outcome if every one does not show mutual-max behavior – this is called 
as Average treatment effect (ATE). This is described as following: 
ATE = E [Y1i-Y0i] = E [Y1] – E[Y0]                                                               …(7.19) 
Where, E [Y1] = Average outcome if everyone shows mutual-max behavior and  
E [Y0] = Average outcome if everyone does not show mutual-max behavior   
Now, E[Yi|M=1]-E[Yi|M=0] = ATE + {E[Y0i | Mi=1] - E[Y0i | Mi=0]}       ...(7.20)  
Again as discussed before the second term of R.H.S. of equation (7.20) is selection 
bias. This selection bias becomes ignorable under the assumption of random 
assignment i.e. potential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment 
conditional on a set of control variables X, i.e. no self selection takes place. The 
identifying assumption rests on conditional independence axiom (CIA), also known as 
selection on observables. It guarantees that conditional on observed characteristics Xi , 
selection bias disappears, i.e. 
 
...(7.21)                               ;relation   ceindependen  shows   ;|},{ 01  iiii XMYY   
Then using propensity score theorem (Angrist and Pischke, 2009 pp. 80-81) – which 
states that potential outcomes are independent of treatment status conditional on a 
scalar function of covariates , propensity score defined as p(Xi) = P(Mi= 1|Xi) , where 
P(.) indicates probability function.  This theorem implies that,  
...(7.22)    score propensity  )p(  where;  )p( |},{      |},{ 0101  iiiiiiiii XXMYYXMYY
Now the measurement formula for ATE is developed as following: (7.17): 
Using equation (7.17): ATE = E [Y1i-Y0i] = E [Y1] – E [Y0] 
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 Where each of the expectations needs to be taken over all the observations.  But 
actually we observe, E [Y1i|Mi=1, Xi] and E [Y0i|Mi=0, Xi]. Then using Baye’s 
theorem of probability, we can get following expressions: 
E[Y1i]all  = E[Y1i|Mi=1, Xi]P(Mi=1)/ p(Xi)   ; and   
E[Y0i]all  = E[Y0i|Mi=0, Xi](1-P(Mi=1))/ (1-p(Xi))   ; hence  
ATE      =     E[Y1i|Mi=1, Xi]P(Mi=1)/ p(Xi)  -  
                                                     E [Y0i|Mi=0, Xi] (1-P (Mi=1))/ (1-p (Xi))  …(7.23) 
Similarly average treatment effect on treated (TOT) is described by following 
equation: 
TOT = E[Y1i- Y0i | Mi=1]  = E[Y1i| Mi=1]- E[Y0i | Mi=1]                                …(7.24)  
The first term on the R.H.S. of equation (7.24) is observed in data. The expression for 
second term is obtained using Baye’s theorem of probability; 
  E[Y0i | Mi=1]    =   E[Y0i | Mi=0] p(Xi).(1-P(Mi=1))/ ((1- p(Xi)).P(Mi=1))      ...(7.25)       
TOT =  E[Y1i| Mi=1]- E[Y0i | Mi=0] p(Xi).(1-P(Mi=1))/ ((1- p(Xi)).P(Mi=1))    …(7.26)     
Now we can obtain desired outcome differences for mutual-max (mutual-min) 
reciprocity either using equation (7.23) or equation (7.26) depending upon whether we 
are interested in knowing average treatment effect on all (ATE ) or average treatment 
effect on treated (TOT)i.e. persons showing mutual-max behavior.           
                             
7.4.2.1.1. Estimation and Results 
 Three outcomes related with informal lending used here are - percentage of informal 
loan (of total loan), informal loan amount, and proportion of the families taking 
informal loan. The results are reported in Table 7.20 and Table 7.21. 
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Table 7.20: mutual-max Reciprocity, Propensity Score and Informal Loan  
 
 Informal 
Loan, 
percent: 
India 
Informal 
Loan, 
percent 
:China 
Informal 
Loan 
Amount: 
India 
Informal 
Loan 
Amount: 
China 
Informal 
Loan 
(1=yes) 
: India 
Informal 
Loan: 
(1=yes) 
China 
Mutual-
max=1, 
weighted: 
(ATE) 
38.74 
(198) 42.46 (249) 
4097.12 6680.45 0.55 (198) 0.67 (249) 
Mutual-
max=0, 
weighted 
(ATE) 
28.50 
(126) 
45.49 
(105) 2932.87 5482.83 
0.44  
(126) 
0.66 
(105) 
Difference 
(ATE) 
10.24* 
s.e.4.63 
-2.97 
s.e. 4.86 
1164.25 
s.e. 814.02 
1197.62 
s.e. 974.80 
0.11* 
s.e. .056 
0.01 
s.e. .055 
Mutual-max=1 37.86 
(199) 
41.17 
(287) 4349.32 6628.62 
0.54 
(199) 
0.64  
(287) 
Mutual-
max=0, 
weighted: 
(TOT) 
25.04 
(126) 
44.67 
(105) 2565.10 5318.42 
0.40 
(126) 
0.66 
(105) 
Difference 
(TOT) 
12.82* 
s.e. 4.5 
-3.50 
s.e. 4.78 
1784.22* 
s.e. 736.48 
1310.20 
s.e. 942.44 
0.14* 
s.e. .056 
-0.02 
s.e..054 
Note: s.e. means standard error; The numbers in brackets (.) show the number of observations. 
ATE: Average Treatment Effect; TOT: Treatment Effect on Treated 
 
Table 7.21: mutual-min Reciprocity, Propensity Score and Informal Loan  
 
 
Informal 
Loan, 
percent: 
India 
Informal 
Loan, 
percent 
:China 
Informal 
Loan 
Amount: 
India 
Informal 
Loan 
Amount: 
China 
Informal 
Loan 
(1=yes) 
: India 
Informal 
Loan: 
(1=yes) 
China 
Mutual min=1, 
weighted: 
ATE 
40.40 (153) 40.24 (132) 4953.62 7326.63 
.56 
(153) 
.65 
(132) 
Mutual min=0, 
weighted: 
ATE 
29.54 (171) 43.40 (222) 2870.42 6418.43 .42 (171) 
.66 
(222) 
Difference 
(ATE) 
10.86* 
s.e. 4.85 
-2.84 
s.e. 4.34 
1083.20 
s.e. 
1101.30 
904.20 
s.e. 1355.32 
.14* 
s.e. .055 
-.01 
s.e. .052
Mutual min=1 38.04 (154) 42.52 (148) 4984.90 6132.84 .54 (154) 
.65 
(148) 
Mutual min=0, 
weighted 
:TOT 
23.87 (171) 41.46 (222) 2565.10 5830.48 .34 (171) 
.65 
(222) 
Difference 
(TOT) 
15.17* 
s.e. 4.58 
1.06 
s.e. 4.27 
2419.80* 
s.e. 736.25 
202.36 
s.e. 976.02 
.20* 
s.e. .054 0.00 
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As guided by Result 7.2, it is hypothesized that these outcomes related to informal 
loan should be higher for the families who show preferences for, mutual-max 
reciprocity, compared to those who do not show such preferences.  Important 
inferences are mentioned as following: 
1. In the case of India, the percentages of informal loan are significantly higher 
(using ATE and TOT measure) for the families showing preferences for mutual-max 
reciprocity in comparison to the families who do not show preferences for such 
reciprocity. In the case of China no such significant results are obtained. 
2. In the case of India, informal loan amount is significantly higher (using TOT 
measure) for families showing preferences for mutual-max reciprocity in comparison 
to the families who do not show such preferences. In the case of China no such 
significant results are obtained. In the case of China the informal loan amount is 
higher for the families showing preferences for mutual-max, but the results are not 
significant. 
3. In the case of India, Significantly higher proportion of families (using ATE and 
TOT measure) showing preference for mutual-max reciprocity take informal loan. In 
the case of China the results are not significant.  
4. However, in the case of India it is observed that these outcomes are also 
significantly higher for the families showing preferences for mutual-min reciprocity in 
comparison to the families who do not show such preferences. This is against the 
conjecture.  In the case of China, the results are similar but not significant.  One reason 
may be that mutual-min and mutual-max categorization is not mutually exclusive. As 
observed in the data large percentages of families show preferences for both the 
reciprocities. The propensity score method is used to make such assignments random 
conditional on observables, but apparently this method has its own limitations. 
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Another reason may be that, informal lending and borrowing are driven by several 
motives and fairness motive is one among these including the risk sharing motive.  
Further these outcomes are presented graphically in Figures 7.5 and 7.6. In Figure 7.5 
the density function of informal loan percentage is plotted against preferences for 
mutual-max reciprocity for both the countries. Evidently the density functions for 
mutual-max=1 seem to dominate the density functions for mutual-max = 0, for 
informal loan percentage beyond 40 – which gives credence to our hypothesis.  In 
Figure 7.6 the density function of informal loan percentage is plotted against 
preferences for mutual-min reciprocity for both the countries. Apparently in the case 
of India the density function for mutual-min=1 seems to dominate the density function 
for mutual-min= 0, for informal loan percentage less than 60, but beyond that the 
density function for mutual-min =0 seems to dominate; which is as per the conjecture. 
In the case of China the density function for mutual-min =1 seems to dominate the 
density function for mutual-min = 0, for informal loan percentage greater than 40; 
which seems to be counterintuitive, but does not disprove our hypothesis in any way. 
In figure 7.7 the density function of informal loan percentage is plotted against the 
preferences for pure mutual-min (mutual-min=1, mutual-max=0) reciprocity for both 
the countries. Apparently in the case of India the density functions for mutual-min=1 
seems to dominate the density functions for mutual-min= 0; which is against the 
conjecture. However, in the case of China the density functions for mutual-min=0 
seems to dominate the density function for mutual-min= 1; which is as per the 
conjecture. 
Overall the results support the hypothesis that informal loan outcomes should be 
higher for the families who show preferences for mutual-max reciprocity – more 
strongly in the case of India. However no neat inferences are obtained related to the 
preferences for mutual-min reciprocity. The results obtained here present a mixed 
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picture. At the least it can be said that families who show preferences for mutual-max 
fairness reciprocities attach high significance to informal financial transaction among 
friends and relatives. 
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Figure7.5: Informal Loan Percentage and mutual-max Reciprocation: Density Function 
Figure7.6: Informal Loan Percentage and mutual-min Reciprocation:  Density Function 
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7.4.2.2. Inferences using Structural Regression Equations 
Theoretically there is nothing interesting in mutual-min fairness equilibrium; no 
lending takes place. The lending and repayment in mutual-max fairness equilibrium is 
described by the equation (7.11), which is reproduced here. Using this equation, 
approximate linear estimation model is proposed in equation (7.27).  Further as seen 
earlier the preferences for mutual-max and mutual-min are also described by equations 
(7.28) and (7.29). 
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Figure7.7: Informal Loan Percentage and mutual-min (pure) Reciprocation:  Density Function 
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X is a set of control variables such as; age, education, asset, income, family size, risk 
aversion, loan used for production and risk management purpose, and credit 
constrainedness. In this regression motivations for risk share is also controlled for. 
 
...(7.29)                                                                     X min  -mutual
  and    ...(7.28)                                                                    X max -mutual
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Here interaction term is used in equation (7.27) to saturate the model, as a good 
number of respondents have shown preferences for both types of reciprocity. 
 
7.4.2.2.1. Estimation and Identification Strategy 
Equations (7.27), (7.28) and (7.29) form a system of equations. We are primarily 
interested in the coefficients β, γ1, γ2, and γ3. For consistent estimation of these 
coefficients, it is necessary that the explanatory variables are not correlated with the 
error term. For this the variables should be satisfactorily exogenous. However this 
requirement seems to be violated for the fairness (mutual-max and mutual-min) 
variables, as these are themselves explained by several variables which are common to 
the variables belonging to equation (7.27). To overcome this problem, the most 
efficient method is to use full information maximum likelihood method (FIML) – that 
estimates these three equations simultaneously using maximum likelihood method. 
However this one seems to be complicated and also here convergence of solutions are 
not guaranteed. Hence we propose a simpler method to estimate the coefficients as 
following:  (i) in the first stage the equations (7.28) and (7.29) are estimated using 
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linear probability model (basically OLS), and (ii) in the second stage the equation 
(7.27) is estimated (using OLS), wherein the predicted values of mutual-max and 
mutual-min (from the first stage) are used.  It is ensured that in the first stage 
exclusion restriction is satisfied. 
In this estimation scheme it is hypothesized that, higher amount of informal loan is 
associated with, (a) larger values of income differences   β >0, (b) higher values of 
mutual-max γ1>0, and (c) lower values of mutual-min γ2 <0. There is no a priori 
conjecture on the coefficient of interaction of mutual-max and mutual-min γ3. The 
positive coefficient implies that the families who show preferences for both mutual-
max and mutual-min get higher outcome related to informal borrowing. 
 
7.4.2.2.2 Results and Inferences on Informal Loan Percentages  
First the above system of equations is estimated for informal loan percentage (of total 
loan) as dependent variable in the equation (7.27). The first stage estimations have 
been found to be satisfactorily significant:  F statistics are around 5.5 and adjusted R 
square is about .20 for both mutual-max and mutual-min OLS regressions, for both the 
countries.  In these regressions the additional explanatory variables (for exclusions 
restrictions) used are – other social preferences such as trust, guilty feeling, altruistic 
preferences, prefer not to default on loans, and preferences for loans from friends and 
relatives. It is realistically conjectured that these variables affect informal loan 
(percentage and amount) through the mutual-max and mutual-min reciprocities. 
The first stage estimation results are not reported here, as we are primarily interested 
in the sign and significance of coefficients β, γ1, γ2, and γ3 of the second stage results. 
From the first stage the predicted values of mutual-max and mutual-min are obtained 
and used in the second stage. The second stage result is reported in Table (7.22).  In 
columns 1 and 2 (related to India and China) all the fairness variables, mutual-max, 
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mutual-min and interaction term are simultaneously used as explanatory variables, 
whereas in columns 3 and 4 only mutual-max variable is used. The second stage is 
estimated using OLS. All the four regressions are statistically significant – as F 
statistic and adjusted R square are satisfactorily high.  
Table 7.22: Informal Loan Percentage and mutual-max and mutual-min Reciprocities 
 
India (1) China (2) India  (3) China (4) Dependent variable: 
Informal Loan 
Percentage 
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Age 1.53 1.18 29.9* 2.04 1.36 1.06 27.43* 1.88 
Age sq -0.02 -1.40 -5.18* -1.94 -0.02 -1.32 -5.03* -1.88 
Household size -1.35 -1.59 -0.48 -0.29 -1.32 -1.57 -0.153 -0.09 
Education -2.95 -0.83 -2.05 -0.58 -3.96 -1.18 -0.36 -0.11 
Log asset 1.00 0.20 -11.74* -3.24 1.42 0.29 -9.21* -2.7 
Log income 3.50 0.45 15.51* 2.46 4.31 0.56 12.89* 2.08 
Risk share 3.31 0.71 1.51 0.29 3.76 0.81 0.03 0.01 
Abs risk coeff. -18.65 -1.07 -3.86* -2.22 -17.72 -1.02 -3.7* -2.12 
Credit constraint -7.22 -0.44 151.44* 6.8 -9.78 -0.6 152.5* 6.87 
Loan risk management 8.76 0.95 4.05 0.51 9.87 1.08 4.92 0.62 
Loan production -20.1* -2.27 -14.43* -1.87 -17.7* -2.08 -14.5* -1.88 
Income difference(exp-4) 0.1* 1.99 0.05 1.16 0.09* 2.05 0.05 1.11 
mutual-max 7.47 0.31 29.81 0.53 -13.35 -1.14 7.46 0.39 
mutual-min -20.74 -0.64 24.05 0.26     
(max*min) -9.98 -0.33 -129.31 -1.08     
Default Informal 0.90 0.04 -30.44 -0.8 13.61 0.62 -36.56 -0.96 
Region6 2.46 0.20   6.27 0.57   
Region8 -
27.16* 
-2.32   -
20.93* 
-2.3   
Region9 5.03 0.42 -17.12 -1.34 -2.48 -0.26 -37.5* -5.96 
_cons 4.20 0.04 -54.98 -0.59 -6.45 -0.06 -56.98 -0.74 
India (1): N= 314; F (19,   293) =5.23; Prob > F= 0.00; Adj R-squared = 0.20 
China (2): N= 346;   F (18,   333) = 3.06; Prob > F = 0.00 Adj R-squared = 0.10 
India (3): N = 314; F (17,   295) = 5.81; Prob > F   = 0.00; Adj R-squared = 0.21 
China (4): N= 346;   F (18,   333) = 3.08; Prob > F = 0.00 Adj R-squared = 0.09 
Important inferences for the estimations of column 1 and 2 are mentioned as 
following: 
1. In the case of both the countries, mutual-max is not found to be significantly 
associated with informal loan percentage, however the sign is appropriate. Thus 
evidence in support of hypothesis (b) is not obtained.  
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2. Similarly In the case of both the countries, mutual-min is not found to be negatively 
(significantly) associated with informal loan percentage.  Hence evidence in support of 
hypothesis (c) is also not obtained.  
3. In the case of both the countries, the interaction term of mutual-max and mutual-
min is not found to be significant. Its coefficient bears negative sign in the case of both 
the countries.  
4. In the case of both the countries, income difference is found to be positively 
associated (significant in the case of India) with informal loan percentage.  This result 
is in conformity with hypothesis (a). 
5. In the case of both the countries, default on informal loan is not found to be 
significant. However the coefficient bears appropriate (negative) sign in the case of 
China. 
6. Absolute risk aversion is found to be negatively associated with informal loan 
percentage. Apparently more risk averse families prefer to take less loans. Also these 
loans seem to be used more for risk management purpose and less for production 
purpose. Also more credit constrained families seem to depend more on informal 
loans. 
Furthermore, for the estimations of column 3 and 4, where only mutual-max 
reciprocity is used, similar inferences are obtained. Again mutual-max is not found to 
be significantly associated with informal loan percentage.  Moreover in the case of 
India, its coefficient bears negative sign – which is not in conformity with the 
hypothesis (b).  
The estimation results for only mutual-min reciprocity are reported in Table 7.23. In 
columns 1 and 3 (related to India and China) income difference is used as an 
explanatory variable, whereas in columns 2 and 4 (for India and China) log of income 
difference is used. Here mutual-min is found to be negatively and nearly significantly 
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(in the case of China) associated with informal loan percentage. This provides 
supporting evidence for hypothesis (c).  
Thus for informal loan percentage, mixed results are obtained. The preferences for 
mutual-max and mutual-min are not found to be significantly associated with it, when 
all the fairness variables are used simultaneously. However, when mutual-max and 
mutual-min are separately used in the estimation; mutual-max is again not found to be 
significantly associated with informal loan percentage, but mutual-min is found to be 
negatively associated with that. Hence evidences in support of hypotheses (b) are not 
obtained, whereas satisfactory evidences are obtained supporting hypothesis (c).   
 
Table 7.23: Informal Loan Percentage and mutual-min Reciprocity 
 
India (1) India (2) log y diff China  (3) China (4)  log y 
diff 
Dependent variable: 
Informal Loan 
Percentage Coeff. t Coeff. T Coeff. t Coeff. T 
Age 1.52 1.18 1.46 1.13 28.64* 1.97 27.6* 1.89 
Age sq -0.02 -1.4 -0.02 -1.33 -5.05* -1.9 -4.8* -1.82 
Household size -1.36 -1.62 -1.45 -1.72 -0.42 -0.25 -0.65 -0.39 
Education -3.08 -0.93 -3.21 -0.96 -1.62 -0.46 -1.8* -0.52 
Log asset 1.09 0.22 0.12 0.02 -10.4* -3.05 -10.3* -3.02 
Log income 3.64 0.47 -5.23 -0.9 13.4* 2.19 8.60 1.81 
Risk share 3.26 0.7 2.66 0.57 -0.95 -0.21 -0.34 -0.08 
Abs risk coeff. -18.30 -1.05 -23.08 -1.34 -3.65 -2.11 -3.8* -2.21 
Credit constraint -7.40 -0.45 -7.55 -0.46 151.4* 6.87 150.8* 6.84 
Loan risk management 9.14 1.01 7.85 0.87 4.72 0.6 4.79 0.61 
Loan production -19.6* -2.3 -20.58* -2.4 -14.8* -1.92 -14.6* -1.89 
Income difference(exp-4) 0.20* 2 8.89 0.94 0.05 1.02 0.46 0.05 
mutual-min -22.51 -1.49 -23.09 -1.52 -45.96 -1.65 -48.23 -1.73 
Default Informal 3.61 0.16 6.08 0.27 -33.29 -0.88 -31.86 -0.84 
Region6 2.98 0.3 5.51 0.57     
Region8 -26.8* -2.62 -26.45* -2.56     
Region9 3.57 0.33 4.62 0.43 -25.1* -2.73 -25.79 -2.8 
_cons 3.52 0.03 0.51 0 -30.26 -0.39 11.50 0.08 
India (1) N= 324; F (18,   305) =    4.61; Prob > F = 0.00; Adj R-squared = 0.17 
India (2) N= 324; F (18,   305) =    4.40; Prob > F = 0.00; Adj R-squared = 0.16 
China (3) N= 347; F (16,   330) =    5.60; Prob > F = 0.00; Adj R-squared = 0.18 
China (4) N= 347; F (16,   330) =    5.61; Prob > F = 0.00; Adj R-squared = 0.18 
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7.4.2.2.3. Inference on Informal Loan Amounts 
 Now the above system of equations is estimated for informal loan amount as 
dependent variable in the equation (7.27). The first stage estimations are same as 
discussed previously. The second stage result is reported in Table 7.24.  In columns 1 
and 3 (related to India and China) income difference is used as an explanatory 
variable, whereas in columns 2 and 4 (for India and China) log of income difference is 
used. Further in all the columns all the fairness variables, mutual-max, mutual-min and 
interaction term are together used as explanatory variables. The second stage is 
estimated using OLS. All the four regressions are statistically significant, as F statistic 
and adjusted R square are satisfactorily high.  
 
Table 7.24: Informal Loan Amount and mutual-max and mutual-min Reciprocities 
 
India (1) India (log y 
diff) (2) 
China (3) China (log 
y diff) (4) 
Dependent variable: 
Log Informal Loan 
amount Coef. T Coef. T Coef. t Coef. T 
Age 0.09 1.41 0.09 1.4 0.25 0.31 0.20 0.24 
Age sq 0.00 -1.52 0.00 -1.48 0.00 0 0.01 0.07 
Household size 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.06 -0.72 -0.08 -0.85 
Education 0.05 0.26 0.05 0.27 -0.17 -0.86 -0.18 -0.92 
Log asset 0.40 1.56 0.37 1.42 0.12 0.59 0.14 0.67 
Log income 0.75* 1.89 0.29 0.95 0.73* 2.12 0.39 1.47 
Risk share 0.46* 1.9 0.42 1.71 0.04 0.16 0.06 0.22 
Abs risk coeff. -1.28 -1.42 -1.51 -1.69 -0.24* -2.56 -0.2* -2.65 
Credit constraint 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.14 5.17* 4.25 5.1* 4.21 
Loan risk manage -0.61 -1.29 -0.68 -1.43 -0.80 -1.86 -0.8 -1.84 
Loan production -1.65* -3.59 -1.70* -3.71 -1.13* -2.69 -1.1* -2.63 
Income difference(exp-5) 0.10* 2.37 0.84* 1.71 0.05* 1.91 0.59 1.13 
mutual-max 1.21 0.97 1.24 0.99 1.61 0.53 1.43 0.46 
mutual min 1.75 1.05 1.57 0.94 -0.59 -0.12 -1.13 -0.22 
(max*min) -1.19 -0.77 -1.09 -0.7 -5.40 -0.82 -4.68 -0.71 
Default informal 0.85 0.65 0.94 0.71 2.76 1.33 2.89 1.39 
Region6 0.48 0.77 0.61 0.97     
Region8 1.43* 2.37 1.42* 2.33     
Region9 0.55 0.9 0.65 1.05 0.11 0.15 0.00 0 
_cons -9.59 -1.65 -14.72 -1.58 -2.96 -0.58 -5.98 -0.71 
India (1): N = 312; F (21,   290) =    5.98;  Prob > F  =  0.00;  Adj R-squared =  0.25 
India (2): N = 312; F (21,   290) = 5.92; Prob > F = 0.00;  Adj R-squared =  0.25 
China (3): N = 342; F (19,   322) = 5.23; Prob > F = 0.00; Adj R-squared =  0.19 
China (4): N = 342; F (19,   322) = 5.10; Prob > F = 0.00; Adj R-squared =  0.19 
  314
 Important inferences from the above estimations are mentioned as following: 
1. In the case of both the countries, mutual-max is found to be positively associated (in 
all the columns) with informal loan amount but these are not significant– so significant 
support of hypothesis (b) is not obtained again. 
2. In the case of India, mutual-min is found to be positively (not significant) associated 
with informal loan amount, whereas, in the case of China, it is found to be negatively 
(not significant) associated. So no significant evidence is obtained on hypothesis (c). 
3. Similarly no significant results are obtained for the interaction term of mutual-max 
and mutual min. 
4. In the case of both the countries, for the estimations related to columns 1 and 3, 
income difference is found to be positively associated   with informal loan amount.  
This result is in conformity with hypothesis (a). However when log of income 
difference is used as an explanatory variable, it loses its significance in the case of 
China as shown in column 4.  
5. In the case of both the countries, default on informal loan is not found to be 
significant. However the coefficient bears appropriate (negative) sign in the case of 
China. 
6.  Further, absolute risk aversion is found to be negatively associated with informal 
loan percentage. Apparently more risk averse families prefer to take less loans. Also 
these loans seem to be used more for risk management purpose and less for production 
purpose. Also more credit constrained families seem to depend more on informal 
loans. Further risk sharing motivations is found to be positively associated with 
informal loan amount in the case of India. 
Then estimation is done using only mutual-max fairness variable and the results are 
reported in Table 7.25. Again in columns 1 and 3 income difference is used as an 
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explanatory variable, whereas in columns 2 and 4 (for India and China) log of income 
difference is used. Important inferences are mentioned as following: 
1. In the case of both the countries, for the estimations related to all the columns, 
mutual-max is found to be positively associated with informal loan amount and now 
this is  significant  in the case of India  and nearly so in the case of China (one sided 
test) . Thus significant support of hypothesis (b) is obtained.  
2. In the case of both the countries, for the estimations related to the columns 1 and 3, 
income difference is found to be positively  associated  (nearly significant in the case 
of China) with informal loan amount.  This result is in conformity with the hypothesis 
(a). However when log of income difference is used as an explanatory variable, it 
loses its significance as shown in columns 2 and 4. 
3. Other inferences are similar to the results mentioned in points 5 and 6 for the 
estimations, when all the fairness variables are used. 
 
Table 7.25: Informal Loan Amount and mutual-max Reciprocity 
 
India (1) India( log y 
diff)(2) 
China (3) China (log 
y diff) (4) 
Dependent variable: 
Log Informal Loan 
amount Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. T 
Age 0.10 1.56 0.10 1.53 0.10 0.13 0.06 0.08 
Age sq 0.00 -1.6 0.00 -1.56 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.11 
Household size 0.00 -0.1 -0.01 -0.17 -0.05 -0.52 -0.06 -0.6 
Education 0.10 0.57 0.10 0.55 -0.05 -0.26 -0.06 -0.3 
Log asset 0.39 1.52 0.36 1.39 0.29 1.53 0.30 1.61 
Log income 0.73* 1.85 0.29 0.96 0.57 1.69 0.25 0.97 
Risk share 0.44* 1.84 0.40 1.66 -0.05 -0.18 -0.03 -0.1 
Abs risk coeff -1.27 -1.41 -1.49 -1.67 -0.23* -2.43 -0.2* -2.5 
Credit constraint 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.29 5.27* 4.34 5.2* 4.31 
Loan risk manage -0.63 -1.33 -0.69 -1.46 -0.76 -1.76 -0.76 -1.7 
Loan production -1.72* -3.9 -1.77* -4 -1.15* -2.72 -1.1* -2.6 
Income difference(exp-4) 0.1* 2.27 0.80 1.64 0.05* 1.86 0.59 1.12 
mutual-max 1.45* 2.38 1.43* 2.35 1.40 1.32 1.52 1.44 
Default informal 0.47 0.41 0.60 0.53 2.41 1.16 2.55 1.22 
Region6 0.22 0.39 0.37 0.65     
Region 1.08 2.3 1.10* 2.33     
Region9 0.75 1.55 0.82 1.68 -1.22 -3.56 -1.3* -3.9 
_cons -9.19 -1.59 -14.10 -1.52 -4.22 -1 -7.60 -0.9 
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Table 7.25 (continued) 
 
India (1): N = 312;   F (19,   292) = 6.48; Prob > F    = 0.00; Adj R-squared = 0.25 
India (2): N = 312;   F (19,   292) = 6.43; Prob > F     = 0.00; Adj R-squared = 0.25 
China (3): N = 342;   F (17,   292) = 5.62; Prob > F     = 0.00; Adj R-squared = 0.19 
China (4): N = 342; F (17,   292) = 5.50; Prob > F      = 0.00; Adj R-squared = 0.18 
Then estimation is done using only mutual-min fairness variable and the results are 
reported in Table 7.26.  Again in columns 1 and 3 income difference is used as an 
explanatory variable, whereas in columns 2 and 4 (for India and China) log of income 
difference is used. Important inferences are mentioned as following: 
1. In the case of India, mutual-min is found to be positively associated with informal 
loan amount. This finding gives evidence against the hypothesis (c). However, in the 
case of China, mutual-min is found to be negatively associated with informal loan 
amount. This result gives significant support to hypothesis (c). Thus a mixed result is 
obtained for the mutual-min reciprocity.  
2. In the case of both the countries, for the estimations related to the columns 1 and 3, 
income difference is found to be positively  associated  (nearly significant in the case 
of China) with informal loan amount.  This result is in conformity with the hypothesis 
(a). However when log of income difference is used as an explanatory variable, it 
loses its significance as shown in columns 2 and 4. 
3. Other inferences are similar to the results mentioned in points 5 and 6 for the 
estimations, when all the fairness variables are used. 
Hence for informal loan amount, significant results are obtained.  In the first set of 
specifications when all the fairness variables are included in the regression, 
appropriate signs are obtained on mutual-max, but the coefficients are not significant. 
However in the second set of specifications when only mutual-max is used, positive 
and significant coefficients are obtained on it, particularly for India. Thus we get 
satisfactory evidence on hypothesis (b). Similarly when only mutual-min is used, 
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significantly positive coefficient is obtained in the case of India and significantly 
negative coefficient is obtained in the case of China. Thus results of India gives 
evidence  rejecting hypothesis (c) whereas, the results of  China support hypothesis (c) 
.Income difference is found to be positively associated with informal loan amount, but 
near significant results are obtained only in the case of China, thus weak evidence 
supporting hypothesis (c) is obtained.  
 
Table 7.26: Informal Loan Amount and mutual-min Reciprocity 
 
India (1) India( log y 
diff)(2) 
China (3) China 
(log y 
diff) (4) 
Dependent variable: 
Log Informal Loan 
amount 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. T 
Age 0.09 1.37 0.09 1.35 0.19 0.24 0.15 0.18 
Age sq 0.00 -1.49 0.00 -1.45 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.12 
Household size 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.06 -0.68 -0.07 -0.8 
Education 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.06 -0.16 -0.82 -0.17 -0.8 
Log asset 0.42 1.63 0.38 1.49 0.16 0.83 0.17 0.88 
Log income 0.77 1.95 0.31 1.02 0.66 1.96 0.35 1.34 
Risk share 0.45 1.87 0.41 1.67 -0.02 -0.1 0.00 0.02 
Abs risk coeff -1.24 -1.37 -1.47 -1.64 -0.24 -2.47 -0.24 -2.5 
Credit constraint -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.06 5.14 4.26 5.10 4.22 
Loan risk manage -0.55 -1.17 -0.61 -1.3 -0.78 -1.81 -0.77 -1.7 
Loan production -1.55 -3.5 -1.60 -3.61 -1.14 -2.68 -1.12 -2.6 
Income difference(exp-4) 0.10* 2.38 0.85* 1.73 0.05* 1.82 0.56 1.08 
mutual-min 1.89* 2.41 1.84* 2.33 -3.86* -2.51 -3.9* -2.5 
Default informal 1.33 1.13 1.45 1.22 2.68 1.26 2.81 1.32 
Region6 0.64 1.26 0.80 1.58     
Region 1.55 2.9 1.55 2.89     
Region9 0.31 0.55 0.40 0.71 -0.10 -0.19 -0.17 -0.3 
_cons -9.71 -1.68 -14.90 -1.61 -1.59 -0.37 -4.64 -0.5 
N = 323; F (18,   304) =    3.67; Prob > F = 0.00; Adj R-squared = 0.14 
N = 323; F (18,   304) =    3.49; Prob > F = 0.00; Adj R-squared = 0.12 
N =343; F (17,   325) =    5.54; Prob > F = 0.00; Adj R-squared = 0.18 
N =343; F (17,   325) =    5.38; Prob > F = 0.00; Adj R-squared = 0.18 
Essentially in the case of both the countries, mixed results are obtained related to the 
nature of associations of fairness reciprocation motives (mutual-max and mutual-min) 
with informal loan transactions in rural areas of developing countries.  No significant 
association of mutual-max with informal loan percentage is observed. However 
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mutual-max is found to be positively and significantly associated with informal loan 
amount, which supports the hypothesis (b). 
Mixed results are also obtained for the preferences for mutual-min reciprocity. 
Preferences for mutual-min reciprocity are found to be negatively (nearly 
significantly) associated with informal loan percentage. Further, mutual-min 
reciprocity is found to be negatively associated with informal loan amount in the case 
of China. These two results support hypothesis (c). However in the case of India, 
mutual-min is found to be significantly and positively associated with informal loan 
amount, which rejects hypothesis (c).  
A summary of the inferences obtained from different methods is compiled in Table 
7.27. 
Overall quite satisfactory results are obtained, as the proposed hypotheses have not 
been rejected in most of the cases, except in one case. These empirical findings even 
not supporting the analytical results entirely, which have been developed using 
fairness equilibria framework, are nevertheless quite encouraging and supplements the 
existing literature that attempt to explain the underlying motives of informal financial 
transactions among friends and relatives in the rural areas of developing countries. 
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Table 7.27: Summary of Inferences on mutual-max and mutual-min and Informal 
Loan 
 
Method Mutual-max is associated with 
higher value of informal loan 
outcome: hypothesis (b) 
Mutual-min is associated with 
lower value of informal loan 
outcome: hypothesis (c) 
Propensity 
Score Method 
Significant supporting results for 
informal loan percentage for India ; 
No significant results for China 
Significant rejecting results for 
informal loan percentage for India ; 
No significant results for China 
Propensity 
Score Method 
Significant supporting results for 
informal loan amount  for India; No 
significant results for China 
Significant rejecting results for 
informal loan amount  for India; No 
significant results for China 
Propensity 
Score Method 
Significant supporting results for 
proportion of the families taking 
informal loan; No significant results 
for China 
Significant rejecting results for 
proportion of the families taking 
informal loan; No significant results 
for China 
Density 
Function 
Density functions for mutual-max=1 
seem to dominate the density 
functions for mutual-max = 0, for 
informal loan percentage beyond 40 
for both the countries. These finding 
supports the hypothesis. 
Density functions for mutual-min=1 
seems to dominate that for mutual-
min= 0 in the case of India. This 
finding rejects the hypothesis.  
However, in the case of China the 
density functions for mutual-min=0 
seems to dominate that for mutual-
min= 1. This finding supports the 
hypothesis 
 
Structural 
Regression 
Method 
No significant results are obtained 
(for both the countries) for informal 
loan percentage, when all the 
fairness variables are simultaneously 
used. 
No significant results are obtained 
(for both the countries) for informal 
loan percentage, when all the 
fairness variables are 
simultaneously used. 
Structural 
Regression 
Method 
No significant results are obtained 
(for both the countries) for informal 
loan percentage, when only mutual-
max is used. 
Satisfactory significant supporting 
results are obtained (for both the 
countries) for informal loan 
percentage, when only mutual-min 
is used. 
Structural 
Regression 
Method 
No significant results are obtained 
(for both the countries) for informal 
loan amount, when all the fairness 
variables are simultaneously used. 
No significant results are obtained 
(for both the countries) for informal 
loan amount, when all the fairness 
variables are simultaneously used. 
Structural 
Regression 
Method 
Significant supporting results for 
informal loan amount for India, 
when only mutual-max is used; 
Nearly significant supporting results 
for China. 
Significant rejecting results for 
informal loan amount for India, 
when only mutual-min is used; 
significant supporting results for 
China. 
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7.5. Conclusion 
It has been emphasized that large numbers of families in rural areas of developing 
countries engage in informal lending and borrowings among friends and relatives. 
Also informal debts constitute a large percentage of total loan portfolios of these 
people. Many of these families depend on such borrowing as they are credit rationed 
in the formal market and also many of these families prefer informal loans. Analysis 
of household survey data from India and China reveals that– (i) informal loans are 
preferred by families having less assets and income, (ii) Informal loans are preferred 
by families who have been denied formal credit more often for lack of collateral, (iii) 
informal loans are of comparatively smaller size, (iv) more informal loans are taken by 
families who prefer taking loans from friends and relatives, and (v) informal loans are 
more often used for risk management purposes. These findings   have important policy 
implications.  
The main objective of this chapter is to analyze the significance and underlying 
motives of such informal financial transactions.  A detail analysis and evidence related 
to risk sharing motives for these financial transactions have been presented in Chapter 
6. 
 However risk sharing motive does not include social preferences such as altruism, 
trust, reciprocity and fairness, which seem to be important for such financial 
transactions. People gain utility both from material payoff and also from their belief 
on the notions of trust and reciprocity.  The primary contribution of this chapter is to 
explain the fairness as an important motive underlying the informal financial 
transactions among relatives and friends. Using fairness equilibrium framework 
proposed by Rabin (1993), important   results are obtained, which explain informal 
borrowing and lending as mutual-max fairness equilibrium (Rabin 1993) outcome. 
The outcomes are mutual –max when each person maximizes the other’s material 
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payoffs.  And hence if significance on mutual-max equilibrium is obtained then 
fairness can be advanced as an important motive for explaining such informal 
financial transactions.  
These results are empirically tested using household survey data from China and India. 
In the survey conducted in India and China, specific questions were asked to families 
that would reveal whether the families have preferences for mutual-max or mutual-
min social interactions. Overall about 75 percent families in China (65 percent in 
India) demonstrate preferences for mutual-max reciprocation, whereas these 
percentages for mutual-min reciprocation are respectively about 40 percent and 50 
percent for China and India. These findings suggest that mutual-max equilibrium is 
more likely to evolve in the fairness equilibrium context and it may be an important 
explanation of risk sharing behaviors. 
The preferences for mutual-max and mutual-min reciprocations are found to be not 
mutually exclusive in the case of both the countries. A large percentage of families are 
found to be showing preferences for both types of fairness reciprocities and also good 
number of families show preferences for neither of these. However it is also found that 
preference for mutual-max   behaviors dominates the preference for mutual-min 
behavior. Further it has been also shown that social preferences for mutual-max and 
mutual-min can be explained by several demographic, socio-economic and other 
behavioral variables. Moreover both these preferences are positively correlated - 
implying that for a large number of people both these types of reciprocations go 
together.  
Because of this complexity of overlapping preferences, first propensity score method 
is used to compare the outcomes of informal borrowings related to mutual-max and 
mutual-min fairness reciprocities. Using this method noteworthy results are obtained 
which are mentioned as following: 
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1. In the case of India, the percentages of informal loan, informal loan amount, and the 
percentage of families using such loans are significantly higher for families showing 
preferences for Mutual-max reciprocity in comparison to the families who do not 
show preferences for such reciprocity. In the case of China no such significant results 
are obtained. 
2. However it is observed that in the case of India, all three outcomes are also 
significantly higher for the families showing preferences for mutual-min reciprocity in 
comparison to the families who do not show such preferences. This is against the 
conjecture.  In the case of China, the results are similar but not significant.  One reason 
may be that mutual-min and mutual-max categorization is not mutually exclusive. The 
propensity score method is used to make such assignments random conditional on 
observables, but apparently this method has its own limitations. Another reason may 
be that, informal lending and borrowing are driven by several motives and fairness 
motive is one among these.  
3. But when the probability density graphs are plotted, it is observed that in the case of 
both the countries the density functions for Mutual-max=1 seem to dominate the 
density functions for Mutual-max = 0, for informal loan percentage beyond 40 . 
Overall these findings give credence to assertion that fairness can be advanced as an 
important motive for explaining informal financial transactions.  
Further structural regression equations are used to estimate the significance of fairness 
variables   mutual-max, mutual-min and their interaction. For informal loan amount, 
satisfactorily significant results are obtained.  In the first set of specifications when all 
fairness variables are included in the regression, appropriate signs are obtained on 
mutual-max, but the coefficients are not significant. However in the second set of 
specifications when only mutual-max is used, positive and significant coefficients are 
obtained on it, particularly for India. However, for mutual-min the results support the 
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proposed hypothesis in the case of China only and the results reject the hypothesis in 
the case of India. For informal loan percentage, no significant results are obtained for 
mutual-max reciprocity, but hypothesis supporting and nearly significant results are 
obtained for mutual-min.  Income difference is found to be positively associated with 
informal loan amount. Essentially the results suggest that fairness reciprocation 
motives mainly preferences for Mutual-max significantly influence informal loans 
transactions in rural areas of developing countries. 
Also the data reveals (Tables 7.12 and  7.16) that a substantial number of respondents 
would lend to a friend or relative even if that friend or relative had previously denied 
them a loan, and further would expect to be able to borrow from a friend or relative if 
they themselves had previously denied a loan. Further, on the margin the finding of a 
sub population (about 8%) that fall into the Mutual Min category does not allow us to 
fully refute the existence of a mutual min. These results, coupled with the strong 
categorization of Mutual Max lead us to believe that the informal financial 
transactions are also driven by the motives of altruism and not purely the fairness 
reciprocity as Rabin’s model predicts. In totality Rabin’s model of fairness and 
reciprocity when applied to explain the informal lending and borrowing is not perfect 
but this seems to be an excellent starting place to incorporate social preferences for 
explaining the informal lending and borrowing among relatives and friends. 
Additionally the empirical investigations of the analytical results have been done using 
the household survey data from China and India. The rural areas of these countries are 
economically similar but socially and culturally different. Such similarities and  
dissimilarities facilitates in inferring the importance of the unobserved social and 
cultural factors shaping the underlying motives of informal financial transactions 
among friends and relatives in these areas. For example, the econometric analysis 
related with risk sharing motive for informal financial transactions present quite 
  324
similar results so far the sign and significance of various covariates are concerned. 
Whereas, such results for fairness motive (mutual-max and mutual-min) are different.  
One reason for this can be that, risk sharing motive depends only on material 
considerations, but fairness motives seem to be strongly influenced by social and 
cultural factors. 
Important limitations of this chapter are: 
1. The non availability of detail data set on informal lending, borrowings and 
repayment after realization of certain non covariant shocks makes the estimations of 
the coefficients and inferences approximate.  
2. Preferences for fairness motives such as mutual-max and mutual-min are measured 
based on responses by heads of families on specific survey questions. However more 
insights can be gained by running field or laboratory experiments.  
Future research working on these suggested improvements may further clarify the 
significance of various motives which sustain informal lending and borrowing among 
friends and relatives. 
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion 
 
This dissertation’s main motivation is to investigate the significance and mechanics of 
informal lending and borrowing among close acquaintances such as relatives and 
friends in the rural areas of developing countries. The term mechanics here has wide 
connotations in the sense that, this dissertation aspires to unravel the pertinent 
questions such as –(i)  why do these families engage in such financial transactions; (ii) 
in what way the non availability of needed amount of credit can affect their various 
livelihood choices and why do these families need  credit and insurance coverage for 
various production and risk management purposes and; (iii)  why the issues related 
with risk sharing and consumption smoothing is a central concern for these families; 
and  (iv) what are the underlying human motives that sustains such informal lending 
and borrowing. All these questions have important policy implications.  
To address these questions in a tractable and comprehensible manner the dissertation 
is divided into chapters such that any one chapter conducts a detail enquiry into a 
pertinent question. The five key chapters in this dissertation are mentioned as 
following: 
1. “Chapter 3:  Credit Rationing: A Theoretical and an Empirical Analysis”. This 
chapter’s central objective is to investigate into the issues related with credit 
rationing in the formal credit markets of the rural areas, as large number of 
families engage in informal financial transactions because they are not able to get 
required amount of credit from the formal credit markets, such as banks and rural 
credit cooperatives. 
2. “Chapter 4: Impact of Credit Constraints on Livelihood Choices”. This chapter’s 
central objective is to investigate into the question; in what way the non 
availability of needed amount of credit can affect their various livelihood choices. 
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3. “Chapter 5: The Economics of Risk Sharing and Consumption Smoothing”. This 
chapter’s central objective is to investigate into the question why the issues related 
with risk sharing and consumption smoothing is a central concern for these 
families and what the widely used mechanisms for that are. 
4. “Chapter 6: The Economics of Informal Lending and Risk Sharing Motive”. This 
chapter’s central objective is to examine the risk sharing and consumption 
smoothing motive that may explain such informal financial transactions. 
5. “Chapter 7: The Economics of Informal Lending and Fairness Motive”. This 
chapter’s central objective is to investigate whether the fairness reciprocity in 
terms of fairness equilibrium framework (Rabin, 1993) can be an important motive 
underlying the informal financial transactions among relatives and friends. This 
proposed line of research is the chief contribution of this dissertation.  
Furthermore, in each of these chapters, the analytical results guided by the important 
objectives of the chapters have been empirically investigated using the household 
survey data from China and India and suitable econometric methods and appropriate 
identification strategies.  
The significant findings of these chapters, limitations of the findings and proposed 
further research are summarized chapter wise as following. For the ease of reading the 
objectives of these chapters are reiterated.   
 
8.1. Chapter 3:  Credit Rationing: A Theoretical and an Empirical Analysis  
The main objective of this chapter is to assess credit-rationing problem in formal 
credit markets of rural areas of developing countries. 
Objective 1: Develop an analytical model that can explain both type I and type II 
credit rationing in the formal credit markets of the rural areas in the developing 
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countries. This analysis helps in understanding the significance of various factors that 
influence credit rationing of the families in these areas. 
Using the asymmetric information framework and  assuming that probability of a 
project’s success positively depends on endowment vectors of a borrower, both type I 
and type II credit rationing  have been demonstrated. It has been shown that market 
equilibrium is attained by usage of loan size, interest rate and collateral requirements 
as screening and incentive devices. 
Objective 2: Understand the disaggregated welfare implications of such credit 
rationing.  This will help in understanding, in what manner different types of families 
are affected by such credit rationing. 
Welfare implications of credit rationing has been analyzed and it has been 
demonstrated that net welfare loss occurs in equilibrium in which the good type 
borrower sustains loss in the case of adverse selection and both good and bad type of 
borrowers may sustain loss in the case of moral hazard problem. 
Objective 3: Analyze the price responsiveness of loan demand and also understand 
how it is associated with the household assets of a family. The analysis related with 
this objective and objective 2 have important policy implications related with Pareto 
improving interventions in these credit markets. 
The analysis also suggests that the loan demand is price inelastic. It is further found 
that the absolute value of price responsiveness increases with interest rate and also it 
decreases with increasing value of family assets. Based on these findings it has been 
suggested that the policies which help in addressing these information asymmetry 
problems particularly loosening the incentive compatibility constraints of bad (poor) 
borrowers, such as loan guarantee, subsidies or other supports may increase efficiency.  
Objective 4: Estimate the extent of credit rationing with the help of analytical results 
and by using household survey data from China and India and by employing suitable 
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econometric methods. This analysis helps in understanding the severity of credit 
rationing in the formal credit markets of these rural areas and also helps in learning the 
significance of various factors that can explain such credit rationing. 
It has been found that large parts of people in these areas suffer from considerable 
amount of credit rationing. The survey data and econometric analysis suggests that 
about 65 percent rural households in India and about 56 percent rural households in 
China face credit rationing (both type I and type II) in the formal credit market.  The 
significance of assets endowment and collateral posting ability has been found as 
important explanatory variables for credit rationing. More than 50 percent families in 
both the countries ascribed lack of collateral as the main reason for denial of formal 
loans. Also about 70 percent families in China and 35 percent families in India feel 
deterred to obtain formal loan because of high interest rates. 
Objective 5: Investigate the prevalence of information asymmetry in the formal credit 
market of the rural areas of developing Countries. This analysis will help in validating 
the assumption of prevalence of information asymmetry in the formal credit markets 
of these areas. This asymmetric information framework has been used in Objective 1. 
A test, positive correlation test, has been proposed to test for information asymmetry 
in these credit markets and significant results are obtained. The significance of these 
tests lie in presenting empirical evidence of prevalence of information asymmetry in 
formal credit markets in these economies although individual significance of adverse 
selection and moral hazard is not distinguished. 
 
However the empirical findings would have been more robust if data on actual amount 
of collateral posted could have been obtained, but apparently this is difficult. Another 
improvement in empirical analysis can be made if some good instrument of interest 
rate is identified to take care of endogeneity of interest rate. Also if panel data on 
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observations are available then unobserved heterogeneities can be controlled and also 
adverse selection and moral hazard effects can be separated in assessing the 
prevalence of information asymmetry in the credit market. Future research may pick 
up on these ideas and can come up with more insights on functioning of credit 
markets. 
 
8.2. Chapter 4: Impact of Credit Constraints on Livelihood Choices 
Objective 1: Develop an analytical model that may help in understanding the effects 
of credit constraints on agriculture input applications.  
Investigation of impacts of credit constraints on farm input applications has been done 
using a static optimization framework. The analysis demonstrates that a credit 
constrained farmer uses suboptimal amount of farm inputs when the credit constraint 
is binding. Furthermore, if credit constraint tightens beyond a threshold level then the 
farming may not be remunerative and he prefers wage labor. 
Objective 2: Develop an analytical model that may help in understanding the effects 
of credit constraints on the wage market outcomes for the families living in rural areas 
of the developing countries. 
Investigation of impacts of credit constraints on wage seeking has been done using a 
static optimization framework. The analysis demonstrates that when the credit 
constraint is binding and furthermore, if credit constraint tightens beyond a threshold 
level then the farming may not be remunerative and number of people prefers wage 
labor. However, increasing number of wage seekers put a downward pressure on wage 
and thus wage market outcome is also adversely affected. 
Objective 3: Analyze the impact of credit constraints on various livelihood choices 
such as, capital investment (physical and human), consumption, leisure, and decision 
to either become an entrepreneur or wage seeker. This analysis has been done using 
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dynamic optimization framework. The process of borrowing, investment, outcome, 
consumption, and repayment evolves over time in an individual’s life cycle.  Hence 
learning the dynamics (and steady state equilibrium –if that exists) of these choice 
variables may strengthen our understanding of influence of borrowing constraints on 
above choices of an individual over her life cycle.  
Analysis of impact of credit constraints on various livelihood choices such as, capital 
investment (physical and human), consumption, leisure, and decision to either become 
an entrepreneur or wage seeker has been done using dynamic optimization framework.  
The results demonstrate that credit constraints affect consumption smoothing, and 
physical capital and human capital accumulation are also adversely affected. 
Furthermore comparative levels of physical capital and human capital accumulation 
influence the decisions of becoming an entrepreneur or wage seeker. 
Objective 4: Using household survey data from China and India, and suitable 
econometric methods; empirically investigate the effects of credit constraints on 
agriculture input applications, food security, and health and educational attainments. 
 Using suitable econometric methods and the household survey data from China and 
India it has been shown that credit constraints negatively affect food consumption, 
farm inputs applications, and health and educational attainments. 
However the empirical findings would have been more robust if data can be obtained 
either pertaining to some natural experiment or ideally relating to a randomized 
experiment. However, it is difficult, expensive and time consuming to get access to 
such data sets. Also if panel data on observations are available then unobserved 
heterogeneities can be controlled. Future research may pick up on these ideas and can 
come up with more insights on impacts of credit constraints. 
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8.3. Chapter 5: The Economics of Risk Sharing and Consumption Smoothing  
Objective 1: Analyze the risk sharing and consumption smoothing motivations of the 
families who live in rural areas of the developing countries. This analysis will help in 
understanding the importance of risk sharing and consumption smoothing motives in 
the presence of credit constraints and incomplete insurance markets. 
Majority of the families living in rural areas of the developing countries are exposed to 
income process which is quite volatile showing high values of coefficient of variation. 
The coefficients of variation of farm income in both the countries are found to be 
around 34 percent, which is reasonably high. The survey data also reveals that the 
families in these areas face various types of risks and uncertainties. In absence of 
adequate access to credit and insurance arrangements often the income fluctuations 
(partially) translate into consumption fluctuations. The analysis shows that rational 
risk averse agents, having convex preferences over goods across various states and 
time periods, will like to smooth consumption across all states and time periods.  
Objective 2: Investigate the risk sharing and consumption smoothing mechanisms of 
the families who live in rural areas of the developing countries. The three important 
mechanisms analyzed are – precautionary savings, risk sharing informal insurance and 
credit transactions.  
In absence of well functioning credit and insurance markets, consumption smoothing 
is a big challenge for these families and they resort to various ex ante and ex post 
measures to smooth their consumptions.  To smooth their consumption and satisfy 
other needs they usually take recourse to - (a) borrow from formal credit market, (b) 
do precautionary savings, (c) enter into mutual risk sharing arrangements, and (d) 
depend on informal borrowing from friends and relatives.  
As large numbers of families are found to be credit constrained, hence the first option 
is of limited significance for risk management purpose. The three important 
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mechanisms used for risk management are; precautionary savings, risk sharing 
insurance and credit arrangements. These mechanisms have been separately analyzed 
in the chapter and useful results are obtained.   
Objective 3: Using household survey data from China and India, and suitable 
econometric methods; empirically investigate the significance of the variables 
associated with these mechanisms.  
Satisfactory evidences of life cycle and precautionary motives for savings are 
obtained. Higher level of household assets and income are found to be positively 
associated with the savings. Also higher values of absolute risk aversion are found to 
be positively associated with the savings. It is also observed that a large number of 
families are not able to save but they seem to attach high importance to the savings. 
Also significant evidences are obtained related to risk sharing insurance arrangements 
and risk sharing credit arrangements. It has been observed that in both the countries 
more than 70 percent families and 90 percent families have engaged in gift 
transactions and loan transactions respectively in emergencies. This demonstrates that 
people do share risk on a large scale and moreover preference for loan transaction 
dominates.  
Further the empirical investigation suggests that the informal loan amount decreases 
with increasing uncertainty in income process and also with increasing risk aversion of 
the agents. However, we could not get supporting inferences for positive association 
of informal loan amount with repayment factor. 
Objective 4: Using household survey data from China and India and the analytical 
results, empirically estimate the willingness of the families to pay for insurance 
coverage (in lieu of a steady income process) as a proportion of their annual income.   
An estimate of coefficient of relative risk aversion and coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion are needed to measure the risk premium and optimal informal loan amount. 
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Risk premium is defined as the minimum amount which a risk averse agent is willing 
to pay to avoid fluctuations in her consumption across dates. The coefficients of 
relative risk aversion of the people have been estimated using a survey question 
related to Binswanger (1981) experiment and also using further approximations. It is 
acknowledged that this way of measuring relative risk aversion coefficient may not be 
rigorous, however for the limited purpose of estimating risk premium of the 
households this may be adequate. Apparently higher level of household assets, 
income, and education level are associated with lower level of risk aversion. Also the 
level of risk aversion seems to be increasing with age of the respondent. 
Using the survey data from China and India, the magnitude of the proportionate risk 
premium is computed which is found to be in the range of 15-20 percent. This 
demonstrates that risk is a major concern for rural people and they are willing to pay 
for insurance coverage as high as 15- 20 percent of annual income.  
However, some of the weaknesses of the estimations are as following: 
4. The coefficients of relative risk aversion and absolute risk aversion of the families 
are measured approximately. Rigorous estimations of these coefficients using 
repeated observations on the choices made by the families related to consumption 
and production activities (Bar-Shira et.al., 1997) may improve the inferences on 
the results.  
5. The variability of income of the households is also measured based on the 
perceptions of the families. Here also using repeated observations on income, may 
give better measurement of the variance of households’ income. 
6. Also in a cross section data, we are not able to control for the unobserved 
heterogeneities of the households. The availability of panel data may resolve the 
omitted variable bias caused by this inadequacy. 
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However this chapter provides helpful insights on risk the sharing and consumption 
smoothing motivations and mechanisms of the families living in rural areas of 
developing economies. 
 
8.4. Chapter 6: The Economics of Informal Lending and Risk Sharing Motive 
Objective 1: Investigate the significance of informal lending and borrowing among 
friends and relatives in rural areas of the developing countries. This analysis helps in 
understanding the magnitude of informal financial transaction among friends and 
relatives in these areas. 
It has been observed that in both the countries more than 70 percent and 90 percent 
families have engaged in gift and loan transactions respectively in emergencies. This 
demonstrates that people do share risk on a large scale and moreover preference for 
loan transaction dominates. 
Analysis of household survey data from India and China about informal loans reveal 
that– (i) these are preferred by families having less assets and income, (ii) these are 
preferred by families who have been denied formal credit more often for lack of 
collateral, (iii) these loans are of comparatively smaller size, (iv) these loans are often 
taken by families who prefer taking loans from friends and relatives, and (v) informal 
loans are more often used for risk management purposes. These findings   have 
important policy implications.  
Objective 2: Develop and analytical framework to investigate the risk sharing and 
consumption smoothing motive that may explain such informal financial transactions. 
This analysis helps in understanding the mechanics of informal financial transactions 
and also helps in characterizing the loan amount, state contingent repayments, and 
default rates in equilibrium.  
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A detail analysis of risk sharing motive for informal lending and borrowing among 
friends and relatives has been presented, and useful results are obtained. This line of 
reasoning explains it as a sub game perfect equilibrium outcome of repeated 
interactions among the households.   The primary contribution of this chapter is to 
characterize the loan amount, state contingent repayments, and default rates in 
equilibrium.  
Objective 3:  Using household survey data from China and India, and suitable 
econometric methods; empirically investigate the significance of the risk sharing 
motive explaining the informal lending and borrowing among friends and relatives. 
To test for risk sharing ideally the data on loan transactions among friends and 
relatives after some shocks are needed. Also observations on repayment and default 
are needed. However, collecting such data is greatly time consuming   and arduous. To 
resolve this problem, a simple strategy is devised, that may identify risk sharing 
motive.  The identification strategy employed is that lower the income of a family 
from the average village income is more the informal borrowing will be done by that 
family for risk management. This is the best approximation achieved in the absence of 
availability of data on partner’s income with whom a particular household is doing 
financial transactions. For both the countries significant evidences are obtained related 
to risk sharing motives explaining informal lending and borrowing.  
However, for improved inferences on the risk sharing motives of informal loan 
transactions following suggestions are made: 
1. For better inferences on risk sharing motives, data on loan transactions among 
friends and relatives after some shocks are needed. Also observations on repayment 
and default are needed.  
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2. Also in a cross section data, we are not able to control for the unobserved 
heterogeneities of the households. The availability of panel data may resolve the 
omitted variable bias caused by this inadequacy. 
3. Well measured values of the coefficients of relative risk aversion and absolute risk 
aversion of the families (as suggested in the Chapter 5) may help us in understanding 
the nature of associations of risk aversion of the families and informal loan transaction 
among friends and relatives.  
Despite these limitations, this chapter provides helpful insights on risk sharing motives 
of informal lending and borrowing among close acquaintances   of the families living 
in rural areas of developing economies. 
 
8.5. Chapter 7: The Economics of Informal Lending and Fairness Motive 
Objective 1: Risk sharing motive does not include social preferences such as altruism, 
trust, reciprocity and fairness, which seem to be important for these financial 
transactions. A growing body of evidence in literature suggests that people are also 
strongly motivated by these social preferences (apart from material gains) which can 
not be ignored in social interactions47.  Hence it is important to understand the 
significance of these social preferences that may supplement our understanding of the 
underlying motives that sustain the informal financial transactions among relatives and 
friends in rural areas of the developing countries. 
In the survey conducted in India and China, specific questions were asked to families 
that would reveal various social preferences of the families related to lending and 
borrowing among friends and relatives. The summary statistics of these social 
preferences are presented in Table 8.1 for India and in Table 8.2 for China. Evidently 
the social preferences such as altruism, trust, reciprocity, and fairness seem to be quite 
                                                 
47 For a good review see Fehr and Schimdt (2006) 
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significant which may partly explain informal financial transactions among friends 
and relatives in rural areas of the developing countries. 
Table 8.1: Summary Statistics of Important Social Preference Variables (India) 
 
Variable (Binary Variables ; 1=yes, 0=no) Comment Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Trusts that informal loan will be rapid (trust1) Trust 399 0.79 0.40 
Will lend even does not trust that loan will be repaid(trust2) Altruism 399 0.45 0.50 
Will lend or borrow even they have refused earlier (alt1) Altruism 399 0.79 0.41 
Stronger version (and conditions) of (alt1) Altruism 399 0.27 0.45 
Strong guilty feeling on defaulting  informal loan Reciprocity 399 0.30 0.46 
Strong guilty feeling on defaulting  formal loan Reciprocity 399 0.32 0.45 
Mutual-min Reciprocity fairness 399 0.51 0.50 
Mutual max Reciprocity fairness 398 0.64 0.48 
Mutual max and Mutual-min Reciprocity fairness 399 0.44 0.50 
Note: In the scale of 1-8, Strong guilty feelings, corresponds to value 8 
  
Table 8.2: Summary Statistics of Important Social Preference Variables (China) 
 
Variable (Binary Variables ; 1=yes, 0=no) Comment Obs Mea
n 
Std. 
Dev. 
Trusts that informal loan will be rapid (trust1) Altruism 1535 0.90 0.30 
Will lend even does not trust that loan will be repaid(trust2) Altruism 1538 0.62 0.49 
Will lend or borrow even they have refused earlier (alt1) Altruism 740 0.81 0.39 
Stronger version (and conditions) of (alt1) Reciprocity 740 0.52 0.50 
Strong guilty feeling on defaulting  informal loan Reciprocity 1540 0.54 0.50 
Strong guilty feeling on defaulting  formal loan fairness 1540 0.44 0.50 
Mutual-min Reciprocity fairness 741 0.40 0.49 
Mutual max Reciprocity fairness 741 0.73 0.45 
Mutual max and Mutual-min Reciprocity  1540 0.15 0.36 
 
Objective 2:  Develop an analytical model using fairness equilibrium framework 
proposed by Rabin (1993) to explain the fairness reciprocity as an important motive 
underlying the informal financial transactions among relatives and friends. Here 
outcomes are mutual –max when each person maximizes the other’s material payoffs 
and mutual-min when each person minimizes the other’s payoff. And hence if mutual-
max equilibrium dominates the mutual-min equilibrium, then fairness can be advanced 
as an important motive for explaining such informal financial transactions. Informal 
borrowing and lending can be explained as mutual-max fairness equilibrium outcome.  
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Using fairness equilibrium framework proposed by Rabin (1993), an analytical model 
is developed which gives two  important   results – (i) When both participants feel 
hostile to each other then in one shot game of lending, borrowing and repayment 
game, no lending, borrowing  or repayment takes place. This is mutual-min fairness 
equilibrium. (ii) When both participants have kind feelings for each other then lending 
and borrowing sustains even in one shot game. Strictly positive amount of lending, 
borrowing, and repayment take place. This is mutual-max fairness equilibrium.  Thus 
this analysis explains informal borrowing and lending as mutual-max fairness 
equilibrium (Rabin 1993) outcome. Moreover the mutual-max fairness equilibrium 
works well if the ratio of endowments of agents is bounded between 1 and 2.30, as too 
much income differences may prompt bigger default with larger sums of money in one 
shot game. 
 
Objective 3: Using household survey data from China and India and suitable 
econometric methods and appropriate identification strategies; empirically investigate 
the results related to fairness reciprocation (mutual-max and mutual-min) motives and 
informal lending and borrowing.   In the survey conducted in India and China, specific 
questions were asked to families that would reveal whether the families have 
preferences for mutual-max or mutual-min social interactions.  
 
Using household survey data from China and India and suitable econometric methods, 
the empirical findings suggest mixed evidences on fairness reciprocity as underlying 
motives for these informal financial transactions. These findings are discussed as 
following:  
1. Overall about 75 percent families in China (65 percent in India) demonstrate 
preferences for mutual-max reciprocation, whereas these percentages for mutual-
  344
min reciprocation are respectively about 40 percent and 50 percent for China and 
India. These findings suggest that mutual-max equilibrium is more likely to evolve 
in the fairness equilibrium context and it may be an important explanation of 
informal financial transactions.  
2. Social preferences for mutual-max and mutual-min can be explained by several 
demographic, socio-economic and other behavioral variables. Moreover both these 
preferences are positively correlated, implying that for a large number of people 
both these types of reciprocations go together, that may depend on the 
circumstances of interactions.  
3.  However, in the aggregate preferences for mutual-max dominate.  The preferences 
for mutual-max and mutual-min reciprocations are found to be not mutually 
exclusive in the case of both the countries. A large percentage of families are 
found to be showing preferences for both types of fairness reciprocities and also 
good number of families show preferences for neither of these.  
4. Because of this complexity of overlapping preferences, first propensity score 
method is used to compare the outcomes of informal borrowings related to mutual-
max and mutual-min fairness reciprocities. Using this method noteworthy results 
are obtained which are mentioned as following. 
a. In the case of India, the percentages of informal loan, informal loan 
amount, and the percentage of families using such loans are significantly 
higher for families showing preferences for Mutual-max reciprocity in 
comparison to the families who do not show preferences for such 
reciprocity. In the case of China no such significant results are obtained. 
b. However it is observed that in the case of India, all three outcomes are also 
significantly higher for the families showing preferences for mutual-min 
reciprocity in comparison to the families who do not show such 
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preferences. This is against the conjecture.  In the case of China, the results 
are similar but not significant.  One reason may be that mutual-min and 
mutual-max categorization is not mutually exclusive. The propensity score 
method is used to make such assignments random conditional on 
observables, but apparently this method has its own limitations. Another 
reason may be that, informal lending and borrowing are driven by several 
motives and fairness motive is one among these.  
c. But when the probability density graphs are plotted, it is observed that in 
the case of both the countries the density functions for Mutual-max=1 seem 
to dominate the density functions for Mutual-max = 0, for informal loan 
percentage beyond 40. 
d. Overall these findings give credence to assertion that fairness can be 
advanced as an important motive for explaining informal financial 
transactions.   
5.  Further structural regression equations are used to estimate the significance of 
fairness variables   mutual-max, mutual-min and their interaction. For informal 
loan amount, satisfactorily significant results are obtained.  In the first set of 
specifications when all fairness variables are included in the regression, 
appropriate signs are obtained on mutual-max, but the coefficients are not 
significant. However in the second set of specifications when only mutual-max is 
used, positive and significant coefficients are obtained on it, particularly for India. 
However, for mutual-min the results support the proposed hypothesis in the case of 
China only and the results reject the hypothesis in the case of India. For informal 
loan percentage, no significant results are obtained for mutual-max reciprocity, but 
hypothesis supporting and nearly significant results are obtained for mutual-min.  
Essentially the results suggest that fairness reciprocation motives mainly 
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preferences for Mutual-max significantly influence informal loans transactions in 
rural areas of developing countries. 
Also the data reveals (objective 1) that a substantial number of respondents would lend 
to a friend or relative even if that friend or relative had previously denied them a loan, 
and further would expect to be able to borrow from a friend or relative if they 
themselves had previously denied a loan. Further, on the margin the finding of a sub 
population (about 8%) that fall into the Mutual Min category does not allow us to fully 
refute the existence of a mutual min. These results, coupled with the strong 
categorization of Mutual Max lead us to believe that these informal financial 
transactions are also driven by the motives of altruism and not purely the fairness 
reciprocity as Rabin’s model predicts. In totality Rabin’s model of fairness and 
reciprocity when applied to explain the informal lending and borrowing is not perfect 
but this seems to be an excellent starting place to incorporate social preferences for 
explaining the informal lending and borrowing among relatives and friends. 
Important limitations of this chapter are: 
1. The non availability of detail data set on informal lending, borrowings and 
repayment after realization of certain non covariant shocks makes the estimations of 
the coefficients and inferences approximate.  
2. Preferences for fairness motives such as mutual-max and mutual-min are measured 
based on responses by heads of families on specific survey questions. However more 
insights can be gained by running field or laboratory experiments.  
Future research working on these suggested improvements may further clarify the 
significance of various motives which sustain informal lending and borrowing among 
friends and relatives. 
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Overall this dissertation successfully enquires into the various pertinent issues related 
with widely observed phenomena of informal lending and borrowing among friends 
and relatives in the rural areas of developing countries. This dissertation makes key 
contribution in exploring the significance of underlying motives for such informal 
financial transactions. Particularly the significance of various social preferences, apart 
from risk sharing motive which is exclusively driven by the material gain 
considerations, has been highlighted. Among these the investigation of   the fairness 
reciprocity, in terms of fairness equilibrium framework (Rabin, 1993), as an important 
motive underlying the informal financial transactions among relatives and friends, 
supplements the existing knowledge in this field.  
Also the empirical investigations of the analytical results have been done using the 
household survey data from China and India. The rural areas of these countries are 
economically similar but socially and culturally different. Such similarities and  
dissimilarities facilitates in inferring the importance of the unobserved social and 
cultural factors shaping the underlying motives of informal financial transactions 
among friends and relatives in these areas. For example, the econometric analysis 
related with risk sharing motive for informal financial transactions present quite 
similar results so far the sign and significance of various covariates are concerned. 
Whereas, such results for fairness motive (mutual-max and mutual-min) are different.  
One reason for this can be that, risk sharing motive depends only on material 
considerations, but fairness motives seem to be strongly influenced by social and 
cultural factors. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Cornell University/Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University Survey of 
Villagers to Assess Specific Credit Rationing Issues, Informal Lending among 
Friends and Relatives, and Interest in Weather insurance and Health Insurance 
(Original Version) 
NARRATIVE TO BE READ TO RESPONDENTS: First of all I would like to thank you 
for taking the time to meet with us. This survey should take approximately 50 minutes 
and again I thank you for your time. The survey we are conducting is a joint product 
between Cornell University in the United States and Northwest Agriculture and 
Forestry University. We are interested in collecting information about the problems 
that you face from credit rationing/ borrowing constraints from banks and PAC  and 
the way you respond to them by engaging in informal lending among your friends and 
relatives. We are also interested in the relationships between these risks and your 
interest and ability to obtain weather and   health insurance. Your responses will be 
completely confidential and under no circumstances will your responses be 
identifiable. In addition we understand that you may not have all of the precise 
information available. In these cases all we ask is that you provide us with your best 
estimates or best judgments.  Finally, you have the right to refuse to answer any 
question we might ask. 
 
Given these objectives are you willing to participate in this survey?  Yes    No 
 
If NO then “Ok, that is fine. For our records can you tell us why you do not want to 
participate? 
 
 
 
 
NOTE to interviewer: If answer above is because respondent does not feel they have 
the information we need then ask why and explain again that we only require a best 
effort on their part, and that we expect that not all respondents will have precise 
information. And then ask if they will reconsider. 
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NOTE to interviewer: If answer above is related to privacy issues, then remind 
respondent that their participation will be most helpful to our research and that they 
will remain anonymous and that their privacy is guaranteed. And then ask if they will 
reconsider.  
 
IF YES….” Thank you very much for your consent. Let us begin. We would like to 
start off by asking some general questions about your farm household”……. Go to 
question 1. 
A: Farm Characteristics and Farmer Risk Attitude  
0. a. Sex of the head of household. ________Male; ___________Female.        
0. b. What is your age ___________________. 
1.  From what village are you reporting?               _____________________ 
2. How many years have you been farming?     ___________________________ 
3. What is the total size (1 acre = 6.07 Mu) of your farm?  _______________________ 
4. Please list the top five crops and sales in order of revenue from the most valuable to 
the least valuable 
 Rank Crop Total Sales 
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
  
5. Is your farm your major source of income?__________ Yes   __________ No. 
6. What was the total household income in the past year from all sources (best guess) 
______________  
7. Please approximate the percent of your income in Q4 from your entire farming 
operation _______________ (INTERVIEWER: Prod for this number. If they do not 
know exactly then say “we do not need an exact number just an approximate number” 
or “was it less or more than 50%, less than 25% etc until a number is obtained.)  
  
8. Including yourself how many people live in this house ________________ 
(INTERVIEWER: this is the total number of people sharing the house of the 
respondent including children, parents etc.) 
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9. Among Children in the household 
a.  How many are in elementary school?  ____________,  
b. How many are in high school? ______________,  
c. How many are in college (university)? ________________. 
        9. 0.  What is your highest education level: a) Never Went to  School___  
b)Some elementary school ___ c) Completed Elementary School_______ d) 
Some  high school____ e) Completed High School ___ f) Some  University or 
college____ g) Completed College  or  University____.  
10. In your house is there a family member suffering from severe sickness? YES_____, 
NO___ 
 
INTERVIEWER “Thank you that is very helpful. Now I would like to ask you some questions 
about your attitudes towards risk and the risks that you face on your farm” 
B.  Sources of Risk and Risk Perceptions 
11. Please indicate if you are willing or not willing to take risks (Circle the most 
appropriate response). 
Statement Not Willing to 
Take Risk 
 Neutral to 
Take risk 
 Willing to 
Take Risk 
I am willing to accept greater 
production risks to increase the chance 
of higher profits 
1 2 3 4 5 
I am willing to take risks with new 
technologies before I see good results 
in other farms 
1 2 3 4 5 
I am willing to take risks with new 
management practices before I see 
good results in other farms 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. For each of the crops listed in question 4, identify the lowest price you believe 
possible, the price that you believe is most likely to be received, and the 
highest possible price you believe possible in the next crop year (2008) 
(INTERVIEWER: Read back crops as listed in Q4 and for each crop prod the 
respondent for lowest, most likely and highest: you may say things like ‘we do 
not need the exact numbers, just your own personal judgment about what the 
prices might be’ by most likely price ask them what price they expect to receive 
in the next harvest. Note: most likely can be the same as lowest and highest) 
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 Crop Lowest possible 
price 
Most likely price Highest possible 
price 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
 
13. For each of the crops listed in question 4, identify the lowest yield you believe 
possible, the yield that you believe is most likely to be received, and the highest 
possible yield you believe possible in the next crop year (2008) (INTERVIEWER: 
Read back crops as listed in Q4 and for each crop prod the respondent for lowest, 
most likely and highest: you may say things like ‘we do not need the exact numbers, 
just your own personal judgment about what the yields might be’ by most likely yield 
ask them what yield they expect to receive in the next harvest. Note: most likely can be 
the same as lowest and highest) 
 Crop Lowest possible 
yield 
Most likely yield Highest possible 
yield 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
 
14. Please indicate how important each of the following weather events is in causing your yields 
to fall below expectations during the planting, growing or harvesting periods. Use a 1 to 5 
scale with 1 = not important, 2 = less important, 3 = neutral, 4 = important, and 5 = very 
important (Circle the most appropriate response). 
(INTERVIEWER: Read back each month to respondent and prod for not important etc). Do 
deficit in rainfall first and then repeat for excessive rainfall) 
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 Deficit in Rainfall 
(Less Than Desirable) 
Excessive Rainfall 
(More Than Desirable) 
Months Not 
Important 
   Very 
Important 
Not 
Important 
   Very 
Important 
January 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
February 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
March 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
April 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
May 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
June 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
July 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
August 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
September 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
October 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
November 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
December 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
15. Please indicate how important each of the following weather events is in causing your yields 
to fall below expectations during the planting, growing or harvesting period. Use a 1 to 5 scale 
with 1 = not important, 2 = less important, 3 = neutral, 4 = important, and 5 = very important 
(Circle the most appropriate response). 
(INTERVIEWER: Read back each month to respondent and prod for not important etc). Do 
excessive heat  first and then repeat for cold weather) 
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 Excessive Heat 
(Hotter Than Desirable) 
Cold Weather 
(Cooler Than Desirable) 
Months Not 
Important 
   Very 
Important 
Not 
Important 
   Very 
Important 
January 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
February 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
March 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
April 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
May 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
June 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
July 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
August 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
September 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
October 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
November 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
December 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
 
INTERVIEWER “Thank you very much for those responses. This is most helpful. Now 
I would like to ask you some questions about how you manage these risks. 
 
C.   Risk Management Options Use and Perceptions  
16. Please indicate how important you believe each item to be in terms of risk 
management in your farm. Then, mark an “X” if you do not use this to manage risk in 
your operation. Scale with 1 = not important, 2 = less important, 3 = neutral, 4 = 
important, and 5 = very important (Circle the most appropriate response). 
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Statement X (Not 
used) 
Not 
Important 
   Very 
Important 
More than one crop, animal, or 
enterprise diversification 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Fields or farms in different 
locations (geographic 
diversification) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Irrigation  1 2 3 4 5 
Spreading sales: selling each 
product over a period of time 
rather than all at once 
(diversified marketing) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Using contracts to market your 
crop in advance at a fixed price 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Government programs   1 2 3 4 5 
Maintaining financial reserves: 
having cash and readily 
convertible assets(e.g. 
machineries, livestock) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Investing off-farm for other 
sources of income 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
D. Crop Insurance Use and Perceptions 
INTERVIEWER: Crop insurance is a common tool used by western farmers. Crop 
insurance will pay you if your crop yield falls below some percentage of your average 
yields. For example if your yield is 1,000 kg/ Mu for a particular crop, insurance may 
provide a payment if actual crop yield falls below 70% of this average. For example if 
actual yield is 500Kg then you would receive a payment based on the difference 
between 700kg and 500 kg (200kg) times the average harvest price. If the price is 
5Yuan then you would receive 5*(700-500)=RMB1,000 but if yields are above 700kg 
you receive nothing. 
 
17. If crop insurance were offered in China do you think that you would purchase crop 
insurance?  
    ______ Regularly ______ Occasionally ______ Some years     ______ Not at all. 
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18. Considering all aspects of the household including the farm, operations, 
house, contents, automobiles, machinery and equipment do you regularly 
purchase insurance for any of the following items: 
a. Life Insurance    Yes_____ No____ 
b. Fire insurance for home and contents Yes_____ No____ 
c. Automobile Insurance    Yes_____ No____ 
d. Health/Medical Insurance  Yes_____ No____ 
e. Protection against crop loss (crop insurance) Yes_____ No____ 
f. Protection against livestock loss (livestock insurance) Yes_____
 No____ 
g. Other ___________________________________________________ 
 
Weather-Based New Insurance Products 
INTERVIEWER: New types of insurance products based on excessive rainfall, deficit rainfall, 
excessive heat or cold weather are being evaluated for potential use in agriculture. For 
example, if you buy deficit rainfall insurance, you will receive a payment if the number of 
inches of rain that fall in your farm during a month or a season is less than what you 
expected. The money you will get is based only on how much shortfall in rainfall you will 
experience. It is not based on how much yield shortfall you experience. Your insurance 
contract will be written based on the historical rainfall data at your local weather station or if 
possible on a weather station on your farm. 
 
19. Please indicate your level of interest in a risk management tool for which would you pay 
a fair price and receive a payment under the following weather events.  Scale with 1 = 
No interest, 2 = Slight interest, 3 = Moderate interest, 4 = High interest, and 5 = Very 
high interest (Circle the most appropriate response). 
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20. Please indicate how important is the stage of operation you would consider protecting 
with weather insurance. Use a 1 to 5 scale with 1 = not important, 2 = less important, 
3 = neutral, 4 = important, and 5 = very important (Circle the most appropriate 
response). 
 
Stages of Operation Not 
Important 
   Very 
Important 
Planting 1 2 3 4 5 
Growing 1 2 3 4 5 
Harvesting 1 2 3 4 5 
 
21. From where do you usually get your temperature and precipitation information? 
a) I do not receive weather forecasts _____________ 
b) Local weather station  ________  
c) Weather station on your farm    ________  
d) Television  ________  
e) Radio  ________  
f) Other sources (Please list ___________________________) 
22. To the best of your knowledge, please approximate how far the local state or 
government weather station is from your farm. 
Weather Events No 
Interest 
   Very 
High 
Interest 
Excessive Rainfall at critical point in 
time 
1 2 3 4 5 
Excessive Heat at critical point in time 1 2 3 4 5 
Deficit in Rainfall over a period of time 1 2 3 4 5 
Cold Weather over a period of time 1 2 3 4 5 
High winds 1 2 3 4 5 
Other (Please list_______) 1 2 3 4 5 
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a. Kilometers _____________  
b. If you do not know distance, please enter Village or Location or nearest weather 
station   _____________________  
c. Don’t know _____________ 
23.  To the best of your knowledge, how do rainfall and temperature readings (throughout 
the summer) recorded at the closest known weather station correspond, with the actual 
rainfall and temperatures at your farm?  
   ____Very Similar   ____ Fairly Similar  ____ A Little Similar  ____ Not at all Similar  
____ Don’t know  
 
F.  Farm Finance and Risk Management 
24. Do you have any debt outstanding? YES  ____ NO ____ 
25. IF YES please indicate the total amount of money you owe including money owed to 
friends, relatives, money lenders, RCC and commercial banks 
___________________________ 
26. If YES Please indicate your farm total debt as a proportion of total assets last year. 
             ____ 0-20%         ____ 21-25%       ____ 26-30%     ____ 31-35%____ 36-40% 
  ____ 41-45%    ____ 46-50%       ____ 51-60%      ____ 61-70%         ____ Over 70% 
   ______ Don’t Know 
27.    If you sell all your assets (home, land, livestocks, agriculture produce etc.) how much 
will you get (in RMB) _____________________.  
 
INTERVIEWER: This may be a difficult question to answer because it places a value on the 
asset values. If respondent does not know or does not understand, simply enter Don’t Know 
28. If Yes Can you please provide the approximate percentage owed to (actually 27) 
a. Relatives,  _______________________ 
b. Friends  _______________________ 
c. Money lender,  _______________________ 
d. RCC  ________________________ 
e. Banks  ________________________ 
f. Other   _________________________ 
INTERVIEWER: Prod to get 100% from a through d. If too difficult then place 
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difference between sum of a+b+c+d  and 100 in ‘other’: If you cannot get 
percentages then prod respondent for actual numbers in RMB. 
 
29. Regarding to your current total amount of debts, assets and 
productivity, what do you think about your debt level? (Use a 1 to 5 scale 
with 1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 = adequate, 4 = high, and 5 = very high (Circle 
the most appropriate response). 
             1 = very low,      2 = low,      3 = adequate,       4 = high,      5 = very 
high 
 
 
30. INTERVIEWER “This is very helpful. Now I would like to ask you about interest 
rates charged on the most recent loan that you have had by source. For each of lender 
types I will list I would like you to provide the ‘ACTUAL’ interest rate charged. If you 
have not borrowed from the lender type I would like you to indicate the interest rate that 
you ‘BELIEVE’ would be charged by the lender. What you believe could be based on 
rates that you have heard from friends or relatives, or any other source that you believe 
reliable.” (INTERVIEWER: In each case read ‘ACTUAL’, ‘BELIEVE’, ‘DON’T 
KNOW’) 
a. Relatives: ACTUAL _____BELIEVE______ DON’T KNOW ______ 
b. Friends: ACTUAL _____BELIEVE______ DON’T KNOW _______ 
c. Money Lender:  ACTUAL _____BELIEVE_______DON’T KNOW _____ 
d. RCC:  ACTUAL _______ BELIEVE_______DON’T KNOW ______ 
e. Banks: ACTUAL _______ BELIEVE_______ DON’T KNOW ______ 
f. Other: ACTUAL _______ BELIEVE_______ DON’T KNOW _______ 
 
31. Have you ever been denied a loan by RCC or bank?  Yes_______ No_______ 
32. If yes what are the major reasons you were denied credit (answer more than one if 
necessary)? 
a. Insufficient collateral ___________ 
b. Crops/Livestock subject to too much price risk  _________ 
c. Subject to too much yield risk. __________ 
d. The crop grown are vulnerable to the extreme weather . ________  
e. I have failed to repay the loan in the past. __________ 
f. Bank does not believe I am trustworthy .___________ 
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g. My bank doesn’t believe that I earned enough income  ________ 
h. The repayment schedule required by RCC does not match the timing of sales 
from my farm. ____ 
 
33. Have you been able to obtain as much credit as you need from RCC or bank? 
a. Never _________________________ 
b. Sometimes ______________________ 
c. If b. “approximately what percentage of loans that you ask for are provided in the 
full amount that you requested ________________________________ 
d. Always _________________________ 
 
34. Have you ever been late in repaying a loan? (INTERVIEWER: By ‘being late’ we 
mean that payment was not promptly paid as agreed upon by the lender, but 
payment was eventually made) 
a. Relative  Yes _____ No____ 
b. Friend  Yes _____ No____ 
c. Money Lender Yes _____ No____ 
d. RCC  Yes _____ No____ 
e. Commercial Bank Yes _____ No____ 
f. Other  Yes _____ No____ 
 
35. Have you ever defaulted (that is not repaid) on a loan? (INTERVIEWER: By 
defaulting we mean that loan was NEVER repaid as agreed upon by the lender) 
 
a. Relative  Yes _____ No____ 
b. Friend  Yes _____ No____ 
c. Money Lender Yes _____ No____ 
d. RCC  Yes _____ No____ 
e. Commercial Bank Yes _____ No____ 
f. Other  Yes _____ No____ 
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INTERVIEWER: Now I would like to ask you some questions about the borrowing 
environment. For these questions please respond to one of the following Strongly Agree, 
Moderatly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree. (Interviewer after reading each 
question repeat the list starting with Strongly agree) 
 
36. Money lenders are more flexible in repayment terms than RCC. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly 
Disagree ____  
 
37. Relatives are more flexible in repayment terms than RCC.  
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly 
Disagree ____  
 
38. Friends are more flexible in repayment terms than RCC. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____  Disagree_____ Strongly 
Disagree ____  
 
39. Borrowing from relatives or friends causes them hardship. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly 
Disagree ____  
 
40. I would be willing to pay more than the RCC interest rate in order to obtain a loan. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly 
Disagree ____  
 
41. Recalling the last time you borrowed money. What was it for ?.(INTERVIEWER 
read the following list) 
a. Health/medicine _______________ 
b. Wedding ____________________ 
c. Funeral _______________ 
d. School tuition  ________________ 
e. Production agriculture (fertilizer, seed, hired labour etc) ______________ 
f. Machinery and equipment ____________ 
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g. House construction. _________________ 
h. Household consumption __________________ 
i. Holiday/vacation ______________________ 
j. Other (Interviewer to write down item)_______________________________ 
 
INTERVIEWER: Thank you for your patience. I have just a few more questions on 
TRUST that I would like to ask you. For these questions please respond to one of the 
following Strongly Agree, Moderately Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree. 
(Interviewer after reading each question repeat the list starting with strongly agree) 
42. If you make a loan to a family member or relative, you TRUST the family 
member/relative to pay it back within a reasonable period of time 
Strongly Agree (5)____ Moderately Agree(4)_____ Agree(3)_____ Disagree(2)_____ 
Strongly Disagree(1) ____  
 
43. If you make a loan to a friend, you TRUST the friend to pay it back within a 
reasonable period of time. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly 
Disagree ____  
 
44. If a family member or relative makes a loan to you the family member does so 
because the family member/relative TRUSTS that you will pay it back in a 
reasonable period of time. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly 
Disagree ____  
 
45. If a friend makes a loan to you the friend does so because the friend TRUSTS that 
you will pay it back in a reasonable period of time. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly 
Disagree ____  
 
46. In your community informal lending between friends and relatives occurs because 
you TRUST one another. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly 
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Disagree ____  
 
47. If you had money available you would lend to a friend or a relative even though you 
MAY NOT TRUST them to repay the loan. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly 
Disagree ____  
 
48. If you needed a loan from a Rural Credit Cooperative but do not have the collateral 
to support the loan, the RCC will lend to you anyway because the RCC TRUSTS 
you to pay it back. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly 
Disagree ____  
 
49. If you needed a loan from a bank but do not have the collateral to support the loan, 
the bank will lend to you anyway because the bank TRUSTS you to pay it back. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly 
Disagree ____  
 
50. If you needed a loan from a Money Lender but do not have the collateral to support 
the loan, the Money Lender will lend to you anyway because the Money Lender 
TRUSTS you to pay it back. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly 
Disagree ____  
 
51. INTERVIEWER: This is the last question. It is a hypothetical situation. Suppose 
that you owed 1,000 RMB to each of a RCC, commercial bank, Money lender, 
friend, relative for a total indebtedness of 5,000 RMB. Now suppose that you had 
available $1,000 RMB to repay the loans. Which of the following is most likely to 
occur (select only 1)? 
a. You would pay back a family member or relative before anyone else 
b. You would pay back a friend before anyone else 
c. You would pay back the RCC before anyone else 
d. You would pay back the commercial bank before anyone else 
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e. You would pay back the money lender before anyone else. 
f. You would pay some money to all of the lenders 
 
 
Guilt questions: 
  
52. a. Have you ever defaulted on a loan from a family member? __ Yes ___     No 
      b. If yes, how guilty did you feel?                     Not guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very 
guilty 
     c.   If no, how much guilt would you have felt if you had defaulted? 
                                                                        Not guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very guilty 
  
53. a. Have you ever defaulted on a loan from a neighbor?  ___ Yes ____         No 
      b. If yes, how guilty did you feel?                     Not guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very 
guilty 
      c.   If no, how much guilt would you have felt if you had defaulted? 
                                                                        Not guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very guilty  
  
54. a. Have you ever defaulted on a loan from an RCC?     ___   Yes   ____           
No 
      b. If yes, how guilty did you feel?                     Not guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very 
guilty 
      c. If no, how much guilt would you have felt if you had defaulted? 
                                                                        Not guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very guilty 
  
55. a. Have you ever defaulted on a loan from another financial institution? 
__Yes __ No 
      b. If yes, how guilty did you feel?                     Not guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very 
guilty 
      c. If no, how much guilt would you have felt if you had defaulted? 
                                                                        Not guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very guilty 
  
56. a. Have you ever defaulted on a loan from a moneylender? __ Yes ____            
No 
      b. If yes, how guilty did you feel?                     Not guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very 
guilty 
      c. If no, how much guilt would you have felt if you had defaulted? 
                                                                        Not guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very guilty 
 
57. What proportion of Household income are you able to save in a year (in RMB): 
a) None     b) Less than 5% c) Between 5 and 10%  d) More than 10% 
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58. If there is a significant reduction in uncertainty in your income would you be more 
likely to (select only 1) 
a) Decrease savings and increase investment in agricultural production 
b) Decrease savings and increase purchases of household consumer goods 
c) Decrease savings and increase travel/vacation 
d) Maintain the same amount of savings 
e) Increase savings slightly 
f) Increase savings a lot 
 
 
59. I am able to borrow needed amount of money from Banks or RCC for 
consumption, education and health purposes? 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree ____ Disagree ____ Strongly Disagree ____  
 
60. I am able to borrow needed amount of money from Banks or RCC for farming 
and business purposes? 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree ____ Disagree ____ Strongly Disagree ____  
 
61. When I am not able to borrow needed amount of money from Banks and RCC for 
consumption, education and health purposes, I find it convenient to borrow from  
(i) Moneylender____ 
(ii) Friends ________ 
(iii) Relatives ________. 
 
62. When I am not able to borrow needed amount of money from Banks and RCC for 
farming and business purposes, I find it convenient to borrow from  
(i) Moneylender____ 
(ii) Friends ________ 
(iii) Relatives ________. 
 
63. Do you have any apprehension of obtaining a loan from a Bank or Rural 
Cooperative – if so indicate the reasons as following? 
 
(a) I have unpaid debts on previous RCC or bank loans. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
(b) Interest rates on RCC or bank loans are higher than interest rates on loans from 
friends or relatives. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
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(c) Interest rates on RCC or bank loans are higher than I am able to pay. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
(d) I lack the collateral to get a loan . 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
  
(e) The RCC or bank is too far for me to travel.  
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
(f) RCC or bank requires too much paper work. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
(g) RCC or bank takes too long in approving loan. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
(h) RCC or bank lender requires a bribe.  
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
(i) I would prefer to borrow from a friend or relative. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
(j)  I would prefer to borrow from a money lender. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
(k) I do not like to be indebted to a bank or RCC. 
 Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
64. If interest rates on RCC or bank loans were lower than current interest rates I 
would be more likely to borrow from a bank or RCC. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
65. If the cost of obtaining a loan (fees, non-interest charges) on RCC or bank loans 
were lower than current costs I would be more likely to borrow from a bank or 
RCC. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
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66. Whether or not you have ever defaulted on a loan from a RCC, Bank, Friend or a 
Relative, which of the following circumstances would most likely be the cause of a 
default in the past or future.  
       a. Lack of resources.  
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
       b. Terms of contract not clear. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
       c. Suffered crop loss, cattle loss. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
       d. Suffered death or major sickness of a family member 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
       e. I diverted the loan for other purpose. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
       f. Other reasons. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
  
 Credit Rationing Model 
 
 67. If I had more land (assets), then I could get a higher loan from a bank or RCC 
without using the assets for collateral. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
68. If I had more land (assets), then I could get a higher loan from a RCC or bank but 
only if I use the assets as collateral.  
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
69. If I had more land (assets), then I could get a higher loan from RCC or bank, at a 
lower interest rate, without using the assets as collateral. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
70. If I had more land (assets), then I could get a higher loan from RCC or bank, at a 
lower interest rate, but only if I use the assets as collateral. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
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____  
 
71. I believe that honest borrowers are compelled to pay higher interest rate, because 
some borrowers do not repay their loan? 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
72. I believe that honest borrowers are not able to obtain a required amount of loan, 
because some of the villagers do not repay their loan or divert the loan. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
73. To obtain a required amount of loan, I would be willing to pay a higher interest 
rate. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
74. To obtain a required amount of loan, I would be willing to post more collateral. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
75. I believe that a borrower who accepts a loan that is very high relative to his farm 
assets is more likely to VOLUNTARILY default on that loan. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree ____ Disagree ____ Strongly Disagree ____  
 
76. I believe that a borrower who accepts a loan, at a higher interest rate is more likely 
to VOLUNTARILY default on that loan. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
Credit Rationing Impact 
 
Please answer the following questions. Interviewer here we use the term ‘borrowing 
constraint’. By borrowing constraint we mean that the farmer cannot obtain all of 
the funds requested from an RCC or bank in the amounts or time frame required. 
 
77. If I faced a borrowing constraint I would use less input than is required for 
maximizing farm income. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
78. If I faced a borrowing constraint I would need wages from off-farm employment.  
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
79. If I faced a borrowing constraint I would not be able to provide a strong education 
and adequate health care for my children. 
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Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
80. If I faced a borrowing constraint my family members (including me) would not be 
able to get adequate food throughout the year. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
81. If I could get adequate credit from a bank or RCC I would  
a) leave agriculture and start a non-farm enterprise _________. 
b) Remain in agriculture and expand agricultural production ________ 
c) Remain in agriculture AND start a non farm business ____________ 
 
 Informal Lending among Friends and Relatives 
 
82. Have you ever received a money gift from a friend that you did not have to repay 
Yes____ No_____. 
 
83. Have you ever received a money gift from a relative that you did not have to 
repay. Yes____ No_____. 
 
84. Have you ever given a money gift to a friend that he or she did not have to repay.  
Yes____ No______. 
 
85. Have you ever given a money gift to a relative that he or she did not have to 
repay. Yes____ No______. 
 
86. Have you ever borrowed money from a friend. Yes____ No_________. 
 
87. Have you ever lent money to a friend. Yes____ No_______. 
 
88. Have you ever borrowed money from a relative. Yes____ No_______. 
 
89. Have you ever lent money to a relative .Yes____. No_______. 
 
90. I would lend money to a friend even if that friend had previously refused a loan to 
me 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
91. I would be able to borrow from a friend even if I had previously refused to lend to 
that friend 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
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92. I would lend money to a relative even if that relative had previously refused a loan 
to me. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
93. I would be able to borrow from a relative even if I had previously refused to lend 
to that relative 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
94. I am able to get a money gift from a relative when I face emergencies (such as 
crop loss, cattle loss, major sickness etc.). 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
95. I am able to get a money gift from a friend when I face emergencies (such as crop 
loss, cattle loss, major sickness etc.). 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
96. I am able to get a loan from a relative when I face emergencies (such as crop loss, 
cattle loss, major sickness etc.). 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
97. I am able to get a loan from a friend when I face emergencies (such as crop loss, 
cattle loss, major sickness etc.) 
strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
98. I am willing to give a money gift to a relative when they face emergencies (such 
as crop loss, cattle loss, major sickness etc.) 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
99. I am willing to give a money gift to a friend when they face emergencies (such as 
crop loss, cattle loss, major sickness etc.)___________. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
100. I am willing to give a loan to a relative when they face emergencies (such as 
crop loss, cattle loss, major sickness etc.). 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
101. I am willing to give a loan to a friend when they face emergencies (such as crop 
loss, cattle loss, major sickness etc.)___________. 
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Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
102. I prefer giving loan at very low interest rate rather than a money gift to friends 
and relatives in the case of emergency. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
103. I prefer getting a loan at very low interest rate rather than a money gift from 
friend and relatives in the case of emergency. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
104. I would rather give a loan at a very low interest rate rather than a money gift to 
friends and relatives for cases not related to emergency. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
105. I would rather get a loan at very low interest rate rather than a money gift from 
friends and relatives for cases not related to emergency__________. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
106. I would prefer not to default in repayment of loans to friends and relatives. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
107. I am able to delay loan repayment to friend and relatives, when I am not able to 
repay because of some emergency. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
108. I allow the delay of loan repayment by friend and relatives, when they are not 
able to repay because of some emergency. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
109. I am able to get the reduction in the interest rate on loan repayment to friends and 
relatives, when I am not able to repay because of some emergency. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
110. I would reduce the interest rate on a loan to friends and relatives, when they are 
not able to repay because of some emergency. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
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111. The more amount I lend to a friend or relative, the more likely it is that they will 
default on the loan. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
112. The community/village pressure helps in the repayment of loans between friends 
and relatives and lowers default. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
 
113. I am able to borrow more when my friend’s and relatives’ income are higher. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
  
114. I find it easier to borrow from friends and relatives if I have repaid loans on 
earlier occasions. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
115. I am more willing to lend to friends and relatives when they have repaid earlier 
loans to me. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
116. I am more likely to give loans to friends and relatives even at a low interest rate 
knowing that he may not repay fully, who have lent/ gifted/repaid money to me on 
earlier occasion. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
117. I am not likely to give loans to friends and relatives even if they offer to pay a 
higher interest rates, who have previously refused to lend/ gift/ repay money to me on 
an earlier occasions. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
118. It is unlikely that I could obtain a loan from a friend or relative, even if I offer to 
pay a higher interest rate, if I have previously refused to lend/ gift/ repay money to 
them on earlier occasions. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____  
 
119. Risk Perceptions and Risk Motives         
"Imagine an honest stranger comes up to you and offers a gamble with the payout 
depending on the flip of a coin. If the coin lands heads you get the amount in the first 
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column and if it lands tails you get the amount in the second column. Each has a 50% 
chance of occurring. If the gamble was repeated by many flips of the coin you would 
expect to receive the amount in the third column. While the odds of receiving the 
amount in the first column are the same as the odds in the second column the high and 
low values are different. Study the six gambles in the table and select the one gamble 
that you would prefer". 
 
Choice Gain in Good luck: 
(RMB): 50% chance 
Gain in Bad luck: 
(RMB): 50% chance 
Expected value 
(RMB) 
1 500 500 500 
2 950 450 700 
3 1200 400 800 
4 1500 300 900 
5 1900 100 1000 
6 2000 0 1000 
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APPENDIX 2 
康奈尔大学/西北农林科技大学 
关于亲朋之间的非正式借贷， 
及农民对天气保险与健康保险兴趣的调查 
 
调查者须知：首先感谢你们在百忙之中参与我们的调查。这项调查大约需要30分钟
，再次感谢各位的参与。我们所做的这个调查是美国康奈尔大学和西北农林科技大
学联合进行的。我们想了解的是你所面临的来自银行和农村信用社的信贷配给和借贷
约束问题，以及你们如何通过向亲戚朋友之间非正式借款来解决这类问题。对于上述
行为中存在的风险，以及你对天气保险和健康保险的兴趣，我们都很想知道。你的答
案将会是保密的，而且绝对不会被辨认出来。另外有些问题你们可能也没有准确可靠
的答案，如果是这样，你只需提供给我们最接近的估计数。当然，你有权拒绝回答我
们提出的任何问题。 
考虑到上述情况，你愿意参与我们的调查吗？ 愿意________    不愿意________ 
如果不愿意，也没有关系。请告诉我们不愿意的理由。 
 
 
 
调查者注意：如果上述理由是因为被调查者不知道准确的信息，我们要了解具体的原因并
向他们再一次说明我们只是希望他们尽力合作，而且我们也并不需要每个被调查者都有准
确的信息。然后请他们重新考虑是否要参与调查。 
 
调查者注意：如果上述理由是因为涉及到被调查者的个人隐私，我们要告诉他们
的参与对我们研究的意义，以及这些调查全都是匿名的，而且会保证他们的隐
私不泄漏。然后请他们重新考虑是否要参与调查。 
 
     
如果回答的是“是”，则“非常感谢你接受调查，我们开始吧。我们想先问一
些一般性的问题，以了解你的家庭情况”。   转到第一问。 
A．农业的特点和农民对风险的态度 
0a.你的家庭户主的性别：         ______________男;  ______________女 
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0b.你的年龄___________ 
1.你所在的村名？____________________________________________ 
2.你已经务农多少年了？  ____________________________________________ 
3.你家农地的面积( 1英亩= 6.07亩)？_______________________________________ 
4. 请按照售收入由高到低的序销 顺列出你家的五种 品农产 比如：玉米、小麦、奶制品等( )和售销 总额。  
 
顺序 农作物 总销售额 
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
5.务农是你的主要收入来源吗？   __________ 是       __________ 否 
6.在过去的一年里，各种来源的家庭总收入是多少？______________________  
7. 请计算第6题中的总收入占你务农开支的比例________________________ 
（调查者：标出这些数字。如果他们不知道准确地数字，就告诉他们“我们不
需要准确地数字，只要一个大概的数字就可以”或“是不是多于或少于50%、
少于20%等直到一个数字被认可”） 
8.包括你在内, 有几口人住在家里？  ______________ 
 
9.家中的孩子 
  a.有几个孩子上小学？______________________________ 
  b.有几个孩子上中学？______________________________ 
  c.有几个孩子上大专（大学）？______________________________ 
 
9.0. 你的教育程度是： 
a.从未上过学__________ 
b.上过小学__________ 
c.小学毕业__________ 
d.上过中学__________ 
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e.中学毕业__________ 
f.上过大专或大学_________ 
g.大专或大学毕业_________ 
 
10.你们家里是否有人患重病？ 有______   没有___________ 
（调查者：“非常感谢你，现在我想问一下你对风险的态度及你目前在农业上所面临的风
险”） 
B.风险的来源和风险观念 
11.请说明一下，你是否愿意承受风险（选一个最合适的答案） 
 
风险描述 不愿意 较不愿
意 
无所谓 较愿
意 
愿意 
我愿意承受较大的生产风险以增加获
得较高收入的机会 
1 2 3 4 5 
在看到其他农户有好的收益之前，我
愿意承受采用新技术的风险。 
1 2 3 4 5 
在看到其他农户有好的收益之前，我
愿意承受采用新的管理方法的风险 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
12.对问题4所列举的各种作物，确定一个你认为可能出现的最低价格、最可能的
价格以及在明年（2008年）很有可能出现的最高价格。 
（调查者：回到问题四中，对被调查者所列举的每一种农作物估计一个可能的最低和
最高价。你可能要告诉他们“我们不需要准确的数字，只写出你自己对这些价格的估
计就可以。”通过这些可能的价格，了解他们对明年农作物的可接受价格的期望是多
少。注：最可能的价格可以和可能的最低和最高价格相同）。 
 
农作物 可能的最低价格 最可能的价格 可能的最高价格
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
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13. 
对问题4所列举的各种作物，确定一个你认为可能的最低产量、最可能的产量以及在明年（
2008年）可能的最高产量。（调查者：读出问题4后的农作物并请被调查者估计每个农作物
所对应的最低产量、最可能的产量及最高产量，应说明“我们不需要准确的数字，只写出
你对这些产量的估计就可以。”通过这些可能的产量，了解他们对明年农作物的可接
受产量的期望是多少。注：最可能的产量可以和可能的最低和最高产量相同）。 
 
农作物 最低产量 最可能的产量 最高产量 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
 
14.以下的天气事件在种植、生长和收获期间可能导致你的产量低于预期的产量。请估计这
些事件的重要性并由低到高的顺序排列，用1至5表示。1表示不重要，2表示不是很重要，3
表示影响不大，4表示重要，5表示非常重要。（圈出最合适的答案） 
（调查者：向被调查者读出每个月，说明每个月的天气情况及其对收入的影响。先回答
雨水不足再回答雨水过量对收入的影响情况） 
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雨水不足 
(低于需要的) 
雨水过多 
(高于需要的) 
月份 
不 
重要 
较不
重要 
没影
响 
较重
要 
非常 
重要 
不重
要 
较不 
重要 
没影 
响 
较重
要 
非常 
重要 
一月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
二月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
三月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
四月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
五月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
六月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
七月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
八月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
九月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
十月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
十一
月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
十二
月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. 
以下的天气事件在种植、生长和收获期间可能导致你的收益低于预期的收益。请估计这些
事件的重要性并按照由低到高的顺序排列，用1至5表示。1表示不重要，2表示不是很重要
，3表示影响不大，4表示重要，5表示非常重要。（圈出最合适的答案） 
（调查者：向被调查者读出每个月并标出不重要的，先回答天气太热再回答天气太冷对
收入的影响情况） 
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 天气过热 
(气温高于需要的温度) 
天气过冷 
(气温低于需要的温度) 
月份 不重
要 
不太
重要 
没影
响 
较重
要 
非常 
重要 
不重
要 
不太 
重要
没影
响 
较重
要 
非常 
重要 
一月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
二月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
三月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
四月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
五月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
六月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
七月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
八月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
九月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
十月 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
十一
月 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
十二
月 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
 
调查者：“非常感谢你的参与，它对我们的研究很有帮助。现在我们想了解一下你如何应
对这些风险。” 
C.风险管理措施的使用和理解 
16.请你指出以下的各个项目在你的农业风险管理中的重要程度，如果不采用这个风险管理
措施请用“x”表示。1表示不重要， 
2表示不是很重要，3没影响，4表示重要，5表示非常重要。（圈出最合适的答案） 
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管理措施风险  
不采
用  
不重
要 
较
不
重
要 
没
影
响 
较
重
要 
非
常 
重
要 
种养多于一种植物、动物（经营多样化）  1 2 3 4 5 
农田或农场在不同的地点(地域多样化)  1 2 3 4 5 
灌溉  1 2 3 4 5 
分散销售：各个时间都销售产品而不
是一次性售出所有产品 (市场多样化) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
采用合同以固定的价格预售农作物  1 2 3 4 5 
参与政府项目  1 2 3 4 5 
维持金融储备:拥有现金及可变现资产(
如机械，牲畜) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
投资非农产业作为收入的其他来源  1 2 3 4 5 
D.作物保险的使用和理解 
调查者：农作物保险是西方农民常用的一种工具。如果你的作物产量低于平均产量一定的
百分比，农作物保险将补偿你的损失。例如，你某个农作物的产量为1000公斤/亩，当你的
农作物实际产量低于这个水平的70%时，农业保险将给你提供补偿。举例来说，如果你的
实际产量为500公斤，你会获得赔偿等于700公斤与500公斤的差量（200公斤）乘以该农作
物的平均价格。如果价格为5元，则你就会获得5*（700-
500）=1000元的补偿，但如果你的产量高于700公斤，就不会得到任何补偿。 
 
17.如果中国推出农作物保险，你将会购买吗？ 
______定期     ______ 偶尔 ______某些年   ______ 不会 
 
18.考虑农户的所有方面，包括农田、农作物经营、房子、财物、汽车、机械和设备，你会
定期为下列项目购买保险吗？ 
a.人寿保险                         是_____ 否____ 
b.房屋和财物火险                   是_____ 否____ 
c.汽车保险                         是_____ 否____ 
d.健康/医疗保险                    是_____ 否____ 
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e.保护农作物免受损失（农作物保险） 是_____ 否____ 
f.保护牲畜免受损失（牲畜保险）     是_____ 否____ 
g.其他___________________________________________________ 
E.新型天气保险产品 
调查者：“我们将要评价在农业中可能应用到的一些和雨水不足或过量、天气过热或过冷
有关的新型保险。例如，你买了雨水不足的保险，如果在一个月或一个季节你农场的降雨
量低于你需要的降雨量，你就会获得一笔赔偿。这笔赔偿金只是以缺水量的多少为计算基
础，而不考虑你的产量降低了多少。只有通过当地气象站或农场自己的气象站测量过历史
降雨量，你的保险合同才能签订”。 
 
19.，如果市场上存在一些定价合理的风险管理工具，这些工具在以下天气事件发生时会提
供一定数额的赔偿，请你估计你对这类风险管理工具的感兴趣程度。使用1到5共5个等级，
1：没兴趣，2：有一点兴趣，3：有兴趣，4：有较高兴趣，5：非常有兴趣。（圈出最合适
的答案） 
天气事件 没兴
趣 
   非常感兴趣
在关键时间降雨量过多 1 2 3 4 5 
在关键时间过热 1 2 3 4 5 
在一段时期降雨过少 1 2 3 4 5 
在一段时期过冷 1 2 3 4 5 
大风 1 2 3 4 5 
其他 (请列出_____________________) 1 2 3 4 5 
 
19. 请标出天气保险在耕种过程中各个阶段的重要性。使用1到5共5个等级，1：不重要
，2：不太重要，3：影响不大，4：重要，5：非常重要。（圈出最合适的答案） 
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耕种 段阶  不重要  没影响  很重要 
种植阶段 1 2 3 4 5 
生长阶段 1 2 3 4 5 
收获阶段 1 2 3 4 5 
21.你通常会从哪里得到气温和降水的信息？ 
a）我不收天气预报_____________ 
b）当地气象站____________ 
c）农户自己的气象站_____________ 
d）电视_____________ 
e）收音机_____________ 
f）其他来源（请列出_____________） 
 
22.据你所知，请估计一下本地区或政府的气象站距离你的农地有多远？ 
g）公里_____________ 
h）如果你不知道距离，请用村庄或地区来形容_____________ 
i）不知道_____________ 
23.据你所知，最近的气象站所报的降雨量和气温（在整个夏季）与你家农地的实际降雨量
和气温是否一致？ 
____非常接近   ____ 较接近   ____ 有点接近    ____ 根本不符    ____ 不知道 
F. 农户融资及风险管理 
24.你有尚未偿还的债务吗？有 ____ 没有 ____ 
25.如果有，说明你欠款的总额，包括你向朋友、亲戚、放款人、农村信用社和
商业银行的借款。 
___________________________ 
26.如果有欠款，请说明您上年的欠款占总资产的比例。 
____ 0-20%   ____ 21-25%  ____ 26-30% ____ 31-35%  ____36-40%  ____41-45%     
  382
____ 46-50%  ____ 51-60%  ____ 61-70%  ____ 超过70%   ______ 不知道 
 
27.如果把你家所有的资产（包括房屋，土地，家畜，农产品等）卖掉，你认为能获得多少
收入？_____________________ 
调查者：“这个问题涉及到资产价值，可能比较难回答。如果被调查者不知道或不理解，
就回答不清楚”。 
28. 如果有尚未偿还的欠款，你能否提供下列欠款占总债务的大概比例？ 
a）欠亲戚 _______________________ 
b）欠朋友_______________________ 
c）欠放款人______________________ 
d）欠农村信用合作社_______________________ 
e）欠银行_______________________ 
f）欠其他_______________________ 
 
（调查者：计算出从a到e的总和是否为100，如果不是100，就将他们的和与100的差额
计入“其他”。如果你不能获得百分数则向被调查者咨询一个确切的人民币金额。） 
 
29. 权衡你目前的债务总额、收入总额和生产能力，你认为你的债务处于何种水平？ 
       很少，         较少，          不多不少，          较多，            很多 
 
30.调查者：“这些将很有帮助。现在我们想了解一下关于你近期主要贷款的利率。对每种
借款类型，请你填写它的实际利率。如果你现在没有这种借款，就填写你认为可能被收取
的利率。这些利率可能是你从朋友、亲戚或其他可靠途径听来的”。（调查者：对每一种
情况都要说明 “实际的利率”“认为的利率”“不知道”） 
a）亲戚            实际_______    认为_______    不知道_______ 
b）朋友            实际_______    认为_______    不知道_______ 
c）放贷者          实际_______    认为_______    不知道_______ 
d）农村信用合作社  实际_______    认为_______    不知道_______ 
e）银行            实际_______    认为_______    不知道_______ 
f）其他            实际_______    认为_______    不知道_______ 
 
31. 农村信用社或银行曾经拒绝给你贷款吗？有_________ 没有________  
32. 如果有，他们拒绝给你贷款的主要原因是什么（如有必要可以选择多个答案）？ 
a）抵押不足___________ 
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b）农作物/牲畜的价格风险过大___________ 
c）产量风险过大___________ 
d）种植的农作物受恶劣天气影响较大___________ 
e）过去有未还清的债务___________ 
f）银行不信任我___________ 
g）银行不相信我能获得足够的收入___________ 
h）农村信用合作社所要求的还款计划与我产品销售时间不匹配________ 
33.你能够从银行或农村信用社获取你所需要的贷款额度吗？ 
a）从不  _________________________ 
b）有时 _________________________ 
   
如果有，那么你得到的贷款数额与你实际要求的贷款数相一致的比例大概是多少_______ 
c）总是_________________________ 
34.你推迟过偿还贷款吗？（调查者：“推迟”的意思是指还款不及时，但却最终偿还了的
。） 
a）亲戚             是_____   否_____ 
b）朋友             是_____   否_____ 
c）放贷者           是_____   否_____ 
d）农村合作信用社   是_____   否_____ 
e）商业银行         是_____   否_____ 
f）其他             是_____   否_____ 
35.你在偿还贷款上违约过吗（即未偿还）？（调查者：我们所说的“违约”是指你的借款
从未偿还） 
a）亲戚             是_____   否_____ 
b）朋友             是_____   否_____ 
c）放贷者           是_____   否_____ 
d）农村合作信用社   是_____   否_____ 
e）商业银行         是_____   否_____ 
f）其他             是_____   否_____ 
 
调查者：“现在我们想要了解一下借款环境。回答这些问题从“非常同意，一般同意，同
意，反对，强烈反对”五个选项中选择”。（调查者读完每个问题后按这个顺序读选项） 
36.在贷款偿还方面，放款者要比农村信用合作社更加通融（灵活）一点 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
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37. 在贷款偿还方面，亲戚要比农村信用合作社更加通融（灵活）一点 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
38. 在贷款偿还方面，朋友要比农村信用合作社更加通融（灵活）一点 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
39. 从亲戚或者朋友那儿借钱会给他们带来经济困难 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
40. 你愿意支付比农村合作信用社更高的利率以获得贷款 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
41.上一次你借钱是为了什么？（调查者：读出下列选项） 
a）健康/医疗_______________ 
b）结婚_______________ 
c）葬礼_______________ 
d）学费_______________ 
e）农业生产（肥料、种子、雇工等等）_______________ 
f）机械和设备_______________ 
g）修建房屋_______________ 
h）家庭消费_______________ 
i）旅游度假_______________ 
j）其他（调查者记录所列举的项目）_______________ 
调查者：“谢谢你耐心的接受调查。我们还想了解关于信用方面的情况。回答这些问题从
“非常同意，一般同意，同意，反对，强烈反对”五个选项中选择”。（调查者读完每个
问题后按这个顺序读选项） 
42.如果你借钱给你的家人或者亲戚，你信任他们会在一个合理的时期内偿还   
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
43.如果你借钱给朋友，是因为你信任他们会在合理的期限内偿还 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
44.你的家人或亲戚借钱给你，是因为他们信任你会在合理的期限内偿还 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
45.你的一个朋友借钱给你，是因为他信任你会在合理的期限内偿还 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
46.你所在的社区中，朋友和亲戚发生借贷关系是因为双方互相信任 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
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47.如果你有多余的钱，即使你不信任亲戚或朋友会归还给你，你也会借给他们 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
48. 
如果你需要从农村信用社贷款，尽管没有抵押担保，信用社也会给你放贷，因为它信任你
会还款 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
49. 如果你需要从银行借钱但是你却没有抵押物，银行会因为信任你一定会归还而借钱给你 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
50. 如果你需要向放款人借钱但却没有抵押物，放款人会因为信任你一定会归还而借钱给你 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
51.调查者：“该问题需要一个假设条件，假如你分别欠农村信用合作社、商业银行、放款
人、朋友和亲戚各1000元钱，合计5000元，而现在你只有1000元钱可用于偿还贷款，下列
各个选项中你将选择哪个？”（只能选择一个） 
    a）你会先偿还家人或者亲戚的钱 
    b）你会先偿还朋友的钱 
    c）你会先偿还农村信用合作社的钱 
    d）你会先偿还商业银行的钱 
    e）你会先偿还放款人的钱 
f）你会付给每方一部分钱 
 
E. 内疚问题 
52.a.你是否曾经没有偿还过亲戚的借款？   是   否 
b.如果是，你感到有多内疚？    不内疚 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 非常内疚 
c.如果否，如果你没有偿还，你感觉会有多内疚？  不内疚 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 非常内疚 
 53. a.你是否曾经没有偿还过邻居的借款？   是   否 
b.如果是，你感到有多内疚？    不内疚 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 非常内疚 
c.如果否，如果你没有偿还，你感觉会有多内疚？  不内疚 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 非常内疚 
54.a.你是否曾经没有偿还过农村合作信用社的贷款？   是   否 
b.如果是，你感到有多内疚？    不内疚 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 非常内疚 
c.如果否，如果你没有偿还，你感觉会有多内疚？ 不内疚 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 非常内疚 
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55.a.你是否曾经没有偿还过其他金融机构的贷款？   是   否 
b.如果是，你感到有多内疚？    不内疚 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 非常内疚 
c.如果否，如果你没有偿还，你感觉会有多内疚？  不内疚 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 非常内疚 
56.你是否曾经没有偿还过放贷者的贷款？   是   否 
如果是，你感到有多内疚？    不内疚 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 非常内疚 
如果否，如果你没有偿还，你感觉会有多内疚？  不内疚 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 非常内疚 
 
57.一年中用于储蓄的收入占家庭总收入的比例是多少（人民币）： 
a) 没有      b) 不到 5%  c) 在5%和10%之间   d) 超过10% 
 
58.如果你的收入稳定性得到了很大提高，你最可能做什么（只选一个）：  
a) 减少储蓄并在农业生产方面增加投资      
b) 减少储蓄同时增加家庭消费品的购买  
c) 减少储蓄并增加旅游/度假  
d) 维持相同数量的储蓄 
e) 稍微增加储蓄 
f) 大量增加储蓄 
 
59. 我是否能够从银行或农村信用社借到我所需要的钱来用于消费、教育支出或医疗保健？ 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____  
 
60. 我是否能够从银行或农村信用社借到我所需要的钱来用于务农或经商？ 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____  
 
61. 
当为了消费、教育、保健，我不能从银行或农村信用社借到我所需要的钱时，我可以更方
便从哪里借到这笔钱？ 
(i) 放款者____ 
(ii) 朋友 ________ 
(iii) 亲戚________. 
 
62.当为了务农或经商，我不能从银行或农村信用社借到我所需要的钱时，我可以更方便从
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哪里借到这笔钱？ 
(i) 放款者____ 
(ii) 朋友 ________ 
(iii) 亲戚________. 
 
63. 你 从 行或信用社 得一笔 款有对 银 获 贷 顾虑吗？如果有，是以下哪种其原因？ 
 
(a) 我还没有偿还先前从银行或信用社所借的贷款 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____  
(b) 从银行或信用社贷款的利率高于从亲戚、朋友贷款的利率 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
(c) 从银行或信用社贷款的利率高于我所能负担的利率 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
(d) 我缺少获得贷款的抵押品 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
(e) 银行或信用社太远了而不能到达 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
(f) 银行或信用社贷款需要填写太多的申请文件 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
(g) 银行或信用社批准贷款的时间太长了 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
(h) 银行贷款负责人或农村信用社贷款负责人要收受贿赂 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
(i) 我更愿意从亲戚或朋友那借钱 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
(j) 我更愿意从放款者那借钱 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
(k) 我不愿意欠银行或信用社的钱 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
 
64.如果银行或农村信用社的利率能够比现行的利率低一些的话，我更愿意从银行或农村信
用社借钱。 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
 
65.如果从银行或信用社获得贷款的成本（费用、非利率开支）能比现在更低一些的话，我
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更愿意从银行或信用社借钱。 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
 
66.不管你曾经是否有过从银行、信用社或朋友、亲戚那借钱而没有还的行为，下面那种情
况最可能是你在过去或将来欠钱不还的原因。 
a.缺少现金来源 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
b.合同条款不明确 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
c.遭遇了作物损失、家畜损失 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
d.家庭成员死亡或得了重大疾病 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
e.把贷款转作了其他用途 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
f.其他原因 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
 
信贷配给模型 
 
67.如果我有更多的土地（资产），那不用抵押我也能够从银行或农村信用社获得更多的贷
款。 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
 
68. 
假设我有更多的土地（资产）。如果我想从银行或农村信用社获得更多的贷款，那么我只
能用这些土地（资产）作为抵押品。 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
 
69. 
如果我有更多的土地（资产），即使我没有把这些土地作为抵押，我也能够从银行或农村
信用社以更低的利率获得更多的贷款。 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
 
70. 
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如果我有更多的土地（资产），那我能够从银行或农村信用社以更低的利率获得更多的贷
款，但是我需要用这些土地作为抵押品。 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
 
71.我相信诚实的借款者将被强迫偿还更高的利率，因为有些借款者并不偿还贷款. 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
 
72.我相信诚实的借款者不能够获得所需要的贷款数量，因为有些村民没有偿还他们的贷款
或是更改贷款用途。 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
 
73.为了获得所需要的贷款数额，我愿意支付更高的利率。 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
 
74.为了获得所需要的贷款数额，我愿意抵押更多的资产。 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
 
75. 我相信，一个人如果借了高于自己总资产的贷款，这个人更容易违约。 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
 
76. 我相信，一个人如果以很高的利率借了贷款，这个人更容易违约。 
      非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____ 
 
 
 
 
信贷配给影响 
 
请回答以下问题。调查者：这里我们使用了术语“借款约束”。关于借款约束我们是
指农民在金额或者是需求时间方面农村信用社或银行并不总是能够满足他们的资金需求。 
 
77. 如果我面临着借款约束，我将因此会减少投入，从而达不到收入最大化。 
      非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____ 
 
78. 如果我面临着借款约束我需要另外一份工作来增加收入。 
  390
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____ 
 
79. 如果我面临着借款约束我将不能够为我的孩子提供良好的教育和足够的医疗保证。 
       非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____ 
 
80.如果我面临着借款约束我的家庭成员（包括我）在一整年里将不能够得到足够的食
物。 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____ 
 
81.如果我从银行或农村信用社能够得到足够的信贷我愿意 
a)放弃农业并且开办一个非农企业_________. 
b)继续农业并且扩展农业产品_________. 
c)继续农业并且做非农生意_________. 
 
 
亲戚朋友间的非正规借贷 
 
82. 你是否曾经从你的朋友那得到一笔你不必还的资助？是____.否____. 
 
83. 你是否曾经从你的亲戚那得到一笔你不必还的资助？是____.否____. 
 
84. 你是否曾经送给你的朋友一笔他（她）不必还的资助？是____.否____. 
 
85.你是否曾经送给你的亲戚一笔他（她）不必还的资助？是____.否____. 
 
86. 你曾经从你的朋友那借过钱吗？是____.否____. 
 
87. 你曾经借钱给你的朋友吗？是____.否____. 
 
88. 你曾经从你的亲戚那借过钱吗？是____.否____. 
 
89.你曾经借钱给你的亲戚吗？是____.否____. 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____ 
 
90. 即使我的朋友曾经拒绝借钱给我，我也愿意借钱给他. 
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非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
 
91. 即使我曾经拒绝借钱给我的朋友，我也能从他那借到钱。 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
 
92.即使我的亲戚曾经拒绝借钱给我，我也愿意借钱给他. 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
 
93.即使我曾经拒绝借钱给我的亲戚，我也能从他那借到钱。 
非常同意____  比较同意_____  同意____  不同意_____非常不同意____  
 
94. 
当面临紧急情况时（如作物损失、家畜死亡、重大疾病等），我能够从亲戚那儿得到一笔
赠款(无须偿还)。 
 非常同意____   比较同意_____    同意_____   不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
95.当面临紧急情况时（如作物损失、家畜死亡、重大疾病等），我能够从朋友那儿得
到一笔赠款(无须偿还)。 
 
非常同意____   比较同意_____    同意_____   不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
96. 
当面临紧急情况时（如作物损失、家畜死亡、重大疾病等），我能够从亲戚那儿借到一笔
钱。 
   非常同意____   比较同意_____    同意_____   不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
97. 
当面临紧急情况时（如作物损失、家畜死亡、重大疾病等），我能够从朋友那儿借到一笔
钱。 
   非常同意____   比较同意_____    同意_____   不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
98. 
我愿意给亲戚一笔赠款(无须偿还)当他们面临紧急情况时（如作物损失、家畜死亡、重大疾
病等）。 
   非常同意____   比较同意_____    同意_____   不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
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99.我愿意给朋友一笔赠款(无须偿还)当他们面临紧急情况时（如作物损失、家畜死亡
、重大疾病等）。 
   非常同意____   比较同意_____    同意_____   不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
100. 
我愿意借给亲戚一笔钱当他们面临紧急情况时（如作物损失、家畜死亡、重大疾病等）。 
   非常同意____   比较同意_____    同意_____   不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
101. 
我愿意借给朋友一笔钱当他们面临紧急情况时（如作物损失、家畜死亡、重大疾病等）。 
   非常同意____   比较同意_____    同意_____   不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
102. 
在紧急情况下，我愿意以很低的利息借给朋友和亲戚一笔钱而不是给他们一笔赠款。 
   非常同意____   比较同意_____    同意_____   不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
 
103. 
在紧急情况下，我愿意以很低的利息从朋友和亲戚那借到一笔钱而不是从他们
那得到一笔赠款。 
   非常同意____   比较同意_____    同意_____   不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
104. 
在非紧急情况下，我愿意以很低的利息借给朋友和亲戚一笔钱而不是赠给他们一笔钱。 
    非常同意____   比较同意_____    同意_____   不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
105. 
在非紧急情况下，我更愿意以很低的利息从朋友和亲戚那借到一笔钱而不是从
他们那得到一笔赠款。 
   非常同意____   比较同意_____   同意_____  不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
106. 在偿还朋友和亲戚的借款方面，我不愿意不还。 
非常同意____   比较同意_____   同意_____  不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
107. 当由于一些紧急情况我不能偿还的时候，我能够推迟对亲戚朋友的贷款偿还期。 
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非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____  
 
108.当他们遇到紧急情况不能按时偿还的时候，我允许亲戚朋友推迟贷款期限。 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____  
 
109．当由于一些紧急情况我不能偿还的时候，亲戚朋友可以为我降低利率。 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____  
 
110. 当他们遇到紧急情况不能按时偿还的时候，我可以减少对他们借款的利率。 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____  
 
111.我借给亲戚朋友的数量越大，他们就越可能拖欠贷款。 
非常同意 ___ 比较同意 ___ 同意 ____ 不同意 ____ 非常不同意 ____ 
 
112.来自村民的舆论压力有助于亲戚朋友间的还款和减少违约 
非常同意____   比较同意_____   同意_____  不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
113.当我的朋友和亲戚的收入更高时，我能够借到更多的钱。 
非常同意____   比较同意_____   同意_____  不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
114. 
我发现如果我偿还了以前从朋友和亲戚那儿借的钱，比较容易再从他们那借到钱。 
非常同意____   比较同意_____   同意_____  不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
115. 当朋友和亲戚偿还了以前的借款，我更愿意再借给他们钱。 
       非常同意____   比较同意_____   同意_____  不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
116. 
我很有可能以较低的利率借钱给那些曾经借给我钱/曾赠给我钱/曾偿还过我钱的朋友和亲戚
，即使我知道他们可能不能全额偿还。 
       非常同意____   比较同意_____   同意_____  不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
117. 
我不可能借钱给那些先前拒绝借给我钱/拒绝给过我赠款/没有还我钱的朋友和亲戚，即使他
们愿意支付较高的利息。 
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非常同意____   比较同意_____   同意_____  不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
118.如果先前我曾经拒绝借给/赠送/偿还亲戚或朋友的钱，即使我支付很高的利率我也
不可能从他们那得到一笔贷款。 
非常同意____   比较同意_____   同意_____  不同意_____ 非常不同意_____ 
 
119. 
假定一个诚实的陌生人来找你并提供给你一个所得取决于抛扔硬币结果的赌博游戏。如果
硬币正面落下，你将得到第一栏（好运气时）显示的金额，如果硬币背面落下，你将得到
第二栏（坏运气时）显示的金额。好运气和坏运气各有50%的机会。如果这个赌博多次重
复抛扔硬币后，你将预期得到第三栏显示的平均金额。从表中的六个赌博中选择一个你偏
爱的赌博”。 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
选项 好运气时的所得 
50% 的机会 
坏运气时的所得 
50% 的机会 
预期金额 
 
1 500 500 500 
2 950 450 700 
3 1200 400 800 
4 1500 300 900 
5 1900 100 1000 
6 2000 0 1000 
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